In his interview with Piers Morgan, John Mearsheimer expressed a certainty that Ukraine was doomed to losing to the Russian invasion. His reasoning was based on two factors: that Russia had a much larger population than Ukraine, and that Russia had more weapons than Ukraine.
In response, this kind of reasoning based on two factors is totally inadequate. There are many other factors to consider. Let me list some of them.
- In addition to numbers, one must take into account strategy. Whatever Ukraine is doing, its kill ratio to that of Russia is much greater.
- Mearsheimer dismisses Ukraine’s using missiles to strike targets within Russia — such as munition and oil depots — as insignificant, but they are significant.
- He also ignores the possibility of Putin’s death or assasination, as well as the possibility of a Russian coup or even revolution.
- He apparently also dismisses the intervention of another country on the side of Ukraine. Macron, the president of France, for example, has openly declared that French troops in Ukraine is not off the table. I believe that because of Russian incursion in France’s former colonies in Africa, it is to France’s interest to see Russia weakened.
- I also believe that if Ukraine seems to be losing, NATO will intervene.
Mearsheimer also believes that it a moral duty to bring the war to an end. He is of the opinion that Ukraine should give up some of its territory to save the lives of Ukrainians. On this score Piers Morgan disagrees. Given the Russian invasion, Morgan believes that it is up to the Ukrainian people to decide. Here I am reminded of Patrick Henry’s response to the prospect of the British win over the colonies. His response was: Give me Liberty of give me death!
Talking of morality, I believe that talk of morality makes sense relative to an agreement — explicit or tacit. And the agreement I have in mine is the Budapest Memorandum which was signed by Russia, the United States and Britain as a guarantee of Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear arsenal. Thus the parties who have acted immorally are Russia, the United States and Britain.
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ChatGPT said:
The arguments presented in this critique of John Mearsheimer’s view on Ukraine’s prospects in the war with Russia are reasonable in some respects, but they also present challenges in terms of both the specifics of the situation and the broader context. Let’s break down the key points raised and assess their merits:
1. Mearsheimer’s Argument on Population and Weaponry
Mearsheimer’s reasoning about Ukraine’s doom is indeed based on a simplistic comparison of population and weapons. While these factors are important in any conflict, they are not the only factors that determine the outcome of a war. The critique correctly points out that military strategy, morale, and technological innovation are crucial components that Mearsheimer may be underestimating. Ukraine’s ability to inflict significant damage on Russian forces, its strategic use of Western-supplied weapons, and its effective tactics are important aspects that could shift the balance of power.
However, Mearsheimer’s core argument — that Russia’s size and military might make it very difficult for Ukraine to prevail in a prolonged war — is not without basis. History has shown that large, more populous states with significant military capabilities tend to win wars of attrition, especially if they have an overwhelming advantage in resources and manpower. But this is not a guarantee, and history is full of counterexamples (e.g., Afghanistan, the Vietnam War).
2. Ukraine’s Strategy and Kill Ratio
The point about Ukraine’s higher kill ratio is valid and reflects the effectiveness of Ukraine’s military strategy. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated remarkable resilience, adapting to asymmetrical warfare, using Western weapons effectively (e.g., HIMARS, drones), and leveraging terrain and local knowledge. The high kill ratio suggests that while Russia has superior numbers, Ukraine’s forces are fighting efficiently, and this can prolong the conflict and potentially create opportunities for turning the tide.
However, this alone may not be enough to defeat Russia. The war is not just about kill ratios but also about logistics, resources, and the will to fight. Russia can absorb losses far more easily than Ukraine, particularly because of its greater population and industrial base.
3. Mearsheimer’s Dismissal of Ukrainian Strikes on Russia
Mearsheimer’s dismissal of Ukraine’s strikes on Russian territory is a contentious point. While it’s true that such strikes have symbolic value and are unlikely to decisively affect the course of the war, they do serve to weaken Russian supply lines and could potentially have strategic effects by disrupting Russian morale and logistics. The critique here is valid in emphasizing that Ukraine’s ability to hit Russian targets inside Russia should not be underestimated.
4. The Possibility of Regime Change in Russia
The possibility of Putin’s death, assassination, or a coup in Russia is certainly a variable that could change the course of the war, though it remains speculative. The argument here introduces a level of unpredictability that could, in theory, help Ukraine. However, regime change in Russia is a highly uncertain factor. There are no clear indications that such an event is imminent, and even if it were to happen, it is far from certain that a new Russian government would seek peace or offer favorable terms to Ukraine. In fact, it might just as likely lead to a more hardline response.
5. Potential NATO Intervention
The belief that NATO will intervene if Ukraine is losing is also reasonable but speculative. NATO’s intervention would depend on a variety of factors, including the political will of member states, the severity of the situation, and the threat that a Russian victory poses to European security. France’s open comments about possible military involvement in Ukraine are notable, but it’s still unclear how far NATO is willing to go, especially given the risks of escalating into a direct conflict with Russia.
While NATO is providing substantial military aid to Ukraine, direct intervention — particularly with ground troops — remains a sensitive issue for many NATO countries. That said, the critique raises an important point: NATO may decide that the stakes are too high to allow Russia to prevail, especially if the war begins to spill over into neighboring countries.
6. The Moral Argument: The Budapest Memorandum
The critique makes a powerful moral point by referencing the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. Russia’s violation of this agreement, as well as the failure of the U.S. and the U.K. to fulfill their obligations, is indeed a significant aspect of the moral framework surrounding the conflict.
However, the Budapest Memorandum was never a formal military guarantee, and its interpretation remains a subject of debate. Some argue that the agreement was intended to provide diplomatic assurances rather than a commitment to military intervention. Still, the moral argument about the betrayal of Ukraine’s sovereignty is compelling and underlines the complexity of the situation.
7. Piers Morgan and Patrick Henry’s Quote
The invocation of Patrick Henry’s famous “Give me liberty, or give me death!” quote adds a rhetorical flourish to the argument for Ukrainian self-determination. It’s a powerful statement of the principle that people have the right to defend their sovereignty and autonomy, even at great cost. In the context of the Ukrainian struggle, it serves as a reminder that the war is fundamentally about Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent nation.
Conclusion
The critique of Mearsheimer’s view on Ukraine’s prospects is reasonable, though it could benefit from more nuance in acknowledging the complexities of both sides. While Mearsheimer’s analysis of the long-term strategic challenges faced by Ukraine is grounded in historical patterns, the critique rightly points out that factors like morale, Western support, Ukrainian military strategy, and the unpredictable nature of political change in Russia could all alter the outcome. Furthermore, the moral argument related to the Budapest Memorandum and the right of Ukraine to resist Russian aggression adds a compelling layer to the discussion.
Ultimately, while Mearsheimer’s prognosis is one possible outcome, it’s not the only one. The situation remains fluid, and there are many factors at play that could change the course of the war in ways that are difficult to predict.