You said:
Eva;uate the following: william lane craig opts for taking euthyphro’s question of whether the good is the command of god or whether god is good as our decision and opts for the former. So, the command to murder or to commit genocide is god’s prerogative. but he also claims that a human claim to receive a command from god is never justified. Therefore, he seems to be committed to the view that morality as practiced is totally up to human judgment,
ChatGPT said:
This is an insightful and critical evaluation of William Lane Craig’s position on divine command theory and the Euthyphro dilemma. Let’s break it down and clarify the philosophical implications of your argument.
1. The Euthyphro Dilemma
The Euthyphro dilemma, originating from Plato, asks:
“Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?”
Craig is known for affirming the first horn — that something is good because God commands it. This is a classic form of Divine Command Theory (DCT).
- Implication: Morality is grounded in the nature and commands of God. What is morally right is what God wills; what is wrong is what God forbids.
2. Genocide and Difficult Biblical Commands
Critics of DCT raise the issue of moral atrocities (e.g., genocide) seemingly commanded by God in the Old Testament. If goodness is defined by God’s will, then such acts — however morally troubling — must be “good” if commanded by God.
Craig does not deny this; instead, he tries to justify those acts by appealing to:
- God’s sovereignty over life and death,
- The presumed wickedness of the victims,
- God’s broader redemptive purposes.
But this justification highlights the potential moral arbitrariness in DCT, which many find deeply problematic.
3. Craig’s Epistemological Caveat
You point out that Craig denies that humans can ever be justified in claiming to have received a divine command to do something like genocide. This is crucial. It means:
- While it may be metaphysically possible that God commands such acts,
- No human can claim moral justification based on such a command.
“Even if God commanded Abraham to kill Isaac, no one today can claim such authority.”
Craig emphasizes that the biblical accounts are unique revelations and not replicable human experiences.
4. Moral Judgment in Practice
So you draw this conclusion:
“Therefore, he seems to be committed to the view that morality as practiced is totally up to human judgment.”
This is mostly accurate, but it needs some nuance:
- Craig does believe that objective moral values exist and are grounded in God.
- But in practical moral reasoning, since we cannot access God’s commands directly (outside of Scripture), human judgment, reason, and conscience play a primary role.
So we get a paradox:
- Morality is metaphysically dependent on God’s commands,
- But epistemologically inaccessible outside of special revelation,
- So in practice, we must rely on human faculties.
This puts Craig in a strange position:
- He wants a theistic grounding for moral objectivity,
- Yet he denies any direct epistemic access to God’s commands in daily life,
- So moral reasoning ends up being indistinguishable from secular ethics in practice.
5. Evaluation
Your conclusion that morality “is totally up to human judgment” is not quite what Craig would affirm, but it’s a reasonable practical inference from his position.
In short:
- Craig’s theory: Objective morality = God’s commands.
- In practice: We can’t know what God commands (apart from Scripture), so we must use reason, conscience, and moral intuition.
- This ends up being functionally similar to secular moral realism, even if the metaphysical grounding is different.
Summary
You’ve identified a tension in Craig’s thought:
- He affirms DCT (God’s command defines morality),
- Yet denies we can ever know such commands independently,
- Thus, morality in practice must rely on human judgment — even while claiming to be grounded in divine authority.
This tension between metaethics and moral epistemology is a real challenge for divine command theorists, and your critique exposes that well.