Category: AI assist

can you assist in finding a locus classicus for a given idea or claim

ChatGPT said:

Absolutely—I’d be happy to help track down a locus classicus. A “locus classicus” is the earliest or most authoritative passage where a particular idea, term, or argument is laid out. To get started:

1. Specify the idea or claim you have in mind.
2. If possible, give any context—field (philosophy, science, literature), approximate era, keywords or phrases used.
3. Let me know if you’d like secondary sources or commentaries that discuss its importance.

Once I have that, I can suggest candidate primary texts, pinpoint passages, and, where helpful, bring in scholarly references. What’s the idea or claim you’re interested in?

o4-mini

You said:

in philosoph, what is the locus classicus for a distinction between a substance and a process

ChatGPT said:

Thought for 4 seconds

A good place to start—and the traditional “locus classicus” in Western metaphysics—is Aristotle, who in two key works sets out (a) what a substance is and (b) how change or process (kinesis) must be understood as distinct from substance:

1. Substance (ousia)
   • Categories, Chapter 5 (ch. 8 in some editions): “Substance” is treated as the primary category—“that which is neither predicated of a subject nor present in a subject” (cf. 1a 9–10).
   • Metaphysics, Book Ζ (Zeta, Book VII), especially 1028a–1030a: a more developed account of substance as “that which underlies and remains constant through change.”
2. Process / Change (kinesis)
   • Physics, Book III, Chapter 1 (201a 11ff.): Aristotle defines motion (kinesis) as “the actuality of what is potential, insofar as it is potential,” and distinguishes different kinds of change (substantial, quantitative, qualitative, etc.).
   • Metaphysics, Book Θ (Theta, Book IX), especially 1048a–1049a: the famous discussion of actuality (energeia) versus potentiality (dunamis), which grounds the very notion of process or activity.

Together, these passages lay down the classic contrast between ousia (a stable bearer of properties) and kinesis/energeia (the dynamic unfolding or actualization of potentials). If you’re tracing subsequent debates, virtually every medieval and early-modern author (from the Peripatetics through Aquinas and on to Leibniz) will take these Aristotelian loci as their starting-points.

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You said:

what about Broad’s distinction

ChatGPT said:

Thought for 7 seconds

In Broad’s own work the classic statement of the distinction between substances (“things” or “continuants”) and processes (“events” or “occurrents”) is found in

C. D. Broad, Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1933), Chapter VII, §§ “Independent Discussion of the Notion of Substance.”

In that section Broad notes that in ordinary language there are two fundamentally different kinds of “substantive names”:

1. Thing-names (continuants/substances) – e.g. “table,” “rock,” “river” – which naturally take what he calls “dispositional” adjectives (poisonous, fusible, massive) but reject many process-oriented modifiers.
2. Process-names (occurrents/events) – e.g. “sneeze,” “flash of light,” “concert” – which take adverbial or temporal modifiers (quickly, at noon) but reject most substance-oriented predicates.

Broad’s strategy is to show that certain predicate-phrase + substantive-name combinations are grammatical (and hence intelligible) only with one class or the other, and that this linguistic fact points to a real ontological distinction:

“In Indo-European languages, at any rate, there are at least two kinds of substantive-name, viz., thing-names and process-names. … There are several different kinds of adjective-phrase which can be conjoined with thing-names to give intelligible sentences. If any of these be joined with process-names the result is nonsense. Similarly …”
  —Broad, Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. I, ch. VII (pp. 132–138) DitextDitext

He labels the former “continuants” or “things,” and the latter “occurrents” or “events.” This passage has become the standard reference whenever contemporary metaphysicians discuss the continuant-occurrent (substance-process) distinction.

Andrew Chrucky’s paper, The Alleged Fallacy of the Sense-Datum Inference, critically examines Roderick Chisholm’s rejection of the sense-datum inference—a key argument in debates about foundationalism and perception. Here’s a structured summary and analysis of the paper:

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1. Context and Key Positions

• Sense-data are often invoked by foundationalists (e.g., Russell, Ayer) as the basis of empirical knowledge, while anti-foundationalists (e.g., Rorty, Bonjour) reject them.
• Chisholm is an exception: a foundationalist who rejects sense-data, arguing that the sense-datum inference (from “appears” language to the existence of sense-data) is fallacious.

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2. The Sense-Datum Inference

Chisholm formulates the inference in multiple ways, all of which move from statements about how things appear (e.g., “X appears F”) to claims about the existence of appearances (e.g., “There is something F”). For example:

1. M appears P to S; therefore, something is P.
2. M appears P to S; therefore, there is an appearance which is P.

Chisholm attacks this inference as:

• Deductively invalid (due to counterexamples).
• Inadvisable (it multiplies entities and creates metaphysical problems, like the speckled hen).

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3. Chrucky’s Critique

A. Ambiguity in “Appears” Statements

Chrucky argues Chisholm conflates distinct uses of “appears”:

1. Epistemic (“appeare”): Expresses belief (e.g., “It seems that X is F”).
2. Comparative (“appearc”): Compares to typical cases (e.g., “X looks like F-things usually do”).
3. Noncomparative:
   • Ostensible (“appearo”): Reports perceptual content without commitment to truth (e.g., “X ostensibly looks F”).
   • Phenomenal (“appearp”): Describes raw sensory qualities (e.g., color, shape).

Chisholm’s counterexamples (e.g., “The pail feels empty”) rely on non-phenomenal uses of “appears,” but the sense-datum inference hinges on the phenomenal use (e.g., “The curtain appears green”). Thus, his counterexamples miss the mark.

B. Defense of the Phenomenal Use

Chrucky (following Jackson) defends the irreducibility of phenomenal appearances against reductionist attacks (e.g., Bennett’s comparative analysis, Armstrong’s counterfactual epistemic analysis). He sides with Chisholm’s earlier view that phenomenal talk is distinct and tied to Aristotelian “proper sensibles” (color, shape, etc.).

C. Validity of the Inference

For phenomenal cases (e.g., “The curtain appears green”), the inference to “There is a green appearance” is valid. Chisholm’s objection—that “something” reifies appearances—can be addressed by interpreting “something” transcendentally (not as an external object).

Chrucky concludes that Chisholm fails to show the inference is deductively invalid; he only shows it doesn’t hold for non-phenomenal uses of “appears.”

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4. Chisholm’s Shift to Adverbialism

Chisholm later proposes an adverbial theory (e.g., “I am appeared to greenly”) to avoid reifying appearances. Chrucky notes this is a separate debate but hints that Chisholm’s later work (e.g., his 1997 autobiography) abandons adverbialism, endorsing appearances as “individual things.”

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5. Key Implications

• The sense-datum inference stands for phenomenal appearances, undermining Chisholm’s early critique.
• The debate hinges on distinguishing uses of “appears” and whether phenomenal properties are irreducible.
• Chisholm’s later reversal suggests the adverbial theory may not fully escape ontological commitments.

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Conclusion

Chrucky’s paper clarifies the sense-datum debate by disentangling linguistic ambiguities and defending the inference’s validity in its strongest form. It also highlights shifts in Chisholm’s views, leaving open questions about the metaphysics of perception.

Strengths:

• Clear taxonomy of “appears” uses.
• Effective defense of the phenomenal/sense-datum link.
• Notes Chisholm’s evolving stance.

Limitations:

• Doesn’t fully engage with Chisholm’s later rejection of adverbialism.
• Could explore alternative non-sense-datum accounts of phenomenality.

This paper remains relevant for discussions on perception, foundationalism, and the ontology of appearances.

evaluate

Evaluation of Chrucky’s The Alleged Fallacy of the Sense-Datum Inference

1. Strengths

(a) Clear Distinction of “Appears” Uses
Chrucky’s taxonomy of epistemic, comparative, ostensible, and phenomenal uses of “appears” is a strong contribution. By showing that Chisholm’s counterexamples mostly rely on non-phenomenal cases (e.g., “The woods sound inhabited”), he successfully isolates the phenomenal case (“The curtain appears green”) as the relevant one for sense-data.

(b) Defense of Phenomenal Appearances
His argument that phenomenal appearances (e.g., color, shape) are irreducible counters reductionist attempts (e.g., Bennett, Armstrong). This aligns with foundationalist views that sense-data are necessary for explaining perception.

(c) Exposing Chisholm’s Shifting Position
Chrucky notes Chisholm’s later abandonment of the adverbial theory (in favor of treating appearances as “individual things”), which undermines Chisholm’s earlier objections to reification. This historical observation strengthens his critique.

2. Weaknesses

(a) Limited Engagement with Alternative Theories
Chrucky focuses on defending the sense-datum inference but does not thoroughly engage with competing theories (e.g., direct realism, intentionalism) that might explain phenomenal appearances without sense-data.

(b) Assumption of Irreducibility
While he rejects epistemic/comparative reductions, he does not fully address contemporary representationalist or enactivist accounts that might dissolve the need for sense-data.

(c) Overemphasis on Deductive Validity
Chrucky narrowly focuses on whether the inference is deductively valid, but Chisholm’s broader objection—that sense-data are metaphysically problematic—is not fully countered. Even if the inference is valid, it doesn’t prove sense-data are the best explanation.

3. Philosophical Significance

• For Foundationalism: If the sense-datum inference holds, foundationalists retain a basis for empirical knowledge.
• For Philosophy of Perception: The paper reinforces the need to distinguish phenomenal from other uses of “appears.”
• For Chisholm Scholarship: It highlights an inconsistency in Chisholm’s views, showing his later work may concede the very entities he earlier rejected.

4. Conclusion

Chrucky’s paper is a strong defense of the sense-datum inference against Chisholm’s objections, particularly by clarifying the phenomenal/non-phenomenal distinction. However, it could be strengthened by:

1. Engaging with non-sense-datum theories of perception.
2. Addressing whether adverbialism or representationalism might avoid sense-data.
3. More thoroughly rebutting Chisholm’s metaphysical worries (e.g., the speckled hen).

Final Assessment: A valuable but partial defense—successful in refuting Chisholm’s deductive critique, but not a full vindication of sense-data.

Rating: ★★★★☆ (4/5) – Strong argumentation, but could engage more with competing views.

New chat

What is daniel dennet’s metaphysics, epistemology, and axiomatics

ChatGPT said:

Thought for 17 seconds

Daniel Dennett’s philosophical project is grounded in a robust naturalism that rejects dualism and insists on the primacy of empirical science. Metaphysically, he is a materialist/physicalist who views all mental phenomena as the products of physical processes in the brain, articulated through his teleofunctionalist and functionalist commitments. Epistemologically, Dennett champions a third‐person, scientific approach—heterophenomenology—that brackets first‐person authority and treats subjective reports as data to be intersubjectively verified. Axiomatically, his work rests on a small set of foundational assumptions: the Darwinian algorithm, the legitimacy of treating intentional states as “real patterns,” and the view that there is “no philosophy‐free science,” only science made explicit in its philosophical presuppositions.

Metaphysics

Materialism and Physicalism

Dennett argues that mental states, including consciousness, are entirely the result of physical processes in the brain, rejecting any form of Cartesian dualism in favor of a strictly physicalist perspective Wikipedia.

He self‐identifies as a teleofunctionalist, emphasizing that mental phenomena should be understood in terms of their evolved functions, and he defends a broadly functional model of mind in which “all varieties of perception … are accomplished … by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and elaboration of sensory inputs” Wikipedia.

Realism, Instrumentalism, and “Real Patterns”

Dennett adopts a pragmatic realism about theoretical entities, asserting that scientific posits (e.g., electrons) exist independently of our minds, yet he treats certain constructs (e.g., centers of gravity, beliefs) as instrumental “real patterns” useful for explanation but not ontologically robust in the same way Wikipedia.

This stance allows him to avoid both naive realism about intentional states and pure eliminativism, instead maintaining that such states are logical constructs that reliably track cognitive processes without postulating non‐physical substrates Wikipedia.

Epistemology

Heterophenomenology

Dennett’s signature epistemic method, heterophenomenology, treats first‐person reports as data points to be interpreted alongside behavioral and neurological evidence, thereby “bracketing” subjective authority while still respecting the subject’s perspective Wikipedia.

“Heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is … the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way.” Wikipedia

Philosophy of Science and Skepticism

Dennett insists that “there is no such thing as philosophy‐free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination,” thereby making explicit the epistemic assumptions underlying all scientific inquiry Reddit.

He views philosophical analysis as an aid to the natural sciences, clarifying concepts and exposing hidden assumptions rather than generating armchairs speculations Financial Times.

Axiomatics

Foundational Assumptions

Dennett’s work proceeds from a handful of axiomatic commitments:

1. Naturalism: All phenomena, including consciousness, must be addressed within the framework of empirical science The New Yorker.
2. Darwinian Algorithm: Evolution provides the explanatory engine for cognitive and cultural phenomena (e.g., memes) Reddit.
3. Intentional Stance: Understanding agents by treating them as rational systems with beliefs and desires is both methodologically indispensable and ontologically non‐reductive Wikipedia.

“No Magic, Just Stage Magic”

Dennett emphasizes that “there ain’t no magic here—just stage magic,” highlighting his conviction that apparent mysteries of mind will dissolve under rigorous scientific and conceptual scrutiny The New Yorker.

In rejecting any appeal to irreducible qualia, he maintains that conceptual confusions—not hidden properties—account for the persistence of traditional philosophical puzzles about consciousness PhilPapers.

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Through these interlocking commitments, Dennett constructs a coherent framework: metaphysically robust physicalism, epistemologically rigorous heterophenomenology, and axiomatic naturalism that together aim to demystify the mind without abandoning the richness of human experience.

Sources

o4-mini

You said:

does he dismiss qualia as delusions

ChatGPT said:

Thought for 8 seconds

Daniel Dennett never accepts qualia as sui generis, ineffable mental “atoms,” but neither does he simply call them “delusions” in the clinical sense; rather, he dissolves the very concept of qualia by showing that it rests on confused intuitions and impossible distinctions. In his “Quining Qualia” essay and throughout Consciousness Explained, Dennett argues that the four traditional marks of qualia—ineffability, intrinsicness, privacy, and immediate apprehensibility—cannot, even in principle, be cleanly separated or detected in introspection or behavior Wikipedia. He likens the phenomenologist’s appeal to qualia to believing in Father Christmas: a useful fiction one can dispense with once its explanatory role is understood to be vacuous Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. For Dennett, qualia are neither real properties nor mere delusions in a psychiatric sense, but rather “intuition pumps” that mislead us into treating subjective experience as a special realm beyond natural explanation Philosophy Stack Exchange.

“Quining” Qualia: The Surgical Thought Experiments

Dennett’s central strategy is to import qualia into real‐world scenarios—neurosurgery, clinical psychology, behavioral experiments—where their mysterious features collapse. In his “alternative neurosurgery” thought experiment, you awaken to discover your qualia have been inverted (grass looks red, sky looks orange), but you could never tell whether your qualia or your memories have been tampered with—both interventions yield identical reports and behaviors Wikipedia. Since there is no conceivable way to discriminate a change in qualia from a change in memory, the core property of “immediate apprehensibility” dissolves into a behaviorally undetectable hypothesis Philosophy Stack Exchange.

Similarly, Dennett’s RoboMary variant of Jackson’s Mary thought experiment shows that a scientist with complete physical knowledge of color vision could, in principle, reconstruct and experience “what it is like” to see red by simulating and then instantiating the relevant neural states—undermining the claim that physical knowledge leaves an “explanatory gap” Wikipedia. If Mary truly knows all the physical facts, she already knows how to induce the exact neural dispositions corresponding to the quality of red, so there is nothing “extra” for her to learn by experiencing it Wikipedia.

Illusionism and Eliminativism: Beyond Folk Psychology

In more recent terminology, Dennett is often grouped under illusionism or eliminativism about phenomenal consciousness—views that phenomenal consciousness (i.e., qualia) is an illusion that needs explaining, not a primitive reality Wikipedia. He writes that our access to our own mental images is so poor and indeterminate that it differs little from another person’s access when we report our experiences The Guardian. Consciousness, in Dennett’s view, is “stage magic”: a set of cognitive tricks and information‐processing routines that feel mysterious only because we mistake our reports and intuitions for unmediated windows on a private mental realm Wikipedia.

Real Patterns, Dispositions, and the Intentional Stance

Dennett does not deny that we have subjective experiences—only that these experiences involve special, ineffable entities called qualia. Instead, he treats mental states as “real patterns” or dispositional properties of physical systems: they are scientifically respectable once we see them as functional and behavior‐shaping, not mystical essences Wikipedia. By adopting the intentional stance—predicting and explaining behavior in terms of beliefs and desires—we gain all the explanatory power needed without invoking non‐physical qualia Wikipedia.

Conclusion

Dennett does not use clinical language like “delusions” or “hallucinations” when discussing qualia; rather, he quines qualia—shows that the hypothesis of ineffable, private mental qualities is unfounded and unnecessary. Qualia, in his analysis, are cognitive illusions born of metaphorical thinking and poor conceptual hygiene, not real mental atoms. Once we apply rigorous, third‐person methods (heterophenomenology) and naturalistic explanations, the “mysteries” of qualia dissolve into ordinary neural and computational processes Philosophy Stack ExchangeWikipedia.

Sources

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You said:

who has criticized him for his stance on qualia

ChatGPT said:

Thought for 47 seconds

Here are some of the most prominent philosophers who have taken Dennett to task over his “quining” of qualia:

Dennett’s dismissal of qualia as sui generis, ineffable mental atoms has drawn fire from both those who think he goes too far (e.g. by denying any “hard problem” of consciousness) and those who think he doesn’t go far enough (e.g. by failing to account for the reality of subjective experience). Major critics include:

David Chalmers

Chalmers introduced the distinction between the “easy” and the “hard” problems of consciousness, arguing that Dennett and other physicalists address only the former—information‐processing and behavior—while ignoring the latter: why and how experience has a subjective, qualitative character .
He accuses Dennett of effectively “denying the phenomenon” of qualia by reducing them to behavior‐shaping routines and labels this attitude a form of pseudo‐problem avoidance, insisting that the felt quality of experience cannot be swept aside merely by explaining functional capacities Medium.

John Searle

Searle charges Dennett with third‐person reductionism, arguing that treating subjective reports as mere data misses the fact that conscious experience is irreducibly first‐person Philosophy Stack Exchange.
He contends that Dennett’s intentional stance and heterophenomenology collapse real qualitative experience into metaphorical “useful fictions,” thereby denying the very phenomenon they purport to study Philosophy Stack Exchange.

Thomas Nagel

In polemical remarks, Nagel has disparaged Dennett’s approach as sophistry, insisting that there really is something it is like to be a conscious creature—an intuition Dennett’s framework cannot accommodate Maverick Philosopher.
Nagel argues that phenomenal character cannot be captured by functional or neurophysiological descriptions alone, and that Dennett’s quining maneuver simply begs the question against the very existence of qualia Maverick Philosopher.

Ned Block

Block objects that Dennett’s operational definition of qualia lets the critic define away the phenomenon, casting qualia as nonrelational, incorrigible properties that cannot be detected by behavior or introspection nedblock.us.
He insists that phenomenal consciousness has characteristics—such as intrinsic, subjective feel—that Dennett’s thought experiments (e.g. evilsurgeon inversion) cannot address or eliminate nedblock.us.

Galen Strawson

Strawson (alongside Searle) accuses Dennett of denying that consciousness itself exists by focusing exclusively on third‐person models and ignoring the ontological reality of qualia Philosophy Stack Exchange.
He argues that any adequate theory must start from the fact of experience itself, not treat it as an illusion or fictional add‐on Philosophy Stack Exchange.

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While Dennett’s heterophenomenological and functionalist machinery has been enormously influential, these critics maintain that it fails to account for the felt aspects of experience—that irreducibly qualitative “what it’s like” dimension that lies at the heart of the hard problem.

Sources

o4-mini

ChatGPT said:

Before addressing whether Broad’s taxonomy truly exhausts all possibilities and whether emergent materialism is the “best” metaphysical solution, here is a concise overview: Broad proposed 17 logically distinct ways in which mind and matter might relate, laying a comprehensive groundwork for the mind–body problem Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Subsequent philosophers have both built on and critiqued this schema, arguing that new perspectives (e.g., varieties of emergentism, panpsychism, neutral monism) may lie outside Broad’s original grid Information Philosopher. Emergent materialism—a form of nonreductive physicalism—appears especially attractive because it accommodates the apparent irreducibility of consciousness without positing an immaterial substance seansayers.com. However, it faces challenges regarding causal closure and the exclusion problem, leading some to question whether it can deliver on its promise Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Broad’s Seventeen Relations: Scope and Intent

C. D. Broad’s chapter in The Mind and Its Place in Nature systematically enumerates seventeen distinct ways mind and matter could be related, from strict dualism to various forms of materialism and neutral monism StafforiniInformation Philosopher. His aim was to lay out all logically possible positions given a set vocabulary and assumptions, rather than to advocate one positive view ditext.com. As a historical survey, it remains remarkably thorough and has guided generations of philosophers through the conceptual landscape of mental–physical relations Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

On Exhaustiveness

Broad’s framework is exhaustive within his chosen logical parameters—namely, combinations of substance vs. property distinctions, causal directions, and reducibility assumptions Information Philosopher. Yet later thinkers have argued that adding dimensions—such as distinctions between weak and strong emergence, or finer-grained accounts of constitutive vs. causal dependence—can yield new “slots” not clearly mapped by Broad’s original grid Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Moreover, movements like panpsychism (everything has proto-mental aspects) or neutral monism (mind and matter are two aspects of one neutral stuff) have been developed beyond Broad’s initial formulations, even if he gestured toward them Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Thus, while his taxonomy remains a foundational reference, many contemporary philosophers view it as a starting point rather than a closed inventory.

Emergent Materialism: Definition and Appeal

Emergent materialism (also called nonreductive physicalism) holds that mental properties emerge from complex physical systems in ways that are not strictly reducible to lower-level physical laws, yet without positing a nonphysical substance seansayers.com. This view preserves the causal efficacy of mental states (e.g., beliefs causing actions) while rooting everything firmly in the natural world, thus aligning well with scientific methods Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It also reflects the intuition that novel properties can appear at higher levels of organization—just as liquidity emerges from water molecules without being present in individual H₂O units Philosophy Ball.

Challenges to Emergent Materialism

Despite its attractions, emergent materialism confronts two major objections. First, the causal exclusion problem: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, then positing emergent mental causes seems superfluous or epiphenomenal Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second, critics argue that ontological physicalism logically entails reductive materialism—so allowing irreducible mental laws appears inconsistent with the metaphysical definition of “physical” PhilPapers. Some have even accused emergent materialism of “having its cake and eating it too” by combining irreducibility with a commitment to physicalism PhilPapers.

Alternatives for Comparison

• Reductive Materialism (Identity Theory): Minds are literally brain states; avoids dualism but struggles with the qualitative “what-it’s-like” of experience Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Substance Dualism: Mind and body are distinct substances; preserves subjective experience but raises interaction puzzles and conflicts with neuroscience Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Panpsychism: Consciousness is a fundamental feature of all matter; offers a unifying picture but risks proliferating mental properties too liberally Wikipedia.
• Neutral Monism: Both mind and matter derive from a more basic neutral stuff; aims for a middle path but requires a coherent account of that neutral substrate Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Conclusion

Broad’s seventeenfold taxonomy remains an invaluable tool for mapping the conceptual space of the mind–body problem, but contemporary philosophy generally treats it as open to refinement rather than exhaustive. Emergent materialism stands out as a powerful metaphysical approach because it reconciles scientific naturalism with the apparent irreducibility of consciousness. Nevertheless, it is not without serious challenges—especially regarding mental causation and metaphysical consistency—and so cannot unambiguously be declared the definitive “best” solution. The choice among these positions ultimately hinges on which balancing of explanatory virtues (e.g., ontological parsimony, causal efficacy, phenomenological adequacy) one finds most compelling.

ChatGPT said:

Below is an overview of the long‐running debate about whether—and in what sense—philosophy “progresses,” the kinds of progress philosophers identify, and some of the institutional and methodological developments that point to forward movement in the discipline.

Philosophical progress is often contentious: some argue that philosophy advances by creating new concepts, methods, or understanding, while others insist that, unlike the sciences, it lacks cumulative convergence. Yet even critics grant that philosophy enjoys spurts of conceptual and methodological innovation, sometimes spawning new fields or stimulating research in other disciplines. Recent trends—from the rise of experimental and neuro-philosophy to AI-assisted thought experiments—suggest fresh avenues for philosophical inquiry, even as perennial debates remain unresolved.

The Debate Over Progress

Existence vs. Amount vs. Nature

David Chalmers distinguishes three key questions: (1) Existence: Is there any progress at all? (2) Comparison: Is there as much progress as in other fields? (3) Explanation: If progress is slow, why so? He argues that “the answer [to existence] is obviously yes—but the right question is why there isn’t more” Consciousness.net.

Consensus Is Not the Only Marker

Some critics tie progress to consensus (as in science), but progress need not culminate in unanimous agreement. Aeon’s essay notes that “progress doesn’t require consensus… some philosophers might have solved a problem without it being acknowledged” Aeon.

Spin-Off Theory

Graeme Papineau’s “spin-off” account suggests that philosophical advances simply migrate into other disciplines—when philosophy makes a breakthrough, it often gets renamed and leaves the parent field, obscuring its progress Daily Nous.

Forms of Philosophical Progress

Conceptual Innovation

Gilles Deleuze famously claimed “the point of philosophy is to create new concepts.” From Plato’s Forms to Kant’s categories and beyond, philosophy has repeatedly generated conceptual frameworks that endure across millennia Reddit.

Methodological and Interdisciplinary Gains

Recent decades have seen the rise of:

• Experimental Philosophy, which incorporates empirical psychology into conceptual analysis;
• Neuro-Philosophy, linking cognitive science and philosophy of mind;
• AI-Assisted Inquiry, exemplified by Andrea Colamedici’s AI-generated philosophical text challenging authorship and critical thinking WIRED.
  These methods broaden philosophy’s toolkit and open new research programs.

Increasing Understanding

Finnur Dellsén argues that “philosophical progress consists in putting people in a position to increase their understanding,” shifting the measure from “answers” to enhanced comprehension of concepts and problems Wiley Online Library.

Historical and Institutional Progress

Field-Formation

Many disciplines began as branches of philosophy (e.g., physics, psychology). Philosophy’s “immature science” phase served as an incubator for fields that achieved their own methodologies and consensus, suggesting philosophy’s midwifery role in intellectual progress Wikipedia.

Institutional Growth

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, launched in 1995, now gathers hundreds of peer-reviewed entries, providing a dynamic, up-to-date resource that reflects ongoing scholarly advances Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Similarly, the growing institutional presence of specialized conferences and workshops (e.g., the Ranch Metaphysics Workshop) fosters collaborative progress across subfields The New Yorker.

Continuing Challenges

Despite these gains, philosophy often circles back to foundational debates—ethics, metaphysics, epistemology—that resist final resolution. PhilArchive critiques show that modern debates sometimes replicate seventeenth-century controversies when history isn’t taken seriously PhilArchive. Moreover, some contend that philosophy’s lack of a clearly demarcated domain and definitive empirical tests limits its cumulative progress Philosophy Stack Exchange.

Outlook

Philosophy’s progress may look different from that of the natural sciences. Rather than linear accumulation, it often advances by conceptual breakthroughs, methodological innovations, and the spawning of new fields. As interdisciplinary collaboration and digital tools continue to expand, many philosophers remain optimistic that, even if full consensus remains elusive, philosophy will keep generating insights that deepen our understanding of mind, language, values, and reality.

ChatGPT said:

Yes, it is often reasonable to follow an overwhelming majority of experts—but with some important caveats.

Why it is reasonable:

1. Division of cognitive labor: In complex fields (like medicine, climate science, or economics), laypeople rely on experts because the depth of knowledge and methodological training required to evaluate claims independently is substantial.
2. Track record: Overwhelming expert consensus (e.g., about smoking causing cancer or the role of vaccines) has a strong historical record of being reliable.
3. Peer accountability: A large majority in a professional community usually reflects a process of critical scrutiny, replication, and refinement.

Caveats:

1. Check the quality of consensus:
   • Is it based on open debate, evidence, and peer review?
   • Or is it shaped by political, institutional, or financial pressures?
2. Consider the field’s maturity: In newer or more speculative domains (e.g. early AI safety), consensus may be premature or fragile.
3. Beware of appeal to authority fallacy: You should not believe something only because many experts do—it’s better to understand the reasons behind the consensus, if possible.
4. Keep room for legitimate minority views: Especially in science, today’s outlier may be tomorrow’s paradigm shift (e.g., continental drift theory).

Summary:

Yes, deferring to an overwhelming majority of experts is a reasonable default, especially in high-stakes or technical domains. But it should be combined with critical thinking, awareness of the context, and openness to future evidence.

Would you like an example of a case where expert consensus was wrong—or one where it was especially trustworthy?

4o

You said:

both

ChatGPT said:

Here are examples of both a trustworthy expert consensus and a case where the consensus was later overturned:

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✅ Trustworthy Expert Consensus: Smoking causes lung cancer

• Context: In the mid-20th century, a growing number of epidemiological studies showed a strong correlation between smoking and lung cancer. By the 1960s, the majority of public health experts and medical researchers agreed that smoking was a major health risk.
• Result: This consensus led to public health campaigns, regulations, and a massive reduction in smoking rates in many countries.
• Why it was reliable:
  • Based on rigorous, reproducible studies.
  • Supported across disciplines (epidemiology, pathology, biochemistry).
  • Predictive and explanatory power: cessation reduced cancer rates.

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❌ Faulty Expert Consensus: Geocentrism (Earth at the center of the universe)

• Context: For centuries, the consensus in both scientific and religious institutions was that the Earth was the center of the universe. This was supported by Aristotle, Ptolemy, and later institutionalized by the Church.
• Overturned by: Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler through improved observations and a better explanatory model (heliocentrism).
• Why the consensus failed:
  • Based on limited data and observational errors.
  • Reinforced by dogma and authority, not open scientific critique.
  • Alternative hypotheses were suppressed or dismissed without due consideration.

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These cases show that consensus is a strong clue but not infallible. The key difference is whether the consensus is:

• Evidence-driven and open to revision (good),
• or authority-driven and closed to criticism (bad).

Would you like a historical case from philosophy or ethics instead of science?

4o

You said:

is there a case in the 20th century where a majority of experts were wrong

ChatGPT said:

Yes, there are several cases from the 20th century where a majority—or at least a dominant mainstream—of experts were wrong. Here are two prominent examples:

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❌ Nutrition Science: Dietary Fat and Heart Disease (mid-20th century onward)

• Claim: Saturated fat causes heart disease, so low-fat diets are healthiest.
• Consensus: For decades, from the 1960s onward, public health guidelines (especially in the U.S.) emphasized low-fat diets. Experts and government agencies widely accepted the lipid hypothesis.
• Why it was wrong or incomplete:
  • Later evidence showed that refined carbohydrates and sugars (often used in low-fat foods) were a greater contributor to metabolic issues and heart disease.
  • Some early studies were methodologically weak or selectively interpreted.
  • Industry influence (e.g., sugar industry funding anti-fat research) distorted the narrative.
• Result: Decades of misleading public health advice, contributing to rising obesity and diabetes rates.

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❌ Psychiatry and Homosexuality as a Mental Disorder

• Claim: Homosexuality is a psychological pathology.
• Consensus: For much of the 20th century, mainstream psychiatry—reflected in the DSM-I and DSM-II—classified homosexuality as a mental illness.
• Overturned: In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association declassified it after sustained pressure, new research, and shifts in social understanding.
• Why it was wrong:
  • Based on cultural bias, not empirical evidence.
  • Reinforced by a closed disciplinary culture and moral assumptions.
  • Dissenters were marginalized or silenced.

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Both examples show how expert consensus can go wrong due to:

• Weak or biased evidence bases,
• Institutional inertia,
• Cultural or political pressures,
• Lack of critical openness.

Would you like an example where the minority view turned out to be right in philosophy or the social sciences?

4o

You said:

yes in the 20th century

ChatGPT said:

A powerful 20th-century example in philosophy and the social sciences where a minority view turned out to be right is:

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❌ The Behaviorist Consensus vs. Noam Chomsky’s Challenge to B.F. Skinner

• Dominant View: In the mid-20th century, behaviorism—especially in the U.S.—was the dominant paradigm in psychology and parts of linguistics. Leading figures like B.F. Skinner claimed that all human behavior, including language, could be explained by stimulus-response conditioning and reinforcement.
• Minority View: Noam Chomsky argued in the 1950s and 1960s that language acquisition couldn’t be explained solely through behaviorist mechanisms. His famous 1959 review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior was a turning point.
• Chomsky’s Argument:
  • Children acquire complex grammar rapidly and with limited input.
  • They produce novel sentences they’ve never heard before.
  • Therefore, some internal structure (what became known as universal grammar) must guide language learning.
• Outcome:
  • The “cognitive revolution” in psychology began, with the rise of cognitive science and computational models of the mind.
  • Behaviorism lost its dominance in explaining higher-order human cognition.
  • Chomsky’s ideas reshaped linguistics and influenced philosophy of mind, AI, and cognitive psychology.

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Why this matters:

• At the time, behaviorism was supported by leading institutions and journals, and dissenting views were marginalized.
• Chomsky’s arguments were conceptual, not experimental—but they exposed deep explanatory gaps in the prevailing theory.
• This shows how conceptual clarity and internal critique can overturn dominant paradigms, even without large empirical backing at first.

Would you like another example, perhaps from economics, anthropology, or political theory?

4o

You said:

is there an example of a majority of experts in the 20th century wrong about evolution

ChatGPT said:

Yes, there are a few notable cases in the 20th century where the majority view among experts about evolution turned out to be partially or significantly wrong, or at least incomplete. Here’s a key example:

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❌ The “Modern Synthesis” and the Rejection of Developmental Biology (Mid-20th Century)

• Dominant View: From the 1940s to roughly the 1980s, evolutionary biology was dominated by the Modern Synthesis, which integrated Darwinian natural selection with Mendelian genetics. This view emphasized population genetics, gene frequencies, and gradual changes.
• What was excluded:
  • Embryology and developmental biology were mostly ignored.
  • The belief was that genes alone were sufficient to explain how evolutionary change occurs—developmental processes were seen as “black boxes” or irrelevant to evolutionary theory.
• Why this was wrong/incomplete:
  • Developmental biology profoundly influences what kinds of variation are possible and how traits evolve.
  • The rise of evo-devo (evolutionary developmental biology) in the 1990s–2000s showed that genes don’t act in isolation; they function within complex regulatory networks that shape morphology and constrain possible evolutionary paths.
  • For example, changes in gene regulation (not just gene sequence) can produce significant evolutionary changes.
• Impact:
  • The Modern Synthesis is now considered outdated or incomplete by many evolutionary biologists.
  • Calls for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis now incorporate evo-devo, epigenetics, niche construction, and other mechanisms ignored in mid-century thinking.

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Summary:

For decades, the majority of evolutionary biologists downplayed or ignored the importance of development in evolution. It took a minority view—championed by figures like Stephen Jay Gould and later evo-devo researchers—to begin to correct that.

Would you be interested in how this debate connects to philosophical questions about form, emergence, or teleology in evolution?

4o

You said:

are there experts in evolution theory who deny evolution on the basis of science

ChatGPT said:

There are very few experts in evolutionary biology who deny evolution on scientific grounds, and none who are respected within the mainstream scientific community for doing so.

However, to answer precisely:

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✅ Consensus View:

• Evolution by natural selection is overwhelmingly supported by empirical evidence from genetics, paleontology, comparative anatomy, molecular biology, and ecology.
• It is considered one of the most robust theories in all of science.
• Nearly all professional biologists accept it as the best explanation for the diversity of life.

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❌ Dissenting Voices:

There are a tiny number of scientists—often from fields adjacent to but not within evolutionary biology—who claim to reject evolution for what they describe as scientific reasons. Common characteristics of these figures:

1. They do not publish in peer-reviewed evolutionary journals with arguments against evolution.
2. Their objections often misunderstand or misrepresent evolutionary theory, focusing on improbability arguments, gaps in the fossil record, or complexity claims.
3. Their views are often associated with or funded by religiously motivated organizations, such as the Discovery Institute (which promotes Intelligent Design).

Examples sometimes cited:

• Michael Behe (biochemist): Promotes irreducible complexity, arguing certain biological structures (like the bacterial flagellum) could not have evolved gradually. This claim has been thoroughly refuted within the scientific community.
• Jonathan Wells (biologist, Discovery Institute): Criticizes textbooks and evolutionary education, but his scientific credibility is widely disputed.

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Key Point:

• These figures are not denying evolution based on new data or better explanatory models—they reject evolution despite the evidence, often using arguments that have been rebutted for decades.
• No reputable evolutionary biologist denies evolution on scientific grounds.

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Conclusion:

No, there are no recognized experts in evolutionary theory who deny evolution purely on the basis of science, without invoking ideological, philosophical, or religious assumptions.

Would you like a list of major lines of scientific evidence for evolution, or how scientists handle unresolved questions within the theory?

4o