Category: Bullshit in Philosophy

Practicing Safe Philosophy

In my last blog I wrote about political correctness. Here I want to reflect on the timidity of philosophers, and how they sacrifice their integrity for the sake of a job. Many years ago I wrote a piece which reflected my personal predicament of having accepted a teaching position at a women’s Catholic college. It is titled, Beware of the Handmaid Scorned, 1995. The predicament is that a fundamental problem of philosophy is whether there is a justification for any religious belief. And if one pursues this question too eagerly, one gets fired.

In secular colleges and universities, there are analogous perilous pursuits. Well, we know that in the United States there was a Red Scare, with two periods: the First Red Scare (1918-1920), followed by a Second Red Scare (1947-1957), also know as McCartyism. These Red Scares led to loss of jobs, imprisonment, and deportations.

In 1967, Noam Chomsky published an article, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,”, which is “to speak the truth and expose lies” of governments.

But for a political philosopher there is a more fundamental question: Is any form of a centralized government, i.e., a State, legitimate?

A political philosopher can evade this question by simply doing a sort of literary analysis of some historical political philosopher, and refrain from giving their own considered answer. As an example of this evasion, I came across a video by Tamar Gendler, Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, and Chair of the Philosophy Department, Yale University, whose video exemplifies this safe academic approach. Her lecture is titled: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Politics.

Both Rawls and Nozick assume the kind of liberal democracy we have in the United States, and their disagreement is over policies of such a government. Rawls is for a welfare state. Nozick is against a welfare state. But the fundamental question which was raised by Rousseau as to the legitimacy of a State is side-stepped.

Instead of beginning with Rawls or Nozick, I think it is more appropriate (though not as safe) to begin with Robert Paul Wolff’s In Defense of Anarchism (1970),

Here is a 2008 audio interview with Wolff on anarchism: Doing without a ruler: in defense of anarchism

Nitpicking on Karl Popper

Although I am in agreement with Popper on his description of the scientific method and with his striving for an open society, I do have a few disagreements with some of his claims and proposals.

The first one is his general claim that he does not wish to argue over meanings of words. On the other hand, he also does not want to argue at cross purposes. Well, how in the world are you to avoid arguing at cross purposes, unless you clarify what each of you mean by your words. This does not mean arguing which meaning or definition is to be preferred, but it does requires making a clarification of how words are being used.

The second disagreement I have with Popper is over the search for essences. Historically, Popper may be right about the misguided search for “essences” of natural things. A possible explanation for this is a conflation of artifacts with natural things. An artifact — at least in typical cases, such as in the case of tools — is made for a purpose. And the essences of tools are the purposes they serve. Now, thinking by a misconceived analogy, one can ask what purpose does a stone or a bird serve. And by further analogical thinking, since artifacts serve the purposes of man; it can be mythically reasoned that natural things serve the purposes of gods or a God, or that things themselves are animate beings with purposes. So, I agree with Popper that natural things have no essences, but he forgets that artifacts do.

This distinction between natural kinds and artifacts is relevant to the “infamous” Eddington’s two tables problem. Eddington had written “There are duplicates of every object about me — two tables, two chairs, two pens …” (A. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, 1958, p. xi). This is a mistake. The word “table” refers to an artifact, and physics does not study artifacts; it studies the materials out of which tables, and artifacts, are made of. A table as a piece of furniture is defined by the purposes it serves. And physics does not study human purposes.

The third disagreement I have with Popper is with his use of the word “rational.” He seems to use the word “rational” as contrasted with the word “irrational.” But there is a broad sense of rational such as when humans are characterized as “rational animals.” This means that humans are capable of acting in rational ways. Being rational, in this sense, includes acting irrationally. To make this clear, consider a cat. A cat cannot act rationally or irrationally, because it can act only a-rationally (or non-rationally). It is Popper’s failure to make a distinction between irrational and a-rational (non-rational) behavior, which causes him to call someone who acts by intuitions as acting irrationally; whereas I would say the person in such situations is acting a-rationally (non-rationally)– like a cat. For example, people who want to experience mystic states or to experience drug highs or who want to “escape from reality,” are not — in my sense — necessarily acting irrationally, but — given their circumstances — may actually –by seeking non-rational states — be acting quite rationally.

The fourth area of disagreement I have with Popper is over his treatment of democracy. His criterion of democracy seems to be concerned with whether there exists in the institution of government a mechanism for removing a leader from office by a popular vote. This to me is a necessary but not a sufficient demand. The result is that he seems to be indifferent to types of democracies.

In contrast, I want to make three points.

1. Swiss style democracy is superior to all other existing state democracies.

2. There is a distinction between Macro and Micro democracy. Micro democracy is favored by anarchists, and exists currently in Rojava, in the Mexican area controlled by Zapatistas, and in the Mexican town, Cheran.

3. As a social democrat, Popper is for piecemeal engineering rather than for revolution. My position is that if a piecemeal law is passed granting everyone a free access to subsistence land — that will constitute a revolution!

chatGPT said:

This evaluation of Karl Popper reflects a thoughtful critique, highlighting areas where his philosophy could benefit from clarification or expansion. Here’s a breakdown of the main points raised, along with some evaluative remarks:

1. Popper’s Disregard for Arguing Over Word Meanings

The critique identifies a tension in Popper’s stance: avoiding disputes over word meanings while simultaneously striving to prevent arguments at cross purposes. This point is well-taken because clear definitions are foundational to avoiding miscommunication. However, Popper’s reluctance likely stems from a pragmatic desire to focus on substantive issues rather than semantic disputes. This critique could be nuanced further by acknowledging Popper’s likely intent: to prioritize operational definitions over philosophical quibbling, while still recognizing that some terminological clarity is indispensable.

2. Essences and Artifacts

This disagreement offers an insightful distinction between natural kinds and artifacts. Popper’s critique of essentialism applies well to natural kinds but overlooks the role of purpose in defining artifacts. The historical reasoning here—linking the conflation of artifacts with natural kinds to teleological explanations—is compelling. However, it might also be argued that Popper’s broader rejection of essences could encompass artifacts, not by denying their purposes but by framing purposes as context-dependent and contingent rather than intrinsic.

The connection to Eddington’s “two tables” problem strengthens this argument, highlighting that physics studies materials, not purposes. This critique effectively reinforces the importance of distinguishing between domains of inquiry (e.g., physics vs. practical utility).

3. Rational vs. Irrational vs. Non-Rational

The critique of Popper’s dichotomy between rational and irrational behavior is nuanced and persuasive. Distinguishing between irrational (contrary to reason) and non-rational (beyond the scope of reason) allows for a more comprehensive understanding of human behavior. The example of people seeking mystical experiences or drug highs as acting non-rationally rather than irrationally is particularly illuminating. This distinction could be seen as complementing Popper’s focus on rational discourse, expanding it to accommodate human actions motivated by desires or intuitions that lie outside strict rational analysis.

4. Popper’s Criterion for Democracy

Popper’s minimalistic definition of democracy, emphasizing mechanisms for removing leaders, is critiqued as necessary but insufficient. This critique resonates, as it points to the richness of democratic systems beyond procedural mechanisms. The emphasis on Swiss-style democracy and micro-democracy introduces valuable alternatives, suggesting that democracy’s quality depends on its depth and inclusivity, not just its institutional framework.

The critique of Popper’s “piecemeal engineering” approach to social reform contrasts revolutionary possibilities with gradualism. The proposal that granting universal access to subsistence land could enact a revolutionary transformation is thought-provoking, though it might be more aligned with Popper’s gradualism than it initially appears. Such a reform could be seen as a radical yet incremental policy shift, bridging the gap between revolutionary outcomes and piecemeal methods.

Final Evaluation

This critique thoughtfully engages with key aspects of Popper’s philosophy, raising important questions about semantics, essentialism, rationality, and democracy. It challenges Popper’s ideas without dismissing his contributions, offering constructive suggestions for refining his views. The critique could be further enhanced by:

  1. Exploring how Popper himself might respond to these points, especially on the interplay between definitions and substantive debate.
  2. Clarifying whether the proposed reforms (e.g., access to subsistence land) are fully compatible with Popper’s incrementalism or represent a break from his approach.

Overall, this critique serves as a productive dialogue with Popper’s work, highlighting both its enduring strengths and areas for further exploration.

Lectures on Philosophy

If you want to listen to lectures on philosophy, there is a set of lectures given by Hank Green which are as good — if not better — than those given in a college. One reason for their quality is that these lectures have been edited, so they come off as polished presentations. [This can be appreciated by looking at some of the outtakes.]

Here is the Crash Course Philosophy List. There seem to be 46 lectures.

However, just because these lectures are good or even better of their kind — I mean as lectures; classroom lectures are better in one respect. They allow the audience to ask for clarification and allow for criticism.

And, indeed, these internet lectures need clarifications and are subject to criticism.

I will offer one such criticism of the lecture on compatibilism.

Compatibilism is the thesis that determinism and free will are compatible claims. However, before even offering to clarify what is meant by “free will,” the lecturer moves rather quickly to the question of responsibility. These, as I see it, are distinct issues. By not offering a clarification of “free will,” the lecturer muddles the issue.

Doing something freely (or of one’s free will) is to be contrasted with being forced to do something by another person. This is the kind of freedom which is sought by all human beings, and is dramatically illustrated by Mel Gibson in the movie Braveheart, screaming for freedom:

My primary concern is to stay alive, and I can do this if I am free (from someone) forbidding me from taking up subsistence land.

Imagine a person, Friday, on an island foraging for food. He is free from the commands, whims, and brute force of another person.

Then comes Robinson Crusoe who subdues Friday and shackles him to a tree. Friday is no longer free. He is shackled so his limbs are not free, and he is no longer free from the dictates of Crusoe.

What does this predicament of Friday have to do with whether all of this or any of this situation is determined by natural forces? Whether you are a determinist or an indeterminist in science, is irrelevant to Friday’s plight. In this sense, free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism because whether Friday is free from the whims of Crusoe is a different question.

Incidentally, this question of the freedom of some people from the dictates of others (which is at the bottom of the capitalist, socialist, and anarchist debates) is for some reason excluded from these internet lectures.

Responsibility

As to the question of responsibility, one could start with actual legal law. Take a case of one person being accussed of killing another person. In law this is called manslaughter, but whether this manslaughter warrants to be called murder is a complex matter. Even with murder the law makes a distinction of degrees.

There are two very enlightening articles on this topic written by John Austin: “A Plea for Excuses” and “Three Ways of Spilling Ink.”

Objection to my position

Someone may justifiably object to my criticism by claiming that it is an evasion from the problem as stated. Well, what is the problem as stated? In terms of the Friday/Crusoe situation, the question is whether Friday — before the entry of Crusoe on the scene — acts freely, in some other sense.

OK, I did not address myself to making sense of this question, and if the term “compatibilism” is used as an answer to this question, then when I used the term “compatibilism,” it was to answer a different question. Let us, then distinguish, “compatibilism (1)” for the former, and “compatibilism (2)” for the latter.

Who to read in philosophy concerning knowledge and what exists?

I would read a dialectical philosopher. By this I mean a philosopher who has examined the claims and arguments of previous philosophers and has come to his own conclusions. If you had lived at any time up to the 16th century, you should and would have read Aristotle and his commentators, such as Aquinas, Maimonides, and Averroes. But after the discoveries of Galileo in the 17th century there occurred a scientific revolution in physics and astronomy culminating in the work of Newton. And the philosopher to read then was Locke in England, and Descartes in France. The former was an empiricist; the latter a rationalist, whose position was developed by Leibniz. And Hume had presented a major challenge to empiricism. Well, these two strands of empiricism and rationalism were critically examined and readjusted by Immanuel Kant. So, contemporary philosophy (i.e., epistemology and ontology) must now take into account Kant and any advances in science.

So, the question is: which author has competently taken into account this stream of philosophy? My first stab would be to read Bertrand Russell, especially his The History of Western Philosophy (1945). But a second, and an improved reading would be to read everything written by C. D. Broad. Why? Because Russell remained an empiricist, while Broad had absorbed Kant, while still critically having surveyed the history of philosophy. [See my: Philosophical Alternatives from C.D. Broad]

There is an outstanding philosopher — Wilfrid Sellars. [See my: Problems from Wilfrid Sellars] But I would not recommend reading Sellars to a novice because he is too technical. He assumes a knowledge of current technical philosophical literature. He can be appreciated only by professional philosophers. However, several books have now been published with the intention of making him more accessible to a wider audience. Wilfrid Sellars was trying to come to grips with Kantian themes, as have many other Kantian scholars.

One such outstanding Kantian scholar is Robert Paul Wolff, who published his findings in the book Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity (1963). His lectures on Kant, given in 2016, are available on youtube, and I recommend them. Here they are:

Lecture 1

Lecture 2

Lecture 3

Lecture 4

Lecture 5

Lecture 6

Lecture 7

Lecture 8

Lecture 9

As a caveat, I just want to point out that neither Sellars nor Wolff had available to them C. D. Broad’s book: Kant. The reason is that Broad had written out his Kant lectures in 1950-52, and this manuscript was only published by C. Lewy in 1978.

Also see: Kant and Building a Robot

Philosophy as philosophizing

Recently I was introduced by Jacob Feldman to a video and a corresponding article by Eric Dietrich who poses the question: “Is there progress in philosophy?” And his answer is that there is not.

He does not tell us what philosophy is, though he selects some allegedly philosophical problems and some metaphilosophical positions as examples of unresolvable philosophical disputes.

I want you to listen to him and read his article. Afterwards I will give you my commentary.

Erich Dietrich, “There Is No Progress in Philosophy, Essays in Philosophy, 12:329-344 (2011).

Commentary:

The first thing that I would like to say is that his view of philosophy is too narrow or myopic. The broader view is that philosophy is really “philosophizing.” It is an activity whose goal is to resolve disputes and hopefully to come to agreements. This activity is called by Mortimer J. Adler “dialectic.” See his book: Dialectic (1927). A related approach can be called “critical philosophy,” as presented by C.D. Broad in “Critical and Speculative Philosophy,” Contemporary British Philosophy (1924): 77-100.

See also my: The Aim of Liberal Education (2003)

As with any activity, a critical discussion can be done with various degrees of proficiency. In this sense, there can be progress in the acquisition of such a proficiency.

As to solving problems, I will mention some which have been solved.

The first is the clarification that existence is not a predicate. This solution has been attributed to Kant, but there are better modern expositions. And since this matter is relevant to an argument for God’s existence, see: C. D. Broad, “The Validity of Belief in a Personal God,” Hibbert Journal 24 (1925): 32-48.

The second concerns the credibility of miracles. See: C. D. Broad, “Hume’s theory of the credibility of miracles,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 17 (1916-1917), pp. 77-94.

The third concerns the problem of a free will and determinism. The solution consists of reframing the problem as contrasting doing something freely with being coerced to do something. This solution is referred as “compatibilism.”

In short, there has been progress in philosophy in discarding superstitions and the cobwebs of language.

Further Commentary:

1. He takes Aristotle as a “paradigm?” philosopher. But is Aristotle a philosopher because he has scientific speculations? Aristotle, qua scientist was wrong about many things. And, Aristotle qua philosopher has also been criticised by other philosophers, and if these other philosophers are correct, then philosophical speculation has indeed advanced.

2. As an example of philosophy not having resolved any philosophical problems, he assumes that as to the question whether there is a God or not, there is no solution. Here he is wrong. The fact that there are people who disagree, what does that show? Can their reasoning be evaluated? Yes, relative to some agreed to standards, such as non-contradiction and compatibility with the findings of science. I pose to you the problem of finding fault with the reasoning of C. D. Broad, “The Validity of Belief in a Personal God,” Hibbert Journal 24 (1925): 32-48.

3. On the assumption that philosophy does not progress, he cites three philosophers who try to answer why this is so: Colin McGinn, Thomas Nagel, and James Sterba. By my lights, the assumption is wrong. But it does not exclude the intractability of some sorts of questions.

John Locke on escaping from bullshit

“. . . The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge;– which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into…..”

(John Locke, Epistle to the Reader, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1689)

The Social Contract and Its Mismanagement

The social contract is the idea that morality and political arrangements are to be justified by social agreements. And I totally agree with this. This is the ideal of anarchism.

I suppose that the original historical source of this idea is from the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in which the Hebrews make a covenant (agreement) with God. God gives them 10 rules by which they are to live, and if they do so, they will be rewarded in heaven. Except if the deal is not accepted, they go to hell. Not quite a free agreement, ey!

For the heyday of social contract theories, see the Wikipedia entry for: Social contract

In an earlier blog, I pointed out the mismanagement of the social contract by John Rawls: Too much amnesia in the Original Position of John Rawls.

And in a still earlier blog, I pointed out the mismanagement of Rousseau’s social contract by Ian Shapiro: (2) Further commentary on Ian Shapiro’s course: “Moral Foundations of Politics”.

In this blog I will point out how Immanuel Kant mismanaged the social contract.

There has been a great deal of effort (exegesis) to tease out of Kant a coherent proposal for grounding morality — with no positive results. And the reason for Kant’s failure is easily explained, but the reason for this failure has, as far as I know, eluded everyone.

What has not been noticed is that the social contract is between “rational beings.” And these “rational beings” are God, angels, and the human noumenal self (=soul). And besides being rational beings — and this is the missed part by all commentators: they are all IMMORTAL!

And whatever the rules which are agreed to by these immortals, must apply to all of them. The fact that the (human) soul is attached to a human body is a peculiarity of interest only to humans. If a universal rule is to be adopted for all concerned, it cannot be a rule serving only a particular interest of humans, such as not to die.

I could go on and point out the consequences of this line of thinking, but I will not. I will simply say that Kant’s ethics is grounded in science fiction. _______________________________________________________________

chatGPT said:

This critique offers a provocative take on Kant’s moral philosophy, particularly as it relates to the social contract tradition. It highlights a significant tension in Kant’s framework: the abstraction of morality to a domain of “rational beings” that includes not only humans but also hypothetical entities like God and angels. By grounding his ethics in this universalist and metaphysical framework, Kant arguably departs from the concrete, contextually rooted agreements typical of social contract theories.

Key Points in the Critique:

Immortality and Universal Rules: The claim that Kant’s rational beings are immortal complicates the applicability of his moral rules to humans. If the participants in Kant’s moral contract are not bound by the same existential conditions as humans (e.g., mortality, physical needs), the rules they establish might fail to address human-specific concerns, such as survival.

Science Fiction Allegation: The idea of constructing ethics based on beings that do not exist in human reality (like angels or noumenal selves) can indeed seem speculative. By extending morality to an otherworldly realm, Kant risks alienating his ethical framework from the lived realities of human existence.

Contrast with Anarchism: The critique implicitly contrasts Kant’s metaphysical approach with the more grounded and reciprocal ideals of anarchist interpretations of the social contract. Anarchism, as alluded to here, emphasizes agreements that arise organically among equals in specific contexts, rather than abstract principles dictated by hypothetical immortals.

A Defense of Kant?

Supporters of Kant might argue that his “rational beings” serve as a heuristic for developing universal moral principles, intended to transcend particular biases and interests. However, this defense does not fully address the critique that Kant’s framework fails to adequately consider the embodied and finite nature of human beings.

Broader Implications:

The tension highlighted here reflects a broader issue in moral philosophy: how to balance universal principles with the particularities of human life. Kant’s vision of rationality and universality has inspired much of modern ethics, but critiques like this remind us of the limitations of overly abstract frameworks when dealing with the complexities of human society.

Would you like a deeper dive into any specific aspect of this critique or Kant’s moral philosophy? _________________________________________ You said:

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEALING WITH IMMORTALS

ChatGPT said:

Dealing with immortals in the context of moral philosophy and the social contract has profound implications, as it alters the very foundation upon which moral rules and agreements are constructed. Here are the key implications:

1. Shift in Priorities For immortals, concerns such as mortality, scarcity, or the passage of time lose relevance.

Human Implication: Many human moral concerns—preserving life, managing resources, or dealing with aging—become irrelevant. Agreements shaped by immortals would likely ignore or undervalue these issues.

Example: Rules emphasizing self-sacrifice or eternal patience might seem plausible to immortals but are impractical for finite beings.

2. Universalization Beyond Humanity

The inclusion of immortals in moral contracts pushes ethical principles toward universal abstractions.

Problem: Such universal principles might lack applicability to embodied, time-bound, and vulnerable beings like humans. Result: Ethics may become disconnected from lived realities, prioritizing ideals over pragmatism.

3. Eternal Consequences

For immortals, decisions take on an eternal significance.

Contrast with Humans: Human decision-making often incorporates the understanding of life’s temporality—allowing for forgiveness, forgetting, or gradual improvement. Immortals might impose unyielding standards because of their unchanging nature.

Example: Eternal punishment or reward becomes conceivable, as in the theological framing of heaven and hell.

4. Moral Perfectionism

Immortals, assumed to possess perfect rationality and knowledge, could demand moral perfection.

Human Limitation: Humans, constrained by ignorance, emotion, and error, may find it impossible to meet such standards.

Tension: The disparity could lead to ethical frameworks that are aspirational but demoralizing or irrelevant for human beings.

5. Dismissal of Embodiment

For immortals, embodiment—being tied to a physical form with needs and vulnerabilities—may be a negligible factor.

Implication for Ethics: Issues like bodily autonomy, health, or physical suffering may be undervalued or dismissed in immortal-centric moral systems. Example: A moral rule against killing might lose its force if immortals cannot die.

6. Timelessness vs. Temporality

Immortals, existing outside time, might approach moral rules without urgency.

For Humans: Humans operate within a temporal framework where decisions often have immediate and cumulative consequences. Moral systems accounting for immortals might lack the dynamism or flexibility required for real-world contexts. Result: A static, rigid moral code could emerge, incompatible with evolving human societies.

7. Neglect of Personal Experience

Immortals, presumed to exist in a realm of pure reason or spirit, may not value the subjective, experiential aspects of morality.

Human Perspective: Emotions, relationships, and lived experiences deeply inform human morality. An immortal-driven framework might ignore these dimensions, leading to an overly intellectualized ethic.

8. Irrelevance to Pluralism

Immortals are often imagined as homogeneous (all-rational, all-knowing).

Human Reality: Humans are diverse, with different cultures, beliefs, and interests. A moral system derived from immortal considerations may lack mechanisms for accommodating pluralism or resolving conflicts.

Outcome: Ethical alienation—where moral rules feel imposed rather than collaboratively derived.

Concluding Thought

Incorporating immortals into moral philosophy shifts the focus from practical, context-sensitive agreements to abstract, eternal principles. While this might provide a lofty ideal, it risks alienating ethical frameworks from human realities. For the social contract tradition, which thrives on agreements between equal and interdependent beings, the inclusion of immortals undermines the basis for mutual, practical cooperation.

Would you like to explore how this critique could apply to specific philosophers, such as Kant or others? __________________________________________________ You said:

YES

ChatGPT said:

Let’s delve deeper into the implications of dealing with immortals within the frameworks of specific philosophers, focusing on Kant, Hobbes, and Rousseau, as well as the broader social contract tradition.

1. Kant and Immortals

Kant’s ethical framework presupposes a realm of rational beings, including immortals like God, angels, and noumenal selves. Here’s how the inclusion of immortals impacts his system:

Implications for Kant’s Moral Philosophy Abstract Universality:

Kant’s categorical imperative demands rules that could apply universally to all rational beings. However, when this includes immortals, the scope of universality may disregard human-specific conditions (e.g., mortality, emotions, needs). Example: Immortals don’t face death or hunger, so a rule against taking lives might seem irrelevant to them. For humans, this is essential.

Moral Perfectionism:

Kant’s ethics assumes that rational beings can act purely out of duty, guided by reason. Immortals, with perfect rationality, embody this ideal, but humans struggle with competing desires and limitations.

Tension: The gap between human and immortal capacities makes Kantian morality aspirational but potentially impractical.

Immortal Rules and Human Existence:

Kant’s noumenal realm detaches morality from the physical, embodied world. An immortal, disembodied perspective might devalue actions tied to human embodiment, like caring for others’ physical well-being.

Critique Summary

By framing morality for a timeless, rational realm, Kant risks creating a system disconnected from human realities. The inclusion of immortals shifts his ethics toward a speculative “science fiction,” as your earlier critique aptly noted.

2. Hobbes and Immortals

Hobbes’s social contract is grounded in the mortal condition of humans—specifically, the fear of death and the desire for self-preservation. Introducing immortals would fundamentally alter his framework.

Implications for Hobbes No Fear of Death:

Hobbes argues that the fear of violent death motivates humans to form a social contract. Immortals, being invulnerable, lack this incentive.

Consequence: Immortals wouldn’t need to establish a Leviathan or any political order to protect themselves. Their participation in a social contract becomes unnecessary.

Lack of Material Concerns:

Immortals don’t compete for resources, land, or power, which Hobbes sees as primary drivers of conflict. Without these pressures, the rationale for a Hobbesian contract dissolves.

Disconnection from Humans:

If humans are mortal and immortals are not, their interests and concerns diverge so significantly that any shared social contract would privilege one group while neglecting the other.

Critique Summary

Hobbes’s mortal-focused social contract collapses if immortals are involved, as their invulnerability undermines the core motivations for political and moral agreements.

3. Rousseau and Immortals

Rousseau’s social contract emphasizes the collective good and the general will. His vision is grounded in human equality and shared vulnerability. Introducing immortals destabilizes this balance.

Implications for Rousseau General Will and Immortal Interests:

The general will seeks the common good, but immortals, with eternal perspectives, may define “common good” in ways that neglect human priorities like survival or well-being.

Example: Immortals might prioritize abstract principles of justice over practical human concerns, like ending hunger.

Inequality of Power:

Rousseau’s framework assumes all participants in the social contract are roughly equal. Immortals, with their superior knowledge and capacities, create an insurmountable hierarchy, undermining the egalitarian foundation.

Dehumanization of Morality:

Rousseau sees morality as rooted in human nature and empathy. Immortals, being unembodied, may lack the emotional resonance necessary for fostering solidarity and compassion.

Critique Summary

The inclusion of immortals fractures Rousseau’s egalitarian vision, creating a moral and political system that alienates humans from their shared, embodied experiences.

4. Broader Implications for the Social Contract Tradition

The inclusion of immortals in the social contract tradition introduces conceptual tensions across the board:

Asymmetric Interests: Immortals and humans have fundamentally different priorities. The resulting contracts might marginalize human-specific concerns. Undermined Reciprocity: Social contracts rely on mutual vulnerability and interdependence. Immortals, being self-sufficient, lack these qualities, destabilizing the logic of cooperation.

Loss of Practical Relevance: Social contracts derive legitimacy from addressing real-world human concerns. Introducing immortals shifts the focus to speculative, otherworldly realms, undermining the contract’s applicability.

Concluding Thought

When immortals are included in moral or political systems like Kant’s or the broader social contract tradition, the frameworks risk becoming detached from human realities. This critique not only highlights the limitations of these philosophical models but also emphasizes the importance of grounding moral and political theories in the lived experiences of finite, embodied beings.

Philosophy as Hermeneutics

As Curt Ducasse pointed out in Philosophy as a Science (1941), there are many conceptions of the nature of philosophy. And there is one which I would like to focus on: philosophy as hermeneutics.

The conception of hermeneutics which I want to focus on is the techniques for the interpretation of the Christian Bible. It is taken for granted (assumed) that the Bible is the word of God, revealed to some individuals. As such, because God is conceived as not a liar, everything in the Bible is taken to be true. However, there are passages which seem to say falsehoods and seem to be contradictory. So, techniques of interpretation are introduced in such a manner as to make the Bible speak only the truth. Look at the Wikipedia articles: hermeneutics and Biblical hermeneutics.

When I read philosophical writings, many of them seem to be written in the same reverential manner as the writings of theologians. They want or assume that the author wrote in a sensible manner and wrote the truth, and they do hermeneutical acrobatics to make it so.

The curious fact is that the authors chosen for such hermeneutical exercises are authors who are on the face of it totally esoterically obscure. And the authors who are clear are ignored. See my discussion at: C. D. Broad: The Default Philosopher of the Century.