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Evaluate for soundness Franz Oppenheimer’s “The State”

Franz Oppenheimer’s “The State” is a significant work in political sociology, but its soundness has been debated since its publication in 1908. Here’s an evaluation:  

Oppenheimer’s Main Argument:

  • The state originates from conquest and domination. He argues that the state is not a natural evolution of society but is born out of violence when one group conquers another and establishes itself as a ruling class to exploit the conquered.  
  • The state is fundamentally an instrument of exploitation. He defines the state as the “organization of the political means” used by the ruling class to extract economic benefits from the subjected population.  

Soundness:

  • Strengths:
    • Historical Evidence: Oppenheimer draws on a wide range of historical examples to support his claims, demonstrating how many states arose from conquest and continue to exhibit exploitative characteristics.  
    • Challenging Conventional Views: His work challenged prevailing theories that portrayed the state as a necessary and beneficial institution for social order.
    • Influence on Libertarian Thought: His ideas significantly influenced libertarian and anarchist thinkers, providing a theoretical framework for criticizing state power.  
  • Weaknesses:
    • Oversimplification: Critics argue that Oppenheimer’s theory oversimplifies the origins and functions of the state. While conquest and domination have played a role in state formation, other factors like social contracts, the need for collective action, and the provision of public goods also contribute.
    • Limited Scope: His focus on conquest and exploitation neglects other aspects of the state, such as its potential for promoting social welfare, protecting individual rights, and resolving conflicts peacefully.
    • Utopian Vision: His belief in the eventual “withering away” of the state and the emergence of a free society based on voluntary cooperation is seen by some as unrealistic.

Conclusion:

Oppenheimer’s “The State” offers a powerful and thought-provoking critique of state power and its origins. While his central thesis about conquest and exploitation holds some validity, it’s not a complete or universally applicable explanation for the existence and functions of the state. The book’s value lies in its challenge to conventional views and its contribution to ongoing debates about the nature and role of the state in society.  

Further Considerations:

  • Contemporary Relevance: Oppenheimer’s ideas remain relevant today, as they raise critical questions about the legitimacy of state power, the potential for state abuse, and the need for checks and balances to prevent exploitation.
  • Alternative Perspectives: To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the state, it’s essential to explore alternative theories, such as social contract theory, pluralist theory, and Marxist theory.
  • Empirical Evidence: Contemporary political science and sociology offer empirical research and data that can further evaluate the soundness of Oppenheimer’s claims about the state.

You said:

Aren’t all states where writing exists formed originally by conwuest?

It’s a fascinating question and gets to the heart of Oppenheimer’s argument! While he strongly emphasizes conquest as the origin of the state, it’s likely an oversimplification to say all states with writing arose solely from conquest.

Here’s a breakdown of why it’s complex:

Arguments for Conquest:

  • Historical Evidence: Many early states with writing systems, like those in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Mesoamerica, do show evidence of conquest playing a significant role in their formation. Archaeological findings often reveal fortifications, weapons, and mass graves that point to violent conflict and domination.
  • Writing as a Tool of Control: Writing itself could be seen as a tool developed and used by emerging elites to manage conquered populations, administer resources, and legitimize their rule.

Arguments Against Conquest as the Sole Origin:

  • Alternative Theories: Other factors likely contributed to state formation, including:
    • Environmental pressures: The need to manage irrigation systems or respond to natural disasters might have led to centralized leadership and social organization.
    • Economic specialization: Trade and the division of labor could have created social hierarchies and a need for governance.
    • Voluntary cooperation: Some scholars argue that states could have emerged through voluntary agreements and social contracts, where people recognized the benefits of collective action and centralized authority.
  • Complexities of “Conquest”: The term “conquest” itself can be ambiguous. It can encompass a wide range of interactions, from violent subjugation to more gradual processes of cultural assimilation and integration.
  • Lack of Clear Evidence in Some Cases: For some states, the archaeological and historical evidence for conquest is less conclusive. It’s difficult to definitively prove that violence and domination were the primary drivers of their formation.

Conclusion:

While conquest undoubtedly played a significant role in the formation of many early states, it’s unlikely to be the sole or universal explanation. State formation is a complex process with multiple contributing factors. Oppenheimer’s emphasis on conquest serves as a valuable reminder of the potential for violence and exploitation in the origins of the state, but it’s important to consider alternative perspectives and the nuances of historical evidence.

You said:

Are modern states the outcome of conquest?

While the origins of modern states are complex and vary considerably, it’s undeniable that conquest and colonialism have played a significant role in shaping the modern world map and the structure of many contemporary states.

Here’s how conquest has influenced modern states:

  • Territorial Boundaries: Many modern states’ borders are the direct result of past conquests, wars, and colonial expansion. European colonialism, in particular, redrew the map of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, often with little regard for pre-existing cultural or ethnic boundaries.
  • State Formation: In many cases, colonial powers imposed their own state structures and institutions on conquered territories. This often involved suppressing indigenous forms of governance and social organization.
  • Internal Conflicts: The legacy of conquest can contribute to internal conflicts within modern states. Ethnic tensions, separatist movements, and struggles over resources often have roots in historical injustices and power imbalances created by conquest.
  • Economic Inequality: Conquest and colonialism often led to the exploitation of resources and labor in colonized territories, contributing to lasting economic inequalities between states.

However, it’s crucial to recognize that:

  • Not all modern states are solely products of conquest. Some states emerged through more peaceful processes of unification, federation, or secession.
  • The impact of conquest varies. The extent to which conquest continues to shape modern states differs depending on specific historical contexts and ongoing political dynamics.
  • Modern states are not static. They continue to evolve and change in response to various factors, including internal social movements, international pressures, and globalization.

Examples of Conquest’s Influence:

  • African States: The arbitrary borders drawn by European colonial powers during the “Scramble for Africa” continue to be a source of conflict and instability in many African countries.
  • Latin America: The legacy of Spanish and Portuguese colonialism has shaped the political and economic landscape of Latin America, with ongoing struggles for indigenous rights and social justice.
  • The United States: The expansion of the United States across North America involved the displacement and dispossession of Native American populations, the consequences of which are still felt today.

Conclusion:

While conquest has undeniably shaped the modern world, it’s essential to avoid oversimplification. Modern states are the products of diverse historical processes, including conquest, colonialism, peaceful unification, and internal social and political struggles. Understanding the complex interplay of these factors is crucial for analyzing contemporary political challenges and working towards a more just and equitable international order.

You said:

Name a modern state that was not formed by conquest.

It’s tricky to definitively say any modern state is entirely free from any historical element of conquest, as state formation is a long and complex process. However, some come closer than others.

Iceland is a strong contender for a modern state formed with minimal conquest.

Here’s why:

  • Settlement: Iceland was primarily settled by Norse and Celtic peoples (mostly Norwegians) between the 9th and 10th centuries. While there were some pre-existing inhabitants, there wasn’t large-scale displacement or subjugation of an existing population.  
  • Voluntary Migration: Many settlers came to Iceland seeking to escape conflict or seek new opportunities, making it more of a voluntary migration than a conquest.  
  • Early Governance: Iceland established one of the world’s earliest parliaments, the Althingi, in 930 AD, indicating a focus on cooperative governance rather than imposed rule.  
  • Limited Conflict: While Iceland experienced periods of internal conflict and was under Norwegian and later Danish rule, these were more instances of political control than violent conquest aimed at acquiring territory.

Important Notes:

  • Indigenous Presence: It’s crucial to acknowledge that Iceland was not entirely uninhabited. There’s evidence of a small pre-existing population of Irish monks. While their interaction with Norse settlers is debated, it likely wasn’t a large-scale conflict that defined Iceland’s formation.
  • Danish Rule: While under Danish rule for centuries, Iceland maintained a degree of autonomy and cultural identity. Its independence movement was largely peaceful and achieved through negotiation.  

While no state’s history is completely free from conflict, Iceland stands out as a modern state whose formation was primarily driven by voluntary settlement and cooperative governance, rather than large-scale conquest and subjugation. Sources and related content

You said:

How did iceland become centralized?

Before centralization, Iceland experienced a unique period known as the Icelandic Commonwealth (c. 930-1262 AD). This era was marked by a decentralized form of governance with some fascinating features:

Key Characteristics:

  • The Althingi: This was the central governing assembly, established in 930 AD. It functioned as a legislative and judicial body, where chieftains (goðar) met annually to make laws, settle disputes, and conduct trials.  
  • Goðar (Chieftains): These were powerful leaders who held both religious and political authority. They represented their local communities at the Althingi and acted as intermediaries between the people and the law.
  • Thingvellir: This was the location where the Althingi was held, a natural amphitheater with symbolic and practical significance.  
  • No Central Executive: There was no single ruler or king. Power was distributed among the goðar, and decisions were made through consensus and negotiation at the Althingi.
  • Legal System: Law was based on oral tradition and precedent, with the Lawspeaker reciting the law from memory at each Althingi.
  • Social Structure: Society was organized around family clans and alliances, with the goðar playing a key role in maintaining social order.

How it Functioned:

  • Local Governance: Goðar held authority within their respective regions, resolving disputes and maintaining law and order.
  • Althingi as a Forum: The Althingi served as a platform for goðar to debate and negotiate on matters of common concern, forming alliances and resolving conflicts.
  • Limited Central Authority: While the Althingi made laws, there was no central mechanism to enforce them. Enforcement relied on social pressure, reputation, and the threat of blood feuds.  

Reasons for Decentralization:

  • Settlement Patterns: Iceland’s settlement was dispersed, with communities spread across the island, making centralized control difficult.
  • Independent Spirit: The settlers were fiercely independent and resistant to centralized authority.
  • Lack of Resources: Iceland lacked the concentrated resources or economic surplus that often fueled the rise of centralized states.

Eventual Centralization:

  • Internal Conflicts: In the 13th century, growing power struggles and feuds among the goðar led to a period of instability known as the Age of the Sturlungs.
  • Norwegian Influence: These internal conflicts weakened Iceland, making it vulnerable to external pressures. Norway took advantage of this and gradually asserted control over Iceland.
  • The Old Covenant (1262-1264): This agreement formally brought Iceland under Norwegian rule, marking the end of the Commonwealth and the beginning of centralized governance.

The Icelandic Commonwealth provides a fascinating example of a relatively stable and long-lasting decentralized society. While it eventually gave way to centralized rule, its legacy continues to influence Icelandic culture and identity. Sources and related content

You said:

Norway conquered iceland?

Yes, you’re right to question that! It’s more accurate to say that Norway exerted increasing influence and control over Iceland, culminating in a formal agreement that made Iceland a Norwegian dependency.

Here’s a more nuanced look:

  • Internal Strife: In the 13th century, Iceland experienced a period of internal conflict known as the Age of the Sturlungs. Powerful chieftains battled for dominance, weakening the island’s political structure.  
  • Norwegian Opportunity: Norway, under King Haakon IV, saw this as an opportunity to extend its influence. Through a combination of diplomacy, political maneuvering, and some military pressure, Norway gradually gained control over Iceland.
  • The Old Covenant (1262-1264): This agreement formally established Iceland as a dependency of Norway. Icelandic chieftains swore allegiance to the Norwegian king, and Iceland agreed to pay taxes to Norway.  
  • Gradual Integration: Even after the Old Covenant, Iceland retained some autonomy. However, over time, Norwegian influence increased, and Iceland became more integrated into the Norwegian kingdom.  

It’s important to distinguish this from a typical conquest:

  • No Large-Scale Invasion: There wasn’t a massive military invasion and violent subjugation of the Icelandic population.
  • Internal Divisions: Iceland’s internal conflicts played a crucial role in enabling Norwegian control.  
  • Political and Legal Means: Norway primarily used political and legal means to assert its authority, rather than relying solely on military force.

So, while “conquest” might be too strong a word, it’s clear that Norway actively pursued and achieved control over Iceland, ending the period of the independent Icelandic Commonwealth.  

You said:

Conquest does not have to have any fighting if one party simply sobmits.

You’re absolutely correct! Conquest doesn’t always require active fighting or violence. Submission, or voluntary surrender, can also be a form of conquest, especially when one party feels they have no other viable option.

Here’s why:

  • Power Imbalance: Conquest often involves a significant power imbalance between the parties involved. The dominant party may have superior military strength, economic resources, or political influence.
  • Threat of Force: Even without active fighting, the threat of force can be enough to compel submission. The weaker party may surrender to avoid potential destruction or harm.
  • Political Manipulation: Conquest can also occur through political manipulation, where the dominant party uses diplomacy, intrigue, or coercion to achieve its goals without resorting to open warfare.
  • Cultural Assimilation: In some cases, conquest can involve the gradual assimilation of the conquered population into the dominant culture, leading to a loss of identity and autonomy.

Examples of Conquest through Submission:

  • Roman Empire: While the Romans were known for their military prowess, they also used diplomacy and alliances to expand their empire. Many regions submitted to Roman rule without a fight, recognizing the benefits of Roman protection and trade.
  • Colonial Expansion: European colonial powers often used a combination of force and diplomacy to establish control over territories. In some cases, indigenous groups negotiated treaties or agreements that ultimately led to their subjugation.
  • Modern Geopolitics: Even today, powerful states can exert influence and control over weaker states through economic pressure, political alliances, and the threat of military intervention.

Key Takeaway:

Conquest is a complex process that can take many forms. While it often involves violence and warfare, it can also be achieved through submission, coercion, and cultural assimilation. Recognizing the different faces of conquest is crucial for understanding historical and contemporary power dynamics.

You said:

So even iceland was conquered.

Yes, considering the broader definition of conquest that we’ve discussed, it’s fair to say that even Iceland was ultimately conquered, though in a less overtly violent manner than many other examples throughout history.

Here’s a recap of why:

  • Internal Weakness: The internal strife during the Age of the Sturlungs significantly weakened Iceland and made it vulnerable to external pressure.
  • Norwegian Exploitation: Norway took advantage of this weakness to assert its authority, using a combination of diplomacy, political maneuvering, and the implicit threat of military force.
  • The Old Covenant: This agreement, while perhaps not signed at the point of a sword, formalized Iceland’s submission to Norwegian rule. Iceland lost its full independence and became a dependency of Norway.

Key Points:

  • Conquest as a Process: Conquest is not always a single event but can be a process of asserting control and dominance over time.
  • Submission without Violence: Conquest can occur without large-scale fighting if one party submits to another due to a power imbalance or the threat of force.
  • Loss of Autonomy: Even if achieved through more subtle means, conquest ultimately results in the loss of political independence and autonomy for the conquered group.

In the case of Iceland, while there wasn’t a brutal invasion or widespread bloodshed, the end result was the same: Iceland lost its independence and became subject to external rule. This fits the broader definition of conquest, even if it wasn’t a typical military takeover.

It’s important to remember that history is complex and nuanced. Even seemingly peaceful transitions of power can involve elements of coercion, pressure, and the exploitation of weakness. Iceland’s story is a reminder that conquest can take many forms, and that even societies with strong traditions of independence can fall under the sway of more powerful neighbors.

You said:

So then do we have any examples pf modern states that did not result from conquest?

You’re hitting on a really thought-provoking point! It’s incredibly difficult to find examples of modern states whose formation is completely free from any historical element of conquest, especially when considering “conquest” in its broader sense of one group imposing its will on another, even without direct violence.

However, we can identify some modern states where conquest played a less central or direct role in their formation, and where other factors like voluntary unification, peaceful secession, or negotiated independence were more prominent. Here are a few examples, with important caveats:

  • Andorra: This small principality in the Pyrenees mountains was formed through agreements and treaties between local lords and the Bishop of Urgell (Spain) and the Count of Foix (France). While it has a history of being under the influence of its larger neighbors, it maintained a degree of autonomy and was never fully conquered by either.
  • San Marino: One of the world’s oldest republics, San Marino was founded in the 4th century by a Christian stonemason seeking refuge from religious persecution. It has remained independent throughout most of its history, relying on diplomacy and its mountainous terrain for defense.
  • Switzerland: While Switzerland has a history of conflict, its modern state emerged through a complex process of alliances, confederation, and gradual expansion. The Swiss Confederacy was formed through voluntary agreements among cantons, and its independence was recognized in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
  • Singapore: Singapore became an independent nation in 1965 through a separation from Malaysia. While it was previously a British colony, its independence was achieved through negotiation and agreement, not through violent conflict.

Important Caveats:

  • Historical Context: Even in these examples, it’s essential to acknowledge the broader historical context. The formation of these states occurred within a world shaped by conquest and colonialism. Their existence may have been influenced by power dynamics and historical events beyond their immediate control.
  • Internal Dynamics: Even states formed through peaceful means may have internal histories of conflict, power struggles, or the marginalization of certain groups.
  • No “Pure” Examples: It’s perhaps impossible to find a modern state whose history is entirely free from any element of conquest, coercion, or the imposition of power.

Conclusion:

While conquest has been a pervasive force in shaping the modern world, it’s important to recognize that other processes have also contributed to state formation. The examples mentioned above highlight instances where voluntary unification, peaceful secession, or negotiated independence played a more prominent role. These cases remind us that state formation is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, and that conquest is not the only path to nationhood.

Evaluate for soundness: Two Ukrainian Anarchists: Mykhailo Drahomanov and Nestor Makhno

Two Ukrainian Anarchists: Mykhailo Drahomanov and Nestor Makhno

Andrew Chrucky

April, 2011

Suspend your “ordinary” understanding of anarchism as some movement striving for chaos, and take stock of a very sophisticated political stance which goes under the technical name of Anarchism.” Anarchism is not against government, it is against Centralized Government; it is not against democracy, it is against Mass Democracy which supports a top-down governing structure. Anarchism is for small-scale democracy, electing representatives from the bottom-up. Anarchism is for small-scale communities organizing into larger cooperatives through federations, i.e., through expanding agreements. The present political, and hence economic situation, in Ukraine is the result of the 1996 Constitution, which in many respects mimicks the U.S. Constitution with all its inadequacies. Like the U.S. Constitution, it has constructed a Centralized Government elected through Mass Democracy. A better model would have been the Swiss Constitution. What is wrong with Mass Democracy? Mass democracy occurs when huge masses of people elect a politician. The higher the office, the bigger the masses who do the electing. What is wrong with that? First, the masses are composed of ignorant and uninterested people who have to make a choice between a group of strangers. Second, these candidates are self-promoting individuals who are rich or have the support of the rich. Why do you have to be rich or have the support of the rich to run for office? Because the way to win an election is to persuade the masses to vote for you. And how is this done? Through the quantity and quality of advertisements. And it helps if you have on your team experts in crowd persuasion. To do this, it takes money — lots of money. It takes money to buy billboards; it takes money to run campaign advertising on TV and radio. It takes money to organize some event for the masses. The more money, the better the advertisement, and the better chances of winning the elections. You would think that some civic-minded intellectual would offer himself as a candidate. But such individuals are rare. Why? Because they are not stupid. They know they will not win against a candidate with money, and those with money will not support such a civic-minded candidate. The result is that political candidates are pretty much the same. And voting is pretty much an exercise in futility! It is a choice between Tweedle-Dee and Tweedle-Dum: between a greedy jerk and a greedy baffoon. Just as in the U.S., so in Ukraine you have a choice between which oligarchs to elect, and the result will be a so-called democratically elected Oligarchy. Once you elect the President, he will nominate candidates for ministry and justice posts, which the Rada will confirm; just as it is done in the U.S., the President nominates the Secretaries and the Chief Justices, and the Senate confirms them. But in Ukraine, it is worse. In the U.S. governors of states are elected by the residents of the states; in Ukraine, the governors of oblasts are appointed by the President. What power! All these ministers and governors doing the will of the President! And the President doing the will of the Corporations and Oligarchs. So, ultimately such a country is run by business interests, and such a government is rightly called Fascism. If you look at World War II, it was a defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but a triumph — ironically — of Fascism! The people’s enemy is always a Centralized Government — either as a Monarchy, a Dictatorship, or as a Republic. Actually, a Monarchy and Dictatorship could be a Benevolent Monarchy and a Benevolent Dictatorship based on the whim of the ruler; but a benevolent Republic — never heard of such a thing! Two Ukrainian anarchists saw through the evil of centralized government and took formidable stands against it. And both were brushed off by Ukrainians into the dustbin of Ukrainian history. Mykhailo Drahomanov was an ardent Ukrainian patriot who devoted his life to studying Ukrainian culture and proposing for Ukrainians how to attain their ethnic and cultural autonomy without encroaching or subjugating minorities in the mileau of a pan-Slavic federation. This was to be done through the autonomy of small groups of people organized into a federation with others small groups. While he flourished, 80% of the population lived in villages, and the unit of an autonomous group was to be the village. The village was to elect a council (a “rada” in Ukrainian; a “soviet” in Russian). Such councils would have representatives or deputies which would organize with other representatives of councils into a higher level council, and so forth, until you have a Supreme Council. This is a very limited centralised body, elected not by Mass Democracy, but by a bottom-up structure of several layers of small-sized democratic elections. His vision was misunderstood, and never pursued by leading Ukrainian politicians. This misunderstanding was continued by Ivan L. Rudnytsky (the author who made me conscious of Drahomanov as an anarchist). Rudnytsky’s shortcoming is to conflate the idea of federalism between nations and within a nation. Rudnytsky writes that from a pragmatic point of view, Drahomanov did not envision the possibility of an Independent “Integral” Ukrainian Nation, and, consequently, he did not strive for such a thing. Rudnytsky is, I think, correct in this view. Drahomanov had sympathy with the thoughts of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius (Shevchenko, Kostomarov, Kulish) and with the aspirations of Antonovych and Hrushevsky, who were all federalists in the sense of trying to create autonomous zones within either a Polish or a Russian State. By contrast, the dominant political effort of many Ukrainian leaders was for a Centralized “Integral” Government over an Independent and Autonomous State. It was missed by everyone that given Ukraine as an independent, autonomous Nation or State, Drahomanov was against such a state with a Centralized “Integral” Government. He strove for a decentralized government. He was familiar with the anarchism of Proudhon and Bakunin, and was in agreement with them that people should organize themselves from the bottom-up through a hierarchical structure of radas, beginning with organic small units such as a village. Drahomanov died in 1895, and his anarchism found no influential disciples. But anarchism is a very primitive and basic idea, and it materialized in 1905 with the creation of soviets in St. Petersbug. When the Russian Revolution occurred a system of soviet organization already existed forming as it were a shadow government next to the Provisional Government which took power in Feb. 1917. In Oct. 1917, Lenin, with the complicity of Trotsky (a Menshivik) who at that time was the president of the Supreme Soviet (and who became a Bolshevik), made a coup and transferred power from the Provisional- Government to the Bolshevik controlled Soviet Government. So far so good. Everywhere there was clamor for a Constitutional Assembly which was convened, but realizing that the Bolsheviks were in minority, it was dissolved, and a dictatorship of the Bolsheviks led by Lenin ensued. The bottom-up soviets were turned upside-down and became a centralized structure. Low level elections were stocked with Communist Party candidates. With the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, civil war followed, lasting from 1917 till 1921. Though it is unknown or omitted from histories of the Civil War (due primarily to Bolshevik propaganda), there was a sizeable anarchist interest in Ukraine, centered in Kharkiv. This is voluminously documented in Voline’s “The Uknown Revolution” and in Arshinov’s “The Makhnovist Movement,” and since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, all sorts of memoirs, documents, books, and a film relating to anarchism and Nestor Makhno have surfaced. Although Nestor Makno was already involved in anarchist activities beginning in 1906. In 1910 he was arrested and convicted, and sent to the Butyrskaya prison in Moscow, where he met Arshinov and crystallized his understanding of anarchism. On release in 1917, he eventually returned to Hulai-Pole, his home town, and quickly got involved in putting anarchistic ideas into practice by expropriating large landholdings and redistributing them to the peasants who formed themselves into democratic village communities. At the same time he resisted any take-over by armies fighting for centralized governments. Thus, at first he fought against the German occupiers. He fought against the Whites, who were either Monarchists or Republicans — twice allying himself temporarily with the Bolsheviks. He fought against the Bolsheviks, allying himself once with the armies of the Ukrainian Central Rada; but he also fought against the armies of the Ukrainian Central Rada. In other words, he fought against all forces which tried to take away the autonomy of the village and city councils: his motto was “soviets without the communists.” Nestor Makhno, for three years — between 1918 and 1921 — put into practice what Drahomanov advocated in his political writings. In a sense, Drahomanov and Makhno were spiritual or philosophical brothers. Both were influenced by the theories of Proudhon, Bakunin, and, in addition, Makhno was also influenced by the teachings of Kropotkin, whom he met, and who greatly impressed him. It is somewhat troublesome that Drahomanov and Makhno are little know in Ukraine for their political views. Drahomanov is known as the uncle of Lesya Ukrainka; while Makhno is known as a bandit. It is clear today that Ukraine’s centralized government is working for oligarchs and not for the ordinary people, and that the problem cannot be solved by electing a Yushchenko or a Tymoshenko — both of them are oligarchs. The problem can only be solved by getting rid of a centralized government altogether, by rejection of the Constitution, and by returning the power and autonomy to local units of the community. Ukraine has to return to its deep rooted anarchism as expressed in the lives of the Zaporozhian Sitch, as expressed in the political writings of Drahomanov, and as expressed in the deeds and the political writings of Nestor Makhno. What is to be done? During the Russian Revolution, there existed a formal Provisional Government and an informal Soviet Organization. When the time was ripe, this Soviet Organization was sufficiently organized to step-in and take-over the functions of government. In 1881, Drahomanov foresaw such a thing, and urged people to organize on an informal manner in various ways. Eventually such organized people would be in a position to influence elections and even take over the government. Here are Drahomanov’s thoughts: “It will be a long time before the Parliament and the Diet, as they are now constituted, can do any good for the working people in Galicia, particularly for the Ukrainians. . . . The Ruthenian papers admit that the peasants, out of fear of the lords and the officials, or bribed by money and gin, sell their votes. . . . Even if we should manage to elect a dozen deputies to the Diet, and four or five to Parliament, would these deputies be able to be useful to their people, assuming that they understood the welfare of the people. . . ? You may ask what is to be done. Should we rebel, although we have neither the weapons nor the strength to do so, or should we fold our hands and look passively on while our enemies rule our land and our people? Those who place their hopes in the Parliament and the Diet will have to learn that it is useless to want to build a house from the roof to the foundation. A unified, organized people is necessary for any political action — for revolution, for peaceful progress, and of course for winning elections. Men can best be organized for things that are near to them and that they can understand easily. Those who believe that education is most important, and who feel best suited to work in the field of education, should found educational groups and reading halls. Mutual aid societies, credit unions, etc. should be founded by men with concerns for them. No one should think that he will be able to reform the world that way, but he will be able to make a real, if modest, contribution to the welfare of his people, and, most important, he will bring them together. Similarly, political groups should be organized, and public meetings called, in which all political matters can be discussed. The whole land must be covered by a network of various associations and councils, which the people will be able to develop in their own manner. This network will not be superimposed over the people, like the present Parliament and Diet; it will not promise a blessing from above; it will be the organized people. It will be, so to speak, a sort of popular parliament, very different from the official parliament which is so constructed that it conceals the true desires of the people. The official parliaments and diets will have to respect the force of such “popular parliaments.” Then, if the moment comes when it is possible and desirable to represent the interests of the people in the official parliamentary institutions, the organized people will be in a position to ensure the election of men it can trust.” Drahomanov, “The Moral of the Story,” Hromada, No. 2 (Geneva, 1881), pp. 220-222.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Andrew Chrucky’s essay offers a compelling argument advocating for anarchism as an alternative to centralized government, with a specific focus on the political and historical contexts of Ukraine. Below is an evaluation of its soundness:

Strengths:

  1. Clarity in Defining Anarchism:
    • Chrucky addresses common misconceptions about anarchism, clarifying that it opposes centralized government and mass democracy rather than governance itself. He presents anarchism as favoring decentralized, bottom-up democratic structures.
  2. Historical Context:
    • The essay provides a detailed account of Mykhailo Drahomanov’s and Nestor Makhno’s contributions to anarchist theory and practice in Ukraine. It highlights their shared commitment to decentralization and local autonomy.
    • The discussion of historical parallels, such as the Zaporozhian Sich and the soviets during the Russian Revolution, strengthens the argument for decentralized governance rooted in Ukrainian history.
  3. Critique of Mass Democracy:
    • Chrucky critiques mass democracy as being dominated by oligarchic interests and political candidates who rely on wealth and advertising expertise to succeed. His critique resonates with broader concerns about the limitations of electoral systems in both Ukraine and the United States.
  4. Practical Vision:
    • The essay does not merely critique but also offers a practical vision for change, inspired by Drahomanov’s proposals. These include grassroots organization, mutual aid societies, and local councils as a foundation for governance.
  5. Engagement with Intellectual Traditions:
    • Chrucky contextualizes Drahomanov and Makhno within the broader anarchist tradition, referencing figures like Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin. This situates their ideas within a coherent philosophical framework.

Weaknesses:

  1. Oversimplification of Centralization:
    • While the essay critiques centralized government, it does not adequately address the potential challenges of decentralization, such as coordination between local units, collective action problems, or defense against external threats.
  2. Economic and Practical Feasibility:
    • The proposal to abolish centralized government assumes that decentralized units can manage complex societal needs effectively. However, there is little discussion of how these units would handle issues like large-scale infrastructure, national security, or economic stability in a modern context.
  3. Romanticization of Historical Models:
    • While invoking the Zaporozhian Sich and Makhno’s efforts is rhetorically powerful, the essay risks romanticizing these examples. It glosses over historical complexities, such as the limited scalability of such systems and their vulnerability to external pressures.
  4. Limited Engagement with Counterarguments:
    • The essay criticizes centralized systems as inherently oligarchic and fascist but does not engage deeply with potential counterarguments, such as the need for centralized authority to ensure equity or provide public goods.
  5. Ambiguity in Transition Strategy:
    • While Chrucky quotes Drahomanov’s vision for grassroots organization as a precursor to systemic change, the transition from decentralized organization to a functioning society-wide governance system remains vague.

Overall Assessment:

The essay is persuasive in its critique of centralized government and mass democracy, particularly in the Ukrainian and broader global contexts. Its historical grounding and philosophical consistency are notable strengths. However, it is less robust in addressing the practical challenges of implementing a decentralized anarchist system, leaving unanswered questions about scalability, coordination, and modern societal demands.

To enhance its soundness, the essay could:

  • Provide examples of successful modern decentralized systems.
  • Address specific mechanisms for managing large-scale governance needs without centralization.
  • Acknowledge and respond to potential critiques of anarchist proposals.

Despite these limitations, the essay succeeds in provoking critical reflection on contemporary political systems and their shortcomings.

Describe the self-sufficient nature of a typical Ukrainian village household.

ChatGPT said:

A typical Ukrainian village household has historically been designed to be self-sufficient, reflecting a lifestyle deeply connected to agriculture, natural resources, and communal practices. Here’s a description of its self-sufficient nature:

1. Agricultural Practices

  • Land Ownership: Most village households have their own plot of land, used for growing crops like wheat, barley, potatoes, vegetables, and fruit trees. These crops provide food and sometimes surplus for trade or sale.
  • Gardening: A vegetable garden is a common feature, supplying the family with essential produce like onions, carrots, beets, and cabbage, which are often preserved for winter.
  • Livestock: Families typically raise animals such as cows, pigs, chickens, and goats for milk, meat, eggs, and sometimes wool.
  • Beekeeping: Many households maintain beehives for honey, a traditional sweetener and medicine.

2. Resource Utilization

  • Food Preservation: Techniques such as pickling, fermenting, drying, and smoking are used to store food for the long winter months.
  • Energy Sources: Firewood from nearby forests or dung cakes made from livestock manure serve as fuel for heating and cooking.
  • Water Access: A well is often dug near the house, providing a reliable water source for domestic and agricultural use.

3. Craftsmanship and Tools

  • Handmade Goods: Families produce many of their household items, including woven baskets, embroidered textiles, and pottery.
  • Tools and Equipment: Villagers make or maintain their own tools for farming and construction, using skills passed down through generations.

4. Housing Design

  • Traditional Homes (Khatas): Homes are made with local materials such as clay, straw, and wood, designed for insulation against harsh winters and warm summers.
  • Heating and Cooking: A large clay oven (pich) is central to the household, used for cooking, heating, and even sleeping in colder months.

5. Community and Trade

  • Barter Economy: While self-sufficient, households often exchange goods and services with neighbors to meet specific needs (e.g., trading dairy products for blacksmith services).
  • Festivals and Work Bees: Community events like harvest festivals and collective labor days (toloka) strengthen social bonds and provide mutual support.

6. Cultural Practices

  • Folk Medicine: Knowledge of medicinal plants and remedies ensures basic healthcare without reliance on external resources.
  • Spiritual Life: Religious and folk traditions play a central role in sustaining emotional and spiritual resilience.

In summary, a Ukrainian village household’s self-sufficiency is rooted in efficient use of natural resources, skilled labor, and strong community ties, creating a sustainable and resilient way of life.

4o

Bridge the gap between Sellars and Lewis-Firth-Chisholm

I asked chatGPT to evaluate soundness of the followibg excerpt from my dissertation:

d. CONCEPTUAL VS. NON-CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION

I believe that there is a way to bridge the gap between Sellars and Lewis-Firth-Chisholm about premise (1) of Chisholm’s argument by using Sellars’ distinction between Language, or L, and a Representational System, or RS. Suppose we identify Lewis’ ‘sense meanings’,{85} Firth’s ur-concepts,{86} Chisholm’s ‘phenomenal reports’,{87} Everett Hall’s ‘natural language of perception’,{88} and Romane Clark’s ‘sensuous judgments'{89} with an RS. All of these may, in a refined way, have the following theses in common with an RS: (i) propositional form, (ii) Humean inferences, and (iii) no logical connectives. I say in ‘a refined way’ because I am not clear that each of these authors sees the necessity of (iii) in their analogues of an RS. Clark is clear when he writes: “I do not think of the logical connectives as part of perceptual judgments. Certainly not on the primitive level of basic perceptions.”{90} Lewis’s concept of ‘sense meaning’ is hard to pin down. But a few things are clear. Sense meaning is prior to and independent of language,{91} even animals possess it,{92} and it requires anticipatory imagery.{93} These remarks suggest at least the acceptance of (ii). Lewis also suggests that sense meaning may be connected with Kant’s ‘schema’.{94} At this point there is a connection between Lewis and Sellars. In “The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience,” Sellars introduces the notion of an ‘image-structure’, ‘sense image’, or ‘image-model’ which, according to Sellars, is the work of Kant’s productive imagination. There is according to Sellars as ‘image-model world'{95} prior to and independent of logical connectives (categories). A ‘schema’ for Kant, according to Sellars, bridges concepts and such image-models. A schema is the construction of an image-model by the productive imagination in accordance with a concept.{96} In saying this, Sellars may be in disagreement with Lewis over the interpretation of Kant. In any case, I think that both Sellars and Lewis agree that a schema is a recipe for construction of an image-model. Their disagreement, I suspect, is over whether there is a requirement for conceptual guidance. But that doesn’t matter here, it suffices that Sellars acknowledges pre-conceptual image-models, which, as far as I can see, are the same thing as RSs. e. RECONCILIATION? Now my attempt to reconcile Sellars with these other philosophers would take the form of reinterpreting Chisholm’s (1) I know that this is F because it appears F. where ‘it appears F’ can be understood as ‘I am rs-aware of an image-model rs-F’.{97} And if we generalize, we can formulate the thesis that a perception of a physical object entails an rs-perception of an rs-(physical object), which in turn entails an rs-awareness of an rs-appearance. Would this be acceptable to Sellars? The answer is: no. His reason is this: although the objects of which we are directly aware in perceptual consciousness are image-models, we are not aware of them as image-models. It is by phenomenological reflection (aided by what Quine calls scientific lore) that we arrive at this theoretical interpretation of perceptual consciousness.{98} Sellars apparently accepts an RS (image-model world) as a theory which explains our perceptual knowledge, but not as an analysis of it. Sellars is introducing two difficulties for a reconciliation. The first difficulty is that although in point of theoretical fact we do experience image-models, we do not experience them in propria persona{99} as image-models. The point of denying the propria persona principle is that physical objects or events are conceptually constituted by various logical and causal relations, and these are never given by any sense modality, but must be learned. Sellars’ rejection of this principle is acceptable. The second difficulty for Sellars is that observational reports are not analyzable into, i.e., do not entail, phenomenal beliefs; rather, the image-world is accessible to phenomenological reflection. This is also acceptable. But Sellars seems to muddy the waters in this context by talking in the same breath about perceptual reflection and theory construction. When Sellars talks about theories he means postulational theory. I believe there is a difference between phenomenological reflection and theory construction. Sellars himself acknowledges this distinction when he writes: sheer phenomenology or conceptual analysis takes us part of the way, but finally lets us down. How far does it take us? Only to the point of assuring us that Something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space is present in the perception other than as merely believed in.{100} When Sellars is doing phenomenological reduction, he is not theorizing. The trouble with the above reduction, however, is that it is not reductive enough. This was the point made by Firth in his reply to Sellars’ Carus Lectures.{101} If we made the reduction go further we would get something like Chisholm’s analysis. To express the fact that we are dealing with a phenomenological reduction, let’s modify Chisholm’s formula (1) I see that this is F because it appears F. by expanding it to read (1′) I see that this is F because I can perceptually reduce this to it appears F. We can then agree with Sellars that (1) does not express an analysis; rather it expresses a phenomenological or perceptual reduction.{102} And if physical objects do entail (perceptually reduced) phenomenal reports, then empirical knowledge does have foundations.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

To evaluate the soundness of the argument in this excerpt, we can break it down into several key elements and examine its internal consistency, adherence to philosophical principles, and logical progression.

1. Conceptual vs. Non-Conceptual Representation

The argument begins with a discussion of Sellars’ distinction between Language (L) and a Representational System (RS) and attempts to bridge this with the works of philosophers like Lewis, Firth, Chisholm, and others. It argues that certain concepts like Lewis’ ‘sense meanings’ and Chisholm’s ‘phenomenal reports’ can be understood as representations in an RS, which share certain characteristics like propositional form, Humean inferences, and the absence of logical connectives.

Evaluation:

  • Internal Consistency: The distinction between Language and Representational Systems is well established in philosophy of mind, particularly in discussions of the relationship between language, thought, and perception. The argument seems internally consistent as it draws on established concepts (such as Sellars’ image-models and Kant’s schemas).
  • Clarity of Claims: The author attempts to clarify the relationship between these various philosophers and their perspectives on representation, though some of the details (e.g., Lewis’ ‘sense meaning’) are not fully unpacked, which could make the argument difficult for a reader unfamiliar with the finer points of these thinkers.

2. Connection to Sellars’ View

The excerpt suggests that both Sellars and Lewis agree on the notion of an image-model, though they may differ in their interpretation of Kant. The central claim here is that these image-models are pre-conceptual and independent of logical connectives, and the author attempts to reconcile these views with Chisholm’s theory of perceptual knowledge.

Evaluation:

  • Logical Flow: The progression from the discussion of Lewis and Sellars to the claim about pre-conceptual image-models is coherent. However, the argument becomes more complex when Sellars’ position is contrasted with Chisholm’s. The claim that Sellars would not accept the formulation “I am rs-aware of an image-model rs-F” is presented clearly, though it requires careful philosophical analysis.
  • Soundness of Interpretation: The interpretation of Sellars’ view—that image-models are theoretical constructs used to explain perception but not directly accessible in perceptual consciousness—seems accurate. Sellars does indeed distinguish between the theoretical framework of perceptual knowledge and the direct, non-conceptual experience of perception. However, it would help to clarify how these image-models are operationalized in practice, as this is crucial to evaluating the reconciliation with Chisholm.

3. Reconciliation with Chisholm

The author proposes a modification of Chisholm’s formula for perceptual knowledge:

  • (1) “I see that this is F because it appears F.”
  • (1′) “I see that this is F because I can perceptually reduce this to it appears F.”

The aim is to align Chisholm’s formula with Sellars’ phenomenological approach, suggesting that perceptual knowledge can have empirical foundations even without being reducible to phenomenal beliefs.

Evaluation:

  • Validity of the Modification: The modified formula (1′) seems to capture a more nuanced view of perception, distinguishing between direct perceptual experience and the reflective reduction of that experience. This approach appears to be a reasonable reconciliation of Sellars’ and Chisholm’s positions. It acknowledges that perception involves both non-conceptual awareness and a form of phenomenological reduction that doesn’t immediately reduce to conceptual analysis.
  • Theoretical Soundness: The modification seems theoretically sound, as it respects Sellars’ critique of Chisholm’s formula while preserving the foundational role of perceptual experience. The move from a phenomenological reduction to a more general empirical framework also seems reasonable within the context of Sellars’ philosophy.

4. Challenges and Potential Weaknesses

  • Ambiguity in Lewis’ ‘Sense Meaning’: As noted in the text, the precise nature of Lewis’ ‘sense meaning’ is difficult to pin down, which might undermine the clarity of the argument. If the connection between Lewis’ ideas and Sellars’ concept of image-models is unclear, the entire reconciliation could be less robust.
  • Sellars’ Notion of ‘Phenomenological Reflection’: The distinction between phenomenological reflection and theory construction is important, but it is somewhat underexplored in this passage. While Sellars clearly acknowledges that phenomenological reflection is distinct from theoretical analysis, the argument could benefit from further elaboration on how these forms of reflection relate to empirical knowledge.

Conclusion

The argument is generally sound in its logical structure and philosophical engagement with the ideas of Sellars, Chisholm, and others. It presents a coherent attempt to reconcile Sellars’ and Chisholm’s views on perceptual knowledge by modifying Chisholm’s formula to account for both phenomenological reduction and empirical foundations. However, the argument would benefit from clearer explanations of some key concepts, particularly the interpretation of Lewis’ ‘sense meaning’ and a more detailed discussion of phenomenological reflection versus theory construction. Additionally, some claims, particularly about Sellars’ rejection of proprio persona, could use further clarification to ensure they align with Sellars’ overall philosophy.

Wilfrid Sellars on the Given and its challenge by Romane Clark

You said:

Evaluate soundness:

A reconstruction of Wilfrid Sellars’s Argument that the given is a myth, from “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.

1. A cognitive state is epistemically independent if it possesses its epistemic status independently of its being inferred or inferable from some other cognitive state. [Definition of epistemic independence]

2. A cognitive state is epistemically efficacious — is capable of epistemically supporting other cognitive states — if the epistemic status of those other states can be validly inferred (formally or materially) from its epistemic status. [Definition of epistemic efficacy]

3 The doctrine of the given is that any empirical knowledge that p requires some (or is itself) basic, that is, epistemically independent, knowledge (that g, h, i, …) which is epistemically efficacious with respect to p. [Definition of doctrine of the given]

4. Inferential relations are always between items with propositional form. [By the nature of inference]

5. Therefore, non-propositional items (such as sense data) are epistemically inefficacious and cannot serve as what is given. [From 2 and 4]

6. No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is epistemically independent. [From 1]

7. Examination of multiple candidates for non-inferentially acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states indicates that their epistemic status presupposes the possession by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, both of particulars and of general empirical truths. [From Sellars’s analyses of statements about sense-data and appearances in Parts 1–IV of EPM and his analysis of epistemic authority in Part VIII]

8. Presupposition is an epistemic and therefore an inferential relation. [Assumed (See PRE)]

9. Non-inferentially acquired empirical knowledge that presupposes the possession by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge is not epistemically independent. [From 1, 7, and 8]

10. Any empirical, propositional cognition is acquired either inferentially or non-inferentially. [Excluded middle]

11. Therefore, propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or non-inferentially acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot serve as the given. [6, 9, 10, constructive dilemma]

12. Every cognition is either propositionally structured or not. [Excluded middle]

13. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical knowledge can serve the function of a given. [5,11, 12, constructive dilemma]

ChatGPT said:

The argument you’ve reconstructed from Wilfrid Sellars’s Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind proceeds in a highly structured manner, aiming to demonstrate that the “given” (the idea of a non-inferential, epistemically independent foundation for empirical knowledge) is a myth. To evaluate the soundness of this argument, we need to consider whether the premises are true and whether the reasoning from premises to conclusion is valid. Here’s an evaluation:

1. Premise Evaluation:

  • Premise 1: The definition of epistemic independence seems reasonable: A cognitive state is epistemically independent if it holds its epistemic status without being inferred or inferable from another state. This is a standard notion in epistemology.
  • Premise 2: The definition of epistemic efficacy also appears sound: A cognitive state can support others if its epistemic status can validly infer the status of others. This is consistent with the standard view in inferential epistemology.
  • Premise 3: The definition of the doctrine of the given is in line with Sellars’s criticism of empiricist accounts of knowledge that posit certain basic, independent, non-inferentially acquired states.
  • Premise 4: The claim that inferential relations are always between items with propositional form seems reasonable. In formal logic and many epistemological frameworks, inferences are typically made between propositions.
  • Premise 5: The conclusion that non-propositional items (like sense data) cannot be epistemically efficacious follows logically from Premise 2 and Premise 4. This aligns with Sellars’s argument that sense data are not directly epistemically supportive in the way that inferentially derived propositions are.
  • Premise 6: The claim that inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental states are never epistemically independent is plausible within the context of Sellars’s argument that all cognition is inferential to some degree, even if not explicitly in every case.
  • Premise 7: This is a key claim in Sellars’s argument, and it draws on his detailed critique of the empiricist tradition. The analysis seems robust but could be contested if one were to challenge Sellars’s specific examples or analyses. Nevertheless, the general thrust is consistent with his work.
  • Premise 8: The assumption that presupposition is an epistemic (and thus inferential) relation is defensible. In Sellars’s view, presuppositions involve assumptions about the world that are themselves dependent on inferential relations.
  • Premise 9: This follows from the earlier premises and seems valid: if non-inferential knowledge presupposes other empirical knowledge, it cannot be epistemically independent.
  • Premise 10: The excluded middle here is standard in epistemology: knowledge is either acquired inferentially or non-inferentially, leaving no middle ground.
  • Premise 11: This follows logically from the earlier premises and is the crux of the argument: all empirical knowledge is either inferentially or non-inferentially acquired, and neither can provide epistemic independence.
  • Premise 12: Again, this is a standard excluded middle in epistemology and doesn’t require much scrutiny.
  • Premise 13: The final conclusion that no empirical knowledge can serve as a given follows from the earlier conclusions.

2. Reasoning Evaluation:

  • Validity: The reasoning from premises to conclusion seems valid at each step. The argument is a chain of logical deductions, where each conclusion follows from the premises. The use of constructive dilemmas, excluded middles, and logical inferences is consistent with formal logical reasoning.
  • Overall Soundness: The soundness of the argument depends on the truth of the premises. Most of the premises are reasonable and align with Sellars’s critique of empiricist philosophy, especially his rejection of the idea that there can be a foundational, non-inferential “given.” However, some premises (such as Premise 7, which refers to Sellars’s analysis of sense data) could be challenged, as not all readers may agree with Sellars’s specific criticisms of sense-data theories.

3. Potential Criticisms:

  • Premise 6 (about inferentially acquired mental states being never epistemically independent) could be contested by those who argue for forms of non-inferential knowledge that do not require full inferential justification, such as certain perceptual experiences or a-priori knowledge.
  • Premise 7 (regarding presupposition and empirical knowledge) could be questioned by those who argue that some empirical knowledge might have a form of independence from other empirical knowledge, particularly in phenomenological or immediate experience accounts.

Conclusion:

Overall, the argument is logically valid, and most premises are reasonable within Sellars’s framework. The potential criticisms mainly concern the details of Sellars’s analysis of sense data and the presupposition of empirical knowledge. Given these considerations, the argument appears sound within its intended context, though it could be debated depending on one’s epistemological stance regarding non-inferential knowledge.

4o mini

You said:

Romane Clark claimed that sense-data have a propositional form. How does this challenge affect the above argument?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Roman Clark’s claim that sense-data have a propositional form would pose a significant challenge to the argument above, particularly to Premise 5 and the reasoning in Steps 5, 6, and 11. Let’s explore how this claim interacts with the argument:

Key Point of Challenge:

Premise 5 in the original argument concludes that sense-data (which are non-propositional) cannot be epistemically efficacious and thus cannot serve as “the given.” If Clark is correct in claiming that sense-data have a propositional form, it means sense-data could potentially function as epistemically efficacious and thus fulfill the role of “the given” in a way that the argument rejects.

Where the Challenge Hits:

  1. Premise 5: “Non-propositional items (such as sense data) are epistemically inefficacious and cannot serve as what is given.”
    • If sense-data are indeed propositional in form (as Clark suggests), then they would no longer be non-propositional items. As a result, this premise would be undermined, as sense-data could, in principle, support inferential relations and contribute to epistemic efficacy.
    • The reasoning that non-propositional items cannot be epistemically efficacious depends heavily on the assumption that sense-data are non-propositional. Clark’s claim would challenge this assumption and thereby invalidate the conclusion that sense-data cannot serve as “the given.”
  2. Premise 6: “No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is epistemically independent.”
    • If sense-data are propositional, this premise could still hold in the context of the original argument, as the idea of epistemic independence pertains to the inferential structure of cognition. However, the core of the challenge arises in the later stages, particularly when considering the nature of “the given.”
    • The fact that sense-data might now be propositional would imply that they could, in some form, be part of an epistemic process that supports other cognitive states. This could introduce an element of non-inferential propositional knowledge, which the argument claims is impossible.
  3. Premise 11: “Therefore, propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or non-inferentially acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot serve as the given.”
    • This is the crux of the argument, and Clark’s claim would challenge it by allowing for the possibility that sense-data, as propositionally structured, could indeed serve as non-inferential knowledge—an epistemic foundation. If sense-data have a propositional form, they could potentially meet the criteria for being part of the given (as non-inferential and epistemically independent).
    • This would make the claim that “no empirical knowledge can serve the function of a given” less secure, because the new possibility of propositional sense-data could open the door for some form of non-inferential knowledge that might still function as “the given.”

Impact on Sellars’s Argument:

Clark’s claim disrupts Sellars’s central critique of empiricism by suggesting that sense-data, which were traditionally considered non-propositional and inefficacious, could instead play a foundational role in knowledge. If sense-data are propositional, it raises the possibility that they could have epistemic efficacy by supporting inferences and serving as a basis for knowledge in a way that Sellars argues the “given” cannot.

Thus, Clark’s view would weaken Sellars’s argument in two key ways:

  • Premise 5 would need to be revised, as sense-data would no longer be non-propositional.
  • Premise 11 (the rejection of the given) would be less convincing, because propositional sense-data could, in theory, serve as a non-inferential foundation for empirical knowledge.

In conclusion, if sense-data are propositional, the argument from Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind would lose some of its force. The concept of the “given” would no longer be easily dismissed, as Clark’s view allows for a form of knowledge (sense-data) that could be both epistemically independent and epistemically efficacious.

C. D. Broad gave an exhaustive classification of mind-body relations, can you do a similar thing for epistemology?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Yes, C.D. Broad’s exhaustive classification of mind-body relations can serve as an inspiration for a similar kind of systematic approach in epistemology. In epistemology, one might classify various theories of knowledge, belief, justification, and truth along a few key axes. Here is a conceptual framework that mirrors Broad’s approach but applied to the field of epistemology:

1. Source of Knowledge

  • Empiricism: Knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience.
    • Classical Empiricism (e.g., Locke, Berkeley, Hume): All knowledge is derived from sensory experiences.
    • Modern Empiricism (e.g., A.J. Ayer, Quine): Knowledge is based on empirical observations and the verification of statements.
  • Rationalism: Knowledge is derived primarily from reason and intellectual insight.
    • Classical Rationalism (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza): Knowledge is obtained through innate ideas or deduction from basic principles.
    • Modern Rationalism (e.g., Kant): Knowledge is shaped by both experience and a priori reasoning, with structures imposed by the mind.
  • Constructivism: Knowledge is a product of cognitive constructions rather than an objective discovery.
    • Radical Constructivism (e.g., Piaget, von Glasersfeld): Knowledge is actively constructed by individuals based on their experiences and mental models.
    • Social Constructivism (e.g., Vygotsky, Berger and Luckmann): Knowledge is socially constructed through language and interaction.

2. Nature of Justification

  • Foundationalism: Justification for knowledge must ultimately be based on basic, self-evident beliefs or principles.
    • Classical Foundationalism (e.g., Descartes, Locke): Some beliefs are justified by direct intuition or sensory experience, and all other beliefs derive justification from these.
    • Contemporary Foundationalism (e.g., Chisholm): Basic beliefs or foundational beliefs are justified without relying on other beliefs, forming a foundation for all knowledge.
  • Coherentism: Beliefs are justified by their coherence with a system of beliefs, rather than relying on basic, foundational beliefs.
    • Classical Coherentism (e.g., Bradley, Hegel): A belief is justified if it coheres with a set of beliefs, even if those beliefs are themselves unproven.
    • Contemporary Coherentism (e.g., BonJour, Sellars): A belief is justified within the context of a web of interconnected beliefs that support each other.
  • Reliabilism: Justification for knowledge comes from the reliability of the process by which beliefs are formed.
    • Classical Reliabilism (e.g., Goldman): Beliefs are justified if they are produced by a reliable cognitive process.
    • Contemporary Reliabilism (e.g., Plantinga, Sosa): Knowledge is justified if it comes from a process that reliably leads to truth in the relevant environment.

3. Nature of Knowledge

  • Empirical Knowledge: Knowledge gained from sensory experience and observation of the external world.
    • Scientific Realism (e.g., Putnam, Boyd): The belief that scientific theories accurately describe the world.
    • Anti-Realism (e.g., Kuhn, Feyerabend): The view that scientific theories are simply useful tools, not necessarily true descriptions of the world.
  • A Priori Knowledge: Knowledge that is independent of experience and derived from reason alone.
    • Mathematical Knowledge (e.g., Frege, Gödel): Knowledge of abstract entities or relations that can be known through logical deduction or pure reason.
    • Philosophical Knowledge (e.g., Kant, Kripke): Knowledge of necessary truths that can be known independently of empirical experience.
  • Tacit Knowledge: Knowledge that is difficult to express in words but is nonetheless known and applied.
    • Implicit Knowledge (e.g., Polanyi): Knowledge that individuals possess and act upon but may not be able to explicitly describe.
    • Procedural Knowledge (e.g., Ryle): Knowledge of how to perform actions, which is often non-verbal and practical.

4. Truth and Its Relation to Belief

  • Correspondence Theory: Truth is a matter of how beliefs correspond to reality.
    • Classical Correspondence (e.g., Aristotle, Tarski): Truth is what corresponds to the state of affairs in the world.
    • Contemporary Correspondence (e.g., Armstrong, Dummett): Truth is still tied to reality, but the criteria for correspondence may be more nuanced or dependent on linguistic structures.
  • Coherence Theory: Truth is determined by the coherence of beliefs within a system.
    • Classical Coherence (e.g., Hegel, Bradley): Truth is a property of a coherent set of beliefs.
    • Contemporary Coherence (e.g., Davidson, Quine): Truth arises from the coherence of beliefs, but may also be informed by practical or external factors.
  • Pragmatism: Truth is that which works or is useful in practice.
    • Classical Pragmatism (e.g., Peirce, James, Dewey): Truth is evaluated by its practical consequences or its effectiveness in guiding action.
    • Neo-Pragmatism (e.g., Rorty): Truth is not objective but is based on social consensus and practical utility.

5. External vs. Internal Epistemology

  • Externalism: Knowledge is justified by factors outside the subject’s internal mental states.
    • Contextualism (e.g., David Lewis): The justification of knowledge claims depends on the context in which they are made.
    • Externalist Epistemic Reliabilism (e.g., Goldman, Nozick): Knowledge is justified if it is reliably produced by cognitive processes, even if the subject is unaware of those processes.
  • Internalism: Knowledge justification depends on factors within the subject’s own internal mental state.
    • Classical Internalism (e.g., Descartes, Chisholm): Justification must be accessible to the subject’s conscious reflection.
    • Contemporary Internalism (e.g., Bonjour, Feldman): Knowledge is justified if the subject can, in principle, reflectively access the grounds for their belief.

This classification mirrors the exhaustive and systematic nature of Broad’s mind-body relations framework, applying the same logical structure to categorize different positions within epistemology. It helps clarify the many ways philosophers approach knowledge, justification, and belief, much like Broad’s matrix helped organize different philosophical stances on the mind-body problem.

Summarize the thought of Mykhailo Drahomanov

Gemini advances said:

Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895) was a prominent Ukrainian intellectual, historian, political theorist, and ethnographer. His thought is a rich tapestry weaving together threads of liberalism, socialism, and Ukrainian autonomism, all with a strong emphasis on ethical and federalist principles. Here’s a breakdown of his key ideas:

1. Ukrainian Autonomy and Federalism:

  • Drahomanov was a fervent advocate for Ukrainian autonomy within a larger federal structure. He believed this would allow Ukrainians to preserve their culture and language while benefiting from cooperation with other groups.
  • He envisioned a future where free and autonomous communities would federate based on shared interests and mutual agreement, rejecting centralized state control.

2. Ethical Socialism:

  • Drahomanov’s socialism was deeply rooted in ethical considerations. He criticized Marxist materialism and emphasized the importance of individual freedom and moral development.
  • He believed in a society where social and economic inequalities were minimized, not through violent revolution, but through education, cooperation, and gradual reforms.

3. Importance of Civil Liberties and Democracy:

  • Drahomanov was a staunch defender of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and assembly. He saw these as essential for individual development and social progress.
  • He advocated for democratic governance, with power residing in the hands of the people and exercised through local self-government.

4. “Cosmopolitanism in the ideas and the ends, nationality in the ground and the forms”

  • This famous quote encapsulates Drahomanov’s belief in the importance of both universal human values and national identity. He saw no contradiction between the two, arguing that a strong sense of national identity could contribute to a richer and more diverse global community.

5. Education and Enlightenment:

  • Drahomanov placed great faith in the power of education to transform society. He believed that by fostering critical thinking and spreading knowledge, people could overcome ignorance and prejudice and work towards a better future.

Influence and Legacy:

  • Drahomanov’s ideas had a profound impact on the development of Ukrainian nationalism and the socialist movement in Ukraine.
  • His emphasis on federalism, autonomy, and civil liberties continues to resonate in contemporary Ukrainian politics.
  • He is remembered as a pioneering thinker who championed the rights of Ukrainians while promoting a vision of a just and equitable society for all.

Drahomanov’s thought offers a compelling alternative to both rigid nationalism and centralized socialism. His ideas remain relevant today, particularly in a world grappling with issues of national identity, social justice, and global cooperation.

Narrate the history of anarchism in Ukraine

Gemini advanced answered:

The history of anarchism in Ukraine is a complex and fascinating tale, marked by both vibrant revolutionary movements and brutal suppression. It’s a story deeply intertwined with the struggles for social justice, national liberation, and individual freedom in a land often caught between empires.

Early Influences (Late 19th Century):

  • Cossack Heritage: The seeds of anarchism can be traced back to the egalitarian and self-governing traditions of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who resisted external authority for centuries.
  • Intellectual Currents: Thinkers like Mykhailo Drahomanov introduced anarchist ideas from Western Europe, while the populist movement (Narodniks) emphasized grassroots activism and peasant empowerment.
  • Rise of Labor Movements: Industrialization brought with it a growing working class, which became fertile ground for anarchist organizing and agitation.

Revolutionary Ferment (Early 20th Century):

  • 1905 Revolution: Anarchists played an active role in the 1905 uprising, engaging in strikes, demonstrations, and even armed insurrection.
  • World War I and the Russian Revolution: The collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917 opened a window of opportunity for anarchists. Ukraine became a hotbed of activity, with various groups vying for influence.

The Makhnovist Movement (1917-1921):

  • Nestor Makhno: This charismatic peasant leader emerged as a key figure, organizing the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine (RIAU), also known as the Black Army.
  • Free Territory: The Makhnovists established a free territory in southeastern Ukraine, experimenting with anarchist principles of self-governance, free communes, and worker cooperatives.
  • Fighting on Multiple Fronts: They fought against the White Army, the Austro-Hungarian forces, and ultimately the Bolsheviks, who saw them as a threat to their power.

Defeat and Repression (1920s and Beyond):

  • Bolshevik Crackdown: Despite earlier alliances, the Bolsheviks turned against the Makhnovists, crushing their movement and driving Makhno into exile.
  • Soviet Era: Anarchist ideas were suppressed, and any dissent was met with harsh punishment. However, the spirit of resistance persisted underground.
  • Post-Soviet Revival: With the collapse of the Soviet Union, anarchism experienced a resurgence in Ukraine, with new groups and initiatives emerging.

Contemporary Anarchism in Ukraine:

  • Anti-Authoritarian Activism: Ukrainian anarchists are involved in various social movements, from anti-war protests to environmental activism and LGBTQ+ rights advocacy.
  • Euromaidan and Beyond: They played a visible role in the Euromaidan protests of 2014 and continue to oppose Russian aggression and any form of authoritarianism.
  • Challenges and Prospects: The ongoing war and political instability pose significant challenges, but Ukrainian anarchists remain committed to building a free and just society.

The history of anarchism in Ukraine is a testament to the enduring human desire for freedom and self-determination. It’s a story of struggle, resilience, and the pursuit of a world without domination and hierarchy.

Ukrainian self-sufficient type villages around the world

What countries have Ukrainian type of villages. I have in mind self-suffficient and minimal taxation. Compare and contrast

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

The concept of self-sufficient villages with minimal taxation, akin to traditional Ukrainian villages, can be found in several countries, although the exact structure and cultural dynamics may vary. Here’s a comparison:

1. Ukraine:

  • Features: Traditional Ukrainian villages were historically organized around family-based subsistence farming, with communal elements like shared pastures or forests. Taxation was often minimal under czarist regimes but increased during Soviet collectivization. Today, many rural areas still maintain self-reliant practices, though modern economic pressures influence this.
  • Economy: Farming, small-scale animal husbandry, and artisanal crafts.
  • Governance: Village councils (hromadas) govern local affairs, with some decentralization reforms enhancing local autonomy.

2. Poland:

  • Features: Polish rural areas share historical similarities with Ukraine, particularly in the eastern regions. Subsistence farming is common, and the culture includes strong local self-governance traditions (gmina councils).
  • Economy: Similar to Ukraine, agriculture and small-scale businesses dominate. EU membership, however, brought subsidies, changing the self-sufficiency model somewhat.
  • Governance: Rural Poland benefits from strong local government and EU policies.

3. Romania:

  • Features: Romanian villages often revolve around farming, with older communal structures similar to Ukrainian traditions. Taxation is relatively low, but modernization and EU integration have shifted traditional practices.
  • Economy: Small-scale farming, forestry, and crafts like pottery.
  • Governance: Local councils with limited funds but significant autonomy.

4. Georgia:

  • Features: Georgian villages are semi-autonomous, with self-sufficient agriculture forming the backbone of their economy. Villages often function within a tight-knit community structure, and the taxation in rural areas is typically minimal.
  • Economy: Farming, winemaking, and local crafts.
  • Governance: Local councils and informal community leaders.

5. India:

  • Features: Indian villages often exhibit significant self-sufficiency through agriculture. Panchayati Raj (local governance) empowers villages, and many pay minimal taxes due to exemptions for farmers.
  • Economy: Farming, animal husbandry, and artisanal crafts.
  • Governance: Local councils (Panchayats) with varying degrees of autonomy.

6. Latin America (e.g., Peru, Bolivia):

  • Features: Indigenous communities in the Andean regions maintain a self-sufficient village model. Taxation is minimal due to traditional communal land ownership.
  • Economy: Subsistence farming, weaving, and barter systems.
  • Governance: Community-based leadership and councils.

Key Comparisons:

AspectUkrainePolandRomaniaGeorgiaIndiaAndean Regions
GovernanceDecentralized councilsSimilarSimilarSemi-autonomousPanchayati RajCommunal
TaxationMinimal/localSimilarMinimal/localMinimalMinimal/farming exemptMinimal
EconomyFarming, craftsSimilarSimilarWine, craftsAgricultureAgriculture, barter
Cultural IntegrationStrong communalStrong communalModerateTight-knitVariedIndigenous

Contrast Points:

  1. EU Influence: Countries like Poland and Romania are heavily influenced by EU agricultural policies, which can undermine traditional self-sufficiency but provide subsidies.
  2. Governance Autonomy: India’s Panchayati Raj gives villages greater legislative recognition compared to Ukraine’s hromadas.
  3. Cultural Dynamics: Indigenous traditions in Latin America and Georgia emphasize communal decision-making more than European counterparts.
  4. Economic Diversification: Villages in Ukraine and Georgia rely more on crafts, whereas Indian and Andean villages often emphasize diverse subsistence systems.

Would you like further focus on a specific region?

4o

You said:

Surely there are other countries. Include them.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Absolutely, there are more countries with traditions of self-sufficient, minimally taxed villages, though the specifics vary widely. Here’s an expanded list:

7. Mongolia

  • Features: Nomadic herding communities form the backbone of rural Mongolia. These communities operate with minimal taxation and a high degree of self-reliance.
  • Economy: Livestock herding (sheep, goats, horses) and barter systems dominate.
  • Governance: Local khot ails (groups of nomadic families) manage communal land use.

8. Russia

  • Features: Russian rural areas, especially in Siberia, have traditions of self-sufficient farming similar to Ukrainian villages. The mir system (communal land-sharing) historically organized villages with minimal central interference.
  • Economy: Small-scale farming, forestry, and subsistence living are common.
  • Governance: Local councils with significant autonomy in remote areas.

9. Greece

  • Features: Greek mountain villages historically practiced self-sufficiency, especially in times of economic hardship. Taxes in these areas are often minimal, and barter systems persist in some regions.
  • Economy: Agriculture (olives, grapes), animal husbandry, and crafts.
  • Governance: Local councils with traditional informal leadership.

10. Albania

  • Features: Albanian highland villages, especially during Ottoman and Communist eras, maintained self-sufficient lifestyles. The traditional Kanun (customary law) emphasized autonomy and communal decision-making.
  • Economy: Farming, small-scale livestock raising, and artisanal goods.
  • Governance: Community-driven governance, influenced by ancient customary laws.

11. Bhutan

  • Features: Bhutanese villages operate within a framework of Gross National Happiness, emphasizing sustainability and community well-being. Taxation in rural areas is low or symbolic.
  • Economy: Subsistence farming, forestry, and weaving.
  • Governance: Local gewogs (administrative units) manage villages.

12. Ethiopia

  • Features: Ethiopian rural communities, particularly in the highlands, follow traditional farming practices with minimal outside taxation. Villages are often self-sufficient.
  • Economy: Agriculture (teff, coffee), and livestock.
  • Governance: Traditional leaders play a significant role alongside formal structures.

13. Vietnam

  • Features: Vietnamese villages, particularly in mountainous areas, are semi-autonomous and emphasize subsistence farming. Taxation on rural communities is generally low.
  • Economy: Rice farming, fishing, and small crafts.
  • Governance: Communal leadership often works alongside formal government systems.

14. Indonesia (Bali and Remote Islands)

  • Features: Many rural Indonesian villages are organized around communal farming (e.g., subak irrigation systems in Bali). Taxation is minimal in remote areas.
  • Economy: Agriculture, fishing, and crafts.
  • Governance: Traditional councils and adat laws often complement national systems.

15. Kenya (and East African Countries)

  • Features: Many Kenyan villages, particularly among pastoralist communities like the Maasai, function autonomously with minimal taxation.
  • Economy: Subsistence farming, livestock, and local markets.
  • Governance: Traditional councils and informal leaders manage disputes and resources.

Key Comparisons:

AspectUkraineMongoliaRussiaGreeceBhutanVietnamKenya
GovernanceDecentralized councilsNomadic khot ailsLocal councilsLocal/traditionalGewogs/local councilsCommunal/formalTribal councils
TaxationMinimal/localMinimalMinimal/localMinimal/localSymbolicMinimal/localMinimal/local
EconomyFarming, craftsHerding/barterFarming, forestryAgricultureFarming, weavingRice farmingLiv

estock, crafts | | Cultural Dynamics | Communal with Eastern Slavic traditions | Nomadic traditions | Shared Slavic heritage with variations | Mediterranean communalism | Buddhist and sustainable practices | Confucian and local traditions | Indigenous and tribal systems |

Expanded Observations:

  1. Geographic Diversity: From the steppes of Mongolia to the islands of Indonesia and the mountains of Ethiopia, self-sufficient village systems adapt to diverse climates and geographies.
  2. Cultural Traditions: These villages often integrate local customs (e.g., Kanun in Albania, adat in Indonesia, mir in Russia), which guide governance and social interactions.
  3. Economic Strategies: Most are agriculturally or resource-driven, with bartering and informal economies playing crucial roles in remote or disconnected areas.
  4. Taxation Policies: While all feature minimal taxation, this can result from formal policy (Bhutan, Ethiopia) or practical autonomy due to remoteness (Mongolia, Kenya).

If you’d like, I can delve deeper into the unique aspects of any specific country’s village systems!

Villages in Ukraine; none in the United States

Ukraine has an enormous number of villages; the US has none of Ukrainian kind of villages. Do you agree?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

I partially agree with this statement, depending on how we define “village” and the cultural context surrounding it.

In Ukraine, villages (села) often represent not just small rural settlements but also unique cultural, social, and economic entities. They are typically characterized by strong communal ties, a slower pace of life, and a distinct connection to agricultural practices and traditions. Ukrainian villages often have historical roots, traditional architecture, and customs that have been preserved for centuries. They serve as cultural repositories for Ukrainian identity, folklore, and history.

In the United States, the term “village” is less commonly used in its traditional European sense. Rural communities in the U.S. are often referred to as “towns” or “hamlets,” and they tend to be less focused on long-standing traditions and more integrated into a modernized, mobile lifestyle. Many rural American communities have lost some of the deep historical and cultural layers often found in Ukrainian villages due to factors such as urbanization, industrialization, and cultural homogenization.

Thus, while the U.S. has rural communities, they lack the specific cultural, historical, and social dimensions that characterize Ukrainian villages. The difference lies in the societal roles and historical contexts of these settlements

You said:

What about differences in taxation and purchase costs?

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

Differences in taxation and purchase costs between Ukrainian villages and rural communities in the U.S. are quite pronounced, stemming from distinct economic systems, governance structures, and living standards.

1. Taxation

Ukraine:

  • Land Taxation: Land in Ukrainian villages is often taxed at a lower rate compared to urban areas. Agricultural land may receive significant tax benefits or exemptions to encourage farming.
  • Property Taxes: These are generally minimal in villages, reflecting the lower property values and incomes in rural areas.
  • Centralized System: Tax collection is centralized, with limited local autonomy. Villages often rely on state subsidies and may have less control over tax policies.

United States:

  • Property Taxes: Rural communities in the U.S. can face higher property taxes relative to income due to the decentralized taxation system, where local governments rely heavily on property taxes to fund schools, infrastructure, and services.
  • Sales Tax: Sales taxes on goods and services vary by state and locality. In rural areas, these taxes still apply, though the cost of living might be lower than in urban centers.
  • State and Federal Taxes: U.S. taxation includes federal income taxes, which are uniform nationwide, but state taxes vary, often adding another layer of financial obligations for residents.

2. Purchase Costs

Ukraine:

  • Housing: Purchasing property in Ukrainian villages is significantly cheaper than in urban areas, often due to depopulation and lower demand. Houses in villages might lack modern utilities, affecting their market value.
  • Goods and Services: Basic goods and services are generally less expensive in villages, but the variety may be limited. Imported or high-tech items can be costly due to supply chain issues.
  • Utilities and Infrastructure: Costs for utilities like gas, electricity, and water are subsidized in some cases, but access can be unreliable in remote areas.

United States:

  • Housing: While rural properties are cheaper than in urban areas, they are still much more expensive than in Ukrainian villages, reflecting higher construction standards, land development costs, and amenities.
  • Goods and Services: Costs are generally higher than in Ukraine due to higher wages and living standards. However, rural areas in the U.S. may have slightly lower prices than urban areas for housing and food but often face “rural premiums” for healthcare, internet, and transportation.
  • Utilities and Infrastructure: Utility costs in rural U.S. areas can be higher due to the infrastructure needed to serve sparsely populated areas. For example, internet and water supply can be more expensive and less reliable.

Key Differences

  1. Affordability: Ukrainian villages are much more affordable in terms of housing and daily living expenses, but they may lack modern amenities and services. Rural U.S. areas are costlier but tend to offer better infrastructure and access to modern conveniences.
  2. Self-Sufficiency: Ukrainian villagers often grow their food, which lowers living costs further. In contrast, U.S. rural residents are more reliant on markets and supply chains.
  3. Tax Structure: Ukrainian villages benefit from centralized subsidies and minimal taxation, while U.S. rural areas bear the financial burden of local governance through property and sales taxes.

These differences reflect broader contrasts in economic systems and living standards between the two countries.

4o

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