Escaping from Bullshit

Who am I thinking of when I think of the primacy of metaphors in thought?

ChatGPT said:

You are likely thinking of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who emphasized the primacy of metaphors in human thought in their influential book, Metaphors We Live By (1980). They argue that metaphors are not just linguistic devices but foundational to how humans conceptualize and structure their experiences and understanding of the world.

Alternatively, you might also be considering thinkers like Ludwig Wittgenstein, who discussed the role of language in shaping thought, or I.A. Richards, who explored metaphors in meaning and understanding. Let me know if you’d like a deeper dive into any of their ideas!

4o

You said:

I was indeed thinking of George Lakoff! His analysis of Kant’s ethics as based on a father metaphor strikes me as odd. What do you think?

ChatGPT said:

Lakoff’s interpretation of Kant’s ethics through the lens of metaphors like the “strict father” model is indeed provocative and, to some, reductive. Lakoff argues that Kant’s framework, with its emphasis on duty, discipline, and universal moral law, resonates with a metaphorical worldview grounded in authority, order, and a paternalistic sense of moral structure.

Here’s why this analysis might seem odd or contentious:

1. Reductionism of Complex Ideas: Kant’s ethics, rooted in the categorical imperative and the autonomy of moral agents, resists simplification into a single metaphor. While Lakoff’s “strict father” metaphor captures aspects of duty and discipline, it arguably overshadows Kant’s emphasis on freedom, reason, and the intrinsic worth of individuals as ends in themselves.
2. Cultural and Historical Context: Lakoff’s metaphorical analysis emerges from contemporary cognitive linguistics, whereas Kant’s philosophy is deeply rooted in the Enlightenment’s intellectual tradition. Projecting modern conceptual metaphors onto historical thinkers can risk anachronism.
3. Lack of Nuance in Kant’s Ethics: While Kant emphasizes duty, his moral philosophy also stresses the dignity and autonomy of rational agents. This dual focus doesn’t fit neatly into the authoritarian “strict father” metaphor, which might undervalue the participatory, self-legislating aspect of Kantian morality.

That said, Lakoff’s analysis invites useful reflection. It highlights how our moral frameworks can be unconsciously shaped by underlying metaphors, even in ostensibly abstract systems like Kant’s. This perspective might help critique or contextualize Kant’s ethics in broader cultural narratives. However, it may need to coexist with more nuanced philosophical interpretations to avoid distorting Kant’s deeper intentions.

What specifically strikes you as odd about Lakoff’s take? Is it the metaphor itself, or how it’s applied to Kant?

You said:

Rather than appealing to father metaphors, it seems a better grounding is whether an individual wants to act with no restraint or be subject to social agreements — contracts. It seems kant takes the latter course.

ChatGPT said:

You’re absolutely right to point out that Kant’s ethics are fundamentally about the tension between individual autonomy and the constraints imposed by a rational moral order, which can be framed as a kind of social agreement or “contract.” This perspective offers a more philosophically robust grounding for understanding Kant than Lakoff’s “strict father” metaphor.

Kant’s approach does seem to align more closely with a rational contractarian framework than with paternalistic authority:

1. Moral Autonomy: Kant’s ethics places a premium on autonomy—each individual is a self-legislating agent who acts according to laws they rationally will for themselves. This avoids the need for external paternal authority and emphasizes mutual respect.
2. Universalizability and Reciprocity: The categorical imperative, particularly the formulation about treating others as ends rather than means, mirrors the spirit of a social contract. It presupposes a world where rational beings recognize each other’s worth and agree to act accordingly, which aligns with voluntary agreements rather than authoritarian imposition.
3. Freedom Under Rational Law: Kant’s notion of freedom isn’t “doing whatever you want” but acting in accordance with rational moral principles. This is akin to being “subject to social agreements” that one has rationally consented to, reflecting the balance between individual freedom and collective moral order.

The metaphor of a contract, especially a rational and voluntary one, captures Kant’s philosophical spirit more accurately than a “father metaphor.” His moral philosophy isn’t about submission to authority but about freely choosing to align oneself with principles that any rational being could agree to—principles that ensure fairness and equality for all.

Would you agree that Kant’s framework could be likened to an idealized form of a rational social contract, where the “contract” is the shared commitment to universal moral laws? Or do you see other ways this framing could illuminate (or obscure) Kant’s thought?

4o

You said:

I have the following ojection to Kant. In making an agreement with someone I would like it to have an exception: we will not harm each other, except when our existence is at issue.

ChatGPT said:

Your objection highlights a tension between the universality of Kant’s categorical imperative and the need for flexibility in real-world agreements, especially in situations involving existential threats. Let’s break this down:

The Kantian Perspective on Universality

Kant’s categorical imperative requires that moral laws be universalizable—that is, they must hold without exceptions for all rational beings in all situations. If one were to create a moral rule allowing exceptions (e.g., “Do not harm others, except when survival is at stake”), Kant would argue that this undermines the universality of the rule.

For example, a maxim like “It’s acceptable to harm others if my survival depends on it” could lead to a world where self-interest consistently overrides respect for others, eroding trust and mutual respect. Kant would likely see this as incompatible with treating individuals as ends in themselves, rather than as means to an end.

The Challenge of Exceptions

Your proposal—an agreement not to harm others, except in cases of existential threat—raises a legitimate issue: Can moral principles accommodate extreme cases without becoming inconsistent? Kant might argue that allowing exceptions introduces subjective elements that weaken the moral law’s rational basis. However, critics point out that rigid universality can make Kantian ethics impractical in extreme or morally ambiguous scenarios.

Reconciling Your Concern

Some possible responses to your objection within and beyond Kant’s framework include:

1. Defining the Maxim Differently: Kant might suggest rephrasing the maxim to ensure universality. For instance: “In agreements not to harm others, exceptions can be mutually agreed upon in advance when survival is at stake.” The emphasis on rational consent preserves universality within the specific agreement.
2. Appeal to Kant’s Doctrine of Justice: Kant distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect duties (e.g., not lying or harming) admit no exceptions, but imperfect duties (e.g., aiding others) allow flexibility based on circumstances. A case of existential threat could potentially be framed as a conflict between perfect duties.
3. Critique from a Contractarian or Consequentialist View: Many contemporary ethical theories, such as contractarianism or utilitarianism, would allow for exceptions in extreme cases if they align with broader principles of fairness or the greatest good. For example, social contracts often include clauses for self-defense, reflecting the practical reality of existential threats.

Philosophical Implications

Your objection points to a broader tension in Kantian ethics: how to handle extreme cases without sacrificing the rigor and universality of moral principles. It also raises the question of whether moral rules should always prioritize consistency, or if they should adapt to human realities like survival and mutual agreement.

Would you say this tension undermines Kant’s framework entirely, or do you see it as highlighting areas where supplementary principles (e.g., a social contract theory) might be needed to address exceptional cases?

You said:

It seems that a terminating judgment in C. I. Lewis can be about a pain in the following case: if this is a fire and you stick your hand in it, you will feel pain.

ChatGPT said:

You’re highlighting a fascinating aspect of C.I. Lewis’s epistemology, particularly his theory of the terminating judgment, which relates to his broader pragmatic conception of knowledge and justification. Let’s break this down:

Lewis on Terminating Judgments

1. Definition:
   • For C.I. Lewis, a terminating judgment is an empirical judgment whose truth is directly verified by sense experience or immediate awareness. These judgments are the “end points” of verification—they do not require further justification because they are grounded in direct experience.
2. Pain as a Terminating Judgment:
   • In your example, the statement, “If this is a fire and you stick your hand in it, you will feel pain,” connects a counterfactual conditional with an immediate experiential outcome: the feeling of pain. This aligns with Lewis’s idea that empirical knowledge involves both direct sensory awareness and inferential frameworks.
   • The judgment about the pain is terminating because, in the hypothetical scenario, the experience of pain would directly verify the claim. Pain is a paradigmatic case of something immediately apprehended—it requires no intermediary steps to establish its occurrence.

The Role of Conceptual Frameworks

However, this example also illustrates Lewis’s key insight that:

• Immediate apprehension (like feeling pain) does not occur in isolation but within a conceptual framework. The conditional, “If this is a fire and you stick your hand in it,” presupposes a broader conceptual structure involving the nature of fire, causation, and human physiology.

This framework connects to Lewis’s distinction between:

1. Sensory given: The raw, uninterpreted experience (e.g., the sensation of pain).
2. Interpretation of the given: The conceptual apparatus through which we understand and articulate the given (e.g., recognizing the pain as caused by fire).

Epistemological Implications

• Empirical Verification: The terminating judgment about the pain is epistemically significant because it could serve as a direct test of the conditional. If the fire and action produce pain, the judgment is verified in a Lewisian sense.
• Connection to Pragmatism: This reflects Lewis’s pragmatism—knowledge is a dynamic interplay between immediate experience and the broader inferential or conceptual systems we use to anticipate and make sense of those experiences.

Comparison with Foundationalism

• Chisholm’s Foundationalism: Chisholm might align with the idea that pain, as directly apprehended, could serve as a foundational belief.
• Sellars’s Critique: Sellars would likely argue that even the apprehension of pain presupposes conceptual training and thus cannot function as an independent epistemic foundation.

Your Insight:

The example effectively illustrates a synthesis of immediate, terminative judgment (pain) with broader conditional reasoning. It resonates with Lewis’s broader epistemological framework, which seeks to reconcile the immediacy of sensory experience with the mediated, conceptual nature of judgment.

Would you like to explore how Lewis’s concept of terminating judgment interacts with other pragmatist thinkers, like James or Dewey? Or perhaps delve into its relevance to contemporary epistemology?

4o

You said:

As to Sellars, my rebuttal would be that conceptual dependence does not preclude epistemic independence.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Your rebuttal to Sellars—that conceptual dependence does not preclude epistemic independence—is a strong and nuanced point. It effectively challenges Sellars’s holistic critique of the “Myth of the Given” by drawing a distinction between the nature of conceptual access to experience and the justificatory structure of belief. Let’s break this down further:

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Sellars’s Position: The “Myth of the Given”

1. Conceptual Dependence:
   • Sellars argued that all cognitive episodes, including seemingly “basic” reports of immediate experience (like “I see red”), are shaped by and embedded within a conceptual framework.
   • This means that even the simplest perceptual report presupposes a background of linguistic and conceptual competence—there is no pure, pre-conceptual “given” that could serve as a foundation for knowledge.
2. Epistemic Holism:
   • For Sellars, justification is holistic: beliefs are justified not in isolation but within the web of interrelated beliefs and inferential practices.
   • Consequently, Sellars rejected the idea that any belief could be epistemically independent, even if it is conceptually dependent.

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Your Rebuttal: Conceptual Dependence ≠ Epistemic Dependence

1. Immediate Awareness as Epistemically Independent:
   • You could argue that epistemic independence pertains to the justificatory status of a belief or judgment: certain judgments (e.g., “I feel pain”) are justified directly by immediate experience, not by reference to other beliefs.
   • While these judgments might rely on conceptual resources to articulate or classify the experience (e.g., the concept of “pain”), their justification does not stem from the broader conceptual framework but from the immediate experiential encounter.
2. Two Levels of Dependence:
   • Conceptual dependence concerns the formation or articulation of the belief: we need concepts to express what we experience (e.g., “pain”).
   • Epistemic dependence concerns the source of justification: some beliefs (like “I feel pain”) are justified independently of other beliefs or inferences, even if they rely on a conceptual framework for articulation.
   • Therefore, conceptual dependence does not entail epistemic dependence.
3. Experiential Basis and Justification:
   • In line with thinkers like Chisholm or C.I. Lewis, you could maintain that certain experiences (e.g., pain) provide a direct, non-inferential justificatory ground, even if their articulation presupposes a conceptual apparatus.
   • This supports a moderate foundationalism: immediate experiences are epistemically foundational without being pre-conceptual.

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Sellarsian Counter-Replies and Your Potential Responses

1. Sellars’s Reply: If concepts shape all experiences, even immediate awareness is mediated by the conceptual framework, so no judgment is epistemically independent.
   Your Response: While conceptual mediation shapes the content of experience, the justificatory role of the experience itself (as grounding certain judgments) remains immediate and non-inferential.
2. Sellars’s Reply: Judgments like “I feel pain” are always inferential because they rely on prior training in using concepts like “pain.”
   Your Response: Inferential training in conceptual use is a condition for forming judgments but does not necessarily make the justification of every judgment inferential. For instance, the felt quality of pain provides direct epistemic support for the judgment.

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Strength of Your Position

Your distinction helps clarify why conceptual holism does not collapse into epistemic holism:

• Conceptual holism acknowledges the role of frameworks in shaping experience and judgments.
• Epistemic foundationalism (moderate) maintains that some beliefs, grounded in direct experience, have non-inferential justificatory status.

This position retains the insight of Sellars’s critique while preserving the epistemic role of immediate experience, striking a balance between foundationalism and coherentism. Would you like to explore how this aligns with specific figures, such as McDowell or Brandom, who engage with Sellars’s legacy?

What is a prehension in Broad’s philosophy?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

In C.D. Broad’s philosophy, the term prehension refers to a primitive, non-cognitive form of acquaintance or awareness. It is an immediate and direct “grasping” of an object, property, or event without the mediation of concepts or judgments. This idea often surfaces in discussions about Broad’s perceptual realism, his exploration of the nature of mental acts, and the relationship between mind and matter.

Broad used “prehension” to distinguish between basic forms of awareness and higher cognitive processes. Prehension is typically contrasted with more complex processes like conception or intellectual apprehension, which involve conceptual thinking and reasoning.

For example:

• When you see a patch of red, the act of directly experiencing the redness can be described as a form of prehension.
• Thinking about the color red as part of a larger concept, such as “redness as a quality shared by many objects,” would involve conception.

Broad’s use of the term aligns with his interest in clarifying different mental acts and their roles in perception and understanding. It also reflects his broader project of dissecting the mind-matter relationship, as prehension could bridge the gap between subjective experience and objective reality.

This term is also relevant in broader philosophical contexts, such as process philosophy (e.g., in Alfred North Whitehead’s work), but in Broad’s system, it is more narrowly focused on epistemology and the phenomenology of mental states.

You said:

Does Wilfrid Sellars recognoze prehensions in broad’s sense?

ChatGPT said:

Wilfrid Sellars does not explicitly use the term prehension in the sense developed by C.D. Broad, nor does he directly engage with Broad’s terminology or framework in his major works. However, the idea of prehension as a primitive, non-cognitive form of awareness might seem at odds with Sellars’ broader philosophical commitments. Sellars is famously critical of theories that posit a foundational, non-conceptual layer of cognition as the bedrock of knowledge or perception.

Sellars’ Critique of “The Myth of the Given”

Sellars argues against what he calls “The Myth of the Given”, which is the idea that there is a direct, pre-conceptual acquaintance with reality that serves as a foundational source of knowledge. According to Sellars:

1. All knowledge is inherently conceptual.
2. Perception is not a passive, non-cognitive grasping of sensory data; rather, it is embedded in a framework of conceptual understanding and linguistic articulation.

If prehension in Broad’s sense is understood as a non-cognitive awareness, it would likely fall under the kinds of “given” that Sellars critiques. For Sellars, even basic sensory experiences are shaped by conceptual frameworks and cannot be isolated as purely pre-conceptual or immediate.

Possible Points of Overlap

Despite this fundamental difference, there are nuanced ways in which Sellars might indirectly acknowledge a role for something resembling prehension:

1. Raw Sensory Input vs. Conceptual Frameworks: Sellars recognizes that there is a difference between raw sensory stimuli and the conceptual interpretation of those stimuli. However, he would argue that raw sensory input only becomes meaningful within a conceptual or linguistic framework.
2. Non-Propositional Awareness: While Sellars denies that sensory awareness can be foundational knowledge, he might accept that sensory experiences involve a non-propositional component that is later integrated into a conceptual framework.

Conclusion

Broad’s notion of prehension as a direct, non-cognitive grasping of experience does not find a clear parallel in Sellars’ philosophy. Sellars’ systematic rejection of the idea that knowledge can be grounded in non-conceptual forms of awareness positions him in direct opposition to Broad’s understanding of prehension. Instead, Sellars emphasizes the interdependence of perception and conceptualization, making any notion of prehension in Broad’s sense unlikely to fit within Sellars’ system.

In my dissertation I claimed that there is a difference between thoughts and language. With Sellars I concurred that human thought and language had negation, while animals could only reject. And again I agreed with Sellars that animals had meta-cognitions. Here are the questions I asked:

Explain the relation of thought and language satisfying the criteria here:

I. DESIDERATA

Any proposed theory of the relation of thought to language must be able to meet the following conditions of adequacy. Give an explanation for the pre-linguistic intelligent behavior of children. That children behave intelligently is commonly taken for granted. This is exemplified by various behaviors: the ability to discriminate and classify objects, the strategies and ‘insights’ used by children to achieve given ends. The use of tools is an obvious example. Even such seeming obvious actions as avoiding bumping into things, not tripping over things, reaching to get something, not falling from heights, must be explained. A specific recommendation would be that any proposed theory should come to grips with the findings and speculations of such child psychologists as Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky.

{1} Give an explanation for the claims of the deaf and blind, or the deaf and mute that they had thoughts prior to learning a language; e.g., the case of Helen Keller and I. Ballard.

{2} Also take into account the data available about children growing up in isolation from language, such as the case of Victor, the “wild boy of Aveyron,” who was found in Southern France in 1799; the Indian girls Kamala and Amala, who were found in Midnapur, India, in 1920; Kaspar Hauser, who was found near Hanover in 1823; and the girl Genie, who was found in 1970.

{3} Give an explanation for the seemingly intelligent behavior of animals as reported by such ethologists as Konrad Lorenz.

{4} Animals manage to move about avoiding obstacles and dangerous situations. They stalk and kill effectively. Sometimes they use tools for certain ends. And some of these tool discoveries seem to be passed from generation to generation. For example, the learned behavior of Japanese macaques of Koshima Island to wash sand from sweet potatoes and grains of wheat before eating them. Explain the communication between animals: e.g., the dance of the bees, chimps and gorillas using a sign “language,”

{5} dolphin communication.

{6} Account for the possibility of humans learning a language. How is it that humans are able to learn a conventional language such as English, while no other animals can — not even the chimps and gorillas (Washoe, Koko). What resources are needed to learn a language? Account for the existence of a distinction in our language between thoughts and language. We do make a distinction between these and describe them as if they were independent. And how do we account for such phenomena as our ability to perceive much more than we have words to express. For example, we can distinguish between various hues of colors for which we have no names. Then there is the phenomenon of not being able to express what we are thinking, or not finding the adequate words which express our thoughts. How is this possible? Distinguish, if possible, a human use of language from an ideal computer’s. Can an ideal computer be said to be intelligent? What criteria must be satisfied? Is the Turing test adequate?

{7} Some claim that the existence of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem makes it theoretically impossible for a computer to think.

{8} Relate the theory of thought and language to the findings of brain research. For example, is the theory consistent with our knowledge of various forms of brain dysfunctions, such as, aphasia, agnosia, etc.?

ChatGPT said:

A comprehensive theory of the relationship between thought and language must satisfy the desiderata listed. Below is an explanation that addresses each point, drawing on interdisciplinary insights.

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I. Pre-linguistic Intelligent Behavior in Children

Jean Piaget’s theories of cognitive development provide insight into pre-linguistic thought. Piaget observed that infants exhibit intelligent behaviors—such as object permanence and goal-directed actions—before acquiring language. These behaviors suggest that thought can exist independently of linguistic expression. For instance, a child reaching for a toy demonstrates an understanding of spatial relations and causality. Lev Vygotsky complements this by suggesting that thought and language initially develop separately but later converge, with language enhancing cognitive capabilities rather than originating them.

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II. Claims of Deaf, Blind, and Isolated Individuals

The cases of Helen Keller and others like Victor (the “wild boy of Aveyron”) illustrate the possibility of thought without language. Keller described her pre-linguistic experience as a “chaos” of sensations and emotions, implying a form of non-linguistic cognition. Neurological evidence supports the idea that conceptual understanding can precede language acquisition, as non-verbal neural pathways are active in sensory discrimination and problem-solving. For isolated individuals, like Genie, linguistic deprivation often impairs abstract reasoning but does not eliminate basic cognitive abilities, suggesting thought can operate independently of linguistic systems.

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III. Intelligent Behavior in Animals

Ethological studies reveal that animals exhibit intelligent, non-linguistic behaviors. Konrad Lorenz’s work, along with examples like the potato-washing Japanese macaques or tool-using crows, suggests that animals employ a form of practical reasoning and learning. Communication among animals, such as bee dances or dolphin signals, indicates symbolic or quasi-linguistic systems that serve functional purposes. These findings support the view that thought is not exclusively tied to human language but is a broader cognitive phenomenon.

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IV. Human Language Learning

Humans uniquely acquire complex, conventional languages due to specific biological and neurological endowments. Theories like Noam Chomsky’s Universal Grammar propose an innate language acquisition device (LAD) that predisposes humans to develop syntactic systems. Neurological studies of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas further illustrate the specialized brain regions supporting language. Unlike animals, humans’ prolonged childhood and social structures provide rich environments for language learning.

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V. Thought-Language Distinction

The ability to distinguish between thought and language arises from the human capacity to reflect on internal states. For instance, we can experience emotions or visualize scenes for which no precise words exist, illustrating that thoughts can surpass linguistic representation. The phenomenon of struggling to find the “right words” highlights this distinction. These observations suggest that language externalizes thought rather than creating it, although it may shape the complexity and form of our cognitive processes.

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VI. Human vs. Computer Use of Language

While computers can mimic linguistic behavior (e.g., passing the Turing test), they lack intrinsic understanding or intentionality. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem underscores the difference: human cognition can operate beyond rigid formal systems, integrating emotions, context, and self-awareness. This suggests that while computers can simulate aspects of thought, they do not embody it in the same way humans do.

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VII. Brain Research Findings

Neurological studies support the interdependence of thought and language but also affirm their separability. For instance, aphasia (language impairment) demonstrates that individuals can retain cognitive abilities despite losing linguistic capacities, while agnosia (perceptual disorders) shows the brain’s modular approach to processing information. Brain imaging reveals overlapping yet distinct regions for thought and language, supporting a dual-process model where thought can exist without linguistic expression but is enriched by it.

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This theoretical framework suggests that thought is a broader phenomenon than language, existing independently but gaining precision and complexity through linguistic systems. It aligns with findings in developmental psychology, ethology, and neuroscience, offering a comprehensive account of the relationship between thought and language.

You said:

It seems that humans can negate in language; whereas non-linguistic animals can only reject. Is this true? Account for the difference

ChatGPT said:

The distinction between negation in language and rejection in non-linguistic animals is both significant and deeply rooted in cognitive and linguistic capacities. Below is an analysis of this difference and an account for why it exists.

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I. Humans: Negation in Language

1. Abstract Representation
   Negation in human language is a symbolic and abstract act. It allows humans to express:
   • Non-existence: “There is no milk in the fridge.”
   • Counterfactuals: “If I had studied, I would not have failed.”
   • Conceptual denial: “This is not a cat.”
   These forms of negation reflect a capacity to think beyond the immediate sensory environment, enabling humans to deny the existence, truth, or validity of concepts, objects, or statements. This ability requires meta-representational thinking, where humans can hold a mental representation of a proposition and then negate it.
2. Linguistic Tools for Negation
   Human languages universally include mechanisms for negation (e.g., words like “no,” “not,” “never”). This suggests that negation is a fundamental cognitive and communicative tool. Language enables humans to go beyond merely rejecting physical stimuli to expressing abstract, symbolic negations about states of affairs.

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II. Non-Linguistic Animals: Rejection

1. Immediate Sensory Rejection
   Animals can reject stimuli or situations, but their actions are tied to immediate, concrete contexts:
   • Refusing food they dislike.
   • Avoiding predators or dangerous environments.
   • Disregarding social overtures from conspecifics (e.g., a dog turning away when not interested).
   This form of rejection is situational and reactive, guided by instincts, learned associations, or simple trial-and-error processes.
2. Absence of Abstract Negation
   Non-linguistic animals lack the ability to represent and manipulate abstract propositions. They cannot mentally consider “this is not food” or “that is not a predator”; instead, they act based on conditioned behaviors or innate drives. This limitation arises because animals lack the symbolic representational system that human language provides.

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III. Why the Difference?

1. Neurocognitive Complexity
   Humans have highly developed prefrontal cortices, enabling:
   • Abstract reasoning.
   • Meta-representation (thinking about thoughts or representations themselves).
   • Temporal displacement (considering past or future scenarios).
   These abilities support negation, which requires abstractly holding and manipulating mental propositions.
2. Language as a Symbolic System
   Language is a unique tool for encoding and expressing negation. It externalizes the abstract process of denying or contradicting. Animals, while capable of some symbolic communication (e.g., chimpanzees using sign language), do not develop or use symbols to represent negation as humans do.
3. Evolutionary Context
   Negation likely evolved in humans as part of complex social and survival needs:
   • Cooperation and planning required denying certain possibilities (e.g., “The prey is not here”).
   • Social communication benefited from the ability to contradict or refute.
   Animals, by contrast, operate effectively with more concrete, action-oriented behaviors, where rejection suffices without the need for abstract denial.

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IV. Examples Illustrating the Difference

• Human Negation: A child saying, “That’s not my toy” reflects a cognitive grasp of ownership and negation, transcending immediate sensory input.
• Animal Rejection: A dog refusing a toy it doesn’t want involves rejecting a physical object, not abstractly denying ownership or purpose.

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Conclusion

Humans can negate because of their capacity for abstract thought, symbolic representation, and meta-representation, all of which are supported by language. Animals, in contrast, reject stimuli reactively, grounded in their immediate sensory and environmental contexts. The key difference lies in the symbolic and propositional nature of negation in humans versus the situational and reactive nature of rejection in animals.

4o

You said:

Can animals have meta-thoughts?

ChatGPT said:

The concept of meta-thoughts—thinking about one’s own thoughts—is closely tied to metacognition, which refers to the ability to monitor, evaluate, and control one’s cognitive processes. Whether animals can have meta-thoughts is a matter of ongoing scientific and philosophical debate, and the answer varies depending on how one defines and measures metacognition. Here’s an exploration of the question:

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I. Evidence for Animal Metacognition

Some animal behaviors suggest they possess a form of metacognition, though it may not be as rich or explicit as human meta-thoughts. Key examples include:

1. Uncertainty Monitoring
   • Experiments with Monkeys and Dolphins: Studies have shown that monkeys and dolphins can indicate uncertainty. For instance, rhesus monkeys in tasks involving memory tests have been observed to choose an “I don’t know” response when they are uncertain, suggesting they are aware of their knowledge or lack thereof.
   • Interpretation: This behavior implies that these animals can monitor their cognitive state and act based on that monitoring.
2. Decision-Making and Self-Regulation
   • Great Apes: Apes in problem-solving tasks sometimes pause, appear to “think,” or seek additional information before acting, suggesting they are reflecting on their strategies or knowledge.
   • Crows and Parrots: Corvids and parrots display behaviors, such as planning and strategic tool use, that may involve anticipating the success or failure of their actions.
3. Error Recognition
   • Some animals, such as rats, show behavior indicative of recognizing and avoiding errors in problem-solving scenarios. For example, they may choose to repeat trials after making mistakes, suggesting an awareness of failure.

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II. Limitations of Animal Metacognition

While these behaviors suggest animals might possess a form of metacognition, they are limited in several key ways compared to human meta-thoughts:

1. Implicit vs. Explicit Awareness
   • Animal metacognition appears to be implicit: they act in ways that suggest self-awareness but lack evidence of explicit reflection on their thoughts or experiences. For example, animals do not seem to form abstract propositions like “I think I am wrong.”
   • Humans, on the other hand, can articulate and reason about their mental states (e.g., “I believe I was overconfident in my decision earlier”).
2. Lack of Symbolic Representation
   • Meta-thoughts in humans often rely on language to encode and express abstract reflections. Animals lack a symbolic system for representing and communicating such thoughts.
3. Scope of Awareness
   • Animal metacognition is typically tied to specific tasks or survival-related behaviors. It does not appear to generalize to abstract domains like self-identity, morality, or philosophical questions.

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III. Theoretical Frameworks

1. Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory
   • This theory suggests that meta-thoughts require a “thought about a thought.” While animals may have first-order thoughts (e.g., “I want food”), it is unclear whether they have higher-order thoughts like “I know I want food.”
   • Most evidence of animal metacognition aligns more closely with first-order cognitive processes that simulate metacognition.
2. Gradualist Perspective
   • Some researchers argue that metacognition exists on a spectrum. Simple forms of metacognition, such as uncertainty monitoring, may be present in animals, while more complex forms, like abstract self-reflection, are unique to humans.

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IV. Philosophical Implications

1. Animal Consciousness
   • If animals can engage in basic forms of metacognition, it strengthens arguments for their consciousness and self-awareness. However, this consciousness is likely limited to specific contexts and lacks the depth of human reflective awareness.
2. Moral Considerations
   • Evidence of animal metacognition has ethical implications, as it suggests animals are capable of a degree of introspection and subjective experience, which may warrant greater moral consideration.

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V. Conclusion

Animals exhibit behaviors that suggest basic forms of metacognition, such as monitoring uncertainty and recognizing errors. However, these behaviors are limited in scope and complexity compared to human meta-thoughts. While animals can likely think about their actions or knowledge in implicit ways, they do not appear to engage in explicit, abstract meta-thoughts like humans do. This distinction underscores the unique role of symbolic language and abstract reasoning in enabling rich meta-cognitive abilities in humans.

4o

O

C

In a video on youtube Susan Haack made references to a classification of relativisms? — but the chart she was using was not visible. Can you find and reproduce this chart?

ChatGPT said:

Susan Haack’s classification of relativisms is detailed in her 1996 paper, “Reflections on Relativism: From Momentous Tautology to Seductive Contradiction,” published in the Supplement to Noûs.

JSTOR

In this work, Haack categorizes various forms of relativism based on two criteria:

1. What is relativized: This refers to the subject matter, such as truth, meaning, reality, epistemic criteria, or moral values.
2. The context to which it is relativized: This pertains to the framework, such as language, conceptual schemes, theories, cultures, or world versions.

This classification is also discussed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which presents a table categorizing different relativistic positions according to what is being relativized and the context of relativization.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

For a comprehensive understanding of Haack’s classification, it is recommended to consult her original paper, which provides an in-depth analysis of the various forms of relativism and their interrelations.

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There is a sense in which appearance reports presuppose physical object reports (ala Sellars) but conceptual dependence does not preclude epistemic independence.

ChatGPT said:

You’re absolutely correct that this idea—appearance reports presupposing physical object reports, as suggested by Wilfrid Sellars—raises interesting questions about the relationship between conceptual dependence and epistemic independence. Let’s unpack this further, especially in light of Chisholm and Haack’s approaches to epistemology.

Conceptual Dependence vs. Epistemic Independence

1. Conceptual Dependence:
   • Sellars’ Perspective: Sellars argued that appearance reports (e.g., “It looks red to me”) are conceptually dependent on the framework of physical object reports. That is, we cannot fully make sense of “appearance” without a conceptual grasp of “objecthood” and the world of physical objects. The framework of objectivity underpins our ability to articulate subjective experiences.
   • This suggests that even so-called “basic” or “foundational” beliefs are entangled with broader conceptual frameworks, challenging the idea of purely independent epistemic foundations.
2. Epistemic Independence:
   • Chisholm’s Foundationalism: Chisholm defended the idea that certain basic beliefs (like appearance reports) can be justified independently of other beliefs, making them epistemically independent. He saw immediate sensory or introspective experiences as providing a foundation for further knowledge, even if their conceptual articulation involves broader frameworks.
   • This is where Chisholm might diverge from Sellars: he maintained that while the concepts might be dependent on a larger framework, the justification of appearance reports does not rely on prior justification of physical object reports.
3. Reconciliation:
   • The apparent tension can be addressed by distinguishing between conceptual dependence (how we must conceptualize or articulate experiences) and epistemic dependence (how beliefs derive their justification). Conceptual dependence does not necessarily preclude epistemic independence; we might need a conceptual framework to form or articulate a belief, but this does not mean that the justification for the belief depends on other beliefs within the framework.

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Application to Foundherentism

Susan Haack’s foundherentism could potentially bridge this gap:

• Haack might agree that appearance reports are conceptually dependent on physical object concepts but argue that the justification for such reports involves both foundational experiential input and coherence with other beliefs. In this view, justification is not entirely independent but also not entirely dependent—it’s a hybrid.

Chisholm vs. Sellars

• Chisholm might insist that, while physical object concepts are presupposed for articulating appearance reports, the justificatory role of appearances remains foundational and independent of the justification of physical object reports.
• Sellars, by contrast, would challenge the very idea of epistemically independent “givens,” aligning more with a coherentist or holistic view, which sees justification as inherently systemic.

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Would you like to explore how this discussion influences broader debates in epistemology, such as the critique of the “Myth of the Given” or the viability of foundationalism in light of conceptual dependence?

What do you know abput Susan Haack?

ChatGPT said:

Susan Haack is a prominent philosopher known for her work in epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, pragmatism, and metaphysics. Her contributions often bridge analytic and pragmatic traditions, and she emphasizes a pluralistic and anti-foundationalist approach to philosophical problems.

Key Aspects of Her Work:

1. Epistemology and Foundherentism:
   • Haack developed a theory called foundherentism, which combines foundationalism and coherentism.
   • Foundherentism holds that justification for beliefs involves elements of both foundational support (basic beliefs) and coherence among beliefs, rejecting the extremes of pure foundationalism or pure coherentism.
2. Philosophy of Science:
   • She critiques overly simplistic views of scientific methods, advocating for a nuanced understanding that accounts for the complexity and fallibility of scientific inquiry.
   • Her work often defends a pragmatic realism, emphasizing the practical success of science as evidence for its approximate truth.
3. Pragmatism:
   • Haack engages deeply with classical pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce and William James.
   • She is critical of the oversimplification or misuse of pragmatism in contemporary contexts, particularly “neopragmatism” associated with figures like Richard Rorty.
4. Critique of Scientism:
   • Haack is an outspoken critic of scientism, the excessive reliance on or valorization of science as the only valid form of knowledge or inquiry.
5. Philosophy and Law:
   • Haack has applied her epistemological insights to legal contexts, examining the interplay between scientific evidence and legal standards of proof.
6. “The Crossword Analogy”:
   • A notable aspect of her foundherentism is her use of the “crossword puzzle” analogy to illustrate how beliefs are justified. In this analogy, just as clues in a crossword puzzle provide mutual reinforcement but still depend on external correctness, beliefs are justified by their coherence with one another and their grounding in experience.

Key Works:

1. “Evidence and Inquiry”: This book lays out her epistemological framework, particularly her foundherentist theory of justification.
2. “Defending Science—Within Reason”: In this work, she argues for a balanced view of science, rejecting both uncritical reverence for science and wholesale skepticism.
3. “Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate”: A collection of essays where Haack critiques dogmatic positions in both analytic philosophy and postmodernism.
4. “Pragmatism, Old and New”: A critical engagement with the history and evolution of pragmatist thought.

Philosophical Style:

Haack’s writing is characterized by clarity, rigor, and wit. She often uses memorable metaphors and analogies to make complex ideas accessible while maintaining philosophical depth. Her ability to synthesize different traditions and methodologies makes her a key figure in contemporary philosophy.

Let me know if you’d like to delve into any specific aspect of her work or philosophy!

You said:

Describe her pragmatism. How does it — if it does — differ from C. I. Lewis.

ChatGPT said:

Susan Haack’s pragmatism is deeply rooted in the classical pragmatist tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James but also represents a critical response to its modern adaptations. Her approach diverges significantly from other interpretations of pragmatism, including that of C.I. Lewis, in several key ways. Below is a breakdown of Haack’s pragmatism and how it contrasts with Lewis’s perspective:

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Susan Haack’s Pragmatism

1. Peircean Foundation:
   • Haack draws heavily on Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism, particularly his emphasis on inquiry as the process of resolving doubt through the interplay of ideas, experience, and reasoning.
   • She defends a pragmatic realism, holding that the success of scientific and other practical endeavors provides strong evidence for the approximate truth of our beliefs about the world.
2. Balance Between Realism and Anti-Foundationalism:
   • Haack’s foundherentism (a hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism) underpins her pragmatic epistemology, which avoids strict foundationalist assumptions while rejecting relativistic or overly skeptical positions.
   • She sees truth as an objective ideal that we aim at, even though our means of arriving at it are fallible and context-dependent.
3. Criticism of “Vulgar Pragmatism”:
   • Haack is critical of the “neopragmatism” of thinkers like Richard Rorty, which she believes misconstrues classical pragmatism by rejecting truth as an objective standard in favor of purely instrumental or conversational norms.
4. Commitment to the Practical:
   • In line with pragmatist tradition, Haack emphasizes the practical consequences of beliefs as a central element of their meaning and justification.
   • However, she insists that these consequences should be evaluated in light of a broader commitment to evidence and experience, not just utility or convenience.

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C.I. Lewis’s Pragmatism

1. Conceptual Pragmatism:
   • C.I. Lewis’s pragmatism is known as conceptual pragmatism, which integrates a Kantian framework with pragmatic insights.
   • He emphasizes the role of the conceptual framework or “categories” through which humans organize and interpret their experience.
   • For Lewis, these frameworks are chosen pragmatically, based on their utility, but they are essential to any knowledge claim because they shape our interpretation of reality.
2. Empiricism with a Pragmatic Twist:
   • Lewis places greater emphasis on the a priori elements of knowledge—those that are presupposed by any empirical inquiry.
   • His pragmatism retains a formal and structured approach to understanding how knowledge is constructed, with a focus on the logical and normative dimensions of inquiry.
3. Truth and Verification:
   • Lewis views truth as relative to a chosen framework but also acknowledges an external reality that constrains those frameworks.
   • While he shares with Haack a commitment to the practical consequences of beliefs, his focus on the role of conceptual frameworks in mediating experience distinguishes his position.

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Key Differences

Aspect	Susan Haack	C.I. Lewis
Roots in Pragmatism	Strongly Peircean, emphasizes inquiry and realism.	Combines pragmatism with Kantian epistemology.
Role of Frameworks	Does not prioritize a priori conceptual schemes.	Stresses the importance of conceptual frameworks.
View of Truth	Objective ideal we aim for, though fallible.	Framework-relative but constrained by reality.
Critique of Scientism	Direct critic of scientism and relativism.	More focused on the structure of knowledge than broader critiques.
Practical Consequences	Tied to evidence, coherence, and practical outcomes.	Emphasizes utility of frameworks for organizing experience.

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Summary of Differences

Haack’s pragmatism is more explicitly rooted in a realist and Peircean tradition, focusing on the iterative and fallible nature of inquiry aimed at objective truth. In contrast, C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism emphasizes the pragmatic selection of frameworks that shape our understanding of the world, combining elements of Kantian epistemology with pragmatist insights. While both share a focus on the practical utility of ideas, Haack’s approach is less tied to the structure of conceptual schemes and more directly engaged with empirical inquiry and critique of scientism.

If you’d like, I can dive deeper into their comparative views on any specific topic!

You said:

Both Lewis and Haack must acknowledge conceptual schemes, surely. These can be called possible worlds, no?

ChatGPT said:

Both Susan Haack and C.I. Lewis indeed acknowledge the importance of conceptual schemes in shaping our understanding of the world, but their approaches differ in how they treat these schemes. Your suggestion to relate conceptual schemes to “possible worlds” is insightful, as it highlights the interpretive frameworks through which we perceive and engage with reality. However, their conceptions of conceptual schemes and their connection to possible worlds diverge in important ways.

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Conceptual Schemes as Possible Worlds

The idea of conceptual schemes as “possible worlds” can be understood in two senses:

1. Interpretive Frameworks: A conceptual scheme organizes experience by defining the categories and principles we use to interpret the world. This aligns with the idea of a possible world as a coherent way things could be understood or structured.
2. Alternative Realities: Different conceptual schemes might correspond to different “possible worlds” in the sense of alternate interpretations of reality, not alternate physical realities.

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C.I. Lewis and Conceptual Schemes

1. Role of Conceptual Frameworks:
   • For Lewis, conceptual schemes are indispensable filters through which we interpret raw sensory data. He believes the a priori principles we adopt—such as causality or spatial relations—are pragmatically chosen because they allow us to make sense of our experiences.
   • These schemes aren’t “possible worlds” in a metaphysical sense but rather tools that structure our engagement with the single, shared external reality.
2. Relation to Possible Worlds:
   • Conceptual frameworks could correspond to “possible worlds” in the sense that they represent different ways reality could be systematically understood, depending on the assumptions or categories we adopt.
   • Lewis does not, however, embrace a modal metaphysics in which all possible worlds are equally real; his focus is epistemological, not ontological.

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Susan Haack and Conceptual Schemes

1. Skepticism Toward Overemphasizing Schemes:
   • Haack acknowledges the role of interpretive frameworks but resists the idea that our understanding of reality is entirely determined by such schemes.
   • Her pragmatic realism emphasizes that while our conceptual schemes influence how we perceive and describe the world, there is an objective reality that constrains and interacts with these schemes.
2. Relation to Possible Worlds:
   • Haack might accept that conceptual schemes can function as “possible worlds” in the sense of alternative interpretive frameworks but would caution against conflating these frameworks with the external reality they aim to describe.
   • She would likely reject any extreme relativist view where different schemes lead to incommensurable “worlds.”

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Comparative Analysis: Conceptual Schemes and Possible Worlds

Aspect	C.I. Lewis	Susan Haack
Nature of Schemes	Essential for organizing raw sensory data; pragmatically chosen.	Tools for inquiry but not exhaustive of reality.
Ontological Commitment	Conceptual schemes shape reality but do not create it.	Reality exists independently of schemes, constraining them.
Possible Worlds Connection	Schemes as different coherent “worlds” of interpretation.	Possible interpretations, but grounded in objective reality.
Reality and Truth	Framework-relative truth, constrained by shared reality.	Truth as an objective ideal, though fallibly pursued.

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Can Conceptual Schemes Be Called Possible Worlds?

Yes, but with important qualifications:

1. Epistemic Sense: Both Lewis and Haack might accept that conceptual schemes function as “possible worlds” epistemically—representing alternate ways to organize and interpret experience.
2. Ontological Caution: Neither would fully endorse the ontological interpretation of possible worlds as independent realities. Haack is particularly resistant to any relativistic or anti-realist implications.

In short, while conceptual schemes might be likened to “possible worlds” in the sense of alternative interpretive perspectives, both Lewis and Haack anchor these schemes in a shared, objective reality that constrains and grounds them. Let me know if you’d like to explore this in more detail!

4o

You said:

When I say concepteual schemes or possible worlds all I mean is to say is that language comes in a holistic manner. Which language is chosen depends on how it fits with appearances and practical undertakings.

ChatGPT said:

Your clarification aligns closely with ideas found in both pragmatism and philosophical discussions about language and meaning. When you suggest that conceptual schemes or possible worlds are about language coming in a holistic manner, shaped by how well it fits with appearances and practical undertakings, you’re touching on several important themes:

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Key Ideas in Your View

1. Language as Holistic:
   • Language isn’t just a collection of isolated terms or propositions; it’s a network of meanings that functions as a whole.
   • Words and concepts gain meaning through their relationships with one another and their role in interpreting and navigating the world.
2. Fit with Appearances:
   • Conceptual schemes or languages are adopted based on how well they correspond to observed phenomena.
   • This echoes pragmatist commitments to the importance of empirical adequacy and experiential grounding in the justification of ideas.
3. Practical Undertakings:
   • The utility of a language or scheme in achieving practical goals is a key criterion for its adoption, reflecting the pragmatist emphasis on the consequences of ideas.

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Connections to Haack and Lewis

Susan Haack:

• Haack would likely agree with your holistic view of language. Her foundherentism reflects the idea that beliefs (and by extension, languages) are justified not in isolation but as part of a mutually reinforcing network.
• She emphasizes that language and conceptual schemes should fit both the empirical world (“appearances”) and practical needs, aligning closely with your point about the interplay between observation and practicality.

C.I. Lewis:

• Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism explicitly recognizes the holistic nature of conceptual frameworks. He would agree that the utility of a framework (or language) is judged by how well it organizes appearances and serves practical purposes.
• However, Lewis adds a Kantian dimension: conceptual schemes are not just practical but also normative, providing necessary conditions for interpreting experience.

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Holism and Language Choice

Your perspective also resonates with the Quinean view of holism, where the meanings of terms in a language are interdependent, and the whole “web of belief” adjusts in response to empirical input or practical pressures. This means:

• The choice of language (or conceptual scheme) is pragmatic and dynamic, guided by its success in coordinating our experiences and achieving our goals.
• Languages are tools, and their adoption depends on how well they serve our purposes in specific contexts.

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Possible Worlds Revisited

By “possible worlds,” if you mean the range of potential languages or schemes that might be adopted to interpret reality:

• These “worlds” are not metaphysical alternatives but practical or epistemic constructs, representing different ways to organize and make sense of the same reality.
• The “best-fit” world is determined by how well it harmonizes appearances and practical undertakings, which is consistent with both pragmatism and your holistic perspective.

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Summary

Your view of language as holistic, shaped by its fit with appearances and practical undertakings, aligns well with both Haack’s pragmatic realism and Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism, as well as broader pragmatist traditions. It emphasizes:

• The relational, networked nature of language.
• The dynamic interplay between empirical adequacy and practical utility.
• A commitment to the adaptability of language in response to new challenges or discoveries.

If you want, we could further explore how specific philosophical debates (e.g., about realism, relativism, or truth) relate to this holistic view!

Is the following a sound argument:

THE MANIFEST IMAGE ≠ THE COMMONSENSE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

____________

Gemini Advanced responds:

This is a dense philosophical argument, but let’s break down the core idea and assess its soundness.

Chrucky’s Main Argument:

• Premise 1: Sellars’ “Manifest Image” is built on an ontology of things (substances), like chairs and tables. It doesn’t fundamentally include processes or events like “a flash of lightning” or “a buzzing sound.”
• Premise 2: Our commonsense understanding of the world does include processes and events as irreducible elements. We perceive and talk about them as distinct from just things.
• Conclusion: Therefore, the Manifest Image is not identical to the commonsense framework. ¹   1. Andrew Chrucky, The manifest image ≠ the commonsense conceptual framework (in the philosophy of Wilfrid sellars) – PhilPapers philpapers.org

Is this argument sound?

• Validity: The argument is logically valid. If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
• Soundness: This depends on whether the premises are true. Chrucky spends much of the paper defending these premises by:
  • Citing other philosophers who agree with him.
  • Analyzing how we use language to describe substances and processes differently.
  • Arguing that Sellars’ attempts to reduce processes to substances are unsuccessful.
  • Pointing to potential inconsistencies in Sellars’ own framework.

Challenges to the Argument:

Chrucky addresses a key challenge from Johanna Seibt, who argues that the Manifest Image does include absolute processes. He responds with three counterarguments:

1. Sellars implies that absolute processes are not in the Manifest Image when he introduces an “alternative framework” to account for them.
2. Including absolute processes would make the Manifest Image a “third” framework, distinct from both the original “person-based” framework and the substance-based framework.
3. Sellars consistently omits absolute processes from his pre-1975 discussions of the Manifest Image.

Overall Assessment:

The argument is compelling and well-structured. Chrucky provides evidence and reasoning to support his premises, and he anticipates and addresses potential objections. Whether you find it ultimately sound depends on:

• Your interpretation of Sellars: Do you agree with Chrucky’s reading of Sellars’ work?
• Your view of commonsense: Do you believe that our commonsense understanding of the world fundamentally includes irreducible processes?

If you accept Chrucky’s premises, his conclusion logically follows. However, like many philosophical arguments, it’s open to debate and interpretation.

Key Takeaways:

• The paper highlights a subtle but important distinction between “things” and “processes” in how we understand the world.
• It raises questions about the relationship between our everyday commonsense understanding and more formalized philosophical frameworks.
• It demonstrates the complexity and nuance of Sellars’ philosophy and its interpretations.
• —————–
  I said:
• Summarize and evaluate for soundness: Wilfrid Sellars, SUBSTANCE, CHANGE AND EVENT (A thesis submitted to the Committee on Graduate Study and Degrees of The University of Buffalo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, June 1934)
  —————————-
  Gemini Advanced replied:
  
  
  Wilfrid Sellars’ 1934 thesis, “SUBSTANCE, CHANGE AND EVENT,” explores the philosophical problem of change in the universe. He critiques existing theories of substance and events, ultimately advocating for a “Physical Realism” that recognizes both the enduring nature of substances and the reality of change.
  Summary:
  Sellars begins by grounding the problem of change in the historical context of philosophical inquiry, highlighting how early theories struggled to reconcile abstract concepts with the empirical reality of motion and change. He criticizes Bertrand Russell’s theory of change, which defines things as series of appearances, for its reliance on an outdated, atomistic psychology and its failure to account for the inherent dynamism of experienced reality.
  He then examines various historical theories of substance, particularly focusing on Locke’s concept of substance as an unknowable substratum in which qualities inhere. Sellars argues that this view leads to absurdities and proposes instead a view of substance as a concrete thing, knowable through its attributes. He also addresses Leibniz’s monadism, which arises from the problem of predicating future states of an object, arguing that it rests on a flawed assumption about the nature of sameness.
• 
  Sellars further critiques theories that posit events as the basic category of existence. He analyzes different versions of this theory, pointing out the difficulties they face in accounting for time and change without resorting to contradictions or unintelligible concepts like the arising of events “out of nothing.” He challenges the notion of causal laws as governing events, arguing that it either leads to a “run of luck” theory or necessitates a problematic distinction between “pure events” and their characters.
  Finally, Sellars outlines his own position, “Physical Realism,” which is grounded in a critical realist epistemology. He argues for a view of substance as a concrete, dynamic entity, characterized by endurance, change, intrinsic nature, structure, and properties. He rejects the traditional dualism of matter and force, emphasizing the inherent dynamism of substances and the interconnectedness of their behavior. He distinguishes between primary and secondary endurance, with primary endurance belonging to non-composite, eternal beings, and secondary endurance characterizing composite entities that can cease to exist. He also differentiates between real time, identified with change, and chronological time, which is a human construct for measuring and ordering events.
• 
  Evaluation of Soundness:
  Sellars’ thesis presents a compelling and well-argued case for Physical Realism. His arguments are generally sound, drawing on both empirical observations and logical analysis to critique existing theories and develop his own position. He demonstrates a strong grasp of philosophical history and contemporary debates, engaging with prominent thinkers like Russell, Locke, Leibniz, and McTaggart.
  His critique of event-based ontologies is particularly effective, highlighting the challenges they face in accounting for time and change without resorting to contradictions or implausible assumptions. His distinction between real and chronological time is also insightful, offering a nuanced perspective on the nature of time and its relation to change.
  However, some aspects of his thesis could benefit from further elaboration. For instance, his concept of primary endurance and the existence of non-composite, eternal beings raises questions about the nature of these beings and their relation to the rest of the universe. Additionally, while he briefly mentions the implications of his view for human relations and the rejection of mechanistic fatalism, this aspect of his thesis could be explored in more depth.
  Overall, Sellars’ thesis is a significant contribution to the philosophy of change, offering a robust and well-reasoned defense of Physical Realism. His arguments are generally sound, and his insights into the nature of substance, change, and time remain relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions.
• ——————–
• I said:
  Does he include processes like “it thunders” as basic in his ontology?
  
  Gemini Advanced replied:
  
  
  
  No, Sellars does not include processes like “it thunders” as basic in his ontology. Here’s why:
  Substance-based ontology: Sellars advocates for a substance-based ontology, where enduring, concrete things are the fundamental constituents of reality. Processes, like “it thunders,” are seen as behaviors of these substances, not as ontologically basic entities in their own right.
  Events as derived: He explicitly defines events as “selected portion[s] of the behavior of a physical system.” This places events in a derivative position ontologically. “It thunders” would be an event, and thus not a fundamental entity in his system.
  Focus on physical systems: Sellars’ Physical Realism primarily focuses on physical systems and their changes. While he acknowledges different levels of causality, his emphasis is on the enduring nature of substances and their dynamic interactions, rather than on isolated processes.
  Knowledge about things: He argues that our knowledge about things includes knowledge of their properties, which define how their structure will change under certain conditions. “It thunders” would be an example of such a change, described and explained in terms of the properties and interactions of the substances involved (e.g., air, water molecules, electrical charges).
  In summary, Sellars’ ontology prioritizes substances and their dynamic interactions. Processes like “it thunders” are understood as events, which are derived from the behaviors of these substances, not as fundamental building blocks of reality.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Gemini can make mistakes, so double-c