Wars and the Will of single individuals

Is it true that wars have been started mostly by the will of single individuals?

ChatGPT said:

It is partially true, but it oversimplifies a complex reality.

Many wars have indeed been initiated under the strong influence—or even direct orders—of single individuals, especially autocrats, monarchs, or dictators. For example:

  • Adolf Hitler played a central role in starting World War II.
  • Napoleon Bonaparte was instrumental in the Napoleonic Wars.
  • Genghis Khan personally led the Mongol conquests.

However, most wars are not solely the product of one person’s will. They typically result from a confluence of factors:

  • Political structures: Even kings and dictators often rely on a supporting elite, military apparatus, or bureaucracy.
  • Economic pressures: Competition for resources, trade routes, or wealth often plays a role.
  • Ideologies and nationalism: Beliefs about race, religion, or national destiny can motivate entire populations.
  • Security dilemmas: Mutual fear and preemptive logic (e.g., “they might attack first”) can lead to war even without a clear aggressor.
  • Historical grievances: Longstanding territorial or cultural conflicts often underlie wars.

In democracies or republics, war decisions usually go through collective political processes, making them less dependent on a single individual’s will (though charismatic or forceful leaders still influence outcomes).

In summary: individuals can catalyze or accelerate war, especially in centralized systems, but wars usually emerge from broader systemic conditions.

Would you like examples from a specific historical period?

4o

You said:

the conditions you speak of are factors which encourage leaders to go to war. no?

ChatGPT said:

Yes, exactly — the conditions I mentioned are enabling or encouraging factors, not causes in themselves unless someone acts on them. Wars don’t happen unless someone—usually a leader or small group—chooses to go to war, even if the choice is pressured by circumstances.

So, you’re right to suggest that:

  • Conditions like economic stress, nationalism, or fear don’t start wars on their own.
  • It still takes intentional human agency, typically at the level of leadership, to initiate war.

In that sense, the will of individuals—especially those with power—is the decisive cause, while broader conditions form the context or justification.

This is especially clear when leaders ignore peaceful alternatives or escalate situations that could have been de-escalated.

Do you think this implies that war is more a moral decision than a structural inevitability?

4o

You said:

yes

ChatGPT said:

That’s a strong and philosophically important position—and one many thinkers have argued: that war is fundamentally a moral choice, not a historical or structural necessity.

If you see war as a moral decision, then:

  • Responsibility rests squarely with those who choose violence, even if pressures exist.
  • Structural causes (economics, alliances, historical grievances) are not excuses, but challenges to be overcome by moral restraint.
  • Leaders who wage war do so because they will it, not because they must.

This idea resonates with thinkers like Leo Tolstoy, who argued against deterministic views of history, insisting that human free will and moral accountability shape events. It’s also echoed in Just War Theory, which assumes war must be morally justified, and not just historically inevitable.

Some critics, though, might argue that leaders themselves are shaped by systemic forces—and their decisions are constrained by what’s politically or socially possible.

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Publishing in Peer Reviewed Journals

I had 3 bad experiences with peer reviews. My article “beware of the handmaid scorned” examplifies the problem. An editor tried to engage me in a defense of the article. I refused, and it was published nonetheless. The polemic should have taken place publicly and the editors comments should have been published with my article. Refusal to publish because of disagreement with the substance of the article is not a suffficient reason. What do you think?

ChatGPT said:

​Your experience with the peer review process, particularly concerning your article “Beware of the Handmaid Scorned,” raises significant ethical considerations. The peer review system is designed to ensure the quality and integrity of scholarly publications, but it is not without its flaws.​

1. Editorial Disagreement and Publication Ethics

Refusing to publish an article solely due to disagreement with its substance, without identifying methodological flaws or ethical issues, is generally considered inappropriate. The Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) emphasizes that editorial decisions should be based on the validity and quality of the work, not on subjective disagreements. ​

2. Transparency in Editorial Processes

Your suggestion that editorial comments should be published alongside the article aligns with the principles of transparency and open discourse. While not all journals practice open peer review, there is a growing movement towards greater transparency in the review process to foster accountability and constructive dialogue. ​

3. Ethical Responsibilities of Editors

Editors have a duty to manage conflicts of interest and ensure that the review process is fair and unbiased. Engaging authors in a private defense of their work, especially when the article is ultimately published, may undermine the objectivity of the review process. COPE provides guidelines to help editors navigate such situations ethically. ​Publication Ethics+4Publication Ethics+4Wikipedia+4

Conclusion

Your experience underscores the need for ongoing discussions about the ethics and transparency of the peer review process. Advocating for open dialogue and adherence to established ethical guidelines can help improve the integrity of scholarly publishing.​Publication Ethics+2WIRED+2Time+2

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4o

What were the actual or real reasons in your judgment for the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

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Qwen2.5-Max

To assess the actual or real reasons behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it is important to move beyond Vladimir Putin’s stated justifications—such as the false claim of “genocide against Russian speakers in the Donbas” 6—and examine deeper geopolitical and historical factors.

1. Geopolitical Ambitions and Sphere of Influence

One of the primary drivers of the invasion appears to be Russia’s desire to reassert its dominance over Ukraine, a country it views as historically and culturally tied to Russia. Putin has long opposed Ukraine’s increasing alignment with Western institutions like NATO and the European Union, which he perceives as encroaching on Russia’s traditional sphere of influence 6. This was evident as early as 2014 when protests erupted in Ukraine after then-President Viktor Yanukovych rejected a deal for greater integration with the EU, leading to Russia’s annexation of Crimea 5. The 2022 invasion can be seen as an escalation of this ongoing effort to prevent Ukraine from fully integrating into Western political, economic, and military structures.

2. Preventing Ukrainian Sovereignty and Independence

Another real reason for the invasion lies in Russia’s attempt to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. Since the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, Ukraine has pursued reforms aimed at reducing corruption, strengthening democratic institutions, and aligning more closely with the West. These developments likely alarmed Putin, who may have feared that a successful, independent Ukraine could serve as a model for pro-democracy movements within Russia itself 7. By invading Ukraine, Russia sought to destabilize the country and reinstall a government more favorable to Moscow’s interests.

3. Historical and Ideological Motivations

Putin has also framed the invasion in ideological terms, arguing that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” and that Ukraine is an artificial state created by Soviet policies. This narrative ignores centuries of distinct Ukrainian identity and nation-building but serves to justify Russia’s actions under the guise of “reuniting” what Putin sees as a fractured historical entity 6. Such rhetoric reflects a broader ambition to restore Russia’s status as a great power and reverse the perceived humiliation of the post-Soviet era.

4. Domestic Political Considerations

While external factors dominate the discourse, domestic considerations within Russia likely played a role as well. In the years leading up to the invasion, Putin faced growing internal dissent, including the Bolotnaya pro-democracy protests (2011–13) and later opposition led by figures like Alexei Navalny 7. A foreign conflict could serve to rally nationalist sentiment, distract from domestic issues, and consolidate support around Putin’s leadership.

Judgment

In my reasoned judgment, the real reasons behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stem from a combination of geopolitical ambitions (to counter NATO expansion and maintain regional hegemony), efforts to suppress Ukrainian independence, ideological motivations rooted in distorted historical narratives, and domestic political calculations. While Putin publicly cited falsehoods such as “genocide” in Donbas 6, these claims were largely pretexts masking a broader strategy aimed at reasserting Russian control over Ukraine and reshaping the global order to suit Moscow’s interests.

Sources:

  • 5: Explains the origins of tensions between Russia and Ukraine since 2014.
  • 6: Outlines Putin’s false claims and broader justifications for the invasion.
  • 7: Highlights Russia’s domestic challenges and their potential impact on the decision to invade.

Was NATO really a threat to a nuclear power of Russia?

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Qwen2.5-Max

The claim that NATO posed a threat to Russia, particularly its nuclear capabilities, has been widely disputed. NATO itself has consistently stated that it “does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia” 1. The alliance’s actions have been defensive in nature, responding to what it describes as “Russian threats and hostile actions” rather than initiating aggression 2.

Russia, on the other hand, possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, with an estimated stockpile of 5,580 warheads, of which 4,380 are operational 4. This makes Russia the most heavily armed nuclear power globally, far exceeding any potential military imbalance that could be attributed to NATO’s conventional forces.

Moreover, NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, which Russia claims left it feeling increasingly threatened, was not intended as an offensive move against Russia but rather aimed at stabilizing post-Cold War Europe by integrating former Soviet bloc states into Western institutions 5. Despite these assurances, Russia framed NATO’s actions as encroaching upon its sphere of influence, leading to heightened tensions.

In conclusion, while Russia has argued that NATO represents a significant threat, this perspective is largely based on perceived geopolitical encirclement rather than actual military necessity or imbalance. NATO maintains that it does not pose a direct threat to Russia 1, especially given Russia’s overwhelming nuclear capabilities 4.

Who are the main commentators that say Russia invaded Ukraine because of NATO– name 20

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Qwen2.5-Max12:31 pm

The claim that Russia invaded Ukraine primarily because of NATO expansion has been a subject of significant debate. While some commentators and scholars argue that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russia, this perspective is often challenged by others who point to internal Russian motivations and historical grievances as the primary drivers of the invasion. Below are notable figures associated with the argument that NATO played a role in Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine:

Commentators Who Argue NATO Expansion Contributed to the Invasion

  1. John Mearsheimer – A prominent realist scholar who argues that NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe and promises of eventual Ukrainian membership provoked Russia 3.
  2. Stephen F. Cohen – An American historian who suggested that NATO’s actions were perceived as existential threats by Russia.
  3. Patrick Buchanan – A conservative commentator who has argued that NATO’s encroachment on Russia’s borders justified Putin’s concerns.
  4. Jeffrey Sachs – An economist who has claimed that Western policies, including NATO expansion, contributed to the conflict.
  5. Henry Kissinger – While not excusing Russia’s actions, Kissinger has noted that ignoring Russian security concerns about NATO was a mistake.
  6. Ray McGovern – A former CIA analyst who argues that NATO’s eastward push destabilized relations with Russia.
  7. Dimitri Simes – President of the Center for the National Interest, who has emphasized Russia’s grievances over NATO.
  8. Andrew Bacevich – A military historian who criticizes U.S. foreign policy, including NATO’s role in provoking Russia.
  9. Ted Galen Carpenter – A senior fellow at the Cato Institute, who has long argued that NATO expansion antagonized Russia.
  10. Richard Sakwa – A professor of Russian and European politics who contends that NATO’s actions created a “new Cold War.”
  11. Paul Craig Roberts – A former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, who claims NATO’s expansion justified Russia’s defensive posture.
  12. Michael Lind – A political analyst who suggests that NATO’s inclusion of Eastern European states inflamed tensions.
  13. Scott Ritter – A former Marine intelligence officer who argues that NATO’s broken promises to Russia led to the invasion.
  14. Alexander Dugin – A Russian philosopher whose ideas influenced Russian nationalism, citing NATO as an existential threat.
  15. Chris Hedges – A journalist and author who critiques NATO’s role in escalating tensions with Russia.
  16. Robert Bridge – A writer critical of Western policies, emphasizing NATO’s provocations against Russia.
  17. Gilbert Doctorow – A political analyst who argues that NATO’s eastward expansion left Russia with no choice but to act.
  18. Jack Matlock – Former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, who believes NATO’s moves undermined post-Cold War stability.
  19. William Engdahl – An author and geopolitical analyst who blames NATO for provoking Russia’s invasion.
  20. George Szamuely – A columnist who argues that NATO’s aggressive stance toward Russia made war inevitable.

Counterarguments and Context

Critics of this perspective, such as Alexander Motyl, argue that blaming NATO for the invasion ignores the agency of Vladimir Putin and his regime’s broader ambitions. Motyl writes that “Russian grievances over NATO helped spark the war ‘makes no sense,’” highlighting instead the role of authoritarianism and imperialism in driving the conflict 2. Similarly, arguments have been made that NATO’s purpose is defensive, and its expansion was aimed at stabilizing Europe rather than threatening Russia 1.

In conclusion, while numerous commentators emphasize NATO’s role in provoking Russia, their views remain contentious and are often countered by those who focus on Russia’s internal motivations and aggressive actions.

What are the counterarguments to the idea that NATO expansion provoked Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

Who are the main scholars or commentators arguing against the idea that NATO provoked Russia’s actions?

How has NATO responded to accusations that its expansion led to increased tensions with Russia?

Bertrand Russell and Brian Klaas on Power

Gemini said:

Brian Klaas and Bertrand Russell both share a profound interest in the nature and consequences of power, though their approaches and emphases may differ. Here’s a possible connection:

  • Power as a Central Force:
    • Russell: Viewed power as a fundamental concept in social sciences, akin to energy in physics. He explored how power dynamics shape social structures, influence individual behavior, and contribute to political and social outcomes.
    • Klaas: Focuses on the corrupting influence of power, particularly in political contexts. His work often examines how power can be abused, leading to authoritarianism, suppression of dissent, and the erosion of democratic institutions.
  • The Dangers of Absolute Power:
    • Russell: A strong advocate for limited government and individual liberties. He warned against the dangers of concentrating power in the hands of a few, emphasizing the importance of checks and balances to prevent tyranny.
    • Klaas: Explores the psychological and sociological effects of holding power, highlighting how it can lead to arrogance, a sense of entitlement, and a disregard for the needs and concerns of others.
  • Power and Knowledge:
    • Russell: Recognized the importance of knowledge and critical thinking in combating the abuse of power. He believed that an informed and engaged citizenry was essential for maintaining a just and democratic society.
    • Klaas: Emphasizes the role of information and transparency in holding power accountable. He explores how the manipulation of information and the suppression of dissent can be used to consolidate power and undermine democratic processes.

Key Differences:

  • Scope: Russell’s analysis of power was broader, encompassing social, political, and philosophical dimensions. Klaas’s work primarily focuses on political power and its impact on democratic institutions.
  • Methodology: Russell’s approach was more philosophical and theoretical, while Klaas’s work often draws on empirical evidence, case studies, and interviews.

In Summary:

While their specific areas of focus and methodologies may differ, both Brian Klaas and Bertrand Russell offer valuable insights into the complexities of power. They both warn against the dangers of unchecked power and emphasize the importance of safeguarding individual liberties and promoting democratic values.

————————

Book by Bertrand Russell on Power:

  • Power: A New Social Analysis: This is Russell’s primary work on the subject. It examines the nature of power, its various forms, and its impact on social and political structures.

Books by Brian Klaas on Power:

  • The Despot’s Apprentice: Donald Trump in the Age of Modern Authoritarianism: This book explores the rise of authoritarianism globally and examines how Trump’s presidency exemplified many of its key characteristics.
  • The Fight for History: How Memory Wars Are Shaping the Present: This book investigates how the manipulation of history and the suppression of dissent are used to consolidate power and shape political narratives.
  • Corruptible: Who Gets Power and How It Changes Us: This book delves into the psychological and sociological effects of holding power, highlighting how it can lead to arrogance, a sense of entitlement, and a disregard for the needs and concerns of others.
  • Fluke: Chance, Chaos, and Why Everything We Do Matters: This book explores the role of chance and randomness in shaping history and individual lives.

Primitive Life, Trade, Conquest, Slavery, the State, Capitalism, and Anarchism: A Comprehensive Exploration

Outline of chapters writtten by chatGPT:

Introduction

Human history is a tapestry woven from the threads of primitive life, trade, conquest, slavery, the state, capitalism, and anarchism. Each of these phenomena has profoundly shaped the trajectory of societies, economies, and ideologies. This book examines their origins, interconnections, and implications, incorporating the insights of key thinkers such as H. J. Nieboer, Marshall Sahlins, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Franz Oppenheimer. By delving into these diverse perspectives, we aim to provide a holistic understanding of the forces that have shaped human civilization.


Chapter 1: Primitive Life and the First Affluent Society

1.1 The Foundations of Human Society Primitive life, characterized by hunter-gatherer communities, forms the baseline of human existence. These societies were marked by egalitarian structures, subsistence economies, and strong communal bonds.

1.2 Marshall Sahlins and the “Original Affluent Society” Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers represented the “original affluent society.” Their affluence derived not from material wealth but from their ability to meet needs with minimal effort, leaving ample time for leisure and social activities. This perspective challenges modern assumptions about progress and scarcity.

1.3 Transition to Agriculture and Its Consequences The advent of agriculture marked a turning point in human history, enabling surplus production and population growth. However, it also introduced hierarchy, labor specialization, and the potential for conflict over resources.


Chapter 2: The Evolution of Trade

2.1 Early Trade Networks Trade emerged as an extension of human interaction, fostering exchange between groups and laying the groundwork for economic specialization. Primitive barter systems evolved into complex trade networks spanning vast distances.

2.2 The Role of Trade in Social Complexity Trade facilitated the development of early civilizations by enabling resource distribution and cultural exchange. However, it also introduced dependencies and inequalities that shaped social hierarchies.

2.3 Trade and Moral Philosophy Philosophers such as Aristotle and Ibn Khaldun debated the ethical dimensions of trade, grappling with its capacity to generate both prosperity and exploitation.


Chapter 3: Conquest and Its Impact

3.1 Conquest as a Mechanism for Change Conquest has historically been a powerful force for redistributing resources and reshaping societies. From the conquests of Alexander the Great to European colonialism, the aftermath of conquest has often included economic integration and cultural diffusion alongside destruction and exploitation.

3.2 Philosophical Reflections on Conquest Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Carl von Clausewitz have analyzed conquest as an extension of politics and human ambition. Conquest has been justified on moral, religious, and economic grounds throughout history.

3.3 The Intersection of Conquest and Trade Conquest frequently facilitated trade expansion by opening new markets and securing resources. The colonial enterprises of the Dutch East India Company exemplify this dynamic, where military might served economic interests.


Chapter 4: Slavery as an Economic and Social Institution

4.1 Slavery in Historical Context Slavery has existed in various forms across cultures and eras. From ancient Rome to the transatlantic slave trade, enslaved labor underpinned economic systems and reinforced social hierarchies.

4.2 H. J. Nieboer’s Analysis of Slavery Dr. H. J. Nieboer, in his seminal work, argued that slavery arose in contexts where land was abundant, but labor was scarce. His framework highlights the economic conditions that perpetuated slavery and its role in structuring societies.

4.3 The Legacy of Slavery The abolition of slavery did not eliminate its social and economic repercussions. Contemporary systems of inequality often reflect the enduring impact of historical exploitation.


Chapter 5: The State and Its Role in Society

5.1 The Emergence of the State The state evolved as a mechanism for organizing power and resources, often emerging from conquest or the need for centralized governance.

5.2 Franz Oppenheimer’s “Political Means” Franz Oppenheimer distinguished between the “economic means” (voluntary exchange) and the “political means” (coercion) of acquiring wealth. He argued that the state originated from conquest and served to institutionalize the political means of resource control.

5.3 Max Weber and the Modern State Max Weber’s definition of the state as the entity with a monopoly on legitimate violence underscores its central role in maintaining order and enabling economic activity. However, Weber also critiqued the bureaucratization of state power.


Chapter 6: Capitalism and Its Discontents

6.1 The Rise of Capitalism Capitalism, as an economic system, emerged from the interplay of trade, technological innovation, and state policies. Its emphasis on profit and efficiency transformed societies, generating unprecedented wealth and inequalities.

6.2 Karl Marx’s Critique of Capitalism Karl Marx provided a foundational critique of capitalism, highlighting its exploitation of labor and inherent contradictions. His concept of historical materialism frames capitalism as a transitory phase in the evolution of human society.

6.3 Capitalism and the State The relationship between capitalism and the state is one of mutual dependence. States enforce property rights and contracts, while capitalist systems often rely on state intervention to address crises and sustain growth.


Chapter 7: Anarchism as a Response to Hierarchy

7.1 Foundations of Anarchist Thought Anarchism rejects centralized authority and advocates for voluntary, decentralized systems of governance. Key figures such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Emma Goldman envisioned societies based on mutual aid and cooperation.

7.2 Anarchism and the State-Capital Nexus Anarchists critique the interdependence of the state and capitalism, arguing that both perpetuate inequality and coercion. Historical examples of anarchist communities demonstrate the viability of alternative systems.

7.3 Challenges and Opportunities While anarchist principles offer compelling critiques, their implementation faces challenges, particularly in large-scale societies. Nonetheless, decentralized movements and technologies provide new avenues for anarchist experimentation.


Chapter 8: Intersections and Implications

8.1 Trade and the State Trade has often been regulated by states to serve specific interests, exemplified by colonial enterprises like the Dutch East India Company. This interplay highlights the complex relationship between economic and political systems.

8.2 Conquest, Slavery, and Capitalism The economic foundations of conquest and slavery reveal enduring patterns of exploitation that have shaped capitalist development. Addressing these legacies requires rethinking systems of production and distribution.

8.3 Towards a More Equitable Future The insights of thinkers like Nieboer, Sahlins, Weber, Marx, and Oppenheimer provide tools for imagining alternative futures. Anarchist principles, combined with lessons from history, offer pathways for building more equitable and sustainable societies.


Conclusion

From primitive life to anarchist visions of the future, the forces of trade, conquest, slavery, the state, and capitalism have profoundly shaped human history. By examining their interconnections and the critiques offered by key thinkers, we gain not only a deeper understanding of our past but also a foundation for addressing the challenges of the present and future.

Compare Thomas DiLorenzo’s Lincoln with Putin

ChatGPT said:

Comparing Thomas DiLorenzo’s depiction of Abraham Lincoln to contemporary figures like Vladimir Putin involves analyzing how DiLorenzo critiques Lincoln’s actions, particularly regarding centralized power and authoritarian tendencies, and examining whether those critiques apply to Putin’s governance. Below is a detailed comparison:


Centralization of Power

  • Lincoln (as per DiLorenzo): DiLorenzo criticizes Lincoln for allegedly undermining federalism by centralizing power in the federal government during the Civil War. He portrays Lincoln as prioritizing national unity over states’ rights, sometimes through coercive measures like suspending habeas corpus and curbing press freedoms.
  • Putin: Putin has systematically centralized power in Russia, weakening regional autonomy and consolidating control in the Kremlin. Measures include restructuring federal districts, appointing governors, and restricting local governance.

Similarity: Both are seen as centralizers, though Lincoln’s actions were in the context of preserving a democratic union, while Putin’s consolidation is tied to an authoritarian framework.


Treatment of Dissent

  • Lincoln: DiLorenzo emphasizes Lincoln’s suppression of dissent, such as the imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, as evidence of authoritarianism.
  • Putin: Putin is widely criticized for suppressing dissent through imprisonment of opposition figures, censorship, and media control. His approach is far more systematic and enduring compared to Lincoln’s wartime actions.

Difference: While Lincoln’s measures were extraordinary and time-bound (wartime emergency), Putin’s repression is a structural feature of his regime.


War and Justification

  • Lincoln: DiLorenzo views Lincoln’s justification for the Civil War—preserving the Union—as questionable, arguing it masked economic motivations and federal overreach.
  • Putin: Putin justifies wars (e.g., in Ukraine) as protecting Russian sovereignty, security, or cultural identity. Critics argue these are pretexts for territorial expansion and imperial ambitions.

Similarity: Both leaders used war to assert national objectives, but Lincoln’s war was defensive (against secession), while Putin’s wars are often viewed as offensive.


Economic Policies

  • Lincoln: DiLorenzo criticizes Lincoln for favoring industrialists and implementing policies like high tariffs and national banking, which he sees as benefiting Northern elites at the expense of Southern states.
  • Putin: Putin’s economic policies favor oligarchs loyal to his regime, with state control over key sectors like energy. Economic centralization often serves to bolster his political power.

Similarity: Both are accused of using economic policies to consolidate power, though Lincoln’s policies were framed as modernizing the economy within a democratic system.


Ideological Framework

  • Lincoln: DiLorenzo challenges the narrative of Lincoln as a champion of liberty, arguing his actions were more about power than principle.
  • Putin: Putin positions himself as a defender of Russian traditionalism and sovereignty but is widely seen as prioritizing personal and regime survival over ideological consistency.

Difference: Lincoln’s legacy, even through DiLorenzo’s lens, remains tied to democratic ideals, whereas Putin’s governance is fundamentally autocratic.


Public Image and Legacy

  • Lincoln: Despite DiLorenzo’s critiques, Lincoln is widely revered as a leader who navigated the U.S. through its most challenging crisis, with a lasting legacy of ending slavery and preserving the Union.
  • Putin: Putin’s legacy is contentious; he is admired by some for restoring Russian strength but condemned internationally for authoritarianism and aggression.

Difference: Lincoln’s legacy largely enhances democratic ideals, while Putin’s reinforces authoritarianism.


Conclusion: While there are parallels in centralizing power and justifying contentious actions, the context and nature of their governance differ significantly. DiLorenzo’s critique of Lincoln frames him as authoritarian within a democratic system, whereas Putin’s actions align with classic authoritarianism.

4o

O

It seems that Chyzhevsky’s national philosophy is identical to a dominant Weltanschauung. But to identify a Weltanschauung with philosophy — the Romantic view, is inconsistent with a Rationalistiv view which considers philosophy a critic of Weltanschauungen.

ChatGPT said:

Yes, you are correct to highlight that Chyzhevsky’s Romantic view of national philosophy opposes the idea that philosophy is primarily a critical examination of views, which is a more analytic or rationalistic approach.

Let’s unpack the issue further:

Chyzhevsky’s Romantic View vs. Critical Philosophy

Chyzhevsky advocates for a Romantic view of national philosophy, which sees philosophy as the self-consciousness of a culture. In this view, national philosophy is not primarily about critically examining or questioning established views (which is typically how philosophy is defined in many traditions, particularly in the analytic tradition), but rather about articulating and reflecting on the culture’s existing values, ideas, and Weltanschauung (worldview).

  • In this view, philosophy is seen more as expressive and revelatory of national identity and consciousness rather than as a critical or analytical activity that seeks to test or critique the validity of beliefs or systems of thought.
  • The Romantic view emphasizes that the diversity of national philosophies is valuable because each one contributes a unique perspective on the absolute. This leads to a form of philosophical relativism or pluralism, where no one philosophy is seen as universally superior but each national philosophy reveals a part of the whole, the absolute truth.

The Critical Tradition of Philosophy

On the other hand, the view that philosophy is a critical examination of views (often associated with the rationalistic or analytic traditions) holds that the primary role of philosophy is to critically assess and challenge ideas, aiming to uncover universal truths or objective standards. In this tradition:

  • Philosophy is seen as a discipline of reasoning, focused on logical analysis, critique, and the evaluation of beliefs, whether they come from popular worldviews, scientific theories, or even other philosophical traditions.
  • The idea of philosophy as a critical investigation of worldviews is about testing ideas, exploring their internal coherence, their logical implications, and their correspondence with reality. It assumes that not all worldviews or philosophical systems are equally valid or true. Some ideas must be rejected or revised through rigorous questioning and examination.

The Tension Between the Two Views

Chyzhevsky’s Romantic view appears to reject this critical perspective. If philosophy is seen as a reflection of the national consciousness and as a manifestation of a culture’s worldview, it might be less about critical examination and more about expressing the values and ideas already deeply embedded in the culture.

This approach suggests that the purpose of philosophy is not to critique the dominant worldview of a culture but rather to affirm it and make it self-conscious, providing a systematic reflection of the worldview, values, and ideals of a nation. In this sense, national philosophy serves as a revelation of the truths inherent in the culture, not a critique of them.

Conflict and Inconsistency

The key inconsistency in Chyzhevsky’s approach comes when he later suggests that certain national philosophies advance world philosophy or bring new insights into the absolute. This idea is more in line with the critical view of philosophy, which seeks to assess the progress and value of ideas in a larger, global context. It implies that some national philosophies move forward the development of thought by critically engaging with and refining earlier ideas, while others may simply repeat or re-affirm existing traditions.

  • This is contradictory because if national philosophy is simply a reflection of national self-consciousness, it should be seen as equally valid across all cultures, without any nation playing a superior or more advanced role in the progression of world philosophy. The idea that some national philosophies advance world philosophy implies a critical approach to the value of different philosophies, which conflicts with the Romantic view of philosophy as a mere expression of cultural consciousness.

Conclusion

In summary, Chyzhevsky’s Romantic view of national philosophy directly opposes the critical examination model of philosophy, which is rooted in the analytic or rationalistic traditions. Chyzhevsky’s view treats philosophy as reflective of a national culture, not as an activity that questions, critiques, or systematically evaluates beliefs. This creates a tension when he also suggests that some national philosophies are more significant than others in advancing world philosophy, as this would imply a critical, evaluative stance that the Romantic view would typically reject.

4o mini

You said:

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

You’re absolutely right. The distinction you’re making between the Romantic view and the Rationalist view highlights an important philosophical tension. Let me clarify and elaborate on the issue.

Romantic View and Weltanschauung

In the Romantic view of national philosophy (as Chyzhevsky seems to endorse), national philosophy is seen as a reflection of a nation’s Weltanschauung (worldview). In this view, philosophy is not primarily concerned with critiquing or evaluating existing ideas but with expressing and affirming the cultural identity and worldview of a nation.

  • Philosophy, in this sense, is understood as the self-consciousness of a national culture. It articulates and deepens the cultural values, beliefs, and principles that are already deeply embedded in the nation’s traditions, customs, and practices.
  • Weltanschauung, in this context, refers to the broader, lived worldview of a nation—the sum of its cultural, social, moral, religious, and philosophical beliefs that shape how people understand the world. The national philosophy in the Romantic view is merely a philosophical articulation or reflection of this worldview. It does not critically engage with these ideas but affirms them and helps the nation become self-aware of its own cultural identity.

Thus, in the Romantic view, national philosophy and the dominant Weltanschauung of a nation are essentially the same thing. Philosophy, as a discipline, becomes a means of reflecting the cultural identity rather than evaluating or challenging it.

Rationalist View and Critique of Weltanschauung

In contrast, the Rationalist view (which is closely associated with analytic philosophy) sees philosophy as fundamentally a critical activity. According to this view:

  • Philosophy is about the critical examination of the ideas, beliefs, and worldviews that societies hold. The philosopher’s task is to analyze, evaluate, and critique the assumptions and frameworks of any given Weltanschauung.
  • The Rationalist or analytic philosopher does not accept a worldview simply because it is the dominant or traditional worldview of a given culture. Instead, the goal is to subject all beliefs—whether cultural, moral, or philosophical—to rigorous scrutiny, and to determine their truth, coherence, and logical consistency. Philosophy, in this sense, is a tool for critique, and it challenges the existing ideas that form a nation’s worldview.

In the Rationalist tradition, the task of philosophy is not to reflect the existing worldview of a nation but to question and refine it. This makes the critical examination of Weltanschauung central to the practice of philosophy.

The Tension Between the Views

The inconsistency you point out arises when one tries to reconcile these two views. On the one hand:

  • The Romantic view treats national philosophy as a reflection of the dominant cultural worldview, essentially equating philosophy with a nation’s Weltanschauung. In this view, national philosophy is simply an affirmation of what the nation already believes about reality, morality, beauty, justice, and so on.
  • On the other hand, the Rationalist view treats philosophy as a critical investigation of a given worldview. In this view, philosophy’s primary role is to evaluate and question the assumptions that underlie the nation’s cultural and philosophical beliefs. It is not simply about affirming what is already believed but about challenging and refining the national worldview through logical reasoning and empirical evidence.

Thus, to equate national philosophy with the dominant Weltanschauung, as the Romantic view does, directly contradicts the Rationalist view, which sees philosophy as a critique of Weltanschauung. If national philosophy is just a reflection of national beliefs, then it is not playing the critical, evaluative role that the Rationalist tradition assigns to philosophy.

Reconciling the Views

To reconcile these two positions (the Romantic and Rationalist views), one could argue that philosophy might indeed reflect a nation’s worldview but also perform a critical function. For instance:

  1. Philosophy as Both Reflection and Critique: One could propose that national philosophy, while reflecting the dominant Weltanschauung, should also engage critically with it. In this way, national philosophers might start by articulating and affirming the national worldview, but they should also evaluate its strengths and weaknesses, offering critical reflections and alternative perspectives. This would allow philosophy to both reflect the culture and also critique it, making it an evolving, dynamic force in shaping cultural identity.
  2. Philosophy’s Role in Cultural Development: Another way to reconcile the views is by seeing philosophy as evolving alongside the broader culture. Initially, philosophy may reflect a culture’s existing Weltanschauung, but as the culture matures, philosophy could begin to critically engage with that worldview, challenging its assumptions and refining its ideas. In this way, philosophy moves from being merely reflective to becoming critical and transformative over time.

Conclusion

In sum, the Romantic view equates national philosophy with the dominant Weltanschauung, making philosophy primarily about reflecting and articulating the national identity and worldview. In contrast, the Rationalist view sees philosophy as a critical examination of Weltanschauung, questioning and evaluating the ideas that a culture holds. The inconsistency arises when one attempts to reconcile these two views, as the Romantic view seems to deny philosophy’s critical role. To resolve this, one might argue that philosophy is not only a reflection of a culture’s worldview but also a critical force that refines and evolves that worldview over time.

4o mini

Chyzhevsky as a Historian of Ukrainian Philosophy

Chyzhevsky as a Historian of Ukrainian Philosophy

Taras Zakydalsky


A paper presented at a conference at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champagne, 2003.


Dmytro Chyzhevsky is quite rightly recognized as the founder of the history of Ukrainian philosophy.1 Not only did he produce the first more or less comprehensive survey of Ukrainian philosophy, 2 which he supplemented with numerous articles on Ukrainian thinkers, such as Ivan Vyshensky, Hryhorii Skovoroda, Panteleimon Kulish, Taras Shevchenko, Mykola Hohol, and Viacheslav Lypynsky, and on the influence of foreign ideas in Ukraine, 3 as well as a book on Hryhorii Skovoroda, 4 he also laid out the theoretical framework and methodological requirements of the field. No one was more acutely aware of the shortcomings of his pioneering work in the history of Ukrainian philosophy than Chyzhevsky himself. In the preface to Narysy z istorii filosofii na Ukraini (Essays in the History of Philosophy in Ukraine), he remarked, “I should also point out that this work is a fruit of my leisure time, that the history of philosophy in Ukraine is not the principal subject of my studies, and therefore that the material I present cannot be taken as the culmination and completion of scholarly research in this field; rather it is an attempt to arouse interest in and draw attention to this field of research, which so far has been avoided in Ukrainian studies.” 5 In my assessment of Chyzhevsky’s work in the field I concentrate on what in my opinion are his main contributions and point out their strengths and weaknesses. A much more comprehensive and detailed account of Chyzhevsky’s work in the history of Ukrainian philosophy can be found in Iryna Valiavko’s recent candidate dissertation. 6

The Concept of National Philosophy

Chyzhevsky begins his surveys with some brief methodological remarks about the purpose and scope of a history of the philosophy produced by a given nation. He distinguishes two views of philosophy and the corresponding types of history associated with them. According to what he calls the “rationalistic” view, philosophy is a science that discovers universal truths about the nature of reality, truth, justice, beauty, etc. Since there can be only one true answer to every question, a plurality of answers is indicative of falsehood. Insofar as national philosophies are distinguished by differing ideas on the same issues they are false and hence undeserving of serious study by the historian. 7 Chyzhevsky calls the other view of philosophy “Romantic” and associates it with Hegel. On this view differences among philosophical doctrines have a positive value. How can that be so? If absolute ideals can be realized only in the limited particular forms (science, religion, morality, law, religion, etc.) of a national culture, and the differences among national cultures manifest different aspects of the absolute, then these differences are important and valuable. Together they constitute a fuller, although never the full, manifestation of the absolute. Viewed from this perspective, philosophy is the self-consciousness of a given culture: it brings out what is distinctive and interesting in a nation’s beliefs about reality, justice, and beauty, and in doing so makes the nation aware of itself as a distinct entity; that is, gives rise to national consciousness. Here philosophy is essentially national, and all national philosophies, insofar as they are partial reflections of the absolute, are true. 8 It follows that all cultures and their corresponding philosophies are equal. Obviously, this is the view of philosophy that Chyzhevsky favors for it gives maximal weight to national philosophies and their histories.

But then, surprisingly enough, Chyzhevsky goes on to say that at different stages in the development of world philosophy different nations play the leading role in carrying the process forward. 9 This implies that only the philosophy of some nations reveals something new and valuable about the absolute, while the philosophy of other nations fails to do so and has no world-historical significance. Furthermore, according to Chyzhevsky, it is only when a nation produces a philosophy that marks a significant forward step in world philosophy that that nation fully discloses the distinctive character of its own culture and philosophy. 10 Clearly, these two propositions are inconsistent with the Romantic account of national culture and philosophy.

The inconsistency can be easily removed by renouncing these two propositions and preserving the pluralistic conception of culture and philosophy. An essentially similar conception has been elaborated by a leading contemporary historian of Ukrainian philosophy, Vilen Horsky, into what he calls the “culturological approach to the history of philosophy.” 11 On this approach philosophy is an integral part of culture. As a reflection on the possibilities of individual and collective existence, it can be described as the self-consciousness of a national culture. 12

This conception of the history of philosophy gives rise to two sets of criteria that define the scope of Ukrainian philosophy: first, the criteria for Ukrainian and secondly, the criteria for philosophy. For politically independent nations with a long and continuous cultural tradition and a permanent territory the contours of their culture are quite distinct and the various criteria we use to assign a thinker to a given culture usually coincide and reinforce one another. A French philosopher is normally French-born and raised in the French culture, works in France and uses French in everyday and professional life, and identifies himself as a Frenchman. But often this is not the case with Ukrainian thinkers. Because of Ukraine’s long-lasting colonial status within the Russian and Austrian empires her educated classes have often identified themselves with the ruling culture, and Ukrainian has rarely served as the language of learning. Hence national consciousness and language are not necessary conditions for being counted as a Ukrainian thinker.  Sometimes, however, they are sufficient conditions. On the other hand, place of birth, upbringing, or work are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, for some Ukrainians have been born, educated, or employed outside Ukraine, while non-Ukrainians have worked in Ukraine and have had very little contact with Ukrainian culture. What is decisive, according to Chyzhevsky, is a thinker’s relation to the Ukrainian philosophical tradition and in the last analysis to Ukrainian culture. 13 The problem is to identify this tradition and culture in a logically non-circular way.

This is a problem Chyzhevsky did not consider. To avoid a logical circle, traditions, whether philosophical or cultural, must be identified not by their properties, but by the place (territory) and the time (period) in which they originate or exist. To speak of a national tradition or culture there must be at least a period in a people’s history when it freely created its culture and institutions and these must endure in some way as the touchstone of national identity. Memory may suffice to maintain historical continuity and a sense of national identity over gaps in the independent life of a nation. In Ukraine’s history periods of cultural autonomy and creativity sometimes outlasted periods of political independence and it is the former that are crucial for determining the national affiliation of intellectual traditions.

Chyzhevsky is certainly aware of the importance of intellectual traditions for determining the Ukrainianness of various thinkers. 14 A few of Chyzhevsky’s brief comments give the impression that likenesses in the content or the form of thought are sufficient to establish the existence of a tradition. I do not think that they are: to show that a tradition exists we must establish actual influence and to do this it is necessary to establish not only similarities in ideas or patterns of thinking but also causal links.

Chyzhevsky’s concept of national philosophy implies quite generous criteria for philosophy. Without explicitly formulating the conditions for counting a thinker as a philosopher and a work as philosophical, Chyzhevsky includes in his surveys of Ukrainian philosophy not only academic philosophers and philosophical treatises but also writers such as Mykola Hohol, Panteleimon Kulish, and Taras Shevchenko and scientists such as Oleksander Potebnia and Bohdan Kistiakivsky. He has been taken to task for this by Andrii Khrutsky (Andrew Chrucky) who argues for a narrower criterion of philosophy as the “critical investigation of worldviews” and a stricter selection process. 15 Khrutsky’s argument has found little sympathy among historians of Ukrainian philosophy and for good reason. His criterion would not only reduce the field of philosophy to a few academic thinkers, it would also practically ignore, contrary to the culturological approach to national philosophy, the influence of philosophical ideas in Ukrainian culture. To bring out fully the role of philosophical ideas in a given culture the historian must consider not only the texts of professional philosophers but also various literary and scientific texts reflecting popular worldviews and containing philosophical ideas. He should also take into account various attempts to define the distinctive features of the national worldview or character, which have the effect of raising national consciousness. 16 This broad and rather complex criterion captures the range of texts and thinkers discussed by Chyzhevsky in his surveys of Ukrainian philosophy and by later specialists in the field.

Philosophy of the Heart

Chyzhevsky is the source of the often repeated and, in my estimate, meaningless claim that “‘the philosophy of the heart’ … is characteristic of Ukrainian thought.” 17 In making this claim he immediately explained that “the philosophy of the heart” stands for three distinct theses:

  1. that emotions have not only ethical and religious but also cognitive significance,
  2. that conscious experience arises from a deeper source, a mysterious “abyss,” and
  3. that man is a microcosm.

One or another of these theses has been held, as he indicates, by Kyrylo Tranquillion-Stavrovetsky, Paisii Velychkovsky, Hryhorii Skovoroda, Semen Hamaliia, Mykola Hohol, Panteleimon Kulish, and Pamfil Iurkevych, but only Hohol seems to have held all held all three theses. 18 Even if Chyzhevsky were to assert that these thinkers are somehow “representative” of Ukrainian philosophy, it would not be clear how any one or all three theses are characteristic of Ukrainian thought. Chyzhevsky can hardly claim that any one (let alone all three) of these theses was first proposed by a Ukrainian thinker or is accepted by all Ukrainian thinkers. It is not the case that the three theses are logically connected or that the seven thinkers mentioned in this context constitute a school or tradition of thought. In fact they were very different in their world outlook and in their philosophical interests. They used the common word “heart” not as a concept, but as a symbol for very different things. Thus I cannot imagine what Chyzhevsky might have meant by “characteristic” here, and he made no attempt to explain what he meant. 19

There have been some recent attempts to defend Chyzhevsky against my criticisms of his claim about the philosophy of the heart, 20 which in my opinion have not been successful. Mykhailo Skrynnyk argued that Skovoroda, Iurkevych, Hohol, and Kulish share the view that there is something deeper in man than reason, and therefore they constitute a tradition of thought. 21 But agreement on a very general and vague point such as this is not enough for a tradition. The fact is that the four mentioned thinkers were very different in their worldviews and intellectual interests. But even if they did represent a single tradition why would that tradition be more characteristic of Ukrainian philosophy than some other one? 

Another of my critics, Iryna Valiavko, admits (1) that no one theory or trend can be representative of the thought of a nation and (2) that there is nothing distinctively Ukrainian about the first and second theses into which Chyzhevsky breaks down the philosophy of the heart. According to her, only the third thesis on man as a microcosm is characteristic of Ukrainian thought, and she tries to show that, although it is not found in Iurkevych, this conception of man is found in Skovoroda, Kulish, Taras Shevchenko, Mykola Kostomarov, Lesia Ukrainka, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, Bohdan Ihor Antonych, Oleksander Dovzhenko, and Pavlo Tychyna. 22

There are several fatal flaws in her argument. First, she reduces the idea of microcosm to the distinction between “inner” and “outer” man or between soul and body. Although historically the conception of man as microcosm has been closely associated with the dualistic conception of man, it is not logically equivalent to or logically connected with the latter. There is no hint in Chyzhevsky that what he really meant by microcosm was dualism. Secondly, the idea of two natures or substances in man is almost universal. Even the language of “inner” or “internal” and “outer” or “external” man is widespread. Chyzhevsky points out that these very terms can be found in the Bible and in the works of ancient and Christian thinkers such as Philo Judaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, Macarius of Egypt, Anthony of the Desert, Meister Eckhart, Jakob Boehme, Sebastian Frank, Angelus Silesius, Heinrich Suso, Johannes Tauler, and Thomas á Kempis. 23 Many more names could be added to the list. Obviously, the language and the ideas behind it did not originate with 24 and are not unique to Ukrainian thinkers and writers. Furthermore, the dualistic terminology that is used in describing man is part of ordinary language. Hence, the fact that some writers use this terminology does not indicate that they have the same or even any definite philosophical conception of man in mind. 

Philosophy at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

In one area of the history of Ukrainian philosophy—the development of philosophy in Ukraine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—Chyzhevsky’s views were well ahead of his time. While Ukrainian scholars, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ivan Franko, and MykhailoVozniak believed that the philosophy taught at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy was an obsolete and lifeless scholasticism, Chyzhevsky asserted that, on the contrary, in the seventeenth century this was an up-to-date, intellectually vibrant neoscholasticism and in the eighteenth century the professors of the academy were familiar with modern European thought. 25 Furthermore, he argued that the philosophy cultivated at the academy was not remote from the cultural life of the time but an important part of the distinctive Baroque culture that flourished in Ukraine. Philosophy was involved in the religious polemics of the time and the defense of the Orthodox faith, which in turn was closely associated with national consciousness. Since in his time the manuscripts of the academy’s courses had not been studied yet and Chyzhevsky himself lacked access to them, he did not have the empirical data for a fuller, more detailed account of the academy’s philosophical tradition, but the account he did give has been largely confirmed by later researchers. 26 Since the 1960s this area of the history of Ukrainian philosophy has been the most exciting and rapidly developing branch of philosophical research in Ukraine.

Skovoroda

Skovoroda was Chyzhevsky’s favorite Ukrainian philosopher. The works he devoted to Skovoroda outnumber by far his writings on any other philosopher: a monograph and over twenty articles. His works are an almost inexhaustible mine of information and interesting observations, but the overall result of all his efforts is rather disappointing. After a lengthy (200-page) and detailed comparison of Skovoroda’s philosophical doctrines, terminology, symbols, images, and phrases with those of several German mystics (Franz von Baader, Boehme, Meister Eckhart, Frank, Silesius, Suso, Tauler, and Valentin Weigel), Chyzhevsky reaches the conclusion that Skovoroda is a mystic, or to be more exact, that Skovoroda’s philosophical system has all the constituents of a “mystical philosophical system:” 27 it rests on a dualistic metaphysics and includes a doctrine of opposites, a metaphysical interpretation of symbols, a typically mystical anthropology and ethics. Chyzhevsky cautions us that, although Skovoroda’s philosophy is mystical, we cannot be certain that Skovoroda himself was a mystic, for we have no solid evidence of Skovoroda’s mystical experiences. 28 After analyzing Skovoroda’s ideas and biographical data, Chyzhevsky concludes: “Although there may be a shadow of doubt about Skovoroda’s own mystical experience, there can be no doubt about the mystical character of his philosophy!” 29 I have no objection to the first part of the conclusion, but I do have some reservations about the second part. First of all, in what sense is Skovoroda’s philosophy mystical?

I would claim that it is mystical only in a weak sense; that is, it is a version of Neoplatonism, a type of system that is typical of mystics but also often embraced by religious thinkers who are not mystics. Chyzhevsky admits as much when he says that “Skovoroda’s ‘methodology’ and ‘metaphysics’ have many analogies in mystical and non-mystical thinkers.” 30 To be mystical in the strong sense, his philosophy would have to have not just a dualistic metaphysics and anthropology, but also a special kind of ethics—an ethics that posits mystical experience as the goal of life and outlines the methods or steps for attaining it. Chyzhevsky claims that Skovoroda does have an ethics that shows how the individual can transcend the bounds of his human nature and fuse with God to become divine. 31 In support of his interpretation Chyzhevsky musters an impressive array of expressions in Skovoroda that are typical of mystical writers and suggest mystical experience. 32 And yet I question this interpretation, and I do so for three reasons.

First, as Chyzhevsky himself points out, there is no doctrine of the degrees of the soul’s progress to fusion with God. 33 Secondly, there is no union or fusion with God that involves loss of self. On the contrary, Skovoroda speaks of union with God as a discovery of one’s true self, as a form of self-knowledge. The transfiguration or divinization that one undergoes is a change from one’s superficial or false self to one’s true self, the inner man. Contrary to what Chyzhevsky suggests this kind of union with God is accomplished not through mystical experience but rather through knowledge and reason. It requires not self-denial, self-mortification, and self-renunciation, but self-knowledge and dialogue. Finally, the key to Skovoroda’s ethics lies in his doctrine of congenial work. According to this doctrine the goal of life is happiness, not mystical experience, and the way to happiness lies not in escape from society and the cares of this world but in activity, in self-realization through socially beneficial work. This is not an ethics of escape from either oneself or the world. Hence, there is no room for mystics or even hermits in Skovoroda’s ethics.

            It is rather obvious that Skovoroda’s philosophy is mystical in the weak sense and this requires no great effort to prove. On the other hand, to contend that Skovoroda’s philosophy is mystical in the strong is to give too much weight to his language and to ignore the main thrust of his moral teachings. 34

            It should be clear from this critical outline of Chyzhevsky’s contribution to the history of Ukrainian philosophy that for all his shortcomings it was Chyzhevsky who laid its foundations, which later researchers refined and expanded. Considering the materials available to him and the conditions in which he worked, his single-handed achievement is truly remarkable. During the Soviet period two areas of Ukrainian philosophy received much attention—the philosophical ideas in the culture of Kyivan Rus’ and the development of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the post-Soviet period, while research in these areas continues, historians of Ukrainian philosophy are turning their attention increasingly on the nineteenth century. The framework of the history of Ukrainian philosophy established by Chyzhevsky is being steadily filled in with new facts, texts, and interpretations. 


Notes

1   Vilen Horsky noted that Chyzhevsky’s contributions to the history of Ukrainian philosophy are probably his most important contributions to the history of philosophy and that “he can justifiably be considered to be the founder of the scholarly discipline of the history of Ukrainian philosophy” (“Dmytro Chyzhevsky iak fundator istoryko-filosofskoho ukrainoznavstva,” in Dialoh kultur,  ed. Lesia Dovha (Kyiv: Respublikanska asotsiatsiia ukrainoznavtsiv, 1996), 13, and the late Valeriia Nichyk stated, “Dmytro Chyzhevsky was the first and most noted historian of Ukrainian philosophy, which he studied as a specialist employing the theoretical achievements and methodology of the latest tendencies of world scholarship in the branches of the philosophy and culturology of the Slavic peoples” (“Dmytro Chyzhevsky i novitni doslidzhennia filosofskoi spadshchyny profesoriv Kyievo-Mohylianskoi Akademii,” Ibid., 29).

2 It appeared first as Filosofiia na Ukraini: Sproba istoriografii (Prague: Siiach, 1926; 2d ed. 1928) and then  in a fuller and more popular version as  Narysy z istorii filosofii na Ukraini (Prague: Ukrainskyi hromadskyi vydavnychyi fond, 1931).  The latter was a reconstruction from memory and remaining materials of a lost larger manuscript completed in 1927 (see his preface to Narysy). A third survey appeared as a chapter “Ukrainska filosofiia” in Ukrainska kultura, ed. Dmytro Antonovych (Munich: 1940; 2d ed. Munich: Ukrainskyi tekhnichno-hospodarskyi instytut, 1988), 176–99.

These surveys were preceded by three much slighter unsystematic works about Ukrainian philosophy: (1) Clemens Hankiewicz’s Grundzüge der slavischen Philosophie (Cracow, 1869; 2d ed. Rzeszow, 1873), in which the fifth chapter (pp. 45-68) is titled “Philosophie bei den Ruthenen.” It outlines the Volkesphilosophie (popular worldview) of the Ukrainian people and the ideas of three nineteenth-century Ukrainian thinkers: Petro Lodii (1764–1829), Iosyf Chachkovsky (?), and Ivan Fedorovych (1811–70). This chapter has been translated by Serhii Vakulenko and published in Zbirnyk Kharkivskoho istorychno-filolohichnoho tovarystva. Nova seriia 9 (1998): 153–66. (2) Vasyl Shchurat’s booklet of 32 pages Ukrainski dzherela do istorii filosofii (Lviv, 1908), which was first serialized in the Lviv newspaper Dilo, nos. 59-64, 1908, traced the influence of medieval Neoplatonist sources in old Ukrainian literature from the tenth to the seventeenth century. One section of this booklet, the section on Slovo o polku Ihorevim, is reprinted in Shchurat’s Vybrani pratsi z istorii literatury (Kyiv: AN URSR, 1963), 27–34. (3) Only a few fragments of Mykola Sumtsov’s large manuscript Nacherky ukrainskoi filosofii v 20-ty viddilakh (Outlines of Ukrainian Philosophy in Twenty Chapters) (see D. Bahalii, “Naukova spadshchyna akad. M.F. Sumtsova,” Chervonyi shliakh, 1923, no. 3: 166) were found and published by A. Kovalivsky in Biuleten Muzeiu Slobidskoi Ukrainy im. H. S. Skovorody, 1926–27, nos. 2–3: 51–74. Recently they were reprinted in Zbirnyk Kharkivskoho istoryko-filolohichnoho tovarystava. Nova seriia 7 (1998): 149–82.  They deal only with the some aspects of Skovoroda’s thought: some of its similarities with Marquis de Vovenargue’s (1715–47), Henry Amiel’s (1821–81), Aleksandr Herzen’s (1812–70), and Ernest Renan’s ideas; Vladimir Ern’s unhistorical treatment of Skovoroda; some similar doctrines in Herasym Smotrytsky and Dmitrii of Rostov; and Skovoroda’s views on the Bible and reason. As we can see not one of these studies comes close to a historical survey of Ukrainian philosophy.

3 For example, Skovoroda as a Ukrainian thinker (1929), Skovoroda and German mysticism (1929), on Skovoroda’s philosophy (1929), Skovoroda’s philosophical method (1930), Shevchenko and David Straus (1931),  Lypynsky as a philosopher of history (1932), Kulish and the philosophy of the heart (1933), Skovoroda  and Silesius (1933), Skovoroda and Philo’s theory of knowledge (1933), sources of Skovoroda’s symbols (1933), Skovoroda’s interpretation of the Bible, Fathers of the Church, and mystics (1935), Skovoroda and  Weisel (1935), Shevchenko’s religious beliefs (1936), Western influences in Ukraine from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century (1927), the influence of the Renaissance in Ukraine (1929), Plato in Rus’ (1931), Ivan Vyshensky (1951), Socianism in Ukraine (53), and Schelling’s influence in Ukraine (1956). Chyzhevsky’s works in the history of Ukrainian philosophy are listed in D. Gerhardt’s “Schriftenverzeichnis von D.I. Čyževśkyj (1912-1954),” in Festschrift für Dmytro Čyževśkyj zum 60. Geburstag am 23. März 1954, ed. M. Vasmer (Berlin: Free University of Berlin, 1954), 1–35, and Hans-Jürgen zum Winkel, “Schriftenverzeichnis von D.I. Tschižewśkij (1954–1965),” in Orbis scriptus: Dmitrij Tschižewśkij zum 70. Geburstag, ed. D. Gerhardt, W. Weintraub, and H.-J. zum Winkel (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1966), 35–48.

4 Filosofiia H. S. Skovorody (Warsaw: Ukrainskyi naukovyi instytut, 1934; 2d ed. Kharkiv: Akta, 2003). It appeared in a revised German translation as Skoworoda: Dichter, Denker, Mystiker (Munich: Fink, 1974).

5 P. 4. Henceforth references are to the corrected edition published in Kyiv by Orii in 1992.

6 See Iryna Viktorivna Valiavko, “Dmytro Chyzhevsky iak doslidnyk ukrainskoi filosofskoi dumky” (Candidate diss., Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1997). Valiavko outlines Chyzhevsky’s interpretation of the Baroque period in Ukraine and of H.S. Skovoroda’s philosophy, summarizes his views on the influence of ancient and of classical German philosophy on Ukraine’s intellectual culture, and attempts to save his thesis about the place of the philosophy of the heart in Ukrainian thought. Her critical evaluation of Chyzhevsky’s ideas is balanced and well grounded. Thanks to her lucid and orderly style of writing the dissertation is a pleasure to read. It has not been published, but it is available on the Internet at < www.library.kr.ua/elib/dissert/valavko.html>

7 Filosofiia na Ukraini (2d ed.), 13; Narysy, 5–6.

8 Filosofiia na Ukraini (2d ed.), 15–16; Narysy, 9–10.

9 Narysy, 11.

10 Filosofiia na Ukraini (2d ed.), 23; Narysy, 13.

11 Vilen Horsky, Istoriia ukrainskoi filosofii: Kurs lektsii (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1996), 13.

12 For a concise summary of Horsky’s conception of the history of philosophy, see my review of his book in the Journal of Ukrainian Studies 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 114–15.

13 Filosofiia na Ukraini (2d ed.), 24. Later historians have agreed with Chyzhevsky that the criterion that determines who is to count as a Ukrainian thinker has to be complex and flexible. For example, see V. Horsky, “Ukraina v istoryko-filosofskomu vymiri,” Filosofska i sotsiolohichna dumka, 1993, no. 2: 25.

14 For example, he says: “Finally, undoubtedly the narrow path that continues the old tradition, no matter who stands on it — a Ukrainian or a foreigner — deserves the closest attention. Hence, by special interest in the Kyiv Academy, hence my attention to the foreigner Schad around whom, as we see, a group of former students of the Academy formed, for this reason I pay attention to Avsenev, etc.” (Filosofiia na Ukraini [2d ed.], 6).

15 A. Khrutsky, “Komentari do istoriohrafii filosofii v Ukraini Chyzhevskoho,” Suchasnist, 1988, no. 5: 62–3. This is a Ukrainian translation done by Vitalij Keis. The original English version is available on the Internet at <www.ditext.com/chrucky/ukraine.html>.

16 This broad and complex criterion has been proposed by V. Horsky in his “Ukraina v istoryko-filosofskomu vymiri,” Filosofska i sotsiolohichna dumka, 1993, no. 2: 25–7 and Istoriia ukrainskoi filosofii, 20.

17 Chyzhevsky, Narysy, 22; and “Ukrainska filosofiia” in Ukrainska kultura (2d ed.), 197.

18 Chyzhevsky, “Ukrainska filosofiia,” 197.

19 An attempt to make some sense of Chyzhevsky’s claim was made by Mariia Kashuba who suggested that the philosophy of the heart is simply the “introversion,” the concentration on the individual person that is traditional in Ukrainian thought (see her  “Dmytro Chyzhevsky i ‘filosofiia sertsia’ v ukrainskii dukhovnii kulturi,” Dmytro Chyzhevsky: Fundator istoryko-filosofskoho ukrainoznavstva, ed. M. Alchuk, I. Zakhara, and A. Karas [Lviv: Lvivskyi derzhavnyi universytet, 1996], 25).

20 See my “Poniattia sertsia v ukrainskii filosofskii dumtsi,” Filosofska i sotsiolohichna dumka, 1991, no. 8:127–38; and “Doslidy v diaspori nad istorieiu vkrainskoi filosofii,” Filosofska i sotsiolohichna dumka, 1993, no. 4: 95.

21 See his “Dmytro Chyzhevsky ta kulturolohichni vymiry ukrainskoi natsionalnoi filosofii,” Dialoh kultur, 26–7.

22 Iryna Potaieva [Valiavko], “Pro ‘filosofiiu sertsia’ v pratsiakh Dmytra Chyzhevskoho,” Filosofska i sotsiolohichna dumka, 1994, nos. 5–6: 25–8; and idem, “Dmytro Chyzhevsky iak doslidnyk ukrainskoi filosofskoi dumky,” chap. 1, sec. 3.

23 Chyzhevsky, Filosofiia H.S. Skovorody, 107–8.

24 Contrary to what Valiavko suggests: “Skovoroda became the author of a new and original cordocentric philosophy, the essence of which lies in the fact that in viewing man as a ‘microcosm’ he divides man into ‘inner’ and ‘outer'” ( “Pro ‘filosofiiu sertsia’ v pratsiakh Dmytra Chyzhevskoho,” 25).

25 Filosofiia na Ukraini (2d ed.), 56; Narysy, 30–1.

26 See Valeriia Nichyk, “Dmytro Chyzhevsky i novitni doslidzhennia filosofskoi spadshchyny profesoriv Kyievo-Mohylianskoi akademii,” Dialoh kultur, 28–40. For a comprehensive account of Chyzhevsky’s contribution to the study of the intellectual culture of the Ukrainian Baroque, see Iryna Valiavko’s candidate’s dissertation Dmytro Chyzhevsky iak doslidnyk ukrainskoi filosofskoi dumky (Kyiv, 1997), chap. 1, sec. 1.

27 Filosofiia H.S. Skovorody, 181.

28 Ibid., 182. And yet, Chyzhevsky goes on to construct a hypothesis about Skovoroda’s transition through the three stages of mystical experience — purification, illumination, and ecstasy — on the basis of Skovoroda’s brief sketch of a dream in “Son” and his biographer’s description of an experience of rapture at nature’s beauty (p. 183).

29 Ibid., 185.

30 Ibid., 181.

31 Ibid.

32 Skovoroda speaks of seeing God, becoming one with God, being transfigured into God, being the lover and spouse of God, the soul’s second birth, God being born in the soul, drunkenness as ecstasy, and being overpowered by various sensations (ibid., 184–5).

33 Ibid., 136.

34 A fine exposition of Chyzhevsky’s interpretation of Skovoroda’s philosophy as a typical form of mysticism is given by Iryna Valiavko in her Filosofiia Hryhoriia Skovorody v osmyslenni Dmytra Chyzhevskoho (Kyiv: Kyivske bratstvo, 1996), 33–6. The only thing lacking is a critical assessment of Chyzhevsky’s interpretation.