Richard Rorty’s Pragmatism

Did Richard Rorty give up on philosophy as done by analysts?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Yes, Richard Rorty distanced himself from analytic philosophy, particularly in the later stages of his career. His critique of analytic philosophy became one of his defining intellectual moves. However, it’s important to nuance what this “giving up” entails.

Rorty’s Transition

Rorty started his career as an analytic philosopher, writing on topics like mind and language, notably in “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” (1979). This work marks a turning point where he critiques the foundational assumptions of analytic philosophy, particularly its quest for certainty, objectivity, and correspondence to reality.

Critiques of Analytic Philosophy

  1. Foundationalism and Representationalism: Rorty rejected the idea that philosophy’s role is to find a secure foundation for knowledge. He critiqued the “mirror” metaphor of mind, which treats the mind as a passive reflector of reality.
  2. Overemphasis on Logic and Language: He viewed analytic philosophy as overly preoccupied with technical issues of logic and semantics at the expense of broader humanistic concerns.
  3. Philosophy as a Discipline: Rorty argued that philosophy should not aspire to the status of a rigorous science. Instead, he believed philosophy is closer to a form of cultural conversation and should embrace its role in addressing existential and social issues.

Embracing Pragmatism and Post-Philosophy

Rorty advocated for a “post-philosophical” approach grounded in pragmatism, inspired by thinkers like William James and John Dewey. He saw this as an alternative to analytic philosophy’s fixation on technical rigor.

Did He Entirely Abandon Philosophy?

Not exactly. Rorty did not reject philosophy as a discipline; instead, he redefined its purpose. He shifted away from analytic methods and concerns, championing philosophy as a tool for cultural criticism and social progress rather than as a search for timeless truths.

Summary

Rorty “gave up” on analytic philosophy insofar as he rejected its core aspirations and methodologies. However, he continued engaging in philosophy, albeit in a manner that emphasized pragmatism, narrative, and a more pluralistic, humanistic outlook. His work became a critique of the analytic tradition rather than a wholesale rejection of philosophical inquiry.

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You said:

Was rorty influenced by Sellars’ critique of foundationalism?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Yes, Richard Rorty was significantly influenced by Wilfrid Sellars’ critique of foundationalism. Sellars’ seminal work, particularly “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (1956), played a critical role in shaping Rorty’s ideas about the limits of traditional epistemology and the problems with the foundationalist project.

Sellars’ Influence on Rorty

  1. Critique of the “Myth of the Given”:
    • Sellars argued against the idea that there are self-evident, foundational “givens” in experience that serve as the ultimate justification for knowledge. Instead, he claimed that all knowledge is conceptual and exists within a framework of language and theory.
    • Rorty adopted this critique, rejecting the notion that philosophy could ground knowledge in indubitable, pre-conceptual foundations. He incorporated this idea into his rejection of representationalism in “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.”
  2. Anti-Foundationalism:
    • Sellars’ holistic view of knowledge—that justification occurs within a network of beliefs rather than relying on an indubitable foundation—resonated with Rorty’s pragmatism.
    • Rorty expanded on Sellars’ insights, arguing that the search for epistemological certainty was a misguided project rooted in an outdated view of the mind and knowledge.
  3. Linguistic Turn:
    • Sellars emphasized the role of language in structuring thought and knowledge, undermining traditional Cartesian ideas of the mind. This focus on language influenced Rorty’s shift towards a view of philosophy as a conversation rather than a foundational science.
  4. Naturalism and Pragmatism:
    • Sellars’ attempt to reconcile scientific naturalism with a robust account of human conceptual activity provided Rorty with a framework to critique both reductive scientism and traditional metaphysics.
    • Rorty, however, pushed this further, arguing for a pragmatist perspective that downplayed the distinction between philosophy and other cultural practices.

Divergences from Sellars

While Rorty was deeply influenced by Sellars, he also diverged from him:

  • Metaphysics and Realism: Sellars retained a commitment to some form of realism and scientific inquiry as an ideal. Rorty, on the other hand, leaned into an anti-realist, pragmatist perspective that was less committed to science as the ultimate arbiter of truth.
  • Philosophical Ambitions: Rorty moved beyond Sellars’ framework by rejecting the idea that philosophy should aim for a systematic understanding of reality, instead advocating for philosophy as cultural criticism.

Conclusion

Rorty’s critique of foundationalism owes much to Sellars’ dismantling of the “Myth of the Given.” He extended Sellars’ insights to challenge not only traditional epistemology but also the broader ambitions of analytic philosophy. Sellars can be seen as a key bridge between Rorty’s early analytic training and his later pragmatist, post-philosophical outlook.

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You said:

Can one call him a linguistic idealist?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Calling Richard Rorty a linguistic idealist would be somewhat misleading, as it doesn’t quite capture the essence of his philosophical position. While Rorty did emphasize the role of language in shaping our conceptual frameworks, his approach was more nuanced and aligned with pragmatism rather than idealism.

Here’s a breakdown of why “linguistic idealist” wouldn’t fully describe Rorty:

Key Points of Rorty’s View:

  1. Pragmatism, Not Idealism:
    Rorty’s philosophy was rooted in pragmatism, a tradition that emphasizes the practical use of concepts and ideas rather than abstract metaphysical questions about reality. Pragmatists like William James and John Dewey saw truth and knowledge as evolving within a social context, shaped by human needs and experiences, rather than grounded in a fixed, external reality.Rorty rejected the idea that language or mind must correspond to an objective reality or that there are transcendent truths to be discovered. Instead, he saw language as a tool for dealing with the world in ways that are useful to us. His pragmatism was about utility, not idealism.
  2. Language as a Tool, Not a Mirror:
    In his critique of representationalism (the “mirror of nature”), Rorty rejected the idea that language or thought must “mirror” an independent reality. For him, language was not a medium through which we access an ideal, external truth. Rather, it was a contingent, evolving social tool used to navigate the world and solve practical problems. This distinction places him at odds with linguistic idealism, which tends to treat language as a mechanism that shapes or even constitutes reality.
  3. Against Metaphysical Idealism:
    Rorty was critical of metaphysical forms of idealism that claim reality is somehow dependent on or constructed by the mind. Unlike idealists (e.g., Berkeley or Hegel), who posited that reality or truth is fundamentally shaped by mental or linguistic structures, Rorty argued that philosophy should give up the quest for metaphysical foundations and focus on pragmatic concerns—i.e., how language serves human practices.
  4. Cultural and Social Conversation:
    Rorty emphasized the role of philosophy as a cultural conversation rather than a search for eternal truths. While language was central to this conversation, it was not viewed as an ideal medium that reveals or constructs a deeper metaphysical reality. This contrasts with linguistic idealists who might argue that our concepts fundamentally structure the world.

Conclusion:

Rorty’s focus on language and conceptual frameworks aligns him with thinkers who recognize the importance of language in shaping our worldview. However, he did not believe that language or mind constructed reality in the metaphysical sense associated with idealism. He was a pragmatist rather than an idealist, focusing on how language functions as a tool in human practice, not as a reflection or construction of an ideal reality. Thus, linguistic pragmatist would be a more accurate term than linguistic idealist for Rorty.

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You said:

He was then a cultural relativist, no?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Richard Rorty’s philosophy does have elements that could be seen as cultural relativist, but it’s important to understand how he framed his ideas, especially in relation to relativism.

Rorty and Cultural Relativism:

Rorty’s pragmatism led him to emphasize that knowledge and truth are contingent on social and historical contexts rather than being based on universal, objective standards. In this sense, his work shares similarities with cultural relativism, especially in the view that there are no absolute, universal truths that transcend specific cultures or practices.

However, it’s critical to make distinctions:

  1. Rejection of Universal Standards:
    Rorty rejected the notion that there is a “view from nowhere” or an objective, universal standpoint from which all truth can be evaluated. This is a key aspect of his anti-foundationalism. According to Rorty, truth and knowledge are always shaped by the language, practices, and social contexts in which they are embedded.
  2. Context-Dependence of Truth:
    Truth, for Rorty, is not about correspondence to an objective reality, but rather about coherence and usefulness within a given context. He argued that what we consider “true” is defined by the norms of the communities we belong to. This contextual and social approach can appear similar to cultural relativism, where truth and norms are shaped by cultural practices.

Key Differences:

While Rorty’s views have some parallels with cultural relativism, there are important distinctions:

  1. Pragmatism Over Relativism:
    Rorty was a pragmatist rather than a relativist in the strict sense. Unlike some forms of relativism, which can imply that all beliefs are equally valid or that we should suspend judgment about competing worldviews, Rorty believed that human communities should aim to reach consensus about practical matters. His philosophy does not suggest that all ways of thinking are equally valid or that there are no better or worse ideas, but rather that what counts as “better” is context-dependent and shaped by human needs and desires.
  2. Lack of a Normative Framework for Relativism:
    Rorty was not a cultural relativist in the sense that he thought any culture’s values should be accepted without critique. While he emphasized the importance of cultural context, he was not a relativist in the sense that all cultural beliefs are equally legitimate. He encouraged a form of pragmatic dialogue where different cultures and practices could engage with each other and refine their values over time. His focus was on dialogue and solidarity between communities, rather than accepting all cultural views without critique.
  3. Ethical Engagement:
    Rorty did believe that cultures could and should critique each other, but his critique was not rooted in universal ethical standards but rather in solidarity and human flourishing. For him, ethical progress was driven by a pragmatic conversation between cultures and the evolving consensus about what is most beneficial for human well-being.

Conclusion:

Rorty’s views do share some overlap with cultural relativism in the sense that he believed knowledge and truth are shaped by social and cultural contexts. However, his position is better described as a pragmatic, anti-foundationalist view that emphasizes the contingent and evolving nature of truth, rather than a strict relativism that implies all cultural beliefs are equally valid. Rorty was less concerned with defending the equal legitimacy of all cultural practices than with fostering practical, constructive conversations about improving human life within particular social contexts.

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You said:

Sharpen Rorty’s idea of pragmatism.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Richard Rorty’s pragmatism is distinct from earlier forms, especially in the way it emphasizes contingency, conversation, and solidarity over fixed truths or foundational principles. To sharpen the understanding of Rorty’s pragmatism, let’s focus on the key themes that define it:

1. Anti-Foundationalism

Rorty’s pragmatism is rooted in a rejection of foundationalism, which is the idea that knowledge must rest on indubitable, objective foundations. He argued against the search for an ultimate, certain ground for knowledge (such as Descartes’ “Cogito” or Kant’s categories). Instead, Rorty adopted a contextual, historical approach to knowledge, asserting that what counts as true or justified is always contingent on social practices and historical contingencies. Knowledge is not about discovering universal truths but is instead rooted in the practical, evolving needs of communities.

2. Truth as Coherence and Utility

Rorty’s pragmatism redefines the concept of truth. Rather than viewing truth as a correspondence to an objective reality, Rorty saw truth as coherence within a particular set of beliefs and practices. Truth is not something to be discovered, but is something that emerges from conversations and consensus-building within communities. He argued that truth is what is useful and beneficial in a particular context, shaped by social practices and pragmatic needs. This utility-driven approach means that truths are always open to revision as communities evolve.

3. Anti-Representationalism

A central tenet of Rorty’s pragmatism is his rejection of representationalism—the idea that language or thought should mirror or correspond to an external, objective reality. Instead, Rorty argued that language is a tool for human interaction and problem-solving, not a means to represent the world. For him, knowledge is constituted by what we say, how we justify it to others, and how we navigate our social world, rather than by accurately reflecting an external, independent reality.

4. The “Final Vocabulary” and Contingency

Rorty emphasized the concept of final vocabularies, which are the irreducible terms and concepts through which individuals and cultures make sense of the world. These vocabularies are contingent and shaped by history, and there is no ultimate, non-arbitrary justification for any particular set of concepts. We must embrace the contingency of our beliefs and practices and recognize that no final, absolute justification exists. This theme encourages a rejection of metaphysical or transcendental foundations, urging a more pragmatic, fallibilistic attitude toward knowledge.

5. Solidarity Over Objectivity

Rorty’s pragmatism shifts focus from objectivity to solidarity. For Rorty, philosophy should aim to foster social cooperation and understanding rather than a quest for an objective, universal truth. Philosophers should strive to create a sense of solidarity among people, allowing for productive dialogue across cultures and ideas. Rorty’s pragmatism is deeply democratic—he views philosophical dialogue as a tool for addressing social, ethical, and political concerns, rather than an exercise in abstract theorizing.

6. Irony and the Finality of No Finality

In his later works, Rorty introduces the idea of the ironic self, someone who recognizes the contingency of their beliefs and vocabularies and yet still participates in the practices and projects of their community. The ironic person understands that their most cherished beliefs are not absolute truths but contingent social constructs. This attitude aligns with Rorty’s broader pragmatism in rejecting metaphysical absolutes in favor of the pragmatic goal of improving human life and fostering productive social conversations.

7. Pragmatic Epistemology: Knowledge as Social Practice

For Rorty, knowledge is fundamentally social. It is not about aligning with an objective reality, but about interacting with others in a way that is useful and constructive for solving problems. Knowledge is not about describing the world as it “really is,” but about participating in conversations that help individuals and societies navigate challenges and make decisions. Epistemic norms (what counts as justified knowledge) are socially constructed and can evolve over time.

Conclusion

Rorty’s pragmatism is sharply focused on the contingency of knowledge, the social nature of truth, and the democratic role of philosophy in fostering dialogue and solidarity. He rejects the quest for objective, universal truths and foundational justifications, advocating instead for a philosophy that is contextual, fallibilistic, and focused on improving human life through pragmatic engagement. His ideas represent a radical shift away from traditional metaphysical and epistemological frameworks, emphasizing pragmatic dialogue, social practice, and the usefulness of concepts rather than their correspondence to an independent reality.

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