Escaping from Bullshit

I have always been puzzled by the term “influence”. Explain to me the different meanings when applied to , e.g., philosophers.

ChatGPT said:

The term “influence” is indeed puzzling, especially when used in discussions about philosophers or philosophical ideas. It’s a word that straddles the line between metaphor and causality, and its meaning changes depending on context. Here’s a breakdown of the main ways “influence” can be used when applied to philosophers:

1. Historical or Causal Influence

This is the most straightforward use: one philosopher read or responded to another, and their thinking was shaped as a result.

• Example: Kant was influenced by Hume — meaning Kant read Hume’s work and, as he said himself, was “awakened from his dogmatic slumber.”
• Here, “influence” implies causal impact: Hume’s writings led Kant to change or develop his views.

Complication: Influence isn’t always easy to trace—did the later philosopher actually read the earlier one? Or did they absorb ideas secondhand?

2. Conceptual or Doctrinal Influence

Sometimes philosophers are said to be influenced by ideas or conceptual frameworks, not necessarily individual thinkers.

• Example: Heidegger was influenced by Greek ontology — this means his thinking incorporated, reworked, or responded to ideas from ancient Greek metaphysics, such as the notion of “Being.”

This kind of influence might be:

• Affirmative (he accepts or builds on it)
• Critical (he reacts against it, but is still shaped by it)

3. Stylistic or Methodological Influence

A philosopher might be influenced in how they write, argue, or frame problems.

• Example: Nietzsche was influenced by the aphoristic style of La Rochefoucauld.
• This isn’t about ideas, but about mode of expression, tone, or structure.

4. Cultural or Intellectual Milieu

Sometimes “influence” refers to being part of a shared intellectual climate.

• Example: Sartre was influenced by existentialism and post-war French thought.
• This doesn’t mean he read a particular thinker, but that he was shaped by a cultural atmosphere, including literature, politics, or general intellectual currents.

5. Retrospective Attribution (Constructed Influence)

Scholars often construct lines of influence after the fact to create historical or conceptual continuity.

• Example: A scholar might claim that Foucault was influenced by Nietzsche, even if Foucault reinterpreted Nietzsche in a radically different way.
• Influence here becomes a tool for explanation, not an observed fact.

6. Mythologized or Symbolic Influence

In some cases, “influence” is almost mythical: it evokes prestige or association rather than a real connection.

• Example: Plato’s influence pervades all of Western philosophy.
• This might mean little more than that Plato is seen as foundational, not that every later philosopher engaged with him directly.

Summary Table

Would you like examples of ambiguous or misused “influence” claims, or help sorting out a specific case?

4o

You said:

ambiguousnand misused

ChatGPT said:

Great — let’s dig into ambiguous and misused cases of the term “influence” in philosophy. These often arise when the term is used too loosely, imprecisely, or rhetorically. Here are some common types, with examples and what’s misleading about them:

1. “Influence” as Mere Similarity

Claim: “Wittgenstein was influenced by Zen Buddhism.”
Why it’s ambiguous: There may be similarities between late Wittgenstein and Zen (emphasis on silence, rejection of metaphysical theorizing), but there’s no evidence Wittgenstein read Zen texts or interacted with Buddhist thinkers.
Misuse: Mistaking convergent thought or thematic parallels for historical or causal influence.

2. “Influence” Without Mediation or Transmission

Claim: “Aristotle influenced Descartes.”
Why it’s ambiguous: Descartes certainly read Aristotle (often critically), but often this is said as though Aristotle’s essence flowed into Descartes. The chain is long, filtered through scholasticism, Renaissance thinkers, etc.
Misuse: Overlooking the complex mediation of ideas across centuries.

3. Over-Inflated Claims of Influence

Claim: “Nietzsche was the primary influence on postmodernism.”
Why it’s misleading: Nietzsche’s ideas were selectively appropriated by postmodern thinkers, often with radical reinterpretation. Foucault, Derrida, and others used Nietzsche against many of his original intentions.
Misuse: Treating influence as a linear inheritance, rather than selective adaptation or even distortion.

4. Retrospective Imposition

Claim: “Plato influenced modern cognitive science.”
Why it’s a stretch: While there may be distant conceptual antecedents (like ideal forms vs. mental representations), Plato didn’t influence cognitive science in any direct or intentional way.
Misuse: Projecting modern categories backward onto historical figures.

5. “Influence” by Reputation or Myth

Claim: “Hegel was deeply influenced by Spinoza.”
Problem: Hegel says Spinoza is essential to philosophy, but what he does with Spinoza is highly idiosyncratic. He reshapes Spinoza into a dialectical thinker, which many scholars think distorts Spinoza entirely.
Misuse: Using “influence” to forge a lineage that serves the later thinker’s prestige or agenda, not accuracy.

6. Influence Used to Flatten or Simplify

Claim: “Marx’s political philosophy was influenced by Hegel.”
Why it’s problematic: While true, this claim often flattens Marx’s radical break from Hegel, especially in terms of materialism vs. idealism.
Misuse: Ignoring dialectical opposition as a form of development — sometimes someone is influenced by rejecting a thinker.

Summary: Red Flags for Ambiguous/Misused Influence

If you want, I can help you analyze a specific influence claim (e.g., “Was X really influenced by Y?”) or develop criteria for legitimate influence vs rhetorical flourish.

ChatGPT said:

The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people with low ability, knowledge, or experience in a particular area overestimate their competence. Meanwhile, those with high competence may underestimate their relative ability, assuming that what is easy for them is easy for others as well.

Origin

It was first described in 1999 by psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger, who conducted experiments showing that people who scored in the lowest percentiles on tests of humor, grammar, and logic tended to rate their own performance much higher than it actually was.

Key Points

1. Incompetence leads to overconfidence: People who lack skill in a domain often lack the metacognitive ability to recognize their deficiencies.
2. Skilled individuals may underestimate themselves: Experts often assume that others find things as easy as they do, leading to a different kind of misjudgment.
3. Learning reduces the bias: As individuals gain more knowledge and skills, their self-assessments tend to become more accurate.

Graphically

It’s often represented as a curve:

• Initial Peak (Peak of “Mount Stupid”): When someone knows a little and feels very confident.
• Valley of Despair: When they realize how much they don’t know.
• Slope of Enlightenment: As they learn more, confidence begins to rise again, but more realistically.
• Plateau of Sustainability: Competence and confidence reach a balanced level.

In Practical Terms

• A beginner who reads a few articles on a medical topic may feel confident enough to challenge doctors.
• A novice programmer may feel ready to build complex systems after finishing a tutorial.
• A real expert may downplay their expertise because they’re aware of how much they don’t know.

It’s a cautionary concept — reminding us to stay humble when we’re new to something and to recognize the value of experience and reflection.

religion seems to be a byproduct of historical belief in animism. am i correct?

ChatGPT said:

You’re partly correct — but the relationship between animism and religion is more nuanced.

Animism as a Root of Religion

Animism — the belief that natural objects, phenomena, and animals possess a spiritual essence — is widely considered by anthropologists (e.g., Edward Tylor) to be one of the earliest forms of religious belief. Tylor, in the 19th century, argued that religion originated from animistic explanations of dreams, death, and natural events. According to this view:

• People saw spirits in nature (trees, rivers, animals).
• Dreams of dead relatives suggested an immaterial soul.
• This led to beliefs in an unseen, spiritual world — the beginning of religion.

In that sense, organized religion could be seen as an outgrowth or systematization of early animistic beliefs.

But It’s Not the Whole Story

However, there are a few caveats:

1. Religion is broader than animism.
   Religion also involves rituals, moral codes, myths, institutions, and often doctrines. These evolve in complex ways that include but are not reducible to animism.
2. Other origins have been proposed.
   • Functionalist theories say religion arose to promote social cohesion (e.g. Durkheim).
   • Cognitive theories argue that religion exploits intuitive mental structures, like agency detection and theory of mind.
   • Political-evolutionary views (e.g. Graeber and Wengrow) suggest religion served roles in social hierarchy, legitimacy, and coordination.
3. Not all religions are animistic.
   While many indigenous religions are animistic, monotheistic and philosophical religions (e.g., Buddhism, Stoicism) move far from animism in focus and metaphysics.

Conclusion

You are correct to say that many religious traditions are historically rooted in animistic beliefs, but religion as a whole has a more diverse set of origins and functions. Animism is a foundational layer, not the whole edifice.

4o

what do you make of a scientist who says he does not believe in superstitions yet hangs a horshoe on his room saying that he is told that it works despite skepticism

ChatGPT said:

This kind of behavior—where a scientist hangs a horseshoe “because he’s told it works, even if he doesn’t believe in it”—is an example of what could be called symbolic or ironic superstition. It’s often cited in anecdotes about Niels Bohr, though it’s unclear whether the story is historically accurate. Regardless, it’s philosophically interesting.

Interpretations:

1. Playful Irony or Social Conformity
   The scientist might not actually believe in the superstition, but hangs the horseshoe as a kind of joke or gesture to cultural tradition. It’s a bit like knocking on wood or saying “bless you” after a sneeze—not because one believes in the literal power of the act, but because it’s a habit or shared social script.
2. Pascal’s Wager for Superstition
   Another reading is pragmatic: “It doesn’t cost me anything to hang the horseshoe, and if it works, great!” This is a form of low-cost hedging, similar in spirit to Pascal’s Wager—believe (or act as if) just in case.
3. Compartmentalization
   The scientist might be a rationalist in the lab but not uniformly so in personal life. Humans often hold inconsistent beliefs or act against their professed beliefs. This isn’t necessarily hypocrisy—it might reflect the mind’s tendency to operate in different modes depending on context (instrumental reason vs. narrative tradition, for example).
4. Agnostic Ritualism
   He might see the act as a harmless ritual with emotional or aesthetic value, even if it lacks empirical support. Much like lighting a candle for someone or touching a lucky object, it provides comfort without demanding belief.

Philosophical Implications:

• It challenges the purist view that rational belief must always dictate behavior.
• It illustrates how cultural practices can persist without literal belief, often because they serve functions other than truth (e.g., cohesion, identity, comfort).
• It raises questions about the nature of belief itself: Can one “half believe”? Can one act as if something is true without assenting to its truth?

Bottom Line:

This behavior isn’t necessarily irrational—it’s human. The scientist might be indulging in irony, ritual, tradition, or even an unconscious bias toward “just in case” thinking. It’s a good reminder that humans aren’t logic machines—they’re meaning-making creatures.

4o

ChatGPT said:

A “fool” is generally someone who lacks good judgment, acts unwisely, or is oblivious to consequences. The term can be used lightly (e.g., in humor), but it can also carry deeper philosophical or moral implications. Here are some common characteristics of a fool, across classical, moral, and practical perspectives:

1. Lack of Self-Awareness

• A fool often doesn’t realize their own ignorance or limitations.
• They may speak confidently about things they do not understand.

“The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.” — Shakespeare, As You Like It

2. Disregard for Consequences

• Fools act impulsively without considering the outcomes of their actions.
• They repeat mistakes rather than learning from them.

“As a dog returns to its vomit, so fools repeat their folly.” — Proverbs 26:11

3. Stubbornness or Closed-Mindedness

• They reject advice, correction, or alternative viewpoints.
• Often, they believe they’re always right, even in the face of evidence.

4. Overconfidence and Boastfulness

• A fool may speak more than they listen, often exaggerating or bragging.
• They mistake volume or certainty for wisdom.

5. Irresponsibility

• Fools avoid responsibility or act recklessly.
• They may cause harm to others without remorse or even awareness.

6. Superficial Thinking

• A fool often sees only surface appearances, not underlying truths.
• They may prioritize short-term pleasure over long-term good.

7. Mockery of Virtue or Wisdom

• They scorn discipline, humility, or learning.
• They may ridicule those who act with caution or moral integrity.

“The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.'” — Psalm 14:1
(Often interpreted as a critique of moral or spiritual denial rather than atheism per se.)

Philosophical View

In philosophy, a fool is sometimes contrasted with the wise person—not simply in knowledge, but in how they orient themselves to the truth, to reason, and to others. For instance:

• Socrates was called wise because he knew what he did not know—a fool does not.

4o