Is the following a sound argument:
THE MANIFEST IMAGE ≠ THE COMMONSENSE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
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Gemini Advanced responds:
This is a dense philosophical argument, but let’s break down the core idea and assess its soundness.
Chrucky’s Main Argument:
- Premise 1: Sellars’ “Manifest Image” is built on an ontology of things (substances), like chairs and tables. It doesn’t fundamentally include processes or events like “a flash of lightning” or “a buzzing sound.”
- Premise 2: Our commonsense understanding of the world does include processes and events as irreducible elements. We perceive and talk about them as distinct from just things.
- Conclusion: Therefore, the Manifest Image is not identical to the commonsense framework. 1 1. Andrew Chrucky, The manifest image ≠ the commonsense conceptual framework (in the philosophy of Wilfrid sellars) – PhilPapers philpapers.org
Is this argument sound?
- Validity: The argument is logically valid. If the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
- Soundness: This depends on whether the premises are true. Chrucky spends much of the paper defending these premises by:
- Citing other philosophers who agree with him.
- Analyzing how we use language to describe substances and processes differently.
- Arguing that Sellars’ attempts to reduce processes to substances are unsuccessful.
- Pointing to potential inconsistencies in Sellars’ own framework.
Challenges to the Argument:
Chrucky addresses a key challenge from Johanna Seibt, who argues that the Manifest Image does include absolute processes. He responds with three counterarguments:
- Sellars implies that absolute processes are not in the Manifest Image when he introduces an “alternative framework” to account for them.
- Including absolute processes would make the Manifest Image a “third” framework, distinct from both the original “person-based” framework and the substance-based framework.
- Sellars consistently omits absolute processes from his pre-1975 discussions of the Manifest Image.
Overall Assessment:
The argument is compelling and well-structured. Chrucky provides evidence and reasoning to support his premises, and he anticipates and addresses potential objections. Whether you find it ultimately sound depends on:
- Your interpretation of Sellars: Do you agree with Chrucky’s reading of Sellars’ work?
- Your view of commonsense: Do you believe that our commonsense understanding of the world fundamentally includes irreducible processes?
If you accept Chrucky’s premises, his conclusion logically follows. However, like many philosophical arguments, it’s open to debate and interpretation.
Key Takeaways:
- The paper highlights a subtle but important distinction between “things” and “processes” in how we understand the world.
- It raises questions about the relationship between our everyday commonsense understanding and more formalized philosophical frameworks.
- It demonstrates the complexity and nuance of Sellars’ philosophy and its interpretations.
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I said: - Summarize and evaluate for soundness: Wilfrid Sellars, SUBSTANCE, CHANGE AND EVENT (A thesis submitted to the Committee on Graduate Study and Degrees of The University of Buffalo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, June 1934)
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Gemini Advanced replied:
Wilfrid Sellars’ 1934 thesis, “SUBSTANCE, CHANGE AND EVENT,” explores the philosophical problem of change in the universe. He critiques existing theories of substance and events, ultimately advocating for a “Physical Realism” that recognizes both the enduring nature of substances and the reality of change.
Summary:
Sellars begins by grounding the problem of change in the historical context of philosophical inquiry, highlighting how early theories struggled to reconcile abstract concepts with the empirical reality of motion and change. He criticizes Bertrand Russell’s theory of change, which defines things as series of appearances, for its reliance on an outdated, atomistic psychology and its failure to account for the inherent dynamism of experienced reality.
He then examines various historical theories of substance, particularly focusing on Locke’s concept of substance as an unknowable substratum in which qualities inhere. Sellars argues that this view leads to absurdities and proposes instead a view of substance as a concrete thing, knowable through its attributes. He also addresses Leibniz’s monadism, which arises from the problem of predicating future states of an object, arguing that it rests on a flawed assumption about the nature of sameness.
Sellars further critiques theories that posit events as the basic category of existence. He analyzes different versions of this theory, pointing out the difficulties they face in accounting for time and change without resorting to contradictions or unintelligible concepts like the arising of events “out of nothing.” He challenges the notion of causal laws as governing events, arguing that it either leads to a “run of luck” theory or necessitates a problematic distinction between “pure events” and their characters.
Finally, Sellars outlines his own position, “Physical Realism,” which is grounded in a critical realist epistemology. He argues for a view of substance as a concrete, dynamic entity, characterized by endurance, change, intrinsic nature, structure, and properties. He rejects the traditional dualism of matter and force, emphasizing the inherent dynamism of substances and the interconnectedness of their behavior. He distinguishes between primary and secondary endurance, with primary endurance belonging to non-composite, eternal beings, and secondary endurance characterizing composite entities that can cease to exist. He also differentiates between real time, identified with change, and chronological time, which is a human construct for measuring and ordering events.
Evaluation of Soundness:
Sellars’ thesis presents a compelling and well-argued case for Physical Realism. His arguments are generally sound, drawing on both empirical observations and logical analysis to critique existing theories and develop his own position. He demonstrates a strong grasp of philosophical history and contemporary debates, engaging with prominent thinkers like Russell, Locke, Leibniz, and McTaggart.
His critique of event-based ontologies is particularly effective, highlighting the challenges they face in accounting for time and change without resorting to contradictions or implausible assumptions. His distinction between real and chronological time is also insightful, offering a nuanced perspective on the nature of time and its relation to change.
However, some aspects of his thesis could benefit from further elaboration. For instance, his concept of primary endurance and the existence of non-composite, eternal beings raises questions about the nature of these beings and their relation to the rest of the universe. Additionally, while he briefly mentions the implications of his view for human relations and the rejection of mechanistic fatalism, this aspect of his thesis could be explored in more depth.
Overall, Sellars’ thesis is a significant contribution to the philosophy of change, offering a robust and well-reasoned defense of Physical Realism. His arguments are generally sound, and his insights into the nature of substance, change, and time remain relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions.- ——————–
- I said:
Does he include processes like “it thunders” as basic in his ontology?
Gemini Advanced replied:
No, Sellars does not include processes like “it thunders” as basic in his ontology. Here’s why:
Substance-based ontology: Sellars advocates for a substance-based ontology, where enduring, concrete things are the fundamental constituents of reality. Processes, like “it thunders,” are seen as behaviors of these substances, not as ontologically basic entities in their own right.
Events as derived: He explicitly defines events as “selected portion[s] of the behavior of a physical system.” This places events in a derivative position ontologically. “It thunders” would be an event, and thus not a fundamental entity in his system.
Focus on physical systems: Sellars’ Physical Realism primarily focuses on physical systems and their changes. While he acknowledges different levels of causality, his emphasis is on the enduring nature of substances and their dynamic interactions, rather than on isolated processes.
Knowledge about things: He argues that our knowledge about things includes knowledge of their properties, which define how their structure will change under certain conditions. “It thunders” would be an example of such a change, described and explained in terms of the properties and interactions of the substances involved (e.g., air, water molecules, electrical charges).
In summary, Sellars’ ontology prioritizes substances and their dynamic interactions. Processes like “it thunders” are understood as events, which are derived from the behaviors of these substances, not as fundamental building blocks of reality.
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