AI assist – Page 29 – Escaping from Bullshit

Publishing in Peer Reviewed Journals

I had 3 bad experiences with peer reviews. My article “beware of the handmaid scorned” examplifies the problem. An editor tried to engage me in a defense of the article. I refused, and it was published nonetheless. The polemic should have taken place publicly and the editors comments should have been published with my article. Refusal to publish because of disagreement with the substance of the article is not a suffficient reason. What do you think?

ChatGPT said:

Your experience with the peer review process, particularly concerning your article “Beware of the Handmaid Scorned,” raises significant ethical considerations. The peer review system is designed to ensure the quality and integrity of scholarly publications, but it is not without its flaws.

1. Editorial Disagreement and Publication Ethics

Refusing to publish an article solely due to disagreement with its substance, without identifying methodological flaws or ethical issues, is generally considered inappropriate. The Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) emphasizes that editorial decisions should be based on the validity and quality of the work, not on subjective disagreements.

2. Transparency in Editorial Processes

Your suggestion that editorial comments should be published alongside the article aligns with the principles of transparency and open discourse. While not all journals practice open peer review, there is a growing movement towards greater transparency in the review process to foster accountability and constructive dialogue.

3. Ethical Responsibilities of Editors

Editors have a duty to manage conflicts of interest and ensure that the review process is fair and unbiased. Engaging authors in a private defense of their work, especially when the article is ultimately published, may undermine the objectivity of the review process. COPE provides guidelines to help editors navigate such situations ethically. Publication Ethics+4Publication Ethics+4Wikipedia+4

Conclusion

Your experience underscores the need for ongoing discussions about the ethics and transparency of the peer review process. Advocating for open dialogue and adherence to established ethical guidelines can help improve the integrity of scholarly publishing.Publication Ethics+2WIRED+2Time+2

Sources

Paradox of Grace

Grace in Chrisrianity seems paradoxical. On one hand it is a gift — something given; not chosen; yet one can choose to reject it. But if one has faith, it is not something chosen or rejected.

ChatGPT said:

That’s a really thoughtful observation — you’re picking up on a deep and long-standing tension in Christian theology around grace, faith, and free will. The paradox you’re pointing to has been at the center of debates for centuries, especially between different Christian traditions.

Let’s break it down a bit:

1. Grace as a Gift

In nearly all Christian traditions, grace is understood as unearned favor from God. It’s not something one earns through works or merit — it’s freely given. As Ephesians 2:8 puts it:

“For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God.”

So, grace is unilateral: God gives it.

2. But… Can You Reject Grace?

Here’s where the traditions split.

In Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theology (and many Arminian Protestant views), humans can cooperate with or reject grace. That is, while grace initiates and empowers, the human response (free will) still matters. This is sometimes called synergism — salvation involves cooperation between divine grace and human will.
In Calvinist/Reformed theology, grace is irresistible for those whom God has chosen (the “elect”). If God gives you saving grace, you will respond with faith. It’s not a matter of choice, because even the faith is given. This view is monergistic — only God’s action is effective.

So depending on the theology, grace may or may not be rejectable.

3. Is Faith Chosen?

Again, tension.

If grace is irresistible and faith is a result of grace (as in Calvinism), then faith is not a human choice. God gives you the faith, just as He gives you grace.
But in other traditions, faith is a kind of human response to grace — made possible because of grace, but still a choice. So you have something like: “God offers you a hand (grace), and you choose to take it (faith).”

This is where your paradox shows up:

If grace is a gift and faith is also not a choice, then what does rejection mean?
But if you can reject grace, doesn’t that imply some kind of will that wasn’t graced?

A Possible Resolution?

Some theologians try to resolve this by saying that grace enables choice — it restores the will so that a person can freely choose God (something impossible without grace). So even the act of choosing or rejecting is made possible by grace — but the choice still matters.

That’s especially common in Wesleyan or Catholic theology:

“Prevenient grace” goes before — it enables a person to respond, but doesn’t compel.

Would you say you’re leaning toward one of these interpretations? Or are you more interested in how the paradox holds up philosophically — like whether the very idea of a “gift that can’t be refused” makes sense?

Is this conversation helpful so far?

Reason

Is Easter or Christmas more significant for salvation?

You said:

ChatGPT said:

In Christian theology, Easter is generally considered more significant for salvation than Christmas.

Here’s why:

1. Easter centers on the resurrection — the core of salvation

Easter celebrates the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which is the foundation of Christian soteriology (doctrine of salvation).
According to the New Testament, especially Romans 10:9, salvation hinges on believing “that God raised him from the dead.”
1 Corinthians 15:17: “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins.”

2. Christmas celebrates the incarnation — necessary, but not sufficient

Christmas commemorates the birth of Christ, the moment of incarnation — God becoming human.
While essential (no death and resurrection without a birth), it’s not itself the act of salvation.
Theologically, it sets the stage for what makes salvation possible.

3. The early Church emphasis

The early Christian Church prioritized the Passion, Crucifixion, and Resurrection far more than the Nativity.
Easter was celebrated long before Christmas was even established as a feast day.

Summary:

Christmas = God comes to us → Incarnation
Easter = God saves us → Crucifixion and Resurrection

So while both are deeply important, Easter is more central to the doctrine of salvation.

David Hume on miracles

ChatGPT said:

David Hume, in Section X titled “Of Miracles” from his 1748 work An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, presents a skeptical view on the credibility of miracles. He defines a miracle as “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.” David Hume+7Wikipedia+7mytutor.co.uk+7

Hume’s Core Argument

Hume argues that our belief in any event should be proportional to the evidence supporting it. Since the laws of nature are established by “a firm and unalterable experience,” any claim of a miracle—which by definition violates these laws—faces overwhelming contrary evidence. Therefore, he posits that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the falsehood of that testimony would be more miraculous than the event it seeks to establish. A Philosopher’s View+2Wikipedia+2Philosophies of Life+2 The New Yorker+1Wikipedia+1

Reasons for Skepticism

Hume provides several reasons to doubt miracle reports:

Human Fallibility: People are prone to error, deception, and the influence of strong emotions, especially when faced with the extraordinary.
Religious Zeal: Witnesses may be biased, either consciously or unconsciously, due to their religious beliefs.Wikipedia
Cultural Context: Miracle stories often originate from “ignorant and barbarous nations,” where critical scrutiny is lacking.Wikipedia
Contradictory Claims: Different religions report conflicting miracles, which cannot all be true, thus undermining their credibility. Wikipedia+1Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy+1

Conclusion

Hume concludes that it’s always more rational to disbelieve a miracle report than to accept it, given the weight of consistent natural laws and the unreliability of human testimony in such matters. His argument has significantly influenced discussions on the intersection of religion and empirical evidence.Wikipedia

Sources

How can an appeal to faith distinguish the truth among the various religions?

ChatGPT said:

An appeal to faith alone can’t reliably distinguish which religion, if any, is true, because:

1. Faith is Subjective

Faith is deeply personal and can be sincere across many religions. A Christian, a Muslim, a Hindu, and a Buddhist may all have strong faith in their respective traditions—but they can’t all be correct in their mutually exclusive claims (e.g., about the nature of God, salvation, reincarnation, etc.).

If faith means “trust without proof” or “conviction in things unseen,” then it becomes non-discriminating—anyone can claim it. That makes it epistemically weak as a tool for identifying truth.

2. Competing Faith Claims

Different religions often claim exclusive truth. For example:

Christianity: “No one comes to the Father except through me.” (John 14:6)
Islam: “The only religion with Allah is Islam.” (Qur’an 3:19)
Hinduism (in some forms): Truth is many, and paths to it are diverse.

Each may appeal to faith to support their doctrine. But if all do this, then faith becomes neutralized as a method of arbitration—it can support any claim, including false ones.

3. Circular Reasoning

Using faith to justify a religion often leads to a circular argument:

“I know my religion is true because I have faith. My faith is valid because my religion is true.”

This doesn’t allow an outsider or a skeptic to evaluate the truth from the outside. It’s not a shared, common ground for discussion—it’s a closed loop.

4. Faith After Evidence vs. Faith as Evidence

Some thinkers distinguish faith after investigation (i.e. trust based on reasoned commitment) from faith as primary evidence (i.e. belief without or despite contrary evidence).

If faith comes after a rational process (historical evidence, coherence, lived experience), it might play a valid role in one’s personal commitment. But it’s not the criterion for truth—it’s the result of thinking something is likely true.

So how could faith play a role?

Internal consistency: Faith might be a response to the internal beauty or coherence of a worldview.
Experiential resonance: One might have faith because a religion “makes sense” of their life experience.
Pragmatic function: Some adopt a faith because it works for them (ethically, emotionally, socially).

But these are all subjective, and none of them offer a universal, comparative standard to decide between conflicting truth claims.

Would you like to explore how different religions might claim to be verified beyond faith—like through miracles, moral transformation, historical reliability, etc.? Or are you more interested in how faith itself might still be philosophically defended?

DeepSeek on Chrucky on Sellars

[Go to Citations]

Edit

This passage presents a detailed critique and extension of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy, particularly concerning the problem of how we perceive and conceptualize physical objects. The author engages with Sellars’ views on language acquisition, the nature of perceptual experience, and the relationship between sensory data (sensa) and the conceptual framework of physical objects. Here’s a structured breakdown of the key themes and arguments:

I. The Gap: Seeing Physical Objects

Sellars’ Assumption of Behaviorese:
- Sellars assumes a pre-existing “Behaviorese” language for the mythical Ryleans but does not explain how they acquire it. This hides the deeper problem of how physical objects are recognized in the first place.
- The author argues that recognizing physical objects requires a concept of physical objects, but how is this concept acquired? Sellars’ answer—through natural and social evolution—is seen as insufficiently specific.
The Role of Sensa:
- Sellars introduces sensa (non-conceptual sensory states) as theoretical entities to explain perception. However, the author questions how sensa, as unstructured elements, can ground the learning of Behaviorese or the recognition of physical objects.
- The gap between the “Heraclitean flux” of sensory processes and the structured language of physical objects needs bridging, possibly through a Representational System (RS).
Animals and Pre-Linguistic Concepts:
- Animals and pre-linguistic humans seem to “rs-see” physical objects without logical concepts. This suggests an innate, non-linguistic capacity for perceptual structuring (e.g., “ur-concepts” or “rs-concepts”).
- The author aligns this with theories like Richard Gregory’s (and Helmholtz’s) that perception involves “unconscious inference” or hypothesis formation from sensory data.
Perception as Hypothesis Formation:
- Perception is likened to forming hypotheses about sensory data, though not in the conscious, linguistic sense. This explains phenomena like ambiguous figures (e.g., the duck-rabbit) and perceptual constancies.
- Sellars critiques this view (e.g., in his debate with Feyerabend), arguing that the “Manifest Image” (common-sense framework) is not a theory about sense data but a distinct conceptual framework.

II. The Computer Analogy

Sellars uses computer models to explain language and thought but fails to account for perception of physical objects.
The author distinguishes between:
1. Hardware-level logic (innate, unconscious processing of sensory data).
2. Software-level logic (conscious, rule-governed language use).
This suggests a middle ground: animals might use a “weaker” logic (e.g., associative or intuitionistic) to structure perceptions without full conceptual thought.

III. Order of Being vs. Order of Knowing

Sellars distinguishes between:
- Ontological priority: Thoughts exist before being known (e.g., as neural patterns).
- Epistemic priority: Knowledge of thoughts requires language.
The author questions whether Sellars grants conceptual thought prior to language. Sellars seems to hold that conceptual thinking emerges only with language learning, while non-conceptual “rs-thoughts” may exist innately.

IV. Logical Construction

Traditional “logical construction” aims to reduce physical objects to sensory elements, but Sellars seems to propose something different: a theoretical unification of sensory data into objects.
This is not strict analysis but a “cross-categorical correspondence” (e.g., a pink ice cube as a swarm of molecules).

V. Unalterability of RS-Concepts

The author argues that some perceptual ways of seeing (e.g., visual illusions like the Müller-Lyer lines) are unalterable and independent of belief.
This suggests a hardwired, innate stratum of perception (the “Manifest Image”) that persists despite scientific or linguistic sophistication.

Key Disputes and Implications

Innate Mechanisms:
- The author argues Sellars is committed to innate perceptual structuring (rs-concepts), even if Sellars avoids explicit innatism.
Perception vs. Theory:
- Sellars rejects the idea that the Manifest Image is a theory about sense data, but the author sees it as analogous to scientific theorizing (just unconscious and non-linguistic).
Language and Thought:
- Sellars ties conceptual thought tightly to language, but the author suggests pre-linguistic “rs-concepts” may play a foundational role.

Conclusion

The author extends Sellars’ framework by:

Positing innate, non-linguistic representational systems (RS) to explain perception.
Drawing parallels between perceptual “hypotheses” and scientific theorizing.
Highlighting the independence of perceptual constancies/illusions from belief, suggesting an unalterable core to the Manifest Image.

This critique enriches Sellars’ philosophy by addressing gaps in his account of perception and concept acquisition, while also challenging his strict division between non-conceptual sensory experience and linguistically mediated thought.

New

Is the difference between an animal intentionality by association and a language with negation sufficient to explain the rift between intuitions and concepts?

ChatGPT said:

The distinction between animal intentionality by association and the human capacity for language with negation offers valuable insights into the divide between intuitions and concepts. However, this distinction alone may not fully account for the complexity of this cognitive rift.

Animal Intentionality by Association

Animals exhibit intentional behaviors that are often driven by associative learning. For instance, a dog may associate the sound of a leash with going for a walk, leading to anticipatory excitement. Such behaviors suggest a form of intentionality grounded in direct experiences and associations. However, this form of intentionality is typically limited to immediate contexts and lacks the abstraction found in human thought .

Language with Negation and Human Conceptual Thought

Human language introduces the capacity for negation, enabling individuals to conceive of and communicate about non-existent or abstract concepts (e.g., “unicorns do not exist”). This linguistic feature allows for complex reasoning, hypothetical thinking, and the formation of concepts that transcend direct sensory experience .

Bridging Intuitions and Concepts

While the presence of language and negation in humans facilitates advanced conceptual thinking, the gap between animal intuitions and human concepts is not solely bridged by these features. Research indicates that some animals possess rudimentary conceptual abilities, such as categorization and problem-solving, albeit without the full-fledged linguistic structures humans use .PMC

Conclusion

In summary, while the capacity for language with negation significantly contributes to the development of complex concepts in humans, it does not entirely explain the cognitive divide between animal intuitions and human conceptual thought. Other factors, including memory, abstraction, and social learning, also play crucial roles in this intricate cognitive landscape.PMC

Sources

The dogmaric differences between orthodox and catholics.

ChatGPT said:

The dogmatic differences between Orthodox Christianity and Roman Catholicism are deeply rooted in theology, authority, and tradition. While both share much in common—such as the Nicene Creed, apostolic succession, the sacraments, and reverence for Church Fathers—there are significant divergences. Here’s a breakdown of the major dogmatic differences:

1. Authority of the Pope

Catholic: The Pope is the supreme head of the Church, with universal jurisdiction. He is considered infallible in matters of faith and morals when speaking ex cathedra (from the chair of Peter).
Orthodox: Reject papal supremacy and infallibility. The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople is a “first among equals,” but has no jurisdictional authority over other Orthodox churches.

2. Filioque Clause

Catholic: The Nicene Creed includes “the Holy Spirit… who proceeds from the Father and the Son [Filioque].”
Orthodox: Reject this addition as a unilateral alteration of an ecumenical creed and hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father, as originally stated.

3. Original Sin

Catholic: Original sin includes inherited guilt and a fallen nature.
Orthodox: Affirm a fallen nature and mortality, but generally reject the idea of inherited guilt. Sin is more a condition than a culpability passed down.

4. Immaculate Conception

Catholic: Mary was conceived without original sin—a dogma proclaimed in 1854.
Orthodox: Do not accept the Immaculate Conception, partly because of their different understanding of original sin.

5. Purgatory

Catholic: Believe in purgatory—a temporary state of purification for souls destined for heaven.
Orthodox: Reject purgatory as defined by Catholic doctrine but believe in prayers for the dead and a process of purification after death in a more mysterious or undefined way.

6. Transubstantiation

Catholic: Dogmatically affirm transubstantiation—the bread and wine become the actual body and blood of Christ in substance.
Orthodox: Believe in the real presence, but are less precise or scholastic about the mechanism. They reject the Aristotelian explanation as dogma.

7. Original Authority and Councils

Catholic: Accept 21 ecumenical councils, including those after the East-West Schism (e.g., Trent, Vatican I, Vatican II).
Orthodox: Recognize only the first seven ecumenical councils (up to Nicaea II in 787) as binding.

8. Clerical Celibacy

Catholic: In the Latin Rite, celibacy is required for priests.
Orthodox: Married men may be ordained as priests (but not bishops). Bishops are celibate monks.

9. Conception of the Church

Catholic: The Church is a visible, hierarchical institution centered on the papacy.
Orthodox: The Church is a communion of autocephalous (self-governing) churches, united by shared faith and sacraments but not centralized.

Would you like a table summarizing these for easier reference?

You said:

yes

ChatGPT said:

Here’s a comparison table summarizing the dogmatic differences between Orthodox and Catholic Christianity:

Doctrine / Issue	Catholic Church	Orthodox Church
Papal Authority	Pope is supreme, universal head of the Church; infallible ex cathedra.	No pope; Ecumenical Patriarch is first among equals, no universal jurisdiction.
Filioque Clause	Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (Filioque).	Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only.
Original Sin	Involves inherited guilt and fallen nature.	Emphasizes fallen nature; generally rejects inherited guilt.
Immaculate Conception	Mary was conceived without original sin (dogma since 1854).	Not accepted; inconsistent with Orthodox view of original sin.
Purgatory	Defined as a state of purification before entering heaven.	Rejects purgatory as defined; affirms prayers for the dead and purification.
Transubstantiation	Eucharist becomes body and blood of Christ in substance (transubstantiation).	Real presence affirmed; mechanism not dogmatically defined.
Ecumenical Councils	Accepts 21 councils, including post-schism ones.	Accepts only the first 7 councils (up to Nicaea II, 787).
Clerical Celibacy	Mandatory for Latin Rite priests (exceptions exist).	Married men can be ordained as priests; bishops must be celibate monks.
Church Structure	Centralized under the Pope.	Decentralized; communion of autocephalous churches.
Theological Method	Scholastic, often uses philosophical definitions (e.g., Aristotelian terms).	Mystical and apophatic; wary of overly rational explanations.

Let me know if you’d like this turned into a printable chart or infographic.

Reason

ChatGPT can make mistakes. Check impo

Emergent Materialism

Make a case for emergent materialism with examples.

ChatGPT said:

Emergent materialism is the view that mental properties (such as consciousness, intentions, or qualia) emerge from physical systems (like brains), but are not reducible to or fully explainable by the physical properties of those systems. Unlike reductive materialism, which says that everything mental just is something physical (e.g., pain = C-fiber firing), emergent materialism says mental phenomena are novel and causally efficacious, but still ultimately depend on matter.

Here’s a structured case for emergent materialism, with examples:

1. The Core Intuition: Novel Properties Arise from Complex Systems

Argument:

Complex systems often display properties that are not present in their parts, nor predictable from them alone.
These emergent properties are real and make a causal difference.

Example:

Wetness of water: A single H₂O molecule isn’t wet. Wetness arises only when many molecules interact in specific ways. The property is real and has practical consequences (e.g., you can drown in it), even though it depends on the molecules.

2. Consciousness as an Emergent Property

Argument:

Consciousness arises from neuronal activity, but no individual neuron is conscious.
The mind appears when a certain organizational threshold is crossed—likely involving specific patterns of information integration, feedback, and plasticity.

Example:

Compare a single neuron (not conscious) to a functioning human brain.
The conscious experience of redness is not found in any neuron or synapse, but in the patterned activity across neural assemblies in the visual cortex.

3. Irreducibility and Non-derivability

Argument:

Mental properties cannot be derived from physical laws alone. Even if we knew all the physics of the brain, we’d still be puzzled about why certain physical configurations produce subjective experience.

Example:

The “hard problem of consciousness” (Chalmers): why does brain activity feel like anything at all?
Functional explanations (like input/output behavior) don’t seem to explain qualia (what it’s like to see red).

4. Causal Powers of Emergent Properties

Argument:

Emergent properties can have causal effects that are not simply reducible to the base components’ interactions.

Example:

A person’s belief (a mental state) that it’s raining can cause them to grab an umbrella and act.
The belief isn’t just a brain state; it’s a representational state that interacts with other mental states and goals.
The brain state realizes the belief, but the belief does explanatory work in terms of rational action.

5. Coherence with Scientific Practice

Argument:

Scientific models in biology, psychology, and neuroscience often rely on higher-level explanations that treat mental properties as real.

Example:

In cognitive neuroscience, models of decision-making use terms like attention, memory, and intention that don’t reduce neatly to molecular or cellular descriptions.

6. Avoids the Pitfalls of Both Dualism and Reductionism

Argument:

Emergent materialism allows us to affirm the physical basis of the mind (avoiding dualism’s ghost-in-the-machine problem) while acknowledging the autonomy and novelty of mental phenomena (avoiding the reductionist dismissal of experience).

Summary

Emergent materialism makes a compelling case that:

Mental phenomena depend on physical processes,
Yet are not reducible to them,
And introduce genuinely new causal powers,
Which we need in order to explain behavior, reasoning, and conscious experience.

It’s like saying: the mind is what the brain does, but what it does is more than the sum of its parts.

Reason

Jesus as a Secular Revolutionary

Use Archibald Robertson, The Origins of Christianity, to make the case that Jesus was a secular revolutionary

chatGPT:

To argue that Jesus was a secular revolutionary using Archibald Robertson’s The Origins of Christianity, we can draw from Robertson’s Marxist historiography and materialist reading of early Christianity. Robertson presents Jesus not as a supernatural figure, but as a historical actor shaped by class conflict and the socio-political context of 1st-century Roman-occupied Judea. Here’s how we can build the case, step by step:

1. Jesus as a Product of Class Struggle

Robertson, influenced by Marxist thought, emphasizes the material conditions and class tensions in Judea at the time of Jesus. He sees Jesus as a representative of a popular movement among the oppressed lower classes—particularly Galilean peasants—against both Roman imperial authority and the collaborationist Jewish priestly aristocracy.

“The Jesus of history was a product of the economic and political ferment of his time—a time of deepening misery and growing unrest under Roman rule.”
— Robertson, The Origins of Christianity

This positions Jesus as a revolutionary figure fighting for material justice, not merely spiritual salvation.

2. Anti-Roman and Anti-Priestly Polemic

Robertson notes how many of Jesus’s teachings can be read as subversive critiques of both Roman power and the Temple elite. The cleansing of the Temple (Mark 11:15-18) is seen as a politically charged act, not just a religious gesture. It challenged the economic exploitation at the heart of the Temple system, which had become integrated with Roman interests.

“The overturning of the money-changers’ tables was not the act of a mystic, but of a man who recognized the collusion between religious authority and economic oppression.”

Here, Jesus aligns with a popular anti-elite sentiment—a key feature of secular revolutionary movements.

3. The Kingdom of God as an Earthly Order

Robertson insists that the “Kingdom of God” in Jesus’s message was not a transcendent heaven but an immanent socio-political transformation. The “kingdom” would reverse the social order, uplift the poor, and depose the powerful—echoing themes of egalitarian revolt.

“Jesus proclaimed the coming of a kingdom in which the poor would inherit the earth—not in some afterlife, but here and now. This was the language of revolution.”

This interpretation aligns Jesus with movements for redistributive justice, not spiritual otherworldliness.

4. Repression and Execution as Political Punishment

Robertson stresses that crucifixion was a Roman method of executing political rebels. Jesus’s death is not best understood as a religious martyrdom, but as the state’s punishment for sedition.

“If Jesus had merely preached peace and piety, Rome would have ignored him. The fact that he was crucified proves that his message was seen as a direct threat to the political order.”

Thus, Jesus dies the death of a revolutionary agitator, not just a theological symbol.

5. Later Spiritualization as Historical Distortion

Finally, Robertson argues that Pauline Christianity and the early Church spiritualized and depoliticized Jesus’s radical message in order to survive and gain favor within the Roman world.

“The original movement of Jesus, a mass uprising of the dispossessed, was gradually transformed into a mystical religion palatable to the ruling classes.”

This shift obscured Jesus’s revolutionary character and turned him into a divine figure, removing the radical edge of his message.

Conclusion: Jesus as a Secular Revolutionary

Using Robertson’s framework, we can argue that:

Jesus emerged from a context of social and economic oppression.
His teachings and actions were revolutionary, aimed at overturning unjust systems.
His execution was political.
The later Church reinterpreted his message to fit religious paradigms, thereby erasing his secular, revolutionary origins.

Robertson gives us a Jesus who stands not as the founder of a church, but as a leader of the oppressed, whose real aims were political and material—a secular revolutionary in a deeply unequal society.