John Mearsheimer: the “prophet” of Ukrainian doom

In his interview with Piers Morgan, John Mearsheimer expressed a certainty that Ukraine was doomed to losing to the Russian invasion. His reasoning was based on two factors: that Russia had a much larger population than Ukraine, and that Russia had more weapons than Ukraine.

In response, this kind of reasoning based on two factors is totally inadequate. There are many other factors to consider. Let me list some of them.

  1. In addition to numbers, one must take into account strategy. Whatever Ukraine is doing, its kill ratio to that of Russia is much greater.
  2. Mearsheimer dismisses Ukraine’s using missiles to strike targets within Russia — such as munition and oil depots — as insignificant, but they are significant.
  3. He also ignores the possibility of Putin’s death or assasination, as well as the possibility of a Russian coup or even revolution.
  4. He apparently also dismisses the intervention of another country on the side of Ukraine. Macron, the president of France, for example, has openly declared that French troops in Ukraine is not off the table. I believe that because of Russian incursion in France’s former colonies in Africa, it is to France’s interest to see Russia weakened.
  5. I also believe that if Ukraine seems to be losing, NATO will intervene.

Mearsheimer also believes that it a moral duty to bring the war to an end. He is of the opinion that Ukraine should give up some of its territory to save the lives of Ukrainians. On this score Piers Morgan disagrees. Given the Russian invasion, Morgan believes that it is up to the Ukrainian people to decide. Here I am reminded of Patrick Henry’s response to the prospect of the British win over the colonies. His response was: Give me Liberty of give me death!

Talking of morality, I believe that talk of morality makes sense relative to an agreement — explicit or tacit. And the agreement I have in mine is the Budapest Memorandum which was signed by Russia, the United States and Britain as a guarantee of Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear arsenal. Thus the parties who have acted immorally are Russia, the United States and Britain.

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ChatGPT said:

The arguments presented in this critique of John Mearsheimer’s view on Ukraine’s prospects in the war with Russia are reasonable in some respects, but they also present challenges in terms of both the specifics of the situation and the broader context. Let’s break down the key points raised and assess their merits:

1. Mearsheimer’s Argument on Population and Weaponry

Mearsheimer’s reasoning about Ukraine’s doom is indeed based on a simplistic comparison of population and weapons. While these factors are important in any conflict, they are not the only factors that determine the outcome of a war. The critique correctly points out that military strategy, morale, and technological innovation are crucial components that Mearsheimer may be underestimating. Ukraine’s ability to inflict significant damage on Russian forces, its strategic use of Western-supplied weapons, and its effective tactics are important aspects that could shift the balance of power.

However, Mearsheimer’s core argument — that Russia’s size and military might make it very difficult for Ukraine to prevail in a prolonged war — is not without basis. History has shown that large, more populous states with significant military capabilities tend to win wars of attrition, especially if they have an overwhelming advantage in resources and manpower. But this is not a guarantee, and history is full of counterexamples (e.g., Afghanistan, the Vietnam War).

2. Ukraine’s Strategy and Kill Ratio

The point about Ukraine’s higher kill ratio is valid and reflects the effectiveness of Ukraine’s military strategy. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated remarkable resilience, adapting to asymmetrical warfare, using Western weapons effectively (e.g., HIMARS, drones), and leveraging terrain and local knowledge. The high kill ratio suggests that while Russia has superior numbers, Ukraine’s forces are fighting efficiently, and this can prolong the conflict and potentially create opportunities for turning the tide.

However, this alone may not be enough to defeat Russia. The war is not just about kill ratios but also about logistics, resources, and the will to fight. Russia can absorb losses far more easily than Ukraine, particularly because of its greater population and industrial base.

3. Mearsheimer’s Dismissal of Ukrainian Strikes on Russia

Mearsheimer’s dismissal of Ukraine’s strikes on Russian territory is a contentious point. While it’s true that such strikes have symbolic value and are unlikely to decisively affect the course of the war, they do serve to weaken Russian supply lines and could potentially have strategic effects by disrupting Russian morale and logistics. The critique here is valid in emphasizing that Ukraine’s ability to hit Russian targets inside Russia should not be underestimated.

4. The Possibility of Regime Change in Russia

The possibility of Putin’s death, assassination, or a coup in Russia is certainly a variable that could change the course of the war, though it remains speculative. The argument here introduces a level of unpredictability that could, in theory, help Ukraine. However, regime change in Russia is a highly uncertain factor. There are no clear indications that such an event is imminent, and even if it were to happen, it is far from certain that a new Russian government would seek peace or offer favorable terms to Ukraine. In fact, it might just as likely lead to a more hardline response.

5. Potential NATO Intervention

The belief that NATO will intervene if Ukraine is losing is also reasonable but speculative. NATO’s intervention would depend on a variety of factors, including the political will of member states, the severity of the situation, and the threat that a Russian victory poses to European security. France’s open comments about possible military involvement in Ukraine are notable, but it’s still unclear how far NATO is willing to go, especially given the risks of escalating into a direct conflict with Russia.

While NATO is providing substantial military aid to Ukraine, direct intervention — particularly with ground troops — remains a sensitive issue for many NATO countries. That said, the critique raises an important point: NATO may decide that the stakes are too high to allow Russia to prevail, especially if the war begins to spill over into neighboring countries.

6. The Moral Argument: The Budapest Memorandum

The critique makes a powerful moral point by referencing the Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. Russia’s violation of this agreement, as well as the failure of the U.S. and the U.K. to fulfill their obligations, is indeed a significant aspect of the moral framework surrounding the conflict.

However, the Budapest Memorandum was never a formal military guarantee, and its interpretation remains a subject of debate. Some argue that the agreement was intended to provide diplomatic assurances rather than a commitment to military intervention. Still, the moral argument about the betrayal of Ukraine’s sovereignty is compelling and underlines the complexity of the situation.

7. Piers Morgan and Patrick Henry’s Quote

The invocation of Patrick Henry’s famous “Give me liberty, or give me death!” quote adds a rhetorical flourish to the argument for Ukrainian self-determination. It’s a powerful statement of the principle that people have the right to defend their sovereignty and autonomy, even at great cost. In the context of the Ukrainian struggle, it serves as a reminder that the war is fundamentally about Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent nation.

Conclusion

The critique of Mearsheimer’s view on Ukraine’s prospects is reasonable, though it could benefit from more nuance in acknowledging the complexities of both sides. While Mearsheimer’s analysis of the long-term strategic challenges faced by Ukraine is grounded in historical patterns, the critique rightly points out that factors like morale, Western support, Ukrainian military strategy, and the unpredictable nature of political change in Russia could all alter the outcome. Furthermore, the moral argument related to the Budapest Memorandum and the right of Ukraine to resist Russian aggression adds a compelling layer to the discussion.

Ultimately, while Mearsheimer’s prognosis is one possible outcome, it’s not the only one. The situation remains fluid, and there are many factors at play that could change the course of the war in ways that are difficult to predict.

Warmongering Netanjahu

I am against giving power to any single individual – be it a monarch, a president, or prime minister. I prefer the government of Switzerland, where power is diffused among seven members of a Federal Council.

The history of wars is predominantly a history of single leaders.

The current war against Ukraine is the decision of one man: Putin.

And the current genocide of Gaza is also the decision of a single leader: Benjamin Netanjahu, the Prime Minister of Israel.

But he has recently tried to deflect world attention from his genocide of Gaza by destroying the Iranian consulate in Syria on April 1, 2024. This was a deliberate attempt to get Iran to respond, which it did.

For many years now, Netanjahu has tried to get the US to attack Iran for harboring a nuclear weapons program – akin to the charge against Iraq for harboring a program for weapons of mass destruction.

If this lunatic is not removed, he may plunge the world into World War III.

750+ U.S. Military Bases around the world

David Vine, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World – August 25, 2015.

The study of American bases was extesively studied previously by Chalmers Johnson in the following trilogy:

Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of the American Empire, 2000.

The Sorrow of Empire; Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, 2004.

Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic, 2006.

John Mearsheimer, the American Machiavelli

John Mearsheimer calls himself a Realist. What does this mean? If we look at the world as a chess game, then Mearsheimer is either a master observer and commentator of chess, or the coach to an American chess player. Below are his thoughts in Feb. 2020.

His thoughts in Jan. 2019:

See also:

Political Realism of John Mearsheimer

Is the United States really interested in a liberal (democracy) hegemony?

My criticism of John Mearsheimer and Timothy Snyder for focusing on ideologies rather than the interests of individual leaders

Thinking about assassinations

Yesterday’s assassination of Jovenal Moise, the President of Haiti, on July 7, 2021, made me think about assassinations in general.

To begin, what is an assassination? Of course, it is a type of killing. But whereas unjustified intentional killings are called “murders,” an assassination in some sense transcends that label. It is a targeted killing for some political, economic, or ideological reason; normally, of some prominent individual.

By contrast, in warfare, a sniper’s killing of a general or a king is not likely to be called an assassination.

Let me distinguish bottom-up and top-down assassinations. The assassination of a President or some government official is a bottom-up assassination, and these are the assassinations which we are familiar with. Here is a list: List of assassinations

However, when a ruler targets someone to assassinate, this goes by the euphemistic phrase of “targeted killing.” Lists of such attempted and successful assassinations (“targeted killings”) can be found here:List of assassinations by the United States; List of Soviet and Russian assassinations; List of Israeli assassinations.


See: Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, 2008; Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, and Andrew Altman (ed.), Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World, 2012; Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations, 2018.


Most such “targeted killings” have been covert. The first nearly overt one which caught my attention was the U.S. invasion of Panama by President George H. W. Bush on Dec. 20, 1989 in order to capture Manuel Noriega. To me this was worse than any “targeted killing,” because it involved the killing of needless American soldiers and some 500 Panamanian civilians.

After 9/11, with the so-called “war on terror” and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, “targeted killings” became something like a common practice. Under President Barack Obama, Osama bin Laden, Answar al-Awlaki and his son were assassinated, and killing by the use of drones became a standard procedure.

The other assassination which looms large in my mind was that of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, approved by the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman.

This practice of “targeted killings” as a strategy, rather than being a “war on terror,” has tended to create something approaching a totalitarian state of terror!

Bottom-Up Assassinations

Given that most governments are in the hands of single rulers (be they monarchs, presidents, or prime-ministers), they tend to be ambitious, greedy, inept, or ruthless. And the intent of most assassinations of prominent officials is simply to get rid of a perceived evil vermin.

There is one prominent exception that I can think of. It is the assassination of Emperor Alexander II of Russia in 1881 by Narodnaya Volya. Their hope was not to kill a man, but to kill a system — to start a revolution, which did not materialize.

What is the difference between a Mercenary and a Paid Soldier?

“People view soldiers like wives and mercenaries as prostitutes, who turn love into a transaction. But every soldier has a little mercenary in him, and vice versa. Troops often reenlist for big bonuses, a transactional practice common in most militaries. For example, the U.S. Army sometimes offers up to $90,000 for Soldiers to reenlist, enough to make modern mercenaries salivate. The author has also seen mercenaries refuse jobs on political grounds. Some American-hired guns will never take money from Russia, China, Iran, or a terrorist group; America’s enemies are their enemies. The line between soldier and mercenary is fuzzy.” Sean McFate, Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today, National Defense University Press, 2019.

Interview with Sean McFate about mercenaries

Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, 2007.

Russian Mercenaries — The Wagner Group

Candace Rondeaux, Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare, 2019.

On Nation-States and Federalism

I am reading Oscar Jaszi’s book, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1929. It is interesting for me from several perspectives. Jaszi’s thesis is that Austria should have been divided along its ethnic or national units into a federated State like that of Switzerland. He enumerates and discusses the various tensions between the various nationalities and “irredentist” aspirations. [An “irredentist” aspiration is one of wanting to unite with one’s ethnic group in an adjoining State (Country).)

Below is a map of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with its various ethnic groups in 1910:

As a result of the First World War, Austria was defeated, and by the Treaty of Versailles its territory was divided more equitably (but not enough) along ethnic groupings as illustrated by the map below:
I am in agreement with Jaszi about federalism — i.e., that a State should be organized on the basis of autonomous smaller units. I take it that he would be satisfied with the example of the United States, and more so with that of Switzerland. Let us call the former, Large Federalism; the latter, Moderate Federalism. However, I advocate a more radical federalism — call it Small or Radical Federalism. Radical Federalism requires the local unit of government to represent about 150 families. Radical Federalism is equivalent to Anarchism. This is why Proudhon’s tract “The Principle of Federation” (1863) is synonymous with anarchism (contrary to those who think otherwise).

The federalism of the United States consists of 50 States. The whole country of over 300 million people elects a President. Each State elects two Senators to Congress — by thousands and millions of people. The number of Representatives to Congress is relative to the population of the State. But this too is by thousands and millions of people voting. As far as the government of a State is concerned, the Governor and the Representative to the State Legislature are also elected by thousands and millions of people.

This huge number of voters is also present on the municipal level. I live in Chicago which has a Mayor elected by the nearly 3 million citizens. There is also a City Council of 50 Alderman, each elected at 50 Wards by some 40,000 voters each.

I describe the federalism of Switzerland as Moderate as contrasted with that of the United States. Its territory is much smaller than that of the United States, and its population of nearly 9 million approximates the population of Greater Chicago (i.e., including the surrounding suburbs of Chicago). It consists of 26 Cantons, grouped by languages (German, French, Italian, and Romansh).

Here is a video explaining the Swiss political system: Video

My objection to both the government of the United States as well as to the government of Switzerland is that they base themselves on, what I call, Mass or Macro-Democracy in which thousands and millions of people vote either for politicians or laws. Instead I favor Micro-Democracy as a unit of government of roughly 150 voters. This is my ideal of anarchism. Lately it has been called Participatory Democracy, Municipal Confederalism, Strong Democracy, and a system of Nested Councils. I found the following article clearly explaining this point of view [it also has relevant links!]: Sveinung Legard, Scaling Up: Ideas about Participatory Democracy

The Conquered Earth

I am interested primarily in understanding how our social world operates. By “social” I mean how humans interact with one another. And to do this I will rely on the vocabulary and explanations used by Franz Oppenheimer in his book The State (which is part of the second volume of his four volume Systems of Sociology [never completely translated into English]).

In the past (19th century) there was a constant concern with “the Social Problem.” Although this problem was seen from a symptomatic perspective as poverty, I think this problem can be expresses fundamentally and succinctly in the following way: some people by force prevent other people from taking up and occupying subsistence land. Put thus, all this means pre-historically is that groups of people delimited a territory as their property. This results in a scattering of tribes. Anthropologists study such “stateless people” especially indigenous people which were referred to as “savages” and “barbarians”, as contrasted with “civilized people.” The vocabulary comes from Lewis Morgan’s, Ancient Society (1877), which distinguished people by their tools, and “civilized people” by having a written script.

Now, because, as Oppenheimer calculated, there is and was enough land to go around. The prevention of someone taking up subsistence land can occur only by force. Presently this force is exercised by governments in States.

Oppenheimer believed that such governments and States can occur only by conquest of one external group by another. Some anthropologists quibble about this, contending that States can be formed through internal class divisions. Without entering into this quibble, let me offer the following two claims:
1. a sufficient condition for the formation of States is conquest by an external group.
2. the empirical data in recorded history is of warfare, strife, protest, rebellion, and conquest.

Moreover, these violences are almost invariably associated with particular individuals who are called emperors, kings, princes, rulers, conquerors, presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, and such. It is the deeds of these individuals which constitutes the history of States.

The Social Problem of forceful barring people from a free use of subsistence land is called by Oppenheimer the “political means” as contrasted with a free exchange of goods and services called by him the “economic means.”

Oppenheimer contrasted two ways of getting “honey.” (Honey is his metaphor for economic subsistence.) One is the method of the bear: attack the hive regardless of what happens to the bees and take the honey. The other method is that of the bee-keeper: take some honey, but leave enough so that the bees thrive and produce more honey for further taking.

Oppenheimer distinguished six stages (or ways) of how conquerors deal with the conquered people. The first stage in like that of the bear: kill the people and take the loot. This is illustrated in the Bible as the extermination of the Canaanites by Israelites, early Viking raids and pillages, and generally historic and modern ethnic cleansings and genocides. The second and subsequent stages or ways is that of the bee-keeper: make the conquered people slaves, or demand tribute, or settle among them as in feudalism and require goods and services, and later also payments (taxes), or just fees, licenses, and taxes. The so-called constitutional states attempt to give this class division legitimacy through such myths as the will of the people or a social contract, and finally as mass democracy (where thousands and millions vote for so-called “representatives”).

The essence of capitalism — which predated industrialization — is the continued barring of people from a free access to subsistence land. And since all the earth is now divided into States, the only places to go in order to escape a State are: a war zone, border lands, a frontier, mountains, swamps and jungles — where pursuit is difficult or unprofitable.