What is a prehension in Broad’s philosophy?
ChatGPT said:
ChatGPT
In C.D. Broad’s philosophy, the term prehension refers to a primitive, non-cognitive form of acquaintance or awareness. It is an immediate and direct “grasping” of an object, property, or event without the mediation of concepts or judgments. This idea often surfaces in discussions about Broad’s perceptual realism, his exploration of the nature of mental acts, and the relationship between mind and matter.
Broad used “prehension” to distinguish between basic forms of awareness and higher cognitive processes. Prehension is typically contrasted with more complex processes like conception or intellectual apprehension, which involve conceptual thinking and reasoning.
For example:
- When you see a patch of red, the act of directly experiencing the redness can be described as a form of prehension.
- Thinking about the color red as part of a larger concept, such as “redness as a quality shared by many objects,” would involve conception.
Broad’s use of the term aligns with his interest in clarifying different mental acts and their roles in perception and understanding. It also reflects his broader project of dissecting the mind-matter relationship, as prehension could bridge the gap between subjective experience and objective reality.
This term is also relevant in broader philosophical contexts, such as process philosophy (e.g., in Alfred North Whitehead’s work), but in Broad’s system, it is more narrowly focused on epistemology and the phenomenology of mental states.
You said:
Does Wilfrid Sellars recognoze prehensions in broad’s sense?
ChatGPT said:
Wilfrid Sellars does not explicitly use the term prehension in the sense developed by C.D. Broad, nor does he directly engage with Broad’s terminology or framework in his major works. However, the idea of prehension as a primitive, non-cognitive form of awareness might seem at odds with Sellars’ broader philosophical commitments. Sellars is famously critical of theories that posit a foundational, non-conceptual layer of cognition as the bedrock of knowledge or perception.
Sellars’ Critique of “The Myth of the Given”
Sellars argues against what he calls “The Myth of the Given”, which is the idea that there is a direct, pre-conceptual acquaintance with reality that serves as a foundational source of knowledge. According to Sellars:
- All knowledge is inherently conceptual.
- Perception is not a passive, non-cognitive grasping of sensory data; rather, it is embedded in a framework of conceptual understanding and linguistic articulation.
If prehension in Broad’s sense is understood as a non-cognitive awareness, it would likely fall under the kinds of “given” that Sellars critiques. For Sellars, even basic sensory experiences are shaped by conceptual frameworks and cannot be isolated as purely pre-conceptual or immediate.
Possible Points of Overlap
Despite this fundamental difference, there are nuanced ways in which Sellars might indirectly acknowledge a role for something resembling prehension:
- Raw Sensory Input vs. Conceptual Frameworks: Sellars recognizes that there is a difference between raw sensory stimuli and the conceptual interpretation of those stimuli. However, he would argue that raw sensory input only becomes meaningful within a conceptual or linguistic framework.
- Non-Propositional Awareness: While Sellars denies that sensory awareness can be foundational knowledge, he might accept that sensory experiences involve a non-propositional component that is later integrated into a conceptual framework.
Conclusion
Broad’s notion of prehension as a direct, non-cognitive grasping of experience does not find a clear parallel in Sellars’ philosophy. Sellars’ systematic rejection of the idea that knowledge can be grounded in non-conceptual forms of awareness positions him in direct opposition to Broad’s understanding of prehension. Instead, Sellars emphasizes the interdependence of perception and conceptualization, making any notion of prehension in Broad’s sense unlikely to fit within Sellars’ system.