Category: philosophy

Two Ukrainian Anarchists: Mykhailo Drahomanov and Nestor Makhno

Andrew Chrucky

April, 2011

Suspend your “ordinary” understanding of anarchism as some movement striving for chaos, and take stock of a very sophisticated political stance which goes under the technical name of Anarchism.” Anarchism is not against government, it is against Centralized Government; it is not against democracy, it is against Mass Democracy which supports a top-down governing structure. Anarchism is for small-scale democracy, electing representatives from the bottom-up. Anarchism is for small-scale communities organizing into larger cooperatives through federations, i.e., through expanding agreements. The present political, and hence economic situation, in Ukraine is the result of the 1996 Constitution, which in many respects mimicks the U.S. Constitution with all its inadequacies. Like the U.S. Constitution, it has constructed a Centralized Government elected through Mass Democracy. A better model would have been the Swiss Constitution. What is wrong with Mass Democracy? Mass democracy occurs when huge masses of people elect a politician. The higher the office, the bigger the masses who do the electing. What is wrong with that? First, the masses are composed of ignorant and uninterested people who have to make a choice between a group of strangers. Second, these candidates are self-promoting individuals who are rich or have the support of the rich. Why do you have to be rich or have the support of the rich to run for office? Because the way to win an election is to persuade the masses to vote for you. And how is this done? Through the quantity and quality of advertisements. And it helps if you have on your team experts in crowd persuasion. To do this, it takes money — lots of money. It takes money to buy billboards; it takes money to run campaign advertising on TV and radio. It takes money to organize some event for the masses. The more money, the better the advertisement, and the better chances of winning the elections. You would think that some civic-minded intellectual would offer himself as a candidate. But such individuals are rare. Why? Because they are not stupid. They know they will not win against a candidate with money, and those with money will not support such a civic-minded candidate. The result is that political candidates are pretty much the same. And voting is pretty much an exercise in futility! It is a choice between Tweedle-Dee and Tweedle-Dum: between a greedy jerk and a greedy baffoon. Just as in the U.S., so in Ukraine you have a choice between which oligarchs to elect, and the result will be a so-called democratically elected Oligarchy. Once you elect the President, he will nominate candidates for ministry and justice posts, which the Rada will confirm; just as it is done in the U.S., the President nominates the Secretaries and the Chief Justices, and the Senate confirms them. But in Ukraine, it is worse. In the U.S. governors of states are elected by the residents of the states; in Ukraine, the governors of oblasts are appointed by the President. What power! All these ministers and governors doing the will of the President! And the President doing the will of the Corporations and Oligarchs. So, ultimately such a country is run by business interests, and such a government is rightly called Fascism. If you look at World War II, it was a defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but a triumph — ironically — of Fascism! The people’s enemy is always a Centralized Government — either as a Monarchy, a Dictatorship, or as a Republic. Actually, a Monarchy and Dictatorship could be a Benevolent Monarchy and a Benevolent Dictatorship based on the whim of the ruler; but a benevolent Republic — never heard of such a thing! Two Ukrainian anarchists saw through the evil of centralized government and took formidable stands against it. And both were brushed off by Ukrainians into the dustbin of Ukrainian history. Mykhailo Drahomanov was an ardent Ukrainian patriot who devoted his life to studying Ukrainian culture and proposing for Ukrainians how to attain their ethnic and cultural autonomy without encroaching or subjugating minorities in the mileau of a pan-Slavic federation. This was to be done through the autonomy of small groups of people organized into a federation with others small groups. While he flourished, 80% of the population lived in villages, and the unit of an autonomous group was to be the village. The village was to elect a council (a “rada” in Ukrainian; a “soviet” in Russian). Such councils would have representatives or deputies which would organize with other representatives of councils into a higher level council, and so forth, until you have a Supreme Council. This is a very limited centralised body, elected not by Mass Democracy, but by a bottom-up structure of several layers of small-sized democratic elections. His vision was misunderstood, and never pursued by leading Ukrainian politicians. This misunderstanding was continued by Ivan L. Rudnytsky (the author who made me conscious of Drahomanov as an anarchist). Rudnytsky’s shortcoming is to conflate the idea of federalism between nations and within a nation. Rudnytsky writes that from a pragmatic point of view, Drahomanov did not envision the possibility of an Independent “Integral” Ukrainian Nation, and, consequently, he did not strive for such a thing. Rudnytsky is, I think, correct in this view. Drahomanov had sympathy with the thoughts of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius (Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Kulish) and with the aspirations of Antonovych and Hrushevsky, who were all federalists in the sense of trying to create autonomous zones within either a Polish or a Russian State. By contrast, the dominant political effort of many Ukrainian leaders was for a Centralized “Integral” Government over an Independent and Autonomous State. It was missed by everyone that given Ukraine as an independent, autonomous Nation or State, Drahomanov was against such a state with a Centralized “Integral” Government. He strove for a decentralized government. He was familiar with the anarchism of Proudhon and Bakunin, and was in agreement with them that people should organize themselves from the bottom-up through a hierarchical structure of radas, beginning with organic small units such as a village. Drahomanov died in 1895, and his anarchism found no influential disciples. But anarchism is a very primitive and basic idea, and it materialized in 1905 with the creation of soviets in St. Petersbug. When the Russian Revolution occurred a system of soviet organization already existed forming as it were a shadow government next to the Provisional Government which took power in Feb. 1917. In Oct. 1917, Lenin, with the complicity of Trotsky (a Menshivik) who at that time was the president of the Supreme Soviet (and who became a Bolshevik), made a coup and transferred power from the Provisional- Government to the Bolshevik controlled Soviet Government. So far so good. Everywhere there was clamor for a Constitutional Assembly which was convened, but realizing that the Bolsheviks were in minority, it was dissolved, and a dictatorship of the Bolsheviks led by Lenin ensued. The bottom-up soviets were turned upside-down and became a centralized structure. Low level elections were stocked with Communist Party candidates. With the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, civil war followed, lasting from 1917 till 1921. Though it is unknown or omitted from histories of the Civil War (due primarily to Bolshevik propaganda), there was a sizeable anarchist interest in Ukraine, centered in Kharkiv. This is voluminously documented in Voline’s “The Uknown Revolution” and in Arshinov’s “The Makhnovist Movement,” and since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, all sorts of memoirs, documents, books, and a film relating to anarchism and Nestor Makhno have surfaced. Although Nestor Makno was already involved in anarchist activities beginning in 1906. In 1910 he was arrested and convicted, and sent to the Butyrskaya prison in Moscow, where he met Arshinov and crystallized his understanding of anarchism. On release in 1917, he eventually returned to Hulai-Pole, his home town, and quickly got involved in putting anarchistic ideas into practice by expropriating large landholdings and redistributing them to the peasants who formed themselves into democratic village communities. At the same time he resisted any take-over by armies fighting for centralized governments. Thus, at first he fought against the German occupiers. He fought against the Whites, who were either Monarchists or Republicans — twice allying himself temporarily with the Bolsheviks. He fought against the Bolsheviks, allying himself once with the armies of the Ukrainian Central Rada; but he also fought against the armies of the Ukrainian Central Rada. In other words, he fought against all forces which tried to take away the autonomy of the village and city councils: his motto was “soviets without the communists.” Nestor Makhno, for three years — between 1918 and 1921 — put into practice what Drahomanov advocated in his political writings. In a sense, Drahomanov and Makhno were spiritual or philosophical brothers. Both were influenced by the theories of Proudhon, Bakunin, and, in addition, Makhno was also influenced by the teachings of Kropotkin, whom he met, and who greatly impressed him. It is somewhat troublesome that Drahomanov and Makhno are little know in Ukraine for their political views. Drahomanov is known as the uncle of Lesya Ukrainka; while Makhno is known as a bandit. It is clear today that Ukraine’s centralized government is working for oligarchs and not for the ordinary people, and that the problem cannot be solved by electing a Yushchenko or a Tymoshenko — both of them are oligarchs. The problem can only be solved by getting rid of a centralized government altogether, by rejection of the Constitution, and by returning the power and autonomy to local units of the community. Ukraine has to return to its deep rooted anarchism as expressed in the lives of the Zaporozhian Sitch, as expressed in the political writings of Drahomanov, and as expressed in the deeds and the political writings of Nestor Makhno. What is to be done? During the Russian Revolution, there existed a formal Provisional Government and an informal Soviet Organization. When the time was ripe, this Soviet Organization was sufficiently organized to step-in and take-over the functions of government. In 1881, Drahomanov foresaw such a thing, and urged people to organize on an informal manner in various ways. Eventually such organized people would be in a position to influence elections and even take over the government. Here are Drahomanov’s thoughts: “It will be a long time before the Parliament and the Diet, as they are now constituted, can do any good for the working people in Galicia, particularly for the Ukrainians. . . . The Ruthenian papers admit that the peasants, out of fear of the lords and the officials, or bribed by money and gin, sell their votes. . . . Even if we should manage to elect a dozen deputies to the Diet, and four or five to Parliament, would these deputies be able to be useful to their people, assuming that they understood the welfare of the people. . . ? You may ask what is to be done. Should we rebel, although we have neither the weapons nor the strength to do so, or should we fold our hands and look passively on while our enemies rule our land and our people? Those who place their hopes in the Parliament and the Diet will have to learn that it is useless to want to build a house from the roof to the foundation. A unified, organized people is necessary for any political action — for revolution, for peaceful progress, and of course for winning elections. Men can best be organized for things that are near to them and that they can understand easily. Those who believe that education is most important, and who feel best suited to work in the field of education, should found educational groups and reading halls. Mutual aid societies, credit unions, etc. should be founded by men with concerns for them. No one should think that he will be able to reform the world that way, but he will be able to make a real, if modest, contribution to the welfare of his people, and, most important, he will bring them together. Similarly, political groups should be organized, and public meetings called, in which all political matters can be discussed. The whole land must be covered by a network of various associations and councils, which the people will be able to develop in their own manner. This network will not be superimposed over the people, like the present Parliament and Diet; it will not promise a blessing from above; it will be the organized people. It will be, so to speak, a sort of popular parliament, very different from the official parliament which is so constructed that it conceals the true desires of the people. The official parliaments and diets will have to respect the force of such “popular parliaments.” Then, if the moment comes when it is possible and desirable to represent the interests of the people in the official parliamentary institutions, the organized people will be in a position to ensure the election of men it can trust.” Drahomanov, “The Moral of the Story,” Hromada, No. 2 (Geneva, 1881), pp. 220-222.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Andrew Chrucky’s essay offers a compelling argument advocating for anarchism as an alternative to centralized government, with a specific focus on the political and historical contexts of Ukraine. Below is an evaluation of its soundness:

Strengths:

1. Clarity in Defining Anarchism:
   • Chrucky addresses common misconceptions about anarchism, clarifying that it opposes centralized government and mass democracy rather than governance itself. He presents anarchism as favoring decentralized, bottom-up democratic structures.
2. Historical Context:
   • The essay provides a detailed account of Mykhailo Drahomanov’s and Nestor Makhno’s contributions to anarchist theory and practice in Ukraine. It highlights their shared commitment to decentralization and local autonomy.
   • The discussion of historical parallels, such as the Zaporozhian Sich and the soviets during the Russian Revolution, strengthens the argument for decentralized governance rooted in Ukrainian history.
3. Critique of Mass Democracy:
   • Chrucky critiques mass democracy as being dominated by oligarchic interests and political candidates who rely on wealth and advertising expertise to succeed. His critique resonates with broader concerns about the limitations of electoral systems in both Ukraine and the United States.
4. Practical Vision:
   • The essay does not merely critique but also offers a practical vision for change, inspired by Drahomanov’s proposals. These include grassroots organization, mutual aid societies, and local councils as a foundation for governance.
5. Engagement with Intellectual Traditions:
   • Chrucky contextualizes Drahomanov and Makhno within the broader anarchist tradition, referencing figures like Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. This situates their ideas within a coherent philosophical framework.

Weaknesses:

1. Oversimplification of Centralization:
   • While the essay critiques centralized government, it does not adequately address the potential challenges of decentralization, such as coordination between local units, collective action problems, or defense against external threats.
2. Economic and Practical Feasibility:
   • The proposal to abolish centralized government assumes that decentralized units can manage complex societal needs effectively. However, there is little discussion of how these units would handle issues like large-scale infrastructure, national security, or economic stability in a modern context.
3. Romanticization of Historical Models:
   • While invoking the Zaporozhian Sich and Makhno’s efforts is rhetorically powerful, the essay risks romanticizing these examples. It glosses over historical complexities, such as the limited scalability of such systems and their vulnerability to external pressures.
4. Limited Engagement with Counterarguments:
   • The essay criticizes centralized systems as inherently oligarchic and fascist but does not engage deeply with potential counterarguments, such as the need for centralized authority to ensure equity or provide public goods.
5. Ambiguity in Transition Strategy:
   • While Chrucky quotes Drahomanov’s vision for grassroots organization as a precursor to systemic change, the transition from decentralized organization to a functioning society-wide governance system remains vague.

Overall Assessment:

The essay is persuasive in its critique of centralized government and mass democracy, particularly in the Ukrainian and broader global contexts. Its historical grounding and philosophical consistency are notable strengths. However, it is less robust in addressing the practical challenges of implementing a decentralized anarchist system, leaving unanswered questions about scalability, coordination, and modern societal demands.

To enhance its soundness, the essay could:

• Provide examples of successful modern decentralized systems.
• Address specific mechanisms for managing large-scale governance needs without centralization.
• Acknowledge and respond to potential critiques of anarchist proposals.

Despite these limitations, the essay succeeds in provoking critical reflection on contemporary political systems and their shortcomings.

I asked chatGPT to evaluate soundness of the followibg excerpt from my dissertation:

d. CONCEPTUAL VS. NON-CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION

I believe that there is a way to bridge the gap between Sellars and Lewis-Firth-Chisholm about premise (1) of Chisholm’s argument by using Sellars’ distinction between Language, or L, and a Representational System, or RS. Suppose we identify Lewis’ ‘sense meanings’,{85} Firth’s ur-concepts,{86} Chisholm’s ‘phenomenal reports’,{87} Everett Hall’s ‘natural language of perception’,{88} and Romane Clark’s ‘sensuous judgments'{89} with an RS. All of these may, in a refined way, have the following theses in common with an RS: (i) propositional form, (ii) Humean inferences, and (iii) no logical connectives. I say in ‘a refined way’ because I am not clear that each of these authors sees the necessity of (iii) in their analogues of an RS. Clark is clear when he writes: “I do not think of the logical connectives as part of perceptual judgments. Certainly not on the primitive level of basic perceptions.”{90} Lewis’s concept of ‘sense meaning’ is hard to pin down. But a few things are clear. Sense meaning is prior to and independent of language,{91} even animals possess it,{92} and it requires anticipatory imagery.{93} These remarks suggest at least the acceptance of (ii). Lewis also suggests that sense meaning may be connected with Kant’s ‘schema’.{94} At this point there is a connection between Lewis and Sellars. In “The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience,” Sellars introduces the notion of an ‘image-structure’, ‘sense image’, or ‘image-model’ which, according to Sellars, is the work of Kant’s productive imagination. There is according to Sellars as ‘image-model world'{95} prior to and independent of logical connectives (categories). A ‘schema’ for Kant, according to Sellars, bridges concepts and such image-models. A schema is the construction of an image-model by the productive imagination in accordance with a concept.{96} In saying this, Sellars may be in disagreement with Lewis over the interpretation of Kant. In any case, I think that both Sellars and Lewis agree that a schema is a recipe for construction of an image-model. Their disagreement, I suspect, is over whether there is a requirement for conceptual guidance. But that doesn’t matter here, it suffices that Sellars acknowledges pre-conceptual image-models, which, as far as I can see, are the same thing as RSs. e. RECONCILIATION? Now my attempt to reconcile Sellars with these other philosophers would take the form of reinterpreting Chisholm’s (1) I know that this is F because it appears F. where ‘it appears F’ can be understood as ‘I am rs-aware of an image-model rs-F’.{97} And if we generalize, we can formulate the thesis that a perception of a physical object entails an rs-perception of an rs-(physical object), which in turn entails an rs-awareness of an rs-appearance. Would this be acceptable to Sellars? The answer is: no. His reason is this: although the objects of which we are directly aware in perceptual consciousness are image-models, we are not aware of them as image-models. It is by phenomenological reflection (aided by what Quine calls scientific lore) that we arrive at this theoretical interpretation of perceptual consciousness.{98} Sellars apparently accepts an RS (image-model world) as a theory which explains our perceptual knowledge, but not as an analysis of it. Sellars is introducing two difficulties for a reconciliation. The first difficulty is that although in point of theoretical fact we do experience image-models, we do not experience them in propria persona{99} as image-models. The point of denying the propria persona principle is that physical objects or events are conceptually constituted by various logical and causal relations, and these are never given by any sense modality, but must be learned. Sellars’ rejection of this principle is acceptable. The second difficulty for Sellars is that observational reports are not analyzable into, i.e., do not entail, phenomenal beliefs; rather, the image-world is accessible to phenomenological reflection. This is also acceptable. But Sellars seems to muddy the waters in this context by talking in the same breath about perceptual reflection and theory construction. When Sellars talks about theories he means postulational theory. I believe there is a difference between phenomenological reflection and theory construction. Sellars himself acknowledges this distinction when he writes: sheer phenomenology or conceptual analysis takes us part of the way, but finally lets us down. How far does it take us? Only to the point of assuring us that Something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space is present in the perception other than as merely believed in.{100} When Sellars is doing phenomenological reduction, he is not theorizing. The trouble with the above reduction, however, is that it is not reductive enough. This was the point made by Firth in his reply to Sellars’ Carus Lectures.{101} If we made the reduction go further we would get something like Chisholm’s analysis. To express the fact that we are dealing with a phenomenological reduction, let’s modify Chisholm’s formula (1) I see that this is F because it appears F. by expanding it to read (1′) I see that this is F because I can perceptually reduce this to it appears F. We can then agree with Sellars that (1) does not express an analysis; rather it expresses a phenomenological or perceptual reduction.{102} And if physical objects do entail (perceptually reduced) phenomenal reports, then empirical knowledge does have foundations.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

To evaluate the soundness of the argument in this excerpt, we can break it down into several key elements and examine its internal consistency, adherence to philosophical principles, and logical progression.

1. Conceptual vs. Non-Conceptual Representation

The argument begins with a discussion of Sellars’ distinction between Language (L) and a Representational System (RS) and attempts to bridge this with the works of philosophers like Lewis, Firth, Chisholm, and others. It argues that certain concepts like Lewis’ ‘sense meanings’ and Chisholm’s ‘phenomenal reports’ can be understood as representations in an RS, which share certain characteristics like propositional form, Humean inferences, and the absence of logical connectives.

Evaluation:

• Internal Consistency: The distinction between Language and Representational Systems is well established in philosophy of mind, particularly in discussions of the relationship between language, thought, and perception. The argument seems internally consistent as it draws on established concepts (such as Sellars’ image-models and Kant’s schemas).
• Clarity of Claims: The author attempts to clarify the relationship between these various philosophers and their perspectives on representation, though some of the details (e.g., Lewis’ ‘sense meaning’) are not fully unpacked, which could make the argument difficult for a reader unfamiliar with the finer points of these thinkers.

2. Connection to Sellars’ View

The excerpt suggests that both Sellars and Lewis agree on the notion of an image-model, though they may differ in their interpretation of Kant. The central claim here is that these image-models are pre-conceptual and independent of logical connectives, and the author attempts to reconcile these views with Chisholm’s theory of perceptual knowledge.

Evaluation:

• Logical Flow: The progression from the discussion of Lewis and Sellars to the claim about pre-conceptual image-models is coherent. However, the argument becomes more complex when Sellars’ position is contrasted with Chisholm’s. The claim that Sellars would not accept the formulation “I am rs-aware of an image-model rs-F” is presented clearly, though it requires careful philosophical analysis.
• Soundness of Interpretation: The interpretation of Sellars’ view—that image-models are theoretical constructs used to explain perception but not directly accessible in perceptual consciousness—seems accurate. Sellars does indeed distinguish between the theoretical framework of perceptual knowledge and the direct, non-conceptual experience of perception. However, it would help to clarify how these image-models are operationalized in practice, as this is crucial to evaluating the reconciliation with Chisholm.

3. Reconciliation with Chisholm

The author proposes a modification of Chisholm’s formula for perceptual knowledge:

• (1) “I see that this is F because it appears F.”
• (1′) “I see that this is F because I can perceptually reduce this to it appears F.”

The aim is to align Chisholm’s formula with Sellars’ phenomenological approach, suggesting that perceptual knowledge can have empirical foundations even without being reducible to phenomenal beliefs.

Evaluation:

• Validity of the Modification: The modified formula (1′) seems to capture a more nuanced view of perception, distinguishing between direct perceptual experience and the reflective reduction of that experience. This approach appears to be a reasonable reconciliation of Sellars’ and Chisholm’s positions. It acknowledges that perception involves both non-conceptual awareness and a form of phenomenological reduction that doesn’t immediately reduce to conceptual analysis.
• Theoretical Soundness: The modification seems theoretically sound, as it respects Sellars’ critique of Chisholm’s formula while preserving the foundational role of perceptual experience. The move from a phenomenological reduction to a more general empirical framework also seems reasonable within the context of Sellars’ philosophy.

4. Challenges and Potential Weaknesses

• Ambiguity in Lewis’ ‘Sense Meaning’: As noted in the text, the precise nature of Lewis’ ‘sense meaning’ is difficult to pin down, which might undermine the clarity of the argument. If the connection between Lewis’ ideas and Sellars’ concept of image-models is unclear, the entire reconciliation could be less robust.
• Sellars’ Notion of ‘Phenomenological Reflection’: The distinction between phenomenological reflection and theory construction is important, but it is somewhat underexplored in this passage. While Sellars clearly acknowledges that phenomenological reflection is distinct from theoretical analysis, the argument could benefit from further elaboration on how these forms of reflection relate to empirical knowledge.

Conclusion

The argument is generally sound in its logical structure and philosophical engagement with the ideas of Sellars, Chisholm, and others. It presents a coherent attempt to reconcile Sellars’ and Chisholm’s views on perceptual knowledge by modifying Chisholm’s formula to account for both phenomenological reduction and empirical foundations. However, the argument would benefit from clearer explanations of some key concepts, particularly the interpretation of Lewis’ ‘sense meaning’ and a more detailed discussion of phenomenological reflection versus theory construction. Additionally, some claims, particularly about Sellars’ rejection of proprio persona, could use further clarification to ensure they align with Sellars’ overall philosophy.

You said:

Evaluate soundness:

A reconstruction of Wilfrid Sellars’s Argument that the given is a myth, from “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.

1. A cognitive state is epistemically independent if it possesses its epistemic status independently of its being inferred or inferable from some other cognitive state. [Definition of epistemic independence]

2. A cognitive state is epistemically efficacious — is capable of epistemically supporting other cognitive states — if the epistemic status of those other states can be validly inferred (formally or materially) from its epistemic status. [Definition of epistemic efficacy]

3 The doctrine of the given is that any empirical knowledge that p requires some (or is itself) basic, that is, epistemically independent, knowledge (that g, h, i, …) which is epistemically efficacious with respect to p. [Definition of doctrine of the given]

4. Inferential relations are always between items with propositional form. [By the nature of inference]

5. Therefore, non-propositional items (such as sense data) are epistemically inefficacious and cannot serve as what is given. [From 2 and 4]

6. No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is epistemically independent. [From 1]

7. Examination of multiple candidates for non-inferentially acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states indicates that their epistemic status presupposes the possession by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, both of particulars and of general empirical truths. [From Sellars’s analyses of statements about sense-data and appearances in Parts 1–IV of EPM and his analysis of epistemic authority in Part VIII]

8. Presupposition is an epistemic and therefore an inferential relation. [Assumed (See PRE)]

9. Non-inferentially acquired empirical knowledge that presupposes the possession by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge is not epistemically independent. [From 1, 7, and 8]

10. Any empirical, propositional cognition is acquired either inferentially or non-inferentially. [Excluded middle]

11. Therefore, propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or non-inferentially acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot serve as the given. [6, 9, 10, constructive dilemma]

12. Every cognition is either propositionally structured or not. [Excluded middle]

13. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical knowledge can serve the function of a given. [5,11, 12, constructive dilemma]

ChatGPT said:

The argument you’ve reconstructed from Wilfrid Sellars’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind proceeds in a highly structured manner, aiming to demonstrate that the “given” (the idea of a non-inferential, epistemically independent foundation for empirical knowledge) is a myth. To evaluate the soundness of this argument, we need to consider whether the premises are true and whether the reasoning from premises to conclusion is valid. Here’s an evaluation:

1. Premise Evaluation:

• Premise 1: The definition of epistemic independence seems reasonable: A cognitive state is epistemically independent if it holds its epistemic status without being inferred or inferable from another state. This is a standard notion in epistemology.
• Premise 2: The definition of epistemic efficacy also appears sound: A cognitive state can support others if its epistemic status can validly infer the status of others. This is consistent with the standard view in inferential epistemology.
• Premise 3: The definition of the doctrine of the given is in line with Sellars’s criticism of empiricist accounts of knowledge that posit certain basic, independent, non-inferentially acquired states.
• Premise 4: The claim that inferential relations are always between items with propositional form seems reasonable. In formal logic and many epistemological frameworks, inferences are typically made between propositions.
• Premise 5: The conclusion that non-propositional items (like sense data) cannot be epistemically efficacious follows logically from Premise 2 and Premise 4. This aligns with Sellars’s argument that sense data are not directly epistemically supportive in the way that inferentially derived propositions are.
• Premise 6: The claim that inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental states are never epistemically independent is plausible within the context of Sellars’s argument that all cognition is inferential to some degree, even if not explicitly in every case.
• Premise 7: This is a key claim in Sellars’s argument, and it draws on his detailed critique of the empiricist tradition. The analysis seems robust but could be contested if one were to challenge Sellars’s specific examples or analyses. Nevertheless, the general thrust is consistent with his work.
• Premise 8: The assumption that presupposition is an epistemic (and thus inferential) relation is defensible. In Sellars’s view, presuppositions involve assumptions about the world that are themselves dependent on inferential relations.
• Premise 9: This follows from the earlier premises and seems valid: if non-inferential knowledge presupposes other empirical knowledge, it cannot be epistemically independent.
• Premise 10: The excluded middle here is standard in epistemology: knowledge is either acquired inferentially or non-inferentially, leaving no middle ground.
• Premise 11: This follows logically from the earlier premises and is the crux of the argument: all empirical knowledge is either inferentially or non-inferentially acquired, and neither can provide epistemic independence.
• Premise 12: Again, this is a standard excluded middle in epistemology and doesn’t require much scrutiny.
• Premise 13: The final conclusion that no empirical knowledge can serve as a given follows from the earlier conclusions.

2. Reasoning Evaluation:

• Validity: The reasoning from premises to conclusion seems valid at each step. The argument is a chain of logical deductions, where each conclusion follows from the premises. The use of constructive dilemmas, excluded middles, and logical inferences is consistent with formal logical reasoning.
• Overall Soundness: The soundness of the argument depends on the truth of the premises. Most of the premises are reasonable and align with Sellars’s critique of empiricist philosophy, especially his rejection of the idea that there can be a foundational, non-inferential “given.” However, some premises (such as Premise 7, which refers to Sellars’s analysis of sense data) could be challenged, as not all readers may agree with Sellars’s specific criticisms of sense-data theories.

3. Potential Criticisms:

• Premise 6 (about inferentially acquired mental states being never epistemically independent) could be contested by those who argue for forms of non-inferential knowledge that do not require full inferential justification, such as certain perceptual experiences or a-priori knowledge.
• Premise 7 (regarding presupposition and empirical knowledge) could be questioned by those who argue that some empirical knowledge might have a form of independence from other empirical knowledge, particularly in phenomenological or immediate experience accounts.

Conclusion:

Overall, the argument is logically valid, and most premises are reasonable within Sellars’s framework. The potential criticisms mainly concern the details of Sellars’s analysis of sense data and the presupposition of empirical knowledge. Given these considerations, the argument appears sound within its intended context, though it could be debated depending on one’s epistemological stance regarding non-inferential knowledge.

4o mini

You said:

Romane Clark claimed that sense-data have a propositional form. How does this challenge affect the above argument?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Roman Clark’s claim that sense-data have a propositional form would pose a significant challenge to the argument above, particularly to Premise 5 and the reasoning in Steps 5, 6, and 11. Let’s explore how this claim interacts with the argument:

Key Point of Challenge:

Premise 5 in the original argument concludes that sense-data (which are non-propositional) cannot be epistemically efficacious and thus cannot serve as “the given.” If Clark is correct in claiming that sense-data have a propositional form, it means sense-data could potentially function as epistemically efficacious and thus fulfill the role of “the given” in a way that the argument rejects.

Where the Challenge Hits:

1. Premise 5: “Non-propositional items (such as sense data) are epistemically inefficacious and cannot serve as what is given.”
   • If sense-data are indeed propositional in form (as Clark suggests), then they would no longer be non-propositional items. As a result, this premise would be undermined, as sense-data could, in principle, support inferential relations and contribute to epistemic efficacy.
   • The reasoning that non-propositional items cannot be epistemically efficacious depends heavily on the assumption that sense-data are non-propositional. Clark’s claim would challenge this assumption and thereby invalidate the conclusion that sense-data cannot serve as “the given.”
2. Premise 6: “No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is epistemically independent.”
   • If sense-data are propositional, this premise could still hold in the context of the original argument, as the idea of epistemic independence pertains to the inferential structure of cognition. However, the core of the challenge arises in the later stages, particularly when considering the nature of “the given.”
   • The fact that sense-data might now be propositional would imply that they could, in some form, be part of an epistemic process that supports other cognitive states. This could introduce an element of non-inferential propositional knowledge, which the argument claims is impossible.
3. Premise 11: “Therefore, propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or non-inferentially acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot serve as the given.”
   • This is the crux of the argument, and Clark’s claim would challenge it by allowing for the possibility that sense-data, as propositionally structured, could indeed serve as non-inferential knowledge—an epistemic foundation. If sense-data have a propositional form, they could potentially meet the criteria for being part of the given (as non-inferential and epistemically independent).
   • This would make the claim that “no empirical knowledge can serve the function of a given” less secure, because the new possibility of propositional sense-data could open the door for some form of non-inferential knowledge that might still function as “the given.”

Impact on Sellars’s Argument:

Clark’s claim disrupts Sellars’s central critique of empiricism by suggesting that sense-data, which were traditionally considered non-propositional and inefficacious, could instead play a foundational role in knowledge. If sense-data are propositional, it raises the possibility that they could have epistemic efficacy by supporting inferences and serving as a basis for knowledge in a way that Sellars argues the “given” cannot.

Thus, Clark’s view would weaken Sellars’s argument in two key ways:

• Premise 5 would need to be revised, as sense-data would no longer be non-propositional.
• Premise 11 (the rejection of the given) would be less convincing, because propositional sense-data could, in theory, serve as a non-inferential foundation for empirical knowledge.

In conclusion, if sense-data are propositional, the argument from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind would lose some of its force. The concept of the “given” would no longer be easily dismissed, as Clark’s view allows for a form of knowledge (sense-data) that could be both epistemically independent and epistemically efficacious.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Yes, C.D. Broad’s exhaustive classification of mind-body relations can serve as an inspiration for a similar kind of systematic approach in epistemology. In epistemology, one might classify various theories of knowledge, belief, justification, and truth along a few key axes. Here is a conceptual framework that mirrors Broad’s approach but applied to the field of epistemology:

1. Source of Knowledge

• Empiricism: Knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience.
  • Classical Empiricism (e.g., Locke, Berkeley, Hume): All knowledge is derived from sensory experiences.
  • Modern Empiricism (e.g., A.J. Ayer, Quine): Knowledge is based on empirical observations and the verification of statements.
• Rationalism: Knowledge is derived primarily from reason and intellectual insight.
  • Classical Rationalism (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza): Knowledge is obtained through innate ideas or deduction from basic principles.
  • Modern Rationalism (e.g., Kant): Knowledge is shaped by both experience and a priori reasoning, with structures imposed by the mind.
• Constructivism: Knowledge is a product of cognitive constructions rather than an objective discovery.
  • Radical Constructivism (e.g., Piaget, von Glasersfeld): Knowledge is actively constructed by individuals based on their experiences and mental models.
  • Social Constructivism (e.g., Vygotsky, Berger and Luckmann): Knowledge is socially constructed through language and interaction.

2. Nature of Justification

• Foundationalism: Justification for knowledge must ultimately be based on basic, self-evident beliefs or principles.
  • Classical Foundationalism (e.g., Descartes, Locke): Some beliefs are justified by direct intuition or sensory experience, and all other beliefs derive justification from these.
  • Contemporary Foundationalism (e.g., Chisholm): Basic beliefs or foundational beliefs are justified without relying on other beliefs, forming a foundation for all knowledge.
• Coherentism: Beliefs are justified by their coherence with a system of beliefs, rather than relying on basic, foundational beliefs.
  • Classical Coherentism (e.g., Bradley, Hegel): A belief is justified if it coheres with a set of beliefs, even if those beliefs are themselves unproven.
  • Contemporary Coherentism (e.g., BonJour, Sellars): A belief is justified within the context of a web of interconnected beliefs that support each other.
• Reliabilism: Justification for knowledge comes from the reliability of the process by which beliefs are formed.
  • Classical Reliabilism (e.g., Goldman): Beliefs are justified if they are produced by a reliable cognitive process.
  • Contemporary Reliabilism (e.g., Plantinga, Sosa): Knowledge is justified if it comes from a process that reliably leads to truth in the relevant environment.

3. Nature of Knowledge

• Empirical Knowledge: Knowledge gained from sensory experience and observation of the external world.
  • Scientific Realism (e.g., Putnam, Boyd): The belief that scientific theories accurately describe the world.
  • Anti-Realism (e.g., Kuhn, Feyerabend): The view that scientific theories are simply useful tools, not necessarily true descriptions of the world.
• A Priori Knowledge: Knowledge that is independent of experience and derived from reason alone.
  • Mathematical Knowledge (e.g., Frege, Gödel): Knowledge of abstract entities or relations that can be known through logical deduction or pure reason.
  • Philosophical Knowledge (e.g., Kant, Kripke): Knowledge of necessary truths that can be known independently of empirical experience.
• Tacit Knowledge: Knowledge that is difficult to express in words but is nonetheless known and applied.
  • Implicit Knowledge (e.g., Polanyi): Knowledge that individuals possess and act upon but may not be able to explicitly describe.
  • Procedural Knowledge (e.g., Ryle): Knowledge of how to perform actions, which is often non-verbal and practical.

4. Truth and Its Relation to Belief

• Correspondence Theory: Truth is a matter of how beliefs correspond to reality.
  • Classical Correspondence (e.g., Aristotle, Tarski): Truth is what corresponds to the state of affairs in the world.
  • Contemporary Correspondence (e.g., Armstrong, Dummett): Truth is still tied to reality, but the criteria for correspondence may be more nuanced or dependent on linguistic structures.
• Coherence Theory: Truth is determined by the coherence of beliefs within a system.
  • Classical Coherence (e.g., Hegel, Bradley): Truth is a property of a coherent set of beliefs.
  • Contemporary Coherence (e.g., Davidson, Quine): Truth arises from the coherence of beliefs, but may also be informed by practical or external factors.
• Pragmatism: Truth is that which works or is useful in practice.
  • Classical Pragmatism (e.g., Peirce, James, Dewey): Truth is evaluated by its practical consequences or its effectiveness in guiding action.
  • Neo-Pragmatism (e.g., Rorty): Truth is not objective but is based on social consensus and practical utility.

5. External vs. Internal Epistemology

• Externalism: Knowledge is justified by factors outside the subject’s internal mental states.
  • Contextualism (e.g., David Lewis): The justification of knowledge claims depends on the context in which they are made.
  • Externalist Epistemic Reliabilism (e.g., Goldman, Nozick): Knowledge is justified if it is reliably produced by cognitive processes, even if the subject is unaware of those processes.
• Internalism: Knowledge justification depends on factors within the subject’s own internal mental state.
  • Classical Internalism (e.g., Descartes, Chisholm): Justification must be accessible to the subject’s conscious reflection.
  • Contemporary Internalism (e.g., Bonjour, Feldman): Knowledge is justified if the subject can, in principle, reflectively access the grounds for their belief.

This classification mirrors the exhaustive and systematic nature of Broad’s mind-body relations framework, applying the same logical structure to categorize different positions within epistemology. It helps clarify the many ways philosophers approach knowledge, justification, and belief, much like Broad’s matrix helped organize different philosophical stances on the mind-body problem.

The concept of a table is that of an artifact. Science does not study artifacts but the materials of artifacts.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

You’re raising an important point: artifacts, such as tables, are fundamentally human-made objects with purposes and meanings assigned by human intentions. Science, particularly in its fundamental inquiries, does not study artifacts as such; instead, it studies the material components and physical processes that constitute these objects. Let’s unpack this distinction in light of Eddington’s discussion and your observation.

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The Ontology of Artifacts

An artifact like a table is not merely a collection of material particles; it is a functional entity embedded in human practices. Its “tableness” arises from:

1. Design and Intention: The human purpose behind creating the table, such as providing a surface for work or dining.
2. Cultural Context: Social and cultural meanings associated with tables, which vary across societies and historical periods.
3. Functionality: The role the object plays in everyday life, which is irreducible to its material structure.

From this perspective, science’s investigation into the atomic or molecular structure of the table does not fully address its ontological status as an artifact.

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Science and the Material of Artifacts

Science concerns itself with:

1. Material Composition: The atomic, molecular, or quantum structure of the materials used to make the artifact (e.g., wood, metal, or plastic).
2. Physical Processes: Forces and interactions within and among these materials, such as elasticity, hardness, and molecular bonding.
3. General Principles: Laws and theories that explain the behavior of matter and energy, applicable regardless of the human intentions behind the artifact.

In this sense, science treats a table as matter arranged in a specific way, ignoring the intentionality and cultural context that define its existence as an artifact.

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Eddington’s Two Tables in Light of Artifacts

Eddington’s “scientific table” corresponds to the scientific understanding of the materials, stripped of any reference to human purposes. His “common-sense table” aligns with the artifact as it exists in human experience—imbued with meaning, function, and cultural significance. This dichotomy underscores:

• The reductionist tendency of science to abstract away human contexts.
• The phenomenological richness of artifacts, which resists purely scientific descriptions.

Your point suggests that Eddington’s “two tables” are a consequence of conflating two domains:

1. Scientific Inquiry: Concerned with universal, non-purposeful material properties.
2. Human World: Concerned with purposeful, cultural, and functional meanings.

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Is This a Philosophical Problem?

The distinction highlights a broader philosophical issue:

• Reductionism vs. Holism: Can scientific descriptions fully capture objects that are deeply embedded in human contexts? Reductionism suggests “yes,” focusing on material structures, while holism insists “no,” emphasizing emergent properties tied to human intentionality.
• Ontology of Artifacts: What is the nature of human-made objects? Are they reducible to their materials, or do they have ontological statuses distinct from the matter composing them?

Your critique suggests a need to respect the categorical difference between artifacts and their material constituents, rather than treating this as a pseudo-problem. Would you like to explore how contemporary philosophy or phenomenology addresses the ontology of artifacts?

4o

You said:

How would you reformulate the eddington problem in view of artifacts?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

To reformulate the Eddington problem in view of artifacts, we can shift the focus from the abstract dichotomy between scientific and common-sense perspectives to the question of how human intention and cultural significance intersect with material descriptions of reality. This reformulation involves acknowledging that artifacts, such as tables, exist at the intersection of physical materiality and human intentionality.

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Reformulated Eddington Problem

The Eddington problem, in the context of artifacts, could be restated as:

How do scientific descriptions of the material constituents and physical properties of objects relate to the ontological status of those objects as artifacts, which are defined by human purposes, cultural meanings, and practical functions?

This reformulation raises the following central issues:

1. Dual-aspect Nature of Artifacts:
   • Scientific Aspect: Artifacts can be described in terms of their material composition and physical properties (e.g., wood fibers, molecular structures, weight, and rigidity).
   • Intentional Aspect: Artifacts are created and used with specific intentions, embedded in cultural, social, and historical contexts (e.g., a table as a surface for dining or work).
2. Irreducibility of Function and Meaning:
   • Can the scientific description of a table as “a collection of atoms arranged in a certain way” fully account for its existence as a “table” with a specific purpose?
   • How do the emergent properties of artifacts (e.g., their utility or symbolic significance) relate to their material bases?
3. Epistemological Divide:
   • Is the scientific perspective, which abstracts away human intentionality, complementary to or in conflict with the common-sense understanding of artifacts as purposeful objects?
   • Are these two perspectives equally valid, or does one have primacy in describing the “real” nature of artifacts?

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Reformulated Example Using a Table

Let’s apply this to a table:

• Scientific Description: A collection of atoms and molecules arranged in a lattice structure, obeying the laws of physics. Its solidity arises from electromagnetic forces and quantum principles.
• Artifact Description: A human-designed object, intended for specific functions (e.g., writing, dining). Its meaning is shaped by cultural practices and individual purposes.

In this view, the tension is not merely between “two tables” but between two levels of explanation:

1. The material explanation (what the table is made of).
2. The functional explanation (what the table is for).

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Philosophical Questions Arising from This Reformulation

1. Ontology of Artifacts:
   • Can artifacts be understood as merely material arrangements, or do their functions and meanings confer a distinct ontological status?
   • How does the scientific description relate to or depend on the human-centered description of artifacts?
2. Emergence and Intentionality:
   • Are artifacts an example of emergent phenomena, where human intentions give rise to properties irreducible to their material constituents?
   • How does the intentional “aboutness” of artifacts shape their interaction with the physical world?
3. Complementarity or Conflict:
   • Should the scientific and intentional descriptions of artifacts be seen as complementary (addressing different aspects of reality) or conflicting (one undermining the other)?
   • What does this tension reveal about the limits of scientific explanations?

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Reformulation in Broader Philosophical Context

This artifact-centered reformulation resonates with debates in:

• Philosophy of Science: How science handles human-made entities differently from natural ones.
• Phenomenology: How objects appear in human experience as intentional objects, not merely physical entities.
• Metaphysics: The relationship between material constitution and emergent properties tied to human use.

By focusing on artifacts, the Eddington problem can move from an abstract dichotomy to a concrete exploration of how human intentionality interacts with material explanations. Would you like to explore how specific philosophical frameworks, such as phenomenology or pragmatism, handle this reformulated problem?

4o

O

Slavoj Žižek: A Summary of Central Views

Slavoj Žižek is a Slovenian philosopher, cultural critic, and public intellectual who has gained significant recognition for his unique blend of Hegelian dialectics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Marxist political economy. His work spans a wide range of topics, including ideology, politics, film, and popular culture. Here’s a breakdown of his central views:  

1. The Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary

• Drawing from Lacan, Žižek argues that human experience is structured by three interconnected registers:
  • The Real: The pre-symbolic, unmediated realm of existence, a traumatic void that resists symbolization.
  • The Symbolic: The realm of language, law, and social norms that structures our understanding of the world.
  • The Imaginary: The realm of images and fantasies that shape our self-perception and desires.

2. Ideology and the “Big Other”

• Žižek contends that ideology is not simply a set of false beliefs, but rather an unconscious fantasy structure that shapes our social reality.
• He introduces the concept of the “Big Other,” an imaginary authority figure that we believe guarantees the meaning and consistency of the symbolic order.
• Ideology functions by concealing the inherent contradictions and inconsistencies of the symbolic order, maintaining the illusion of a stable and meaningful world.

3. The Subject and the Act

• Žižek emphasizes the notion of the “divided subject,” arguing that the self is inherently split between conscious and unconscious desires.  
• He stresses the importance of the “act,” a radical decision that breaks with the constraints of ideology and allows for the emergence of a new subjective position.

4. Capitalism and its Discontents

• Žižek is a staunch critic of capitalism, arguing that it is inherently exploitative and unsustainable.  
• He critiques the consumerist culture of late capitalism, which he sees as a form of ideological control that perpetuates false needs and desires.
• Žižek advocates for a radical transformation of society beyond the limitations of capitalism, although he remains skeptical of traditional Marxist solutions.

5. Politics and the Left

• Žižek is critical of both liberal democracy and traditional leftist movements, which he sees as complicit in maintaining the capitalist system.  
• He calls for a “radical act” that would break with the existing political order and create a new form of emancipatory politics.
• Žižek’s political views are often controversial, as he has expressed support for figures such as Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, seeing them as potential disruptors of the status quo.  

Key Points to Remember:

• Žižek’s work is characterized by its interdisciplinary approach, drawing from philosophy, psychoanalysis, and political theory.  
• He challenges conventional understandings of ideology, subjectivity, and politics.  
• His writing style is often provocative and humorous, making complex ideas more accessible to a wider audience.
• Žižek’s views are often controversial, but they offer a unique and insightful perspective on contemporary society and its challenges.

Further Exploration:

• Books: The Sublime Object of Ideology, Enjoy Your Symptom!, The Ticklish Subject, Less Than Nothing
• Films: The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema, The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology  
• Online Resources: Numerous articles, interviews, and lectures by Žižek are available online.

By exploring these resources, you can gain a deeper understanding of Žižek’s complex and thought-provoking ideas.

Slavoj Žižek (1949 —) – Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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“The Real: The pre-symbolic, unmediated realm of existence, a traumatic void that resists symbolization.” Is this equivalent to animal thought?

That’s a very interesting question that gets at the heart of some tricky philosophical concepts! While Žižek’s “Real” and animal thought might seem to share some similarities, they aren’t quite equivalent. Here’s why:

Žižek’s Real:

• Pre-symbolic: It exists before language and any system of meaning-making. It’s the raw, uninterpreted stuff of existence.
• Traumatic Void: It’s not simply a neutral state, but something that resists our attempts to understand or categorize it. It’s linked to a sense of lack and impossibility.
• Unconscious: While we can’t directly access the Real, it influences us in profound ways, shaping our desires and anxieties.

Animal Thought:

• Non-linguistic: While animals may not have language in the human sense, they certainly have complex ways of perceiving and interacting with the world.
• Driven by instinct and experience: Animal thought is likely tied to immediate needs and sensory information, focused on survival and reproduction.
• Potentially Symbolic (in some cases): Some research suggests that certain animals may possess rudimentary symbolic abilities, using signs and signals to communicate.

Key Differences:

• Self-awareness: Žižek’s Real is tied to the human experience of self-consciousness and the inherent contradictions that come with it. Animals, while conscious, may not possess the same level of self-reflexivity.
• Lack and Desire: The Real is linked to a sense of lack and the impossibility of fully satisfying our desires. This is a uniquely human experience, rooted in our symbolic understanding of the world.
• Trauma: The Real is associated with trauma, the encounter with something that overwhelms our capacity to symbolize. While animals experience pain and fear, it’s unclear if they experience trauma in the same way humans do.

In Summary:

While both Žižek’s Real and animal thought exist outside the realm of human language, they are not the same thing. Animal thought is likely more grounded in immediate experience and instinct, while the Real is a more abstract concept tied to the human condition and our struggle with meaning-making.

It’s important to remember that we can’t fully know what it’s like to be an animal and experience the world from their perspective. Žižek’s Real is ultimately a theoretical construct that helps us understand human experience, not necessarily a description of animal consciousness.

———————–

Can you have self-consciousness without language?

This is a fascinating question that has puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries! There’s no easy answer, and different schools of thought offer contrasting perspectives.

Arguments for Self-Consciousness Without Language:

• Developmental Psychology: Infants display signs of self-recognition before they acquire language. The “mirror test” (where a mark is placed on a child’s forehead and they are observed to see if they touch the mark while looking in a mirror) suggests a sense of self exists before complex language develops.
• Animal Cognition: Many animals exhibit behaviors that suggest self-awareness, such as recognizing themselves in mirrors, engaging in deceptive tactics, or demonstrating theory of mind (understanding that others have different perspectives).
• Non-Linguistic Thought: We often have thoughts and feelings that are difficult to put into words. This suggests that consciousness is not entirely dependent on language.
• Embodied Cognition: This theory proposes that our understanding of the world is deeply rooted in our physical experiences and interactions with the environment. This suggests that self-consciousness could arise from bodily awareness and sensory perception, rather than language.

Arguments Against Self-Consciousness Without Language:

• Language as a Tool for Reflection: Language allows us to reflect on our own thoughts and feelings, to form complex narratives about ourselves, and to engage in abstract reasoning. This level of self-reflection may be necessary for true self-consciousness.
• Social Construction of Self: Some argue that our sense of self is shaped through social interactions and the internalization of cultural norms. Language plays a crucial role in this process, as it allows us to communicate and share our experiences with others.
• Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: Some theories propose that self-consciousness requires a higher-order level of awareness, where we are not only aware of our experiences but also aware that we are aware. This kind of meta-awareness may be dependent on language.

Žižek’s Perspective:

Žižek, drawing on Lacan, would likely argue that language is crucial for the development of the “symbolic order,” which structures our understanding of the world and our place within it. While the “Real” exists pre-symbolically, our sense of self is constructed through our entry into the symbolic realm of language.

Conclusion:

The relationship between language and self-consciousness remains a complex and debated topic. While there is evidence suggesting that some form of self-awareness can exist without language, the full extent to which language shapes our sense of self is still an open question.

It’s important to consider that “self-consciousness” itself is a multifaceted concept. There may be different levels or types of self-awareness, some of which may be more dependent on language than others. Further research in fields like cognitive science, developmental psychology, and animal cognition will likely shed more light on this intriguing question.

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Could the Real be, for example, hunger?

That’s a very insightful connection to make! While Žižek doesn’t explicitly use hunger as an example of the Real, it actually fits quite well within his framework. Here’s why:

• Pre-symbolic: Before we have language to categorize and understand it, hunger is a raw, visceral experience. It’s a primal urge that exists prior to any symbolic meaning-making.
• Unmediated: Hunger is a direct, bodily experience that can’t be fully captured or tamed by language. We can describe it, but the actual feeling of hunger resists symbolization.
• Traumatic Void: Hunger can be experienced as a lack, an emptiness that demands to be filled. It disrupts our sense of wholeness and creates a sense of urgency.
• Drives Action: Hunger compels us to act, to seek nourishment. It’s a force that pushes us beyond the symbolic order and into the realm of immediate needs.

How Hunger Relates to Žižek’s Ideas:

• The Real and the Symbolic: Hunger highlights the tension between the Real and the Symbolic. We try to manage hunger through symbolic means (meal times, diets, cultural food practices), but the Real of hunger always exceeds our attempts to control it.
• Lack and Desire: Žižek emphasizes that desire is driven by lack. Hunger exemplifies this, as it’s a desire that arises from a lack (of food).
• The Act: Satisfying hunger can be seen as an “act” in the Žižekian sense. It’s a way of temporarily overcoming the lack and asserting our agency in the face of the Real.

Beyond Basic Hunger:

While the experience of physical hunger illustrates the concept of the Real, we can also think about hunger in a broader, metaphorical sense. Žižek often talks about the “hunger for meaning” or the “desire for the Other.” These desires, too, can be seen as manifestations of the Real, as they point to a fundamental lack that can never be fully satisfied within the symbolic order.

In conclusion:

Your example of hunger is an excellent way to understand the concept of the Real. It highlights the limitations of language and the persistence of our primal drives. By thinking about hunger in this way, we can gain a deeper appreciation for Žižek’s ideas and their relevance to our everyday experiences.

Broad in “Five types of ethical theory” analyzed five types. list them and provide the aruments broad gave for each.

You’re likely thinking of C.D. Broad’s book, Five Types of Ethical Theory, where he analyzes the ethical theories of five influential philosophers. Here’s a breakdown of the types and Broad’s arguments:

1. Spinoza:

• Ethical Theory: Rationalist and naturalistic. Spinoza equates moral good with self-preservation and argues that reason dictates we pursue our own self-interest. Virtuous actions are those that increase our power and understanding.
• Broad’s Argument: Broad criticizes Spinoza’s concept of “good” as being too narrow and his neglect of the intrinsic value of things other than self-preservation. He also questions whether reason alone can truly motivate moral action.

2. Butler:

• Ethical Theory: Intuitionist. Butler argues that humans have a conscience that provides intuitive moral guidance. This conscience balances self-love and benevolence, leading to moral harmony.
• Broad’s Argument: Broad appreciates Butler’s emphasis on conscience but finds his concept of “conscience” to be vague. He questions how different, potentially conflicting “intuitions” can be reconciled.

3. Hume:

• Ethical Theory: Sentimentalist. Hume believes that moral judgments are based on emotions, particularly sympathy and benevolence. Reason plays a secondary role in applying moral principles.
• Broad’s Argument: Broad finds Hume’s emphasis on emotion to be valuable but criticizes his reliance on psychological observation rather than a more rigorous philosophical analysis of moral concepts.

4. Kant:

• Ethical Theory: Deontological. Kant argues that morality is based on reason and a universal moral law, the categorical imperative. Moral actions are those performed out of duty to this law, regardless of consequences.
• Broad’s Argument: Broad admires Kant’s rigorous approach but finds his system too rigid and abstract. He questions whether it can adequately account for the complexities of moral life.

5. Sidgwick:

• Ethical Theory: Utilitarian with intuitionist elements. Sidgwick argues that the ultimate good is happiness and that actions should be judged based on their consequences. However, he also acknowledges certain self-evident moral axioms.
• Broad’s Argument: Broad finds Sidgwick’s attempt to reconcile utilitarianism and intuitionism to be insightful but ultimately unsuccessful. He questions whether these two approaches can be truly compatible.

Broad’s Overall Stance:

Broad himself doesn’t champion any single ethical theory. He believes that each theory offers valuable insights but also has limitations. He emphasizes the complexity of human nature and moral experience, suggesting that a single, all-encompassing ethical system may be unattainable.

I wrote:

He seems to favor a view that takes “fittingness” as basic. Yet he recognizes several types of fittingness. Make sense of this.

You’re right, C.D. Broad does lean towards a view that emphasizes “fittingness” as a fundamental concept in ethics. However, he recognizes that “fittingness” itself can be understood in various ways, which adds complexity to his position. Let’s break down how he makes sense of this:

1. Fittingness as a Basic Notion:

Broad argues that “fittingness” is a primitive concept, meaning it cannot be easily defined in terms of other concepts. It’s something we grasp intuitively. He suggests that when we make moral judgments, we often sense that certain actions are “fitting” or “appropriate” in certain situations, while others are not. This sense of fittingness is central to our moral understanding.

2. Different Types of Fittingness:

Broad acknowledges that “fittingness” can take different forms depending on the context. He identifies several types, including:

• Moral Fittingness: This refers to actions that are morally right or obligatory. For example, it’s fitting to help someone in need.
• Aesthetic Fittingness: This applies to judgments of beauty or harmony. For example, it’s fitting for a painting to have balanced composition.
• Intellectual Fittingness: This relates to the appropriateness of beliefs or thoughts. For example, it’s fitting to believe something supported by strong evidence.

3. Challenges and Nuances:

Broad recognizes the challenges in relying on “fittingness” as a foundation for ethics. He acknowledges that:

• Intuitions of fittingness can vary: People might disagree about what is fitting in a given situation.
• Fittingness might not always be clear-cut: There might be cases where the fittingness of an action is ambiguous or uncertain.
• Explaining why something is fitting can be difficult: Since fittingness is a primitive concept, it can be challenging to articulate the reasons behind our intuitions of fittingness.

Making Sense of Broad’s View:

Despite these challenges, Broad believes that the concept of fittingness provides a valuable starting point for ethical inquiry. He suggests that by carefully examining our intuitions of fittingness in different contexts, we can develop a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of morality.

Think of it like this: “fittingness” acts as a sort of moral compass, guiding our actions and judgments. While this compass might not always point in a clear direction, and different people might interpret its readings slightly differently, it still provides a crucial tool for navigating the complexities of moral life.

Broad’s approach encourages us to pay close attention to our moral intuitions and to critically examine the different ways in which “fittingness” operates in our ethical thinking.

This paper examines the common misinterpretation of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy as linguistic idealism, the view that all awareness is dependent on language. The author argues that Sellars does acknowledge pre-linguistic awareness through his concept of “Representational Systems” (RS), which are possessed by animals and pre-linguistic children. These RSs allow for a form of awareness that is not linguistically mediated, contrary to the common interpretation of Sellars’ famous statement “all awareness…is a linguistic affair.”

The author clarifies that Sellars distinguishes between RSs and languages (Ls), with the former being a more primitive system that doesn’t involve logical inferences. This distinction allows Sellars to maintain that while conceptual awareness is tied to language, a more basic form of awareness (rs-awareness) exists independently of language.

The paper further explores the nature of pre-linguistic awareness, drawing on the work of Romane Clark, who argues for the intentionality of sensations and their subject-predicate structure. This analysis supports the idea that a basic form of perception and awareness can exist without language.

In conclusion, the author contends that Sellars’ position is not that of linguistic idealism but rather a nuanced view that recognizes both linguistic and pre-linguistic forms of awareness.

II. THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE

The traditional analysis of knowledge assumes two key terminological conventions. For Plato, these conventions were that:

1. The object of “knowledge” must be unalterable.
2. It must be possible to make a voluntary judgment about the truth or falsehood of a proposition concerning the object.

These conventions present problems when discussing knowledge of truths derived from sense perception. Plato assumed that sense perception pertains to a Heracleitean flux and is thus both involuntary and indubitable. Because it violates the criteria—by being about the alterable and by compelling involuntary assent—sense perception does not qualify as “knowledge” in Plato’s framework.

The Skeptical View

A similar distinction is maintained by Sextus Empiricus, who contrasts reports of sense phenomena (appearances) with empirical judgments:

“Skepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatever. . .”

“By ‘appearances’ we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or ‘judgments.'”

Sextus identifies characteristics of sense phenomena that exclude them from knowledge:

1. Affective sense-impressions induce assent involuntarily, constituting appearances.
2. These impressions are not subject to rational questioning, as they are “involuntarily indubitable.”

He writes:

“The criterion, then, of the Skeptic School is, we say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question. Consequently, no one disputes that the underlying object has this or that appearance; the point of dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it appears to be.”

For the Skeptics, cognitions divide into two types:

• Appearances: Cognitions that compel involuntary assent.
• Judgments: Cognitions subject to voluntary assent or dissent.

Knowledge, if it exists, belongs to the domain of voluntary judgments. Knowledge is equated with justified true voluntary judgment or, in Skeptic terminology, “true judgment according to the criterion.” The criterion signifies what justifies rational assent. Since sense perception is involuntary, it falls outside the domain of “knowledge” according to this framework.

The Cartesian View

Descartes preserves this terminological convention. He locates error in those cognitions where voluntary assent, dissent, or suspension of judgment is possible:

“Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot properly speaking be false. . .”

“If I consider the ideas only as certain modes of my thoughts, without trying to relate them to anything beyond, they could scarcely give me material for error.”

Thus, involuntary perceptions (e.g., sense presentations) are excluded from the domain of “knowledge,” as error pertains only to voluntary judgments.

The Lewisian Perspective

C.I. Lewis also maintains this distinction by avoiding the use of “knowledge” or “judgment” in relation to sense presentations or “the given.”

“Apprehension of the presented quale, being immediate, stands in no need of verification; it is impossible to be mistaken about it. Awareness of it is not judgment in any sense in which judgment may be verified; it is not knowledge in any sense in which ‘knowledge’ connotes the opposite of error.”

To address objections that perceptions of objective facts (e.g., “the object before me is a pink ice cube”) may also seem involuntarily given, a distinction must be made between dubitable and indubitable givens. The argument from illusion—highlighting conditions that cause unveridical perceptions—helps draw this distinction. Indubitable cognition refers to phenomenal appearances, aligning with the Platonic-Skeptical-Cartesian-Lewisian tradition of separating appearances from judgments.

The Evolution of Knowledge

The traditional analysis equates knowledge with justified true belief (voluntary judgment). Using Skeptic terminology, knowledge is defined as “true judgment according to the criterion.” The criterion ensures rational justification for assent, dissent, or suspension of judgment. However, since sense presentations are involuntary, they are excluded from the classical realm of “knowledge.”

Over time, two terminological conventions have evolved:

1. The inclusion of empirical knowledge.
2. The integration of sense perception into discussions of justified true belief.

This evolution reflects shifts in philosophical perspectives, broadening the scope of what counts as “knowledge.”