There is a sense in which appearance reports presuppose physical object reports (ala Sellars) but conceptual dependence does not preclude epistemic independence.
ChatGPT said:
You’re absolutely correct that this idea—appearance reports presupposing physical object reports, as suggested by Wilfrid Sellars—raises interesting questions about the relationship between conceptual dependence and epistemic independence. Let’s unpack this further, especially in light of Chisholm and Haack’s approaches to epistemology.
Conceptual Dependence vs. Epistemic Independence
- Conceptual Dependence:
- Sellars’ Perspective: Sellars argued that appearance reports (e.g., “It looks red to me”) are conceptually dependent on the framework of physical object reports. That is, we cannot fully make sense of “appearance” without a conceptual grasp of “objecthood” and the world of physical objects. The framework of objectivity underpins our ability to articulate subjective experiences.
- This suggests that even so-called “basic” or “foundational” beliefs are entangled with broader conceptual frameworks, challenging the idea of purely independent epistemic foundations.
- Epistemic Independence:
- Chisholm’s Foundationalism: Chisholm defended the idea that certain basic beliefs (like appearance reports) can be justified independently of other beliefs, making them epistemically independent. He saw immediate sensory or introspective experiences as providing a foundation for further knowledge, even if their conceptual articulation involves broader frameworks.
- This is where Chisholm might diverge from Sellars: he maintained that while the concepts might be dependent on a larger framework, the justification of appearance reports does not rely on prior justification of physical object reports.
- Reconciliation:
- The apparent tension can be addressed by distinguishing between conceptual dependence (how we must conceptualize or articulate experiences) and epistemic dependence (how beliefs derive their justification). Conceptual dependence does not necessarily preclude epistemic independence; we might need a conceptual framework to form or articulate a belief, but this does not mean that the justification for the belief depends on other beliefs within the framework.
Application to Foundherentism
Susan Haack’s foundherentism could potentially bridge this gap:
- Haack might agree that appearance reports are conceptually dependent on physical object concepts but argue that the justification for such reports involves both foundational experiential input and coherence with other beliefs. In this view, justification is not entirely independent but also not entirely dependent—it’s a hybrid.
Chisholm vs. Sellars
- Chisholm might insist that, while physical object concepts are presupposed for articulating appearance reports, the justificatory role of appearances remains foundational and independent of the justification of physical object reports.
- Sellars, by contrast, would challenge the very idea of epistemically independent “givens,” aligning more with a coherentist or holistic view, which sees justification as inherently systemic.
Would you like to explore how this discussion influences broader debates in epistemology, such as the critique of the “Myth of the Given” or the viability of foundationalism in light of conceptual dependence?