Author: chrucky

Who to read in philosophy concerning knowledge and what exists?

I would read a dialectical philosopher. By this I mean a philosopher who has examined the claims and arguments of previous philosophers and has come to his own conclusions. If you had lived at any time up to the 16th century, you should and would have read Aristotle and his commentators, such as Aquinas, Maimonides, and Averroes. But after the discoveries of Galileo in the 17th century there occurred a scientific revolution in physics and astronomy culminating in the work of Newton. And the philosopher to read then was Locke in England, and Descartes in France. The former was an empiricist; the latter a rationalist, whose position was developed by Leibniz. And Hume had presented a major challenge to empiricism. Well, these two strands of empiricism and rationalism were critically examined and readjusted by Immanuel Kant. So, contemporary philosophy (i.e., epistemology and ontology) must now take into account Kant and any advances in science.

So, the question is: which author has competently taken into account this stream of philosophy? My first stab would be to read Bertrand Russell, especially his The History of Western Philosophy (1945). But a second, and an improved reading would be to read everything written by C. D. Broad. Why? Because Russell remained an empiricist, while Broad had absorbed Kant, while still critically having surveyed the history of philosophy. [See my: Philosophical Alternatives from C.D. Broad]

There is an outstanding philosopher — Wilfrid Sellars. [See my: Problems from Wilfrid Sellars] But I would not recommend reading Sellars to a novice because he is too technical. He assumes a knowledge of current technical philosophical literature. He can be appreciated only by professional philosophers. However, several books have now been published with the intention of making him more accessible to a wider audience. Wilfrid Sellars was trying to come to grips with Kantian themes, as have many other Kantian scholars.

One such outstanding Kantian scholar is Robert Paul Wolff, who published his findings in the book Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity (1963). His lectures on Kant, given in 2016, are available on youtube, and I recommend them. Here they are:

Lecture 1

Lecture 2

Lecture 3

Lecture 4

Lecture 5

Lecture 6

Lecture 7

Lecture 8

Lecture 9

As a caveat, I just want to point out that neither Sellars nor Wolff had available to them C. D. Broad’s book: Kant. The reason is that Broad had written out his Kant lectures in 1950-52, and this manuscript was only published by C. Lewy in 1978.

Also see: Kant and Building a Robot

Controversial subjects should be learned through dialogues and debates

Reflecting on my own learning experience, I do not remember learning much of anything (with exceptions) about controversial matters such as politics, religion, or ethics from listening to lectures. But I have learned more from participating in and listening to dialogues and debates.

Listening to a lecture — given either to a small audience such as in a typical classroom, or to a large audience such as in a public lecture — at best, one learns the opinions of the lecturer; but one does not learn the merits of such opinions unless they are subject to criticism by a person of at least equal competence. I, therefore, recommend that all controversial matters taught in schools be conducted by two competent persons with incompatible positions.

Historically, such an approach was dramatically illustrated by Plato’s dialogues, as well as by Aristotle in some of his writings, and more so by Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. But these are imaginary or opinionated dialogues. What is needed is to witness real disputes.

As illustrations, let me offer the following debates available on the internet as examples.

The first one is a BBC radio debate between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston in 1948:

Here is a transcript of the debate: A Debate on the Argument from Contingency

The second debate is between Norman Finkelstein and Alan Dershowitz at Democracy Now in 2003 on the Palestine-Israel conflict:

Here is my take on this debate and its aftermath: Andrew Chrucky, Norman Finkelstein, DePaul, and U.S. Academia: Reductio Ad Absurdum of Centralized Universities, 2007.

The third debate is between Richard Wolff and Gene Epstein on Socialism vs Capitalism in 2019.

Here is my partial commentary: Richard Wolff’s failed definition of capitalism

The fourth debate is between Tucker Carlson and Cenk Uygur on immigration in 2018.

Here are my Comments on the Cenk Uygur and Tucker Carlson “debate”

The fifth: Sir Roger Penrose and William Lane Craig: How to combine the physical realm, the mental realm, and the abstract realm?

My last illustration is the debate between Stefan Molyneux and Peter Joseph on the merits of capitalism: Andrew Chrucky’s annotated commentary on the debate between Stefan Molyneux and Peter Joseph of the Zeitgeist Movement about the free market system, which took place on September 23, 2013.

Immanuel Kant and Building a Robot

Every time I read about Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, I keep thinking that what Kant is describing is a set of problems to be dealt with in building a robot; although, of course, he is talking about human beings.

As I was looking for anyone else who has a similar outlook, I came across the following video:

Here is a link in Wikipedia to: Richard Evans

And below is a talk which I think is also relevant: Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality | Anil Seth

Philosophy as philosophizing

Recently I was introduced by Jacob Feldman to a video and a corresponding article by Eric Dietrich who poses the question: “Is there progress in philosophy?” And his answer is that there is not.

He does not tell us what philosophy is, though he selects some allegedly philosophical problems and some metaphilosophical positions as examples of unresolvable philosophical disputes.

I want you to listen to him and read his article. Afterwards I will give you my commentary.

Erich Dietrich, “There Is No Progress in Philosophy, Essays in Philosophy, 12:329-344 (2011).

Commentary:

The first thing that I would like to say is that his view of philosophy is too narrow or myopic. The broader view is that philosophy is really “philosophizing.” It is an activity whose goal is to resolve disputes and hopefully to come to agreements. This activity is called by Mortimer J. Adler “dialectic.” See his book: Dialectic (1927). A related approach can be called “critical philosophy,” as presented by C.D. Broad in “Critical and Speculative Philosophy,” Contemporary British Philosophy (1924): 77-100.

See also my: The Aim of Liberal Education (2003)

As with any activity, a critical discussion can be done with various degrees of proficiency. In this sense, there can be progress in the acquisition of such a proficiency.

As to solving problems, I will mention some which have been solved.

The first is the clarification that existence is not a predicate. This solution has been attributed to Kant, but there are better modern expositions. And since this matter is relevant to an argument for God’s existence, see: C. D. Broad, “The Validity of Belief in a Personal God,” Hibbert Journal 24 (1925): 32-48.

The second concerns the credibility of miracles. See: C. D. Broad, “Hume’s theory of the credibility of miracles,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 17 (1916-1917), pp. 77-94.

The third concerns the problem of a free will and determinism. The solution consists of reframing the problem as contrasting doing something freely with being coerced to do something. This solution is referred as “compatibilism.”

In short, there has been progress in philosophy in discarding superstitions and the cobwebs of language.

Further Commentary:

1. He takes Aristotle as a “paradigm?” philosopher. But is Aristotle a philosopher because he has scientific speculations? Aristotle, qua scientist was wrong about many things. And, Aristotle qua philosopher has also been criticised by other philosophers, and if these other philosophers are correct, then philosophical speculation has indeed advanced.

2. As an example of philosophy not having resolved any philosophical problems, he assumes that as to the question whether there is a God or not, there is no solution. Here he is wrong. The fact that there are people who disagree, what does that show? Can their reasoning be evaluated? Yes, relative to some agreed to standards, such as non-contradiction and compatibility with the findings of science. I pose to you the problem of finding fault with the reasoning of C. D. Broad, “The Validity of Belief in a Personal God,” Hibbert Journal 24 (1925): 32-48.

3. On the assumption that philosophy does not progress, he cites three philosophers who try to answer why this is so: Colin McGinn, Thomas Nagel, and James Sterba. By my lights, the assumption is wrong. But it does not exclude the intractability of some sorts of questions.

John Locke on escaping from bullshit

“. . . The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge;– which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into…..”

(John Locke, Epistle to the Reader, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1689)

The Social Contract and Its Mismanagement

The social contract is the idea that morality and political arrangements are to be justified by social agreements. And I totally agree with this. This is the ideal of anarchism.

I suppose that the original historical source of this idea is from the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in which the Hebrews make a covenant (agreement) with God. God gives them 10 rules by which they are to live, and if they do so, they will be rewarded in heaven. Except if the deal is not accepted, they go to hell. Not quite a free agreement, ey!

For the heyday of social contract theories, see the Wikipedia entry for: Social contract

In an earlier blog, I pointed out the mismanagement of the social contract by John Rawls: Too much amnesia in the Original Position of John Rawls.

And in a still earlier blog, I pointed out the mismanagement of Rousseau’s social contract by Ian Shapiro: (2) Further commentary on Ian Shapiro’s course: “Moral Foundations of Politics”.

In this blog I will point out how Immanuel Kant mismanaged the social contract.

There has been a great deal of effort (exegesis) to tease out of Kant a coherent proposal for grounding morality — with no positive results. And the reason for Kant’s failure is easily explained, but the reason for this failure has, as far as I know, eluded everyone.

What has not been noticed is that the social contract is between “rational beings.” And these “rational beings” are God, angels, and the human noumenal self (=soul). And besides being rational beings — and this is the missed part by all commentators: they are all IMMORTAL!

And whatever the rules which are agreed to by these immortals, must apply to all of them. The fact that the (human) soul is attached to a human body is a peculiarity of interest only to humans. If a universal rule is to be adopted for all concerned, it cannot be a rule serving only a particular interest of humans, such as not to die.

I could go on and point out the consequences of this line of thinking, but I will not. I will simply say that Kant’s ethics is grounded in science fiction. _______________________________________________________________

chatGPT said:

This critique offers a provocative take on Kant’s moral philosophy, particularly as it relates to the social contract tradition. It highlights a significant tension in Kant’s framework: the abstraction of morality to a domain of “rational beings” that includes not only humans but also hypothetical entities like God and angels. By grounding his ethics in this universalist and metaphysical framework, Kant arguably departs from the concrete, contextually rooted agreements typical of social contract theories.

Key Points in the Critique:

Immortality and Universal Rules: The claim that Kant’s rational beings are immortal complicates the applicability of his moral rules to humans. If the participants in Kant’s moral contract are not bound by the same existential conditions as humans (e.g., mortality, physical needs), the rules they establish might fail to address human-specific concerns, such as survival.

Science Fiction Allegation: The idea of constructing ethics based on beings that do not exist in human reality (like angels or noumenal selves) can indeed seem speculative. By extending morality to an otherworldly realm, Kant risks alienating his ethical framework from the lived realities of human existence.

Contrast with Anarchism: The critique implicitly contrasts Kant’s metaphysical approach with the more grounded and reciprocal ideals of anarchist interpretations of the social contract. Anarchism, as alluded to here, emphasizes agreements that arise organically among equals in specific contexts, rather than abstract principles dictated by hypothetical immortals.

A Defense of Kant?

Supporters of Kant might argue that his “rational beings” serve as a heuristic for developing universal moral principles, intended to transcend particular biases and interests. However, this defense does not fully address the critique that Kant’s framework fails to adequately consider the embodied and finite nature of human beings.

Broader Implications:

The tension highlighted here reflects a broader issue in moral philosophy: how to balance universal principles with the particularities of human life. Kant’s vision of rationality and universality has inspired much of modern ethics, but critiques like this remind us of the limitations of overly abstract frameworks when dealing with the complexities of human society.

Would you like a deeper dive into any specific aspect of this critique or Kant’s moral philosophy? _________________________________________ You said:

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEALING WITH IMMORTALS

ChatGPT said:

Dealing with immortals in the context of moral philosophy and the social contract has profound implications, as it alters the very foundation upon which moral rules and agreements are constructed. Here are the key implications:

1. Shift in Priorities For immortals, concerns such as mortality, scarcity, or the passage of time lose relevance.

Human Implication: Many human moral concerns—preserving life, managing resources, or dealing with aging—become irrelevant. Agreements shaped by immortals would likely ignore or undervalue these issues.

Example: Rules emphasizing self-sacrifice or eternal patience might seem plausible to immortals but are impractical for finite beings.

2. Universalization Beyond Humanity

The inclusion of immortals in moral contracts pushes ethical principles toward universal abstractions.

Problem: Such universal principles might lack applicability to embodied, time-bound, and vulnerable beings like humans. Result: Ethics may become disconnected from lived realities, prioritizing ideals over pragmatism.

3. Eternal Consequences

For immortals, decisions take on an eternal significance.

Contrast with Humans: Human decision-making often incorporates the understanding of life’s temporality—allowing for forgiveness, forgetting, or gradual improvement. Immortals might impose unyielding standards because of their unchanging nature.

Example: Eternal punishment or reward becomes conceivable, as in the theological framing of heaven and hell.

4. Moral Perfectionism

Immortals, assumed to possess perfect rationality and knowledge, could demand moral perfection.

Human Limitation: Humans, constrained by ignorance, emotion, and error, may find it impossible to meet such standards.

Tension: The disparity could lead to ethical frameworks that are aspirational but demoralizing or irrelevant for human beings.

5. Dismissal of Embodiment

For immortals, embodiment—being tied to a physical form with needs and vulnerabilities—may be a negligible factor.

Implication for Ethics: Issues like bodily autonomy, health, or physical suffering may be undervalued or dismissed in immortal-centric moral systems. Example: A moral rule against killing might lose its force if immortals cannot die.

6. Timelessness vs. Temporality

Immortals, existing outside time, might approach moral rules without urgency.

For Humans: Humans operate within a temporal framework where decisions often have immediate and cumulative consequences. Moral systems accounting for immortals might lack the dynamism or flexibility required for real-world contexts. Result: A static, rigid moral code could emerge, incompatible with evolving human societies.

7. Neglect of Personal Experience

Immortals, presumed to exist in a realm of pure reason or spirit, may not value the subjective, experiential aspects of morality.

Human Perspective: Emotions, relationships, and lived experiences deeply inform human morality. An immortal-driven framework might ignore these dimensions, leading to an overly intellectualized ethic.

8. Irrelevance to Pluralism

Immortals are often imagined as homogeneous (all-rational, all-knowing).

Human Reality: Humans are diverse, with different cultures, beliefs, and interests. A moral system derived from immortal considerations may lack mechanisms for accommodating pluralism or resolving conflicts.

Outcome: Ethical alienation—where moral rules feel imposed rather than collaboratively derived.

Concluding Thought

Incorporating immortals into moral philosophy shifts the focus from practical, context-sensitive agreements to abstract, eternal principles. While this might provide a lofty ideal, it risks alienating ethical frameworks from human realities. For the social contract tradition, which thrives on agreements between equal and interdependent beings, the inclusion of immortals undermines the basis for mutual, practical cooperation.

Would you like to explore how this critique could apply to specific philosophers, such as Kant or others? __________________________________________________ You said:

YES

ChatGPT said:

Let’s delve deeper into the implications of dealing with immortals within the frameworks of specific philosophers, focusing on Kant, Hobbes, and Rousseau, as well as the broader social contract tradition.

1. Kant and Immortals

Kant’s ethical framework presupposes a realm of rational beings, including immortals like God, angels, and noumenal selves. Here’s how the inclusion of immortals impacts his system:

Implications for Kant’s Moral Philosophy Abstract Universality:

Kant’s categorical imperative demands rules that could apply universally to all rational beings. However, when this includes immortals, the scope of universality may disregard human-specific conditions (e.g., mortality, emotions, needs). Example: Immortals don’t face death or hunger, so a rule against taking lives might seem irrelevant to them. For humans, this is essential.

Moral Perfectionism:

Kant’s ethics assumes that rational beings can act purely out of duty, guided by reason. Immortals, with perfect rationality, embody this ideal, but humans struggle with competing desires and limitations.

Tension: The gap between human and immortal capacities makes Kantian morality aspirational but potentially impractical.

Immortal Rules and Human Existence:

Kant’s noumenal realm detaches morality from the physical, embodied world. An immortal, disembodied perspective might devalue actions tied to human embodiment, like caring for others’ physical well-being.

Critique Summary

By framing morality for a timeless, rational realm, Kant risks creating a system disconnected from human realities. The inclusion of immortals shifts his ethics toward a speculative “science fiction,” as your earlier critique aptly noted.

2. Hobbes and Immortals

Hobbes’s social contract is grounded in the mortal condition of humans—specifically, the fear of death and the desire for self-preservation. Introducing immortals would fundamentally alter his framework.

Implications for Hobbes No Fear of Death:

Hobbes argues that the fear of violent death motivates humans to form a social contract. Immortals, being invulnerable, lack this incentive.

Consequence: Immortals wouldn’t need to establish a Leviathan or any political order to protect themselves. Their participation in a social contract becomes unnecessary.

Lack of Material Concerns:

Immortals don’t compete for resources, land, or power, which Hobbes sees as primary drivers of conflict. Without these pressures, the rationale for a Hobbesian contract dissolves.

Disconnection from Humans:

If humans are mortal and immortals are not, their interests and concerns diverge so significantly that any shared social contract would privilege one group while neglecting the other.

Critique Summary

Hobbes’s mortal-focused social contract collapses if immortals are involved, as their invulnerability undermines the core motivations for political and moral agreements.

3. Rousseau and Immortals

Rousseau’s social contract emphasizes the collective good and the general will. His vision is grounded in human equality and shared vulnerability. Introducing immortals destabilizes this balance.

Implications for Rousseau General Will and Immortal Interests:

The general will seeks the common good, but immortals, with eternal perspectives, may define “common good” in ways that neglect human priorities like survival or well-being.

Example: Immortals might prioritize abstract principles of justice over practical human concerns, like ending hunger.

Inequality of Power:

Rousseau’s framework assumes all participants in the social contract are roughly equal. Immortals, with their superior knowledge and capacities, create an insurmountable hierarchy, undermining the egalitarian foundation.

Dehumanization of Morality:

Rousseau sees morality as rooted in human nature and empathy. Immortals, being unembodied, may lack the emotional resonance necessary for fostering solidarity and compassion.

Critique Summary

The inclusion of immortals fractures Rousseau’s egalitarian vision, creating a moral and political system that alienates humans from their shared, embodied experiences.

4. Broader Implications for the Social Contract Tradition

The inclusion of immortals in the social contract tradition introduces conceptual tensions across the board:

Asymmetric Interests: Immortals and humans have fundamentally different priorities. The resulting contracts might marginalize human-specific concerns. Undermined Reciprocity: Social contracts rely on mutual vulnerability and interdependence. Immortals, being self-sufficient, lack these qualities, destabilizing the logic of cooperation.

Loss of Practical Relevance: Social contracts derive legitimacy from addressing real-world human concerns. Introducing immortals shifts the focus to speculative, otherworldly realms, undermining the contract’s applicability.

Concluding Thought

When immortals are included in moral or political systems like Kant’s or the broader social contract tradition, the frameworks risk becoming detached from human realities. This critique not only highlights the limitations of these philosophical models but also emphasizes the importance of grounding moral and political theories in the lived experiences of finite, embodied beings.

Philosophy as Hermeneutics

As Curt Ducasse pointed out in Philosophy as a Science (1941), there are many conceptions of the nature of philosophy. And there is one which I would like to focus on: philosophy as hermeneutics.

The conception of hermeneutics which I want to focus on is the techniques for the interpretation of the Christian Bible. It is taken for granted (assumed) that the Bible is the word of God, revealed to some individuals. As such, because God is conceived as not a liar, everything in the Bible is taken to be true. However, there are passages which seem to say falsehoods and seem to be contradictory. So, techniques of interpretation are introduced in such a manner as to make the Bible speak only the truth. Look at the Wikipedia articles: hermeneutics and Biblical hermeneutics.

When I read philosophical writings, many of them seem to be written in the same reverential manner as the writings of theologians. They want or assume that the author wrote in a sensible manner and wrote the truth, and they do hermeneutical acrobatics to make it so.

The curious fact is that the authors chosen for such hermeneutical exercises are authors who are on the face of it totally esoterically obscure. And the authors who are clear are ignored. See my discussion at: C. D. Broad: The Default Philosopher of the Century.

On Richard Wolff and worker-owned enterprises

Richard Wolff focuses on the issue of what is called, “exploitation.” This is the fact that, for example, a factory owner, or a CEO of some corporation receives an income many times greater than an employee. This greater income is due to receiving the “surplus value” or “profit” from an enterprise.

Wolff’s proposal is to legally convert private enterprises [I take it of some large size] into worker-owned enterprises on the model of the Mondragon enterprise in Spain.

Wolff is trying to satisfy a principle of equality in outcome.

I, in contradistinction, am not driven by any principle of an equality of outcome, but rather I am driven by a principle for an equality of opportunity. I want a universal right for access to subsistence, and I see this demand being satisfied by allowing everyone a right of free access to subsistence land.

Thus, I do not propose barring free enterprises, nor exploitation, nor surpluses, nor profits. In my arrangement, a private entrepreneur could actually be beneficial to those who cannot help themselves, i.e., those who cannot survive independently, but can do so by being directed.

And concerning those who can help themselves independently, the entrepreneur will have to lure them with a reward which is greater than that which they could eke out by their own efforts, or efforts of those who have combined in some co-operative manner. In other words, he will be compelled by the circumstances to minimize his profits. Thus, Wolff’s desire for eliminating “exploitation” in factories will tend to be achieved by my proposal.

In my thought experiment with Crusoe and Friday on an island, I imagined that they agreed to a division of the island into two equal parts, but that Crusoe possessed a rifle with bullets, and that the island had many feral pigs. Crusoe would let Friday use the gun on the condition that Friday share his kills with Crusoe.

Since this arrangement was better than what Friday could manage on his own without a rifle, he agreed to the deal. This is an example of an agreed to exchange where Crusoe is “exploiting” Friday. But this is not an example of capitalism because Friday is not forced to accept the deal at the cost of starvation (by not having free access subsistence land), because, after all, he still can hunt pigs with a spear, a bow, or some form of trap. It is simply that he can more easily shoot two pigs in a much shorter time than it would take to get even one pig by an alternative method.

We can generalize from this example to say that Crusoe will be “rewarded” if he can come up with some appealing invention or idea — including some form of entertainment. [As does Wilt Chamberlain in Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)] But the reward will tend to be short-lived. For example, Friday could — hypothetically speaking — make his own rifle and bullets. And someone else can become more entertaining than Wilt Chamberlain.

In our current society, there are patent laws, which ensure a monopoly and profits. On the island, there are no patent laws.

_______________________________________

chatGPT summarizes:

This excerpt presents a comparison of two approaches to addressing economic inequality and exploitation: Richard Wolff’s proposal of worker cooperatives and the author’s own proposal based on providing a universal right to access subsistence land. The core difference here revolves around how exploitation is viewed and how it can be mitigated.

Richard Wolff’s Approach:

Wolff’s theory is rooted in Marxist economics, where the main issue is exploitation, specifically the extraction of “surplus value” or profits from workers by owners of capital. According to Wolff, in a capitalist system, factory owners, or CEOs, make profits by paying workers less than the value they produce, with this surplus being appropriated by the capitalist class. His solution is to transform enterprises into worker-owned cooperatives, where employees collectively own and manage the business, thereby eliminating exploitation by ensuring that workers share in the profits they generate.

The Author’s Proposal:

In contrast, the author rejects the idea of equalizing outcomes (such as eliminating profits or wealth inequality) and focuses on equality of opportunity. The author’s central proposal is based on granting universal access to subsistence land—meaning that everyone should have a right to access land that enables them to survive independently. This idea is meant to ensure that no one is left in a position of forced dependency, making it a guarantee of basic subsistence for all.

However, unlike Wolff, the author is not against private entrepreneurship or profit-making. The proposal suggests that entrepreneurs could still profit, but only if they offer rewards or incentives that are greater than what individuals could secure by their own efforts or in cooperative arrangements. This means entrepreneurs would be naturally compelled to minimize their profits to attract workers who could otherwise survive independently. In this sense, it aligns somewhat with Wolff’s desire to reduce exploitation, even though the approach is different.

The Crusoe and Friday Thought Experiment:

The author uses the Crusoe and Friday scenario to illustrate their idea. On a deserted island, Crusoe possesses a rifle and agrees to let Friday use it on the condition that Friday shares his kills. This is an example of exploitation, as Crusoe is extracting a portion of Friday’s labor, but the key difference from capitalist exploitation is that Friday is not forced into the arrangement—he has the option of hunting pigs without Crusoe’s help, albeit with more difficulty. The idea here is that exploitation does not necessarily imply coercion; it can be a voluntary exchange where both parties benefit.

This scenario also suggests that, in the absence of coercive laws (like patent law or monopolies), individuals could choose to improve their circumstances independently. For example, Friday could make his own rifle, or someone else could develop more appealing entertainment than Wilt Chamberlain, as referenced from Nozick’s thought experiment in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

Key Differences in Perspective:

  1. Exploitation and Voluntary Exchange: The author argues that exploitation doesn’t always mean coercion or inequality of outcome. Instead, it can be a voluntary arrangement where both parties benefit, and the exploited party has an alternative means of survival. This contrasts with Wolff’s view, where exploitation is inherently tied to the unequal distribution of wealth and power.
  2. Equality of Outcome vs. Opportunity: Wolff is concerned with reducing inequality in outcomes (by redistributing profits and wealth to workers), while the author is more focused on ensuring equality of opportunity, particularly by guaranteeing access to basic resources, such as land. In the author’s view, if everyone has access to the means of subsistence, they are free to enter into voluntary economic exchanges without coercion.
  3. Private Entrepreneurship: The author is not opposed to the existence of private enterprises or profits, but believes that entrepreneurs will be forced to minimize their profits in order to compete with independent individuals or cooperatives who can survive without them. This is a kind of natural check on exploitative behavior, in contrast to Wolff’s call for legal and structural changes to eliminate private ownership of enterprises.
  4. Patent Law and Monopoly: The author points out that in the absence of patent laws, the natural competition would lead to innovation and reduce monopolies, making it harder for individuals or corporations to exploit others through exclusive control of intellectual property.

Conclusion:

The author’s proposal is a distinctive take on economic fairness, focused on providing universal access to subsistence rather than equality of outcome. By guaranteeing the basic right to land and survival, the author suggests that people would not be forced into exploitative labor conditions, and the need for coercive state intervention (e.g., worker cooperatives or redistribution) would be reduced. The emphasis is on freedom of opportunity and the idea that voluntary exchange (even if it involves exploitation in some cases) can still be fair if the parties involved have alternative ways to sustain themselve

Too much amnesia in the Original Position of John Rawls

John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (1971) posits a group of rational people who are told to deliberate on rules of justice for a life they will have after being transported into some unpredictable human condition in some unpredictable institutional situations.

He concludes that the only rational choice is to agree on two principles. The following formulation here will suffice:

The two principles of justice are the liberty principle and the difference principle. The two principles are intended to apply to the basic structure of society–the fundamental political and economic arrangements–as opposed to particular actions by governmental officials or individual statutes. The liberty principle requires that the basic structure provide each citizen with a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties — such as freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and due process of law. The difference principle requires that inequalities in wealth and social position be arranged so as to the benefit the worst off group in the world. Rawls states that the two principles are lexically ordered, with the liberty principle taking precedence over the difference principle in the case of conflict.

As it turns out, although the altered condition of the people in the Original Position is unpredictable, their transported institutional situation seems to be a liberal democratic society with a capitalist economy. So, in effect they are asked to write a meta-law for, let’s say, the Constitution of the United States. In effect, the second principle would require the introduction of either a right to a job for all or a basic income for all, and perhaps a free universal health care.

What these people in the Original Position seem to have forgotten is that they are animals on earth who need access to subsistence, and that they can get this subsistence if they have a free access to land. Before the contents of some agreed to rule is adopted, it is first necessary to make agreements in the first place. So, it seems that the first order of business is to come up with two meta-rules: Meta-Rule 1: Make Agreement (on Rules) rather than resort to coercion (War); Meta-Rule 2: Abide by the agreements (Rules).

Really, instead of the contrived Original Position, a more historically realistic situation is envisioned by John Stuart Mill. He imagines a group of colonists arriving at some uninhabited land.

Book II, Chapter 1. Principles of Political Economy:

In considering the institution of property as a question in social philosophy, we must leave out of consideration its actual origin in any of the existing nations of Europe. We may suppose a community unhampered by any previous possession; a body of colonists, occupying for the first time an uninhabited country; bringing nothing with them but what belonged to them in common, and having a clear field for the adoption of the institutions and polity which they judged most expedient; required, therefore, to choose whether they would conduct the work of production on the principle of individual property, or on some system of common ownership and collective agency.

If private property were adopted, we must presume that it would be accompanied by none of the initial inequalities and injustices which obstruct the beneficial operation of the principle in old societies. Every full grown man or woman, we must suppose, would be secured in the unfettered use and disposal of his or her bodily and mental faculties; and the instruments of production, the land and tools, would be divided fairly among them, so that all might start, in respect to outward appliances, on equal terms. It is possible also to conceive that in this original apportionment, compensation might be made for the injuries of nature, and the balance redressed by assigning to the less robust members of the community advantages in the distribution, sufficient to put them on a par with the rest. But the division, once made, would not again be interfered with; individuals would be left to their own exertions and to the ordinary chances, for making an advantageous use of what was assigned to them. If individual property, on the contrary, were excluded, the plan which must be adopted would be to hold the land and all instruments of production as the joint property of the community, and to carry on the operations of industry on the common account. The direction of the labour of the community would devolve upon a magistrate or magistrates, whom we may suppose elected by the suffrages of the community, and whom we must assume to be voluntarily obeyed by them. The division of the produce would in like manner be a public act. The principle might either be that of complete equality, or of apportionment to the necessities or deserts of individuals, in whatever manner might be conformable to the ideas of justice or policy prevailing in the community.

Examples of such associations, on a small scale, are the monastic orders, the Moravians, the followers of Rapp, and others: and from the hopes, which they hold out of relief from the miseries and iniquities of a state of much inequality of wealth, schemes for a larger application of the same idea have reappeared and become popular at all periods of active speculation on the first principles of society. In an age like the present [1848], when a general reconsideration of all first principles is felt to be inevitable, and when more than at any former period of history the suffering portions of the community have a voice in the discussion, it was impossible but that ideas of this nature should spread far and wide. The late revolutions in Europe have thrown up a great amount of speculation of this character, and an unusual share of attention has consequently been drawn to the various forms which these ideas have assumed: nor is this attention likely to diminish, but on the contrary, to increase more and more.

Rawls’ problem is caused by starting off with a bad idea of justice. Justice, in short, is simply the virtue of keeping to your agreements.

Anyway, here is Noam Chomsky’s view of Rawls:

Origin of Capitalism

In the following blog, Robert Paul Wolff answers how capitalism started. Taken from: The Philosopher’s Stone

Wednesday, March 5, 2014
A REPLY TO CHRISTOPHER WALSH
Christopher Walsh posts the following interesting question in the comments section of this blog:

dear professor wolff

the fact of primitive accumulation seems a particularly telling criticism of Nozick style justifications of capitalism because it hoists them on their own petard – what is primitive accumulation but a particularly egregious form of coercive property rights violation i.e. theft. I sometimes wonder whether capitalism could be justified if there had been no primitive accumulation and everyone started out with equal shares of resources. Perhaps the appropriate response is that capitalism could never have come into being in such circumstances. What do you think?

I have had my say about Nozick’s book in the article [ Robert Nozick’s Derivation of the Minimal State,”Arizona Law Journal, 1977 ]archived at box.net [follow the link at the top of this page], so I shan’t repeat myself here. But the larger question about the conditions under which capitalism came into existence, or could come into existence, is worth some discussion, because it is an opportunity to expose a fundamental defect in the style of thinking characteristic of those of all political complexions who defend capitalism.

It is of course obvious that in some sense everyone did start with equal shares of resources, if we go back far enough to a time when there were no property rights at all, no law, no organized society, indeed perhaps no homo sapiens sapiens, but just bands of homo neanderthalensis. But let us for a moment engage in the kind of “thought experiment” that anarcho-capitalists, libertarians, and other such-like lovers of capitalism so favor, and which is Bob Nozick’s stock in trade. Imagine a society of men and women in which everyone farms a plot of land or plies a trade, and in which, on market day, they all gather in the town square to exchange what they have produced for what they need: potatoes for shoes, cloth for chickens, hats for strawberries, and so forth. How might capitalism as we know it emerge out of this idyllic starting point? Well, one imaginative chap who had read a little Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman on a rainy day, might step forth in the town square and in a loud voice announce that he is prepared to hire some sturdy lads and lasses to work a good plot of land he has located. The land should yield a thousand bushels of wheat a year, he says, and he is prepared to give the ten farmers he seeks to hire fifty bushels of wheat a piece for their labor [numbers for illustration only — I am a philosopher, so I haven’t a clue how much wheat one farmer can grow in a year]. Everyone looks at him as though he had lost his senses. “Why on earth should we give you half of the crop we raise with the sweat of our brows and the pain of our backs?” they want to know. “Well” he says, I had the idea first, and besides I found the land, so I have decided to take half the crop for myself.” The poor sap gets no takers, and goes back to the library [they do have libraries] to see whether he can find another book that will give him the clue to becoming a capitalist.

First he tries some old Puritans, who preach the virtues of discipline, self-sacrifice, and the deferral of gratification. Apparently the secret to becoming a capitalist is to live a life of self-denial and carefully put to one side a part of every year’s crop, or a portion of every year’s pile of shoes — whatever happens to be one’s way of making a living. So he tries this, and sure enough it seems to work. After a year of hard farming labor, he sets aside ten of the one hundred bushels of wheat he has grown, which he exchanges for some additional tools and better seed. Year after year, he keeps at it, and he does indeed prosper, so much so that he is visibly better off than those of his fellows who are less able or willing to engage in disciplined self-denial. But he still does not have anyone working for him, because whenever he tries to hire some chaps to farm his land, he finds that he must either offer them the full product of their labor, which doesn’t do him any good whatsoever, or he must offer them less than the product of their labor, in which case they laugh at him and go back to their own land.

Well, twenty years go by, and our aspiring capitalist is getting on in life, so he decides to go back to the library for one last search of the available books. There he stumbles on a copy of Capital, and after he has plowed through the mysterious and quite unhelpful discussions of the fetishism of commodities and the working day [what, he wonders, are factories], he comes upon Part VIII “The So-Called Primitive Accumulation.” The heavens open, the angels sing, and he realizes that he has found the Promised Land. Off he goes back to his village, where he proceeds to use the little bit extra he has saved by his rigorous self-denial to hire a few bully boys who prefer beating up farmers to working the land. They pretty quickly drive the hard-working farmers from the good land, and stand ready to guard it for its new owner, our capitalist hero. Now, when he goes to the square and offers to pay fifty bushels of wheat for enough work to produce one hundred bushels of wheat, the dispossessed farmers, driven from their land, have no choice but to accept his offer. Agricultural capitalism has arrived. Can financial capitalism be far behind?

Modern-day apologists for capitalism simply assume without explanation that a few people will own the means of production — the state standing behind them to protect that ownership with the full force of law and police — while the many have nothing but their labor and are therefore forced to sell that labor to the owners of the means of production for a wage. These apologists focus all their attention on the wage bargain struck in the labor market, worrying endlessly about whether it is a bargain “freely arrived at,” without ever really asking themselves how the participants in the wage bargain came to be in the situation that defines their relative bargaining power.

To answer Christopher Walsh’s question simply, capitalism never develops out of a situation in which everyone has an equal share of the resources, unless first a process of expropriation and primitive accumulation has taken place.