DeepSeek answered:
Clarence Irving Lewis, in his work Mind and the World Order, does indeed discuss the concept of the “given” in experience, and his treatment of this concept has been subject to interpretation and critique, including by Wilfrid Sellars in his famous critique of the “Myth of the Given.” To determine whether Lewis is guilty of falling into what Sellars calls the “Myth of the Given,” we need to carefully examine Lewis’s position and compare it with Sellars’s critique.
Lewis’s Concept of the “Given”
Lewis distinguishes between two elements in knowledge: the given and the conceptual interpretation. The given is the immediate, sensuous content of experience—what is presented to the mind independently of any interpretation or conceptual activity. This given element is characterized by its qualitative specificity and its independence from the mind’s constructive activity. Lewis emphasizes that the given is not created by the mind but is simply there, as the raw material upon which the mind operates.
However, Lewis also insists that the given alone does not constitute knowledge. Knowledge arises only when the given is interpreted through concepts. The conceptual element is what allows us to categorize, relate, and make sense of the given. Thus, for Lewis, the given is a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge. It provides the content, but the form and structure of knowledge come from the mind’s conceptual activity.
Sellars’s Critique of the “Myth of the Given”
Wilfrid Sellars, in his essay Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, critiques the idea that there is a “given” in experience that can serve as an unmediated foundation for knowledge. Sellars argues that the notion of the given is a myth because it assumes that there can be non-conceptual, non-inferential knowledge that is immediately present to the mind and can serve as a foundation for all other knowledge. Sellars claims that all knowledge, even perceptual knowledge, is conceptually mediated and inferential. There is no “pure given” that is free from conceptual interpretation.
Sellars’s critique targets the idea that the given can provide a foundation for knowledge without itself being subject to the same conceptual and inferential processes that govern the rest of our knowledge. He argues that the given, if it is to play any role in justifying knowledge, must itself be something that can be known, and this requires that it be brought under concepts. But once it is brought under concepts, it is no longer “given” in the sense of being unmediated or non-inferential.
Is Lewis Guilty of the Myth of the Given?
Lewis’s position is nuanced, and whether he is guilty of the “Myth of the Given” depends on how one interprets his account of the given and its role in knowledge.
- Lewis’s Given as Non-Conceptual: Lewis does describe the given as non-conceptual and independent of the mind’s activity. This might seem to align with the “Myth of the Given” as Sellars describes it, because Lewis seems to posit a level of experience that is prior to conceptualization and yet somehow foundational for knowledge.
- Lewis’s Emphasis on Conceptual Interpretation: However, Lewis also insists that the given alone does not constitute knowledge. Knowledge requires the conceptual interpretation of the given. This suggests that Lewis does not see the given as providing a foundation for knowledge in the way that Sellars critiques. For Lewis, the given is merely the raw material that must be interpreted through concepts to become knowledge. In this sense, Lewis might be seen as avoiding the “Myth of the Given” because he does not claim that the given can justify knowledge on its own.
- Lewis’s Pragmatic Approach: Lewis’s pragmatism also plays a role here. He views concepts as tools for interpreting experience, and he emphasizes that the validity of our concepts is determined by their practical success in organizing and predicting experience. This pragmatic approach suggests that Lewis is not committed to the idea of a non-conceptual given that can serve as an unmediated foundation for knowledge.
Conclusion
Lewis’s position is complex, and while he does posit a “given” element in experience, he does not seem to fully commit to the “Myth of the Given” as Sellars critiques it. Lewis’s given is not a foundation for knowledge in the sense of providing non-inferential, non-conceptual justification. Instead, it is the raw material that must be interpreted through concepts to become knowledge. In this sense, Lewis might be seen as avoiding the “Myth of the Given,” though his position is certainly open to interpretation and debate.
Ultimately, whether Lewis is guilty of the “Myth of the Given” depends on how one interprets his account of the given and its role in knowledge. Some might argue that his emphasis on the non-conceptual given aligns him with the myth, while others might argue that his insistence on the necessity of conceptual interpretation means that he avoids it.