william lang craig has a divine command theory of morality. He claims on the one hand that there is nothing immoral in god commanding genocide, but on the other hand he says that no one is epistemically justified in believing that god has commanded them to commit murder or genocide. eg, abraham and issaac. explain and evaluate
ChatGPT said:
William Lane Craig indeed holds to a form of Divine Command Theory (DCT), specifically a non‑voluntarist version: moral duties are grounded in God’s commands, but those commands are not arbitrary—they flow from God’s loving, just nature forumserver.twoplustwo.com+15en.wikipedia.org+15moralapologetics.com+15.
1. Craig on genocide (e.g., Canaanites)
- On human vs. divine authority: Craig asserts that humans are prohibited from killing innocents, but God – having authority over life and death – is not similarly bound. If God commands genocide, it’s not immoral for humans to carry it out, because obedience to God defines moral duty whyevolutionistrue.com.
- On justification: He interprets commands like the Canaanite conquest as judicial acts: God judged a sinful people (such as those practicing child sacrifice), and thus had morally sufficient reason to order their dispossession or destruction reasonablefaith.org.
2. Craig on epistemic justification
- Epistemic restraint: Craig emphatically argues that even if one “heard” a command from God to commit genocide, our epistemic access is too fallible—most such experiences are psychological or delusional. No one is justified in believing God has commanded them to kill innocents; if you believed so, you ought to seek psychiatric help whyevolutionistrue.com+1randyeverist.com+1.
- Divine communication vs revelation: In his view, God rarely commands directly; He operates through texts, conscience, or communal sense. Individual visions often lack sufficient grounding to claim with certainty divine origin .
3. Abraham & Isaac: an illustrative parallel
Just as with Abraham and Isaac: while God already knew Abraham was morally justified in sacrificing Isaac by divine command, Abraham had to trust he truly heard God and believe He had morally sufficient reasons. Craig sees this as a parallel scenario: “unusual” commands may override ordinary moral principles, but carry the same heavy epistemic burden.
4. Evaluating Craig’s position
| Strength | Weakness |
|---|---|
| Consistency under DCT: He maintains coherence by stating moral rightness is defined by God’s commands. “If God commands it, it’s obligatory.” randyeverist.com+5whyevolutionistrue.com+5philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com+5 | Moral arbitrariness: Critics note any security in “intrinsic” wrongness disappears—if God could command rape or genocide, DCT makes them right, undermining objective moral intuitions . |
| Checks on misuse: By requiring extraordinary justification to believe one has heard from God, Craig tries to prevent divine commands being weaponized arbitrarily. | Epistemic gap remains: How do we distinguish true divine commands from psychological impulses? Craig says we can’t reliably do so, which leads either to paralysis or faith that we can’t justify . |
| Theological coherence: He avoids Kantian externalism by tying obligation to the nature of a loving, just God, not external moral standards. | Tension with moral realism: Critics argue Craig ends up with either moral relativism (rightness depends on God’s will) or unknowable morality (we cannot know divine commands)—undermining any confidence in saying an atrocity is objectively wrong . |
5. Conclusion
Craig’s position can be summarized as:
- Yes, genocide or sacrificing Isaac is not immoral if truly commanded by God—moral obligation is defined strictly by divine will.
- No, humans lack justification to believe they’ve received such divine commands—our epistemic access is too limited and fallible. This arguably prevents real-world moral catastrophes from being justified as divine will—but at the cost of moral certainty.
6. Final analysis
Craig successfully resolves one tension in DCT—how to reconcile divine sovereignty with morality—but exposes himself to deeper criticisms:
- Arbitrariness: If any act could be right if God commanded it, what prevents God from commanding evil? Craig says God’s nature prevents it—but then morality appears grounded in God’s nature, not his commands (blurring his own DCT claims) reasonablefaith.org+15biola.edu+15moralapologetics.com+15en.wikipedia.org+15en.wikipedia.org+15santitafarella.wordpress.com+15philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com+5randyeverist.com+5reddit.com+5.
- Epistemic insufficiency: Requiring mental breaks to process perceived divine commands prevents misuse—but also precludes knowledge. So even a good person cannot claim justified certainty even if they truly have heard God.
In short, Craig defends a logically consistent DCT while distancing believers from moral apathy—but the stance still rests on fragile assumptions about God’s nature, the reliability of revelation, and the status of moral knowledge.
Takeaways
- Theologically coherent, yet pushes most morality into the realm of faith.
- Protects against moral abuse, but deprives believers of assured moral guidance.
- Leaves deep philosophical challenges unresolved, especially concerning objective ethics and divine arbitrariness.
What interests you most in this debate—practical ethics, philosophical coherence, or something else?
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You said:
if no one is justified in thinking that god commands murder or genocide, then the characters in the bible that followed god’s commands are not justified in doing so. evaluate
ChatGPT said:
According to Craig, Divine Command Theory (DCT) holds that what God commands is morally right, and what He forbids is morally wrong. So if God truly commands murder or genocide—as in biblical cases like the conquest of the Canaanites—then the followers are morally justified in carrying out those acts, even though the same actions would be immoral if performed on human initiative alone confrontingbelievers.com+15goodreads.com+15whyevolutionistrue.com+15.
1. No justification to believe you’ve heard God
Craig’s key safeguard is his strict epistemic restraint: no one is justified in believing they’ve received a divine command to kill innocents. He argues that most such experiences stem from psychological or delusional origins, and even if a genuine vision occurred, it’s difficult to attain sufficient epistemic certainty. He advises extreme caution—even institutionalization—if someone insisted they heard God commanding genocide .
2. Implication for biblical characters
That caution applies retroactively: just because characters like Joshua or Saul carried out genocide doesn’t necessarily mean they justifiably believed they were carrying out God’s will. Craig might respond:
- Cases like Joshua involved commands given in Scripture, transmitted through a trusted prophetic tradition, not random private revelations.
- The Bible itself serves as the authoritative vehicle. Those individuals weren’t relying on personal visions, but on community-backed scriptures and prophetic confirmation—an epistemic structure Craig considers more robust than personal conviction.
Still, Craig’s position forces hard questions:
- If human hearing of God is fallible, how do ancient prophets attain certainty?
- Is Scripture interpretation infallible? Craig sometimes appeals to God’s moral character (He wouldn’t command wrong), but critics say that undercuts DCT: morality seems rooted in God’s nature, not merely His commands .
3. Criticisms
Reddit philosophers and critics raise serious objections based on Craig’s framework:
“This position creates a dichotomy where an act … can be morally wrong in one instance but morally right in another, based solely on whether it was commanded by God.” nairaland.com+15reddit.com+15richarddawkins.net+15
And:
“How precisely could the adherent of DCT declare [a shooting at Sandy Hook] morally incorrect if the shooter claimed a divine command?” reddit.com+3reddit.com+3reddit.com+3
These critiques pinpoint two major issues:
- Moral arbitrariness: Any evil could be rendered good by divine decree.
- Epistemic inconsistency: If personal hearing of God is unreliable, ancient biblical contexts aren’t substantially different—they’re still human constructs subject to error.
4. Conclusion
Craig’s position rests on two pillars:
- Absolute moral authority of divine commands—even genocide can be morally right if commanded.
- Prudent epistemology—ordinary believers (and biblical figures lacking prophetic confirmation) aren’t justified in believing they’ve received such commands.
But this leads to tensions:
- If divine commands are arbitrary, why trust them at all?
- If scriptural transmission can’t ensure certainty, how can we accept biblical atrocities as justified?
So, when we ask: if no one is justified in thinking God commands murder, are biblical characters unjustified too?—Craig must either grant that biblical actors had some extraordinary epistemic access, or else admit that even Joshua or Saul acted without justification, relying on tradition, not divine certainty.
TL;DR
- Craig says divine commands—even genocide—are morally right, if truly from God.
- But humans today (and arguably biblical actors) lack justified epistemic access to know such commands are genuine.
- This creates a tension: the moral permissibility exists in theory, but justified belief in practice is elusive—even for ancient characters.
Would you like to dive deeper into how Craig distinguishes prophetic authority from personal revelation—or explore alternatives like moral realism that avoid these pitfalls?
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