The first one is his general claim that he does not wish to argue over meanings of words. On the other hand, he also does not want to argue at cross purposes. Well, how in the world are you to avoid arguing at cross purposes, unless you clarify what each of you mean by your words. This does not mean arguing which meaning or definition is to be preferred, but it does requires making a clarification of how words are being used.
The second disagreement I have with Popper is over the search for essences. Historically, Popper may be right about the misguided search for “essences” of natural things. A possible explanation for this is a conflation of artifacts with natural things. An artifact — at least in typical cases, such as in the case of tools — is made for a purpose. And the essences of tools are the purposes they serve. Now, thinking by a misconceived analogy, one can ask what purpose does a stone or a bird serve. And by further analogical thinking, since artifacts serve the purposes of man; it can be mythically reasoned that natural things serve the purposes of gods or a God, or that things themselves are animate beings with purposes. So, I agree with Popper that natural things have no essences, but he forgets that artifacts do.
This distinction between natural kinds and artifacts is relevant to the “infamous” Eddington’s two tables problem. Eddington had written “There are duplicates of every object about me — two tables, two chairs, two pens …” (A. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, 1958, p. xi). This is a mistake. The word “table” refers to an artifact, and physics does not study artifacts; it studies the materials out of which tables, and artifacts, are made of. A table as a piece of furniture is defined by the purposes it serves. And physics does not study human purposes.
The third disagreement I have with Popper is with his use of the word “rational.” He seems to use the word “rational” as contrasted with the word “irrational.” But there is a broad sense of rational such as when humans are characterized as “rational animals.” This means that humans are capable of acting in rational ways. Being rational, in this sense, includes acting irrationally. To make this clear, consider a cat. A cat cannot act rationally or irrationally, because it can act only a-rationally (or non-rationally). It is Popper’s failure to make a distinction between irrational and a-rational (non-rational) behavior, which causes him to call someone who acts by intuitions as acting irrationally; whereas I would say the person in such situations is acting a-rationally (non-rationally)– like a cat. For example, people who want to experience mystic states or to experience drug highs or who want to “escape from reality,” are not — in my sense — necessarily acting irrationally, but — given their circumstances — may actually –by seeking non-rational states — be acting quite rationally.
The fourth area of disagreement I have with Popper is over his treatment of democracy. His criterion of democracy seems to be concerned with whether there exists in the institution of government a mechanism for removing a leader from office by a popular vote. This to me is a necessary but not a sufficient demand. The result is that he seems to be indifferent to types of democracies.
In contrast, I want to make three points.
1. Swiss style democracy is superior to all other existing state democracies.
2. There is a distinction between Macro and Micro democracy. Micro democracy is favored by anarchists, and exists currently in Rojava, in the Mexican area controlled by Zapatistas, and in the Mexican town, Cheran.
3. As a social democrat, Popper is for piecemeal engineering rather than for revolution. My position is that if a piecemeal law is passed granting everyone a free access to subsistence land — that will constitute a revolution!
chatGPT said:
This evaluation of Karl Popper reflects a thoughtful critique, highlighting areas where his philosophy could benefit from clarification or expansion. Here’s a breakdown of the main points raised, along with some evaluative remarks:
1. Popper’s Disregard for Arguing Over Word Meanings
The critique identifies a tension in Popper’s stance: avoiding disputes over word meanings while simultaneously striving to prevent arguments at cross purposes. This point is well-taken because clear definitions are foundational to avoiding miscommunication. However, Popper’s reluctance likely stems from a pragmatic desire to focus on substantive issues rather than semantic disputes. This critique could be nuanced further by acknowledging Popper’s likely intent: to prioritize operational definitions over philosophical quibbling, while still recognizing that some terminological clarity is indispensable.
2. Essences and Artifacts
This disagreement offers an insightful distinction between natural kinds and artifacts. Popper’s critique of essentialism applies well to natural kinds but overlooks the role of purpose in defining artifacts. The historical reasoning here—linking the conflation of artifacts with natural kinds to teleological explanations—is compelling. However, it might also be argued that Popper’s broader rejection of essences could encompass artifacts, not by denying their purposes but by framing purposes as context-dependent and contingent rather than intrinsic.
The connection to Eddington’s “two tables” problem strengthens this argument, highlighting that physics studies materials, not purposes. This critique effectively reinforces the importance of distinguishing between domains of inquiry (e.g., physics vs. practical utility).
3. Rational vs. Irrational vs. Non-Rational
The critique of Popper’s dichotomy between rational and irrational behavior is nuanced and persuasive. Distinguishing between irrational (contrary to reason) and non-rational (beyond the scope of reason) allows for a more comprehensive understanding of human behavior. The example of people seeking mystical experiences or drug highs as acting non-rationally rather than irrationally is particularly illuminating. This distinction could be seen as complementing Popper’s focus on rational discourse, expanding it to accommodate human actions motivated by desires or intuitions that lie outside strict rational analysis.
4. Popper’s Criterion for Democracy
Popper’s minimalistic definition of democracy, emphasizing mechanisms for removing leaders, is critiqued as necessary but insufficient. This critique resonates, as it points to the richness of democratic systems beyond procedural mechanisms. The emphasis on Swiss-style democracy and micro-democracy introduces valuable alternatives, suggesting that democracy’s quality depends on its depth and inclusivity, not just its institutional framework.
The critique of Popper’s “piecemeal engineering” approach to social reform contrasts revolutionary possibilities with gradualism. The proposal that granting universal access to subsistence land could enact a revolutionary transformation is thought-provoking, though it might be more aligned with Popper’s gradualism than it initially appears. Such a reform could be seen as a radical yet incremental policy shift, bridging the gap between revolutionary outcomes and piecemeal methods.
Final Evaluation
This critique thoughtfully engages with key aspects of Popper’s philosophy, raising important questions about semantics, essentialism, rationality, and democracy. It challenges Popper’s ideas without dismissing his contributions, offering constructive suggestions for refining his views. The critique could be further enhanced by:
- Exploring how Popper himself might respond to these points, especially on the interplay between definitions and substantive debate.
- Clarifying whether the proposed reforms (e.g., access to subsistence land) are fully compatible with Popper’s incrementalism or represent a break from his approach.
Overall, this critique serves as a productive dialogue with Popper’s work, highlighting both its enduring strengths and areas for further exploration.