Category: AI assist

What do you know abput Susan Haack?

ChatGPT said:

Susan Haack is a prominent philosopher known for her work in epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, pragmatism, and metaphysics. Her contributions often bridge analytic and pragmatic traditions, and she emphasizes a pluralistic and anti-foundationalist approach to philosophical problems.

Key Aspects of Her Work:

1. Epistemology and Foundherentism:
   • Haack developed a theory called foundherentism, which combines foundationalism and coherentism.
   • Foundherentism holds that justification for beliefs involves elements of both foundational support (basic beliefs) and coherence among beliefs, rejecting the extremes of pure foundationalism or pure coherentism.
2. Philosophy of Science:
   • She critiques overly simplistic views of scientific methods, advocating for a nuanced understanding that accounts for the complexity and fallibility of scientific inquiry.
   • Her work often defends a pragmatic realism, emphasizing the practical success of science as evidence for its approximate truth.
3. Pragmatism:
   • Haack engages deeply with classical pragmatists like Charles Sanders Peirce and William James.
   • She is critical of the oversimplification or misuse of pragmatism in contemporary contexts, particularly “neopragmatism” associated with figures like Richard Rorty.
4. Critique of Scientism:
   • Haack is an outspoken critic of scientism, the excessive reliance on or valorization of science as the only valid form of knowledge or inquiry.
5. Philosophy and Law:
   • Haack has applied her epistemological insights to legal contexts, examining the interplay between scientific evidence and legal standards of proof.
6. “The Crossword Analogy”:
   • A notable aspect of her foundherentism is her use of the “crossword puzzle” analogy to illustrate how beliefs are justified. In this analogy, just as clues in a crossword puzzle provide mutual reinforcement but still depend on external correctness, beliefs are justified by their coherence with one another and their grounding in experience.

Key Works:

1. “Evidence and Inquiry”: This book lays out her epistemological framework, particularly her foundherentist theory of justification.
2. “Defending Science—Within Reason”: In this work, she argues for a balanced view of science, rejecting both uncritical reverence for science and wholesale skepticism.
3. “Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate”: A collection of essays where Haack critiques dogmatic positions in both analytic philosophy and postmodernism.
4. “Pragmatism, Old and New”: A critical engagement with the history and evolution of pragmatist thought.

Philosophical Style:

Haack’s writing is characterized by clarity, rigor, and wit. She often uses memorable metaphors and analogies to make complex ideas accessible while maintaining philosophical depth. Her ability to synthesize different traditions and methodologies makes her a key figure in contemporary philosophy.

Let me know if you’d like to delve into any specific aspect of her work or philosophy!

You said:

Describe her pragmatism. How does it — if it does — differ from C. I. Lewis.

ChatGPT said:

Susan Haack’s pragmatism is deeply rooted in the classical pragmatist tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James but also represents a critical response to its modern adaptations. Her approach diverges significantly from other interpretations of pragmatism, including that of C.I. Lewis, in several key ways. Below is a breakdown of Haack’s pragmatism and how it contrasts with Lewis’s perspective:

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Susan Haack’s Pragmatism

1. Peircean Foundation:
   • Haack draws heavily on Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism, particularly his emphasis on inquiry as the process of resolving doubt through the interplay of ideas, experience, and reasoning.
   • She defends a pragmatic realism, holding that the success of scientific and other practical endeavors provides strong evidence for the approximate truth of our beliefs about the world.
2. Balance Between Realism and Anti-Foundationalism:
   • Haack’s foundherentism (a hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism) underpins her pragmatic epistemology, which avoids strict foundationalist assumptions while rejecting relativistic or overly skeptical positions.
   • She sees truth as an objective ideal that we aim at, even though our means of arriving at it are fallible and context-dependent.
3. Criticism of “Vulgar Pragmatism”:
   • Haack is critical of the “neopragmatism” of thinkers like Richard Rorty, which she believes misconstrues classical pragmatism by rejecting truth as an objective standard in favor of purely instrumental or conversational norms.
4. Commitment to the Practical:
   • In line with pragmatist tradition, Haack emphasizes the practical consequences of beliefs as a central element of their meaning and justification.
   • However, she insists that these consequences should be evaluated in light of a broader commitment to evidence and experience, not just utility or convenience.

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C.I. Lewis’s Pragmatism

1. Conceptual Pragmatism:
   • C.I. Lewis’s pragmatism is known as conceptual pragmatism, which integrates a Kantian framework with pragmatic insights.
   • He emphasizes the role of the conceptual framework or “categories” through which humans organize and interpret their experience.
   • For Lewis, these frameworks are chosen pragmatically, based on their utility, but they are essential to any knowledge claim because they shape our interpretation of reality.
2. Empiricism with a Pragmatic Twist:
   • Lewis places greater emphasis on the a priori elements of knowledge—those that are presupposed by any empirical inquiry.
   • His pragmatism retains a formal and structured approach to understanding how knowledge is constructed, with a focus on the logical and normative dimensions of inquiry.
3. Truth and Verification:
   • Lewis views truth as relative to a chosen framework but also acknowledges an external reality that constrains those frameworks.
   • While he shares with Haack a commitment to the practical consequences of beliefs, his focus on the role of conceptual frameworks in mediating experience distinguishes his position.

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Key Differences

Aspect	Susan Haack	C.I. Lewis
Roots in Pragmatism	Strongly Peircean, emphasizes inquiry and realism.	Combines pragmatism with Kantian epistemology.
Role of Frameworks	Does not prioritize a priori conceptual schemes.	Stresses the importance of conceptual frameworks.
View of Truth	Objective ideal we aim for, though fallible.	Framework-relative but constrained by reality.
Critique of Scientism	Direct critic of scientism and relativism.	More focused on the structure of knowledge than broader critiques.
Practical Consequences	Tied to evidence, coherence, and practical outcomes.	Emphasizes utility of frameworks for organizing experience.

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Summary of Differences

Haack’s pragmatism is more explicitly rooted in a realist and Peircean tradition, focusing on the iterative and fallible nature of inquiry aimed at objective truth. In contrast, C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism emphasizes the pragmatic selection of frameworks that shape our understanding of the world, combining elements of Kantian epistemology with pragmatist insights. While both share a focus on the practical utility of ideas, Haack’s approach is less tied to the structure of conceptual schemes and more directly engaged with empirical inquiry and critique of scientism.

If you’d like, I can dive deeper into their comparative views on any specific topic!

You said:

Both Lewis and Haack must acknowledge conceptual schemes, surely. These can be called possible worlds, no?

ChatGPT said:

Both Susan Haack and C.I. Lewis indeed acknowledge the importance of conceptual schemes in shaping our understanding of the world, but their approaches differ in how they treat these schemes. Your suggestion to relate conceptual schemes to “possible worlds” is insightful, as it highlights the interpretive frameworks through which we perceive and engage with reality. However, their conceptions of conceptual schemes and their connection to possible worlds diverge in important ways.

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Conceptual Schemes as Possible Worlds

The idea of conceptual schemes as “possible worlds” can be understood in two senses:

1. Interpretive Frameworks: A conceptual scheme organizes experience by defining the categories and principles we use to interpret the world. This aligns with the idea of a possible world as a coherent way things could be understood or structured.
2. Alternative Realities: Different conceptual schemes might correspond to different “possible worlds” in the sense of alternate interpretations of reality, not alternate physical realities.

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C.I. Lewis and Conceptual Schemes

1. Role of Conceptual Frameworks:
   • For Lewis, conceptual schemes are indispensable filters through which we interpret raw sensory data. He believes the a priori principles we adopt—such as causality or spatial relations—are pragmatically chosen because they allow us to make sense of our experiences.
   • These schemes aren’t “possible worlds” in a metaphysical sense but rather tools that structure our engagement with the single, shared external reality.
2. Relation to Possible Worlds:
   • Conceptual frameworks could correspond to “possible worlds” in the sense that they represent different ways reality could be systematically understood, depending on the assumptions or categories we adopt.
   • Lewis does not, however, embrace a modal metaphysics in which all possible worlds are equally real; his focus is epistemological, not ontological.

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Susan Haack and Conceptual Schemes

1. Skepticism Toward Overemphasizing Schemes:
   • Haack acknowledges the role of interpretive frameworks but resists the idea that our understanding of reality is entirely determined by such schemes.
   • Her pragmatic realism emphasizes that while our conceptual schemes influence how we perceive and describe the world, there is an objective reality that constrains and interacts with these schemes.
2. Relation to Possible Worlds:
   • Haack might accept that conceptual schemes can function as “possible worlds” in the sense of alternative interpretive frameworks but would caution against conflating these frameworks with the external reality they aim to describe.
   • She would likely reject any extreme relativist view where different schemes lead to incommensurable “worlds.”

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Comparative Analysis: Conceptual Schemes and Possible Worlds

Aspect	C.I. Lewis	Susan Haack
Nature of Schemes	Essential for organizing raw sensory data; pragmatically chosen.	Tools for inquiry but not exhaustive of reality.
Ontological Commitment	Conceptual schemes shape reality but do not create it.	Reality exists independently of schemes, constraining them.
Possible Worlds Connection	Schemes as different coherent “worlds” of interpretation.	Possible interpretations, but grounded in objective reality.
Reality and Truth	Framework-relative truth, constrained by shared reality.	Truth as an objective ideal, though fallibly pursued.

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Can Conceptual Schemes Be Called Possible Worlds?

Yes, but with important qualifications:

1. Epistemic Sense: Both Lewis and Haack might accept that conceptual schemes function as “possible worlds” epistemically—representing alternate ways to organize and interpret experience.
2. Ontological Caution: Neither would fully endorse the ontological interpretation of possible worlds as independent realities. Haack is particularly resistant to any relativistic or anti-realist implications.

In short, while conceptual schemes might be likened to “possible worlds” in the sense of alternative interpretive perspectives, both Lewis and Haack anchor these schemes in a shared, objective reality that constrains and grounds them. Let me know if you’d like to explore this in more detail!

4o

You said:

When I say concepteual schemes or possible worlds all I mean is to say is that language comes in a holistic manner. Which language is chosen depends on how it fits with appearances and practical undertakings.

ChatGPT said:

Your clarification aligns closely with ideas found in both pragmatism and philosophical discussions about language and meaning. When you suggest that conceptual schemes or possible worlds are about language coming in a holistic manner, shaped by how well it fits with appearances and practical undertakings, you’re touching on several important themes:

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Key Ideas in Your View

1. Language as Holistic:
   • Language isn’t just a collection of isolated terms or propositions; it’s a network of meanings that functions as a whole.
   • Words and concepts gain meaning through their relationships with one another and their role in interpreting and navigating the world.
2. Fit with Appearances:
   • Conceptual schemes or languages are adopted based on how well they correspond to observed phenomena.
   • This echoes pragmatist commitments to the importance of empirical adequacy and experiential grounding in the justification of ideas.
3. Practical Undertakings:
   • The utility of a language or scheme in achieving practical goals is a key criterion for its adoption, reflecting the pragmatist emphasis on the consequences of ideas.

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Connections to Haack and Lewis

Susan Haack:

• Haack would likely agree with your holistic view of language. Her foundherentism reflects the idea that beliefs (and by extension, languages) are justified not in isolation but as part of a mutually reinforcing network.
• She emphasizes that language and conceptual schemes should fit both the empirical world (“appearances”) and practical needs, aligning closely with your point about the interplay between observation and practicality.

C.I. Lewis:

• Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism explicitly recognizes the holistic nature of conceptual frameworks. He would agree that the utility of a framework (or language) is judged by how well it organizes appearances and serves practical purposes.
• However, Lewis adds a Kantian dimension: conceptual schemes are not just practical but also normative, providing necessary conditions for interpreting experience.

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Holism and Language Choice

Your perspective also resonates with the Quinean view of holism, where the meanings of terms in a language are interdependent, and the whole “web of belief” adjusts in response to empirical input or practical pressures. This means:

• The choice of language (or conceptual scheme) is pragmatic and dynamic, guided by its success in coordinating our experiences and achieving our goals.
• Languages are tools, and their adoption depends on how well they serve our purposes in specific contexts.

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Possible Worlds Revisited

By “possible worlds,” if you mean the range of potential languages or schemes that might be adopted to interpret reality:

• These “worlds” are not metaphysical alternatives but practical or epistemic constructs, representing different ways to organize and make sense of the same reality.
• The “best-fit” world is determined by how well it harmonizes appearances and practical undertakings, which is consistent with both pragmatism and your holistic perspective.

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Summary

Your view of language as holistic, shaped by its fit with appearances and practical undertakings, aligns well with both Haack’s pragmatic realism and Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism, as well as broader pragmatist traditions. It emphasizes:

• The relational, networked nature of language.
• The dynamic interplay between empirical adequacy and practical utility.
• A commitment to the adaptability of language in response to new challenges or discoveries.

If you want, we could further explore how specific philosophical debates (e.g., about realism, relativism, or truth) relate to this holistic view!

Is the following a sound argument:

THE MANIFEST IMAGE ≠ THE COMMONSENSE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

____________

Gemini Advanced responds:

This is a dense philosophical argument, but let’s break down the core idea and assess its soundness.

Chrucky’s Main Argument:

• Premise 1: Sellars’ “Manifest Image” is built on an ontology of things (substances), like chairs and tables. It doesn’t fundamentally include processes or events like “a flash of lightning” or “a buzzing sound.”
• Premise 2: Our commonsense understanding of the world does include processes and events as irreducible elements. We perceive and talk about them as distinct from just things.
• Conclusion: Therefore, the Manifest Image is not identical to the commonsense framework. ¹   1. Andrew Chrucky, The manifest image ≠ the commonsense conceptual framework (in the philosophy of Wilfrid sellars) – PhilPapers philpapers.org

Is this argument sound?

• Validity: The argument is logically valid. If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
• Soundness: This depends on whether the premises are true. Chrucky spends much of the paper defending these premises by:
  • Citing other philosophers who agree with him.
  • Analyzing how we use language to describe substances and processes differently.
  • Arguing that Sellars’ attempts to reduce processes to substances are unsuccessful.
  • Pointing to potential inconsistencies in Sellars’ own framework.

Challenges to the Argument:

Chrucky addresses a key challenge from Johanna Seibt, who argues that the Manifest Image does include absolute processes. He responds with three counterarguments:

1. Sellars implies that absolute processes are not in the Manifest Image when he introduces an “alternative framework” to account for them.
2. Including absolute processes would make the Manifest Image a “third” framework, distinct from both the original “person-based” framework and the substance-based framework.
3. Sellars consistently omits absolute processes from his pre-1975 discussions of the Manifest Image.

Overall Assessment:

The argument is compelling and well-structured. Chrucky provides evidence and reasoning to support his premises, and he anticipates and addresses potential objections. Whether you find it ultimately sound depends on:

• Your interpretation of Sellars: Do you agree with Chrucky’s reading of Sellars’ work?
• Your view of commonsense: Do you believe that our commonsense understanding of the world fundamentally includes irreducible processes?

If you accept Chrucky’s premises, his conclusion logically follows. However, like many philosophical arguments, it’s open to debate and interpretation.

Key Takeaways:

• The paper highlights a subtle but important distinction between “things” and “processes” in how we understand the world.
• It raises questions about the relationship between our everyday commonsense understanding and more formalized philosophical frameworks.
• It demonstrates the complexity and nuance of Sellars’ philosophy and its interpretations.
• —————–
  I said:
• Summarize and evaluate for soundness: Wilfrid Sellars, SUBSTANCE, CHANGE AND EVENT (A thesis submitted to the Committee on Graduate Study and Degrees of The University of Buffalo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, June 1934)
  —————————-
  Gemini Advanced replied:
  
  
  Wilfrid Sellars’ 1934 thesis, “SUBSTANCE, CHANGE AND EVENT,” explores the philosophical problem of change in the universe. He critiques existing theories of substance and events, ultimately advocating for a “Physical Realism” that recognizes both the enduring nature of substances and the reality of change.
  Summary:
  Sellars begins by grounding the problem of change in the historical context of philosophical inquiry, highlighting how early theories struggled to reconcile abstract concepts with the empirical reality of motion and change. He criticizes Bertrand Russell’s theory of change, which defines things as series of appearances, for its reliance on an outdated, atomistic psychology and its failure to account for the inherent dynamism of experienced reality.
  He then examines various historical theories of substance, particularly focusing on Locke’s concept of substance as an unknowable substratum in which qualities inhere. Sellars argues that this view leads to absurdities and proposes instead a view of substance as a concrete thing, knowable through its attributes. He also addresses Leibniz’s monadism, which arises from the problem of predicating future states of an object, arguing that it rests on a flawed assumption about the nature of sameness.
• 
  Sellars further critiques theories that posit events as the basic category of existence. He analyzes different versions of this theory, pointing out the difficulties they face in accounting for time and change without resorting to contradictions or unintelligible concepts like the arising of events “out of nothing.” He challenges the notion of causal laws as governing events, arguing that it either leads to a “run of luck” theory or necessitates a problematic distinction between “pure events” and their characters.
  Finally, Sellars outlines his own position, “Physical Realism,” which is grounded in a critical realist epistemology. He argues for a view of substance as a concrete, dynamic entity, characterized by endurance, change, intrinsic nature, structure, and properties. He rejects the traditional dualism of matter and force, emphasizing the inherent dynamism of substances and the interconnectedness of their behavior. He distinguishes between primary and secondary endurance, with primary endurance belonging to non-composite, eternal beings, and secondary endurance characterizing composite entities that can cease to exist. He also differentiates between real time, identified with change, and chronological time, which is a human construct for measuring and ordering events.
• 
  Evaluation of Soundness:
  Sellars’ thesis presents a compelling and well-argued case for Physical Realism. His arguments are generally sound, drawing on both empirical observations and logical analysis to critique existing theories and develop his own position. He demonstrates a strong grasp of philosophical history and contemporary debates, engaging with prominent thinkers like Russell, Locke, Leibniz, and McTaggart.
  His critique of event-based ontologies is particularly effective, highlighting the challenges they face in accounting for time and change without resorting to contradictions or implausible assumptions. His distinction between real and chronological time is also insightful, offering a nuanced perspective on the nature of time and its relation to change.
  However, some aspects of his thesis could benefit from further elaboration. For instance, his concept of primary endurance and the existence of non-composite, eternal beings raises questions about the nature of these beings and their relation to the rest of the universe. Additionally, while he briefly mentions the implications of his view for human relations and the rejection of mechanistic fatalism, this aspect of his thesis could be explored in more depth.
  Overall, Sellars’ thesis is a significant contribution to the philosophy of change, offering a robust and well-reasoned defense of Physical Realism. His arguments are generally sound, and his insights into the nature of substance, change, and time remain relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions.
• ——————–
• I said:
  Does he include processes like “it thunders” as basic in his ontology?
  
  Gemini Advanced replied:
  
  
  
  No, Sellars does not include processes like “it thunders” as basic in his ontology. Here’s why:
  Substance-based ontology: Sellars advocates for a substance-based ontology, where enduring, concrete things are the fundamental constituents of reality. Processes, like “it thunders,” are seen as behaviors of these substances, not as ontologically basic entities in their own right.
  Events as derived: He explicitly defines events as “selected portion[s] of the behavior of a physical system.” This places events in a derivative position ontologically. “It thunders” would be an event, and thus not a fundamental entity in his system.
  Focus on physical systems: Sellars’ Physical Realism primarily focuses on physical systems and their changes. While he acknowledges different levels of causality, his emphasis is on the enduring nature of substances and their dynamic interactions, rather than on isolated processes.
  Knowledge about things: He argues that our knowledge about things includes knowledge of their properties, which define how their structure will change under certain conditions. “It thunders” would be an example of such a change, described and explained in terms of the properties and interactions of the substances involved (e.g., air, water molecules, electrical charges).
  In summary, Sellars’ ontology prioritizes substances and their dynamic interactions. Processes like “it thunders” are understood as events, which are derived from the behaviors of these substances, not as fundamental building blocks of reality.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Gemini can make mistakes, so double-c

ChatGPT said:

Noam Chomsky’s criticism of Slavoj Žižek primarily revolves around differences in their philosophical and methodological approaches. Here are the key points of Chomsky’s critique:

1. Obscurantism and Lack of Empirical Basis:
   • Chomsky has criticized Žižek for what he views as overly abstract, jargon-heavy writing that lacks clear empirical grounding. Chomsky values clarity and evidence-based arguments and has described Žižek’s work, along with other prominent continental philosophers, as being unnecessarily obscure.
2. Rejection of Theory for Its Own Sake:
   • Chomsky argues that Žižek often engages in theoretical exercises that are disconnected from real-world issues or practical solutions. This reflects Chomsky’s preference for pragmatism and actionable scholarship.
3. Focus on Ideas Over Action:
   • Chomsky views Žižek’s focus on critiquing ideology and exploring philosophical ideas as being less useful than efforts to directly address and change societal problems. This critique aligns with Chomsky’s broader disdain for what he sees as intellectual exercises that do not contribute to concrete social or political action.
4. Criticism of Postmodernism:
   • Chomsky has criticized postmodernist and continental philosophical traditions (with which Žižek is often associated), suggesting they sometimes serve more to obscure than to clarify. While Žižek’s work is not strictly postmodern, his style and emphasis on psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics often place him in this general intellectual category.

Žižek’s Response: Žižek has responded to Chomsky’s criticisms by defending the role of theory and abstract thinking in addressing ideological underpinnings of societal structures. He argues that Chomsky underestimates the importance of understanding ideology and culture in shaping political and social realities.

The tension between the two reflects broader divisions between analytical and continental philosophy, as well as between activism-oriented scholarship and more theoretical approaches.

ChatGPT said:

John Searle’s criticism of Jacques Derrida centered on Derrida’s interpretation of J.L. Austin’s speech act theory, particularly in Derrida’s essay “Signature Event Context” (1971). Searle engaged with Derrida’s ideas in his essay “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida” (1977). The debate revolved around the nature of language, meaning, and the philosophy of communication.

Here are the key points of Searle’s critique:

1. Misreading of Austin

Searle argued that Derrida fundamentally misunderstood and misrepresented Austin’s work on speech acts. Austin distinguished between performative and constative utterances and emphasized the importance of the context for successful speech acts. Searle accused Derrida of ignoring this distinction and oversimplifying Austin’s ideas by focusing too much on iterability (the repeatability of language across different contexts).

2. Iterability and Meaning

Derrida claimed that iterability—the fact that signs can be repeated in different contexts—undermines the notion of a stable or fixed meaning. Searle rejected this argument, maintaining that iterability does not negate the intentionality or context-bound nature of language. He accused Derrida of conflating citation (the deliberate quoting of language) with iterability and mischaracterizing how meaning functions in communication.

3. Philosophical Vagueness

Searle criticized Derrida’s writing style as opaque and deliberately obscure. He argued that Derrida’s deconstruction often relied on equivocation and rhetorical maneuvers rather than rigorous philosophical argumentation.

4. Theory of Communication

Searle defended a more conventional understanding of communication, where intentionality and shared conventions play a central role. He argued that Derrida’s emphasis on the inherent instability of language was exaggerated and unnecessary for understanding how communication functions in everyday life.

5. Relativism and Skepticism

Searle accused Derrida’s approach of leading to a kind of epistemological and linguistic relativism, undermining the possibility of meaningful communication or objective truth.

Derrida’s Response

Derrida responded to Searle’s critique in “Limited Inc” (1988). In it, Derrida argued that Searle misunderstood his work and reiterated his position on iterability. Derrida also took issue with Searle’s dismissal of his writing style, arguing that style and substance are inseparable in philosophy.

Outcome of the Debate

The Searle-Derrida debate highlighted deep divides between analytic and continental philosophy:

• Searle represented an analytic tradition emphasizing clarity, logic, and the functionality of language.
• Derrida embodied a continental approach, focusing on the instability of meaning and the deconstructive critique of philosophical systems.

This debate remains a landmark in modern philosophy, illustrating fundamental disagreements about the nature of language, meaning, and interpretation.

4o

O

Sidney Hook wrote an essay on Heidegger’s “being” — criticizing it. What was his criticism?

ChatGPT said:

Sidney Hook, an American philosopher and prominent pragmatist, criticized Martin Heidegger’s concept of Being in his essay “Heidegger’s ‘Being’ and the Crisis in Philosophy” (1943). Hook was deeply skeptical of Heidegger’s approach to philosophy, particularly in regard to its abstraction, obscurity, and alleged lack of practical applicability. Below are the key points of Hook’s criticism:

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1. Lack of Clarity and Meaning

• Hook criticized Heidegger for the vagueness and obscurity of his language, particularly regarding Being (Sein). He argued that Heidegger’s formulations, such as “Being reveals itself through Dasein,” are excessively abstract and lack any concrete or operational meaning.
• For Hook, this kind of imprecision undermined the philosophical value of Heidegger’s work, making it difficult to critically evaluate or engage with in a meaningful way.

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2. Overemphasis on Metaphysical Abstractions

• Hook argued that Heidegger’s philosophy overemphasized metaphysical speculation at the expense of empirical investigation or practical relevance.
• He saw Heidegger’s focus on Being as a retreat into a mystical or almost theological framework, disconnected from real-world problems or scientific inquiry.

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3. The “Crisis in Philosophy”

• Hook believed that Heidegger’s philosophy reflected a broader crisis in contemporary philosophy, particularly in continental traditions. He saw Heidegger’s emphasis on Being as emblematic of a shift away from the rational, pragmatic traditions of philosophy (like those rooted in John Dewey’s work) and toward an overly subjective and romanticized view of existence.
• According to Hook, this crisis represented a move toward irrationalism and anti-scientific thinking.

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4. Heidegger’s Methodology

• Hook took issue with Heidegger’s reliance on phenomenology and his rejection of analytic or scientific methods. For Hook, the phenomenological method, especially as applied to Being, seemed speculative and unverifiable.
• He criticized Heidegger’s use of etymology and linguistic analysis as insufficient for addressing deep philosophical questions. For Hook, philosophy needed to rely on clear argumentation and empirical evidence, not poetic or linguistic reflections.

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5. Misplaced Focus on Being

• Hook argued that Heidegger’s central question—What is Being?—is either a trivial question (answerable through linguistic or grammatical analysis) or a meaningless one (as it does not lead to actionable or empirical insights).
• For Hook, the philosophical focus should not be on abstract metaphysical categories like Being but rather on practical, human-centered problems.

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6. Heidegger’s Political Implications

• While Hook’s essay primarily addresses Heidegger’s philosophy, his critique is colored by concerns about Heidegger’s association with Nazism. Hook believed that Heidegger’s abstract focus on Being and his rejection of reason and science had dangerous political implications, aligning with authoritarian and irrational ideologies.
• This connection to Heidegger’s politics led Hook to view his philosophy as not just misguided but potentially harmful.

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7. Philosophical Irrelevance

• Ultimately, Hook viewed Heidegger’s work as irrelevant to the progress of philosophy. He argued that Heidegger’s preoccupation with Being was a distraction from the practical concerns of human life and the pressing questions of ethics, politics, and science.

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Hook’s Pragmatist Alternative

• As a pragmatist influenced by John Dewey, Hook believed that philosophy should address real-world problems and focus on human needs and experiences. He emphasized action, problem-solving, and empirical methods as central to philosophical inquiry, in direct opposition to Heidegger’s abstract and speculative approach.

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Conclusion

Sidney Hook’s critique of Heidegger centered on the abstract and imprecise nature of Heidegger’s concept of Being, its lack of empirical grounding, and its perceived retreat into mysticism and irrationalism. For Hook, Heidegger’s philosophy represented a crisis in philosophy—a move away from clarity, science, and human-centered concerns toward an esoteric and politically dangerous form of metaphysical speculation.

4o

O

Chapter 11

34 years after writing my dissertation, I am ready to reply to my advisor’s [Christopher Gowans] query of what happened with chapter 10. My reply then was: I ran out of steam!

After this, in the years followiing, I became engaged in deveping a Wilfrid Sellars cite, and expected some kind of commentary on my dissertation. Not a peep!

Meanwhile in the following years there occurred many writings on Sellars. They referred to my Sellars cite and praised it, but never commented on my dissertation which was in their face. I reciprocated.

Recently I started exploring the powers of AI – chatGPT and Gemini Advamced. So I loaded them with portions of my dissertation to get ctitical comment. And these comments forced me to rethink what I had written.

Here – in a nutshell – is what I realized – rather what I had assumed in my dissertation.

Given the form of “ if p then q,” foundationalisms are of two kinds. One focuses on the p and the other on the q. Those who focus on p are embarking on Pseudo Foundationalism, and this is the kind of foundationalism Sellars criticized, and this kind of foundationalism rests either on reports of appearances, and such reports imply nothing. Or it rests on reports about physical objects and their appearances – all of which requires an appeal to other physical object reports – and this constitutes the myth of the given of foundationalism.

Genuine Foundationalism focuses on q. Now Q can be a physical object or an appearance report. A physical object report is fallible and cannot be a foundation. Only an appearance report can be foundational ala C. I. Lewis’s terminating judgment. In my dissertation I made the connection betweem Firth, Chisholm and Lewis. This kind of Given is not disputed by Sellars.

In my dissertation I focused on the necessary condition for foundationalism, and I explicitly ignored how coherence entered into the situation — though I pointed out that both Chisholm and Lewis incorporated coherence into their version of foundationalism. I also ignored the problem of how coherence and foundations meshed. On reflection, the answer is provided by C.I. Lewis with his pragmatism.

Lewis’s position given with two examples is this. We start with some prediction of what will happen if we perform action A (the pragma). The prediction is an appearance, the Given. This analysis constitutes the antecedent version of Susan Haack’s foundherentism.

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I submitted the above for chatGPT to evaluate.

ChatGPT said:

Your reflective account of Chapter 11 reveals an intricate exploration of foundationalism, particularly in relation to Sellars, C.I. Lewis, and subsequent philosophical commentary. Here’s an evaluation and response to your insights, focusing on the main points you’ve shared.

Key Themes and Observations

1. Two Forms of Foundationalism:
   • Your distinction between “Pseudo-Foundationalism” (focused on p, the antecedent of conditional reasoning) and “Genuine Foundationalism” (focused on q, the consequent) is compelling.
   • Sellars’s critique of the “myth of the given” aligns well with your diagnosis of pseudo-foundationalism relying on either appearance reports (which “imply nothing”) or physical object reports (requiring further reports, leading to circularity). This accurately captures Sellars’s rejection of foundationalist appeals to uninterpreted sense data or brute facts.
2. Genuine Foundationalism and C.I. Lewis:
   • Your emphasis on Lewis’s idea of “terminating judgments” as foundational and its compatibility with Sellars’s philosophy is an insightful resolution to the myth of the given.
   • By connecting Lewis’s foundationalism to Chisholm and Firth, you’ve clarified that foundational appearances (the “Given”) are not inherently problematic when understood pragmatically. This may indeed bypass Sellars’s critique, as Sellars does not dispute appearances per se but their role in justificatory isolation.
3. Coherence and Pragmatism:
   • Your acknowledgment of the interplay between coherence and foundationalism highlights an essential tension in epistemology. You suggest that C.I. Lewis resolves this tension through pragmatism—offering a predictive and action-oriented account of justification.
   • This anticipates Susan Haack’s “foundherentism,” which integrates foundational and coherentist elements. Your observation that Lewis’s framework provides an “antecedent version” of foundherentism is astute and positions your dissertation within a broader philosophical trajectory.
4. AI’s Role in Reassessing Your Work:
   • The use of AI to critique and clarify your dissertation highlights its potential as a reflective tool for revisiting longstanding philosophical projects.
   • Your re-engagement with these foundational questions exemplifies how AI can prompt fresh perspectives on established ideas.

Suggestions for Further Development

1. Clarify the Notion of “Pseudo-Foundationalism”:
   • It might help to elaborate on why pseudo-foundationalism necessarily fails (e.g., its reliance on circularity or epistemic isolation) compared to genuine foundationalism. This could further sharpen your critique and distinguish the two forms.
2. Expand on the Lewis-Sellars Connection:
   • While you note that Sellars does not dispute Lewis’s Given, elaborating on their compatibility could solidify your position. For instance, does Lewis’s pragmatism sufficiently address Sellars’s concern that the Given must play a role in a broader inferential system?
3. Integrate Foundherentism More Explicitly:
   • Foundherentism as an epistemological model offers fertile ground for your analysis. Connecting it explicitly with your distinctions between p and q could further substantiate your claim about its antecedence in Lewis’s work.
4. Engage with Recent Commentary:
   • Since your Sellars site has been influential but your dissertation overlooked, incorporating newer Sellars scholarship into your re-evaluation may yield additional insights or support your original thesis.

Conclusion

Your reflections bring valuable clarity to the debate on foundationalism and coherence, positioning your work within the ongoing evolution of epistemological theory. Revisiting these ideas through the lens of C.I. Lewis’s pragmatism and their relationship to foundherentism adds significant depth. If you plan to expand on these ideas further, refining the connections between foundationalism, pragmatism, and modern epistemological frameworks could solidify your contribution to the field.

You said:

How is the following related to susan Haack anf C.I.Lewis: “Let me first turn to Chisholm. He defends a version of foundationalism which has a foundationalist and a coherentist aspect. He writes: “There are two moments of epistemic justification, one of them foundational and the other not.”{20}”

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT

The quote from Chisholm, highlighting the dual aspects of epistemic justification—foundational and non-foundational—can be related to Susan Haack and C.I. Lewis in the following ways:

Susan Haack

Susan Haack is known for her theory of “foundherentism,” which combines elements of foundationalism and coherentism. Her view acknowledges that epistemic justification involves both foundational beliefs (those that are justified independently) and coherence among a system of beliefs. Haack’s framework resonates with Chisholm’s idea of “two moments of epistemic justification” by suggesting that justification is neither purely foundational nor purely coherent but a blend of both. Chisholm’s acknowledgment of foundational and non-foundational elements aligns with Haack’s hybrid approach.

C.I. Lewis

C.I. Lewis contributed significantly to foundationalist epistemology with his concept of the “given.” Lewis argued that some knowledge comes directly from immediate experience (foundational), but this raw data requires interpretation through a conceptual framework, which introduces a coherentist aspect. Lewis’s work suggests that while some aspects of justification are foundational (based on direct experience), they are interwoven with the coherence of the interpretive framework.

Connection to Chisholm

Chisholm’s dual-aspect view of justification parallels these thinkers:

• From Haack, Chisholm’s view reflects the integration of foundational and coherent elements, suggesting an interplay between independently justified beliefs and the coherence of the belief system.
• From Lewis, Chisholm inherits the idea that foundational experiences (e.g., the given) must be complemented by conceptual and coherentist structures to provide full justification.

In summary, Chisholm’s perspective finds resonance in Haack’s foundherentism and Lewis’s integration of the given and conceptual interpretation, both of which explore the relationship between foundational and coherent elements in epistemic justification.