I asked chatGPT to put in a table the following from my dissertation on Wilfrid Sellars:
The term ‘foundations’ is a metaphor suggesting the foundations of some structure, usually a house; sometimes a pyramid. To have a contrasting metaphor for ‘coherentism’ the images of circles and rafts have been used. Here are Sellars’ images: One seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a tortoise (what supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (where does it begin?). Neither will do.{19} The foundations of the pyramid (or tortoise) is the metaphor for the justification of basic premises. How this justification is to be described varies in classical foundationalism. The proposed marks or criteria of basic premises have been certainty, incorrigibility, infallibility, indubitability, and/or self-warrantability. By contrast the image of the raft (or serpent) will mean the requirements of consistency and coherence. How ‘coherence’ is to be understood has, like the notion of foundational security, several interpretation. For example, in C. I. Lewis we find the term ‘congruence’ and in R. Chisholm the term ‘concurrence’ used for this purpose; while in Sellars we come across the notion of ‘explanatory coherence’. The notion of coherence and these related notions are meant, I suspect, to express the requirement of systematic logical, temporal, spatial, and causal relations. But are foundationalism and coherentism contradictory alternatives? Since the defense of coherentism has been by way of an attack on foundationalism, i.e., a defense of non-foundationalism, in order to understand the foundationalist/non-foundationalist debate we need some minimal thesis which is in dispute. Let me, then, try to formulate it. If we view the situation abstractly and metaphorically, the foundationalism versus non-foundationalism debate could contain the following claims:
(EC) The raft exists; there is no pyramid.
(EF) The pyramid exists; there is no raft.
(M) The pyramid and the raft both exist.
(MC) The raft is a necessary condition for the pyramid, but the pyramid is not the necessary condition for the raft.
(MF) The pyramid is the necessary condition for the raft, but the raft is not a necessary condition for the pyramid.
(W) The pyramid and the raft entail each other. I will call (EC) Extreme Coherentism and
(EF) Extreme Foundationalism — no one holds such a view;
(MC) is Moderate Coherentism, while
(MF) is Moderate Foundationalism;
(W) can be viewed either as Weak Coherentism or as Weak Foundationalism.
To decide which of these alternatives is defended by so called foundationalists and non-foundationalists, let us look at the writing of a self-proclaimed foundationalist — Roderick Chisholm; and the writings of the self-conscious non-foundationalist — Laurence Bonjour. I am not sure where to place others, including Sellars. And since I am writing about Sellars, I will shortly explain why there is a difficulty in placing Sellars at either end of these poles. Let me first turn to Chisholm. He defends a version of foundationalism which has a foundationalist and a coherentist aspect. He writes: “There are two moments of epistemic justification, one of them foundational and the other not.”{20} As Chisholm sees the epistemic situation, both sets of metaphors will do: they express two aspects of knowledge. Now, this is a significant thesis. It indicates that foundationalism does not deny coherence as a necessary condition for securing knowledge. And if this is the pronouncement of a foundationalist, which seems to fit the alternative (W) of Weak Foundationalism, then a non-foundationalist, who opposes Chisholm, must be defending either (EC) or (MC). I am not going to pursue the structural problem of how various types of beliefs are tied together as, for example, in various modes of induction or coherence; so I am not interested is dealing with the superstructure of the foundational-coherentist issue, save for one respect. I want to defend a necessary condition for foundationalism.
ChatGPT said:
Here’s a table summarizing the key points related to Sellars’ metaphorical images, the foundationalism vs. coherentism debate, and the claims about these perspectives:
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Foundationalism | A view suggesting that certain beliefs or premises are justified without reference to other beliefs, often represented metaphorically by a “pyramid” or “tortoise.” Basic premises are justified through criteria like certainty, incorrigibility, or self-warrantability. |
| Coherentism | A view suggesting that the justification for beliefs arises from their coherence with other beliefs, often represented metaphorically by a “raft” or a “serpent.” The requirements for coherence include consistency, logical relations, and causal or temporal relations. |
| Metaphor of Foundations | Refers to the image of a “pyramid” or “tortoise” where the foundation justifies the structure above it. This is typically associated with classical foundationalism, where basic premises are justified by foundational criteria. |
| Metaphor of Coherence | Refers to the image of a “raft” or “serpent,” suggesting that knowledge is justified by its coherence with other beliefs or parts of a system. Coherence is understood through concepts like “explanatory coherence” or “congruence.” |
| Foundationalist Criteria for Justification | Certainty, incorrigibility, infallibility, indubitability, and/or self-warrantability are some of the proposed criteria for justifying basic premises in classical foundationalism. |
| Coherence and Related Terms | Coherence can be understood through different interpretations, such as “congruence” (C. I. Lewis), “concurrence” (R. Chisholm), or “explanatory coherence” (Sellars). These terms reflect the need for systematic logical, temporal, spatial, and causal relations between beliefs. |
| Extreme Coherentism (EC) | The belief that only coherence matters, and there is no foundational structure (no pyramid). |
| Extreme Foundationalism (EF) | The belief that only foundational beliefs matter, and there is no coherent system (no raft). |
| Moderate Coherentism (MC) | The belief that coherence is a necessary condition for foundational beliefs, but not the sole justification. There is a recognition of both foundational and coherentist aspects. |
| Moderate Foundationalism (MF) | The belief that foundational beliefs are necessary for coherence, but not the sole justification. Acknowledges the need for coherence while maintaining foundational premises. |
| Weak Coherentism or Foundationalism (W) | The belief that coherence and foundationalism entail each other to some degree. A middle ground that accepts some form of mutual dependence between foundational premises and coherence. |
| Chisholm’s Position | Chisholm defends a version of foundationalism that also incorporates a coherentist aspect. He argues that epistemic justification has both foundational and coherentist moments, meaning that coherence is seen as a necessary condition for securing knowledge. This suggests a form of Weak Foundationalism (W). |
| Bonjour’s Position | Bonjour, a self-proclaimed non-foundationalist, opposes the view that foundationalism is required for knowledge. He would likely defend Extreme Coherentism (EC) or Moderate Coherentism (MC), rejecting the foundationalist requirement for justification. |
| Sellars’ Position | Sellars does not clearly align with either extreme foundationalism or coherentism. He presents a more nuanced view that suggests a complex relationship between basic premises and coherence, potentially supporting the Weak Foundationalism (W) position, though his exact stance is difficult to place. |
This table provides a structured overview of the metaphors used in the foundationalism vs. coherentism debate, as well as the various claims and positions within that debate, particularly focusing on the distinctions between extreme and moderate views.