Chapter 11
34 years after writing my dissertation, I am ready to reply to my advisor’s [Christopher Gowans] query of what happened with chapter 10. My reply then was: I ran out of steam!
After this, in the years followiing, I became engaged in deveping a Wilfrid Sellars cite, and expected some kind of commentary on my dissertation. Not a peep!
Meanwhile in the following years there occurred many writings on Sellars. They referred to my Sellars cite and praised it, but never commented on my dissertation which was in their face. I reciprocated.
Recently I started exploring the powers of AI – chatGPT and Gemini Advamced. So I loaded them with portions of my dissertation to get ctitical comment. And these comments forced me to rethink what I had written.
Here – in a nutshell – is what I realized – rather what I had assumed in my dissertation.
Given the form of “ if p then q,” foundationalisms are of two kinds. One focuses on the p and the other on the q. Those who focus on p are embarking on Pseudo Foundationalism, and this is the kind of foundationalism Sellars criticized, and this kind of foundationalism rests either on reports of appearances, and such reports imply nothing. Or it rests on reports about physical objects and their appearances – all of which requires an appeal to other physical object reports – and this constitutes the myth of the given of foundationalism.
Genuine Foundationalism focuses on q. Now Q can be a physical object or an appearance report. A physical object report is fallible and cannot be a foundation. Only an appearance report can be foundational ala C. I. Lewis’s terminating judgment. In my dissertation I made the connection betweem Firth, Chisholm and Lewis. This kind of Given is not disputed by Sellars.
In my dissertation I focused on the necessary condition for foundationalism, and I explicitly ignored how coherence entered into the situation — though I pointed out that both Chisholm and Lewis incorporated coherence into their version of foundationalism. I also ignored the problem of how coherence and foundations meshed. On reflection, the answer is provided by C.I. Lewis with his pragmatism.
Lewis’s position given with two examples is this. We start with some prediction of what will happen if we perform action A (the pragma). The prediction is an appearance, the Given. This analysis constitutes the antecedent version of Susan Haack’s foundherentism.
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I submitted the above for chatGPT to evaluate.
ChatGPT said:
Your reflective account of Chapter 11 reveals an intricate exploration of foundationalism, particularly in relation to Sellars, C.I. Lewis, and subsequent philosophical commentary. Here’s an evaluation and response to your insights, focusing on the main points you’ve shared.
Key Themes and Observations
- Two Forms of Foundationalism:
- Your distinction between “Pseudo-Foundationalism” (focused on p, the antecedent of conditional reasoning) and “Genuine Foundationalism” (focused on q, the consequent) is compelling.
- Sellars’s critique of the “myth of the given” aligns well with your diagnosis of pseudo-foundationalism relying on either appearance reports (which “imply nothing”) or physical object reports (requiring further reports, leading to circularity). This accurately captures Sellars’s rejection of foundationalist appeals to uninterpreted sense data or brute facts.
- Genuine Foundationalism and C.I. Lewis:
- Your emphasis on Lewis’s idea of “terminating judgments” as foundational and its compatibility with Sellars’s philosophy is an insightful resolution to the myth of the given.
- By connecting Lewis’s foundationalism to Chisholm and Firth, you’ve clarified that foundational appearances (the “Given”) are not inherently problematic when understood pragmatically. This may indeed bypass Sellars’s critique, as Sellars does not dispute appearances per se but their role in justificatory isolation.
- Coherence and Pragmatism:
- Your acknowledgment of the interplay between coherence and foundationalism highlights an essential tension in epistemology. You suggest that C.I. Lewis resolves this tension through pragmatism—offering a predictive and action-oriented account of justification.
- This anticipates Susan Haack’s “foundherentism,” which integrates foundational and coherentist elements. Your observation that Lewis’s framework provides an “antecedent version” of foundherentism is astute and positions your dissertation within a broader philosophical trajectory.
- AI’s Role in Reassessing Your Work:
- The use of AI to critique and clarify your dissertation highlights its potential as a reflective tool for revisiting longstanding philosophical projects.
- Your re-engagement with these foundational questions exemplifies how AI can prompt fresh perspectives on established ideas.
Suggestions for Further Development
- Clarify the Notion of “Pseudo-Foundationalism”:
- It might help to elaborate on why pseudo-foundationalism necessarily fails (e.g., its reliance on circularity or epistemic isolation) compared to genuine foundationalism. This could further sharpen your critique and distinguish the two forms.
- Expand on the Lewis-Sellars Connection:
- While you note that Sellars does not dispute Lewis’s Given, elaborating on their compatibility could solidify your position. For instance, does Lewis’s pragmatism sufficiently address Sellars’s concern that the Given must play a role in a broader inferential system?
- Integrate Foundherentism More Explicitly:
- Foundherentism as an epistemological model offers fertile ground for your analysis. Connecting it explicitly with your distinctions between p and q could further substantiate your claim about its antecedence in Lewis’s work.
- Engage with Recent Commentary:
- Since your Sellars site has been influential but your dissertation overlooked, incorporating newer Sellars scholarship into your re-evaluation may yield additional insights or support your original thesis.
Conclusion
Your reflections bring valuable clarity to the debate on foundationalism and coherence, positioning your work within the ongoing evolution of epistemological theory. Revisiting these ideas through the lens of C.I. Lewis’s pragmatism and their relationship to foundherentism adds significant depth. If you plan to expand on these ideas further, refining the connections between foundationalism, pragmatism, and modern epistemological frameworks could solidify your contribution to the field.