Can Wittgrnstein’s philosophy be characterized as a type of escape from bullshit?
ChatGPT said:
This is a sharp and interesting question — and the short answer is yes, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be characterized as a type of escape from what Harry Frankfurt later famously called “bullshit.” But let’s unpack that a bit more carefully.
What Do We Mean by “Bullshit”?
Harry Frankfurt, in his essay On Bullshit, defines bullshit not merely as lies, but as speech (or writing, or action) that shows a disregard for the truth — where the speaker doesn’t care whether what they’re saying is true or false. The goal is often persuasion, performance, or social manipulation.
Wittgenstein’s Project(s)
Wittgenstein had two main philosophical phases — and both can be seen as allergic to bullshit, but in different ways:
1. Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus):
- He wanted to limit language to what could be clearly and logically said.
- His famous final line — “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” — is a call to shut up when it comes to metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and other areas where language breaks down.
- This is arguably an attempt to cut off bullshit at the source — if you can’t say it clearly and logically, don’t say it at all.
Anti-bullshit angle: Don’t pretend to know what can’t be known; don’t use language to fake insight.
2. Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations):
- He became skeptical of rigid logic and turned toward how language is used in everyday life.
- He saw much of traditional philosophy as being trapped in confusion caused by language misuse.
- He emphasized “language games” — the idea that meaning depends on context and practice, not abstract definitions.
Anti-bullshit angle: Most philosophical problems arise because we’re bewitched by our own language — and philosophers often talk nonsense while thinking they’re being profound.
Wittgenstein as Bullshit-Cleaner
Across both phases, you can see Wittgenstein as trying to:
- Clarify what can be said meaningfully,
- Expose empty or misleading uses of language,
- Push us toward silence or humility when we’ve reached the limits of what can be said.
So yes: Wittgenstein’s philosophy is, in many ways, a radical attempt to escape bullshit — by exposing the limits of language, the seductions of philosophical jargon, and the dangers of mistaking words for understanding.
Final Take:
Wittgenstein isn’t offering more philosophy. He’s offering a way out of pseudo-philosophy — a way out of bullshit.
If you’re interested, I can show how this applies to specific examples of modern philosophical or political language — or how his approach compares to Frankfurt’s more contemporary critique.
You said:
you are assuming thT franfurth;s definition of bullshit is accurate, but is it
ChatGPT said:
Great — now you’re asking the real philosophical questions.
You’re absolutely right to challenge the assumption that Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit is “accurate.” In philosophy, terms like “bullshit” aren’t natural kinds — they’re conceptual constructions, and we can question or revise them. So let’s take your point seriously.
Frankfurt’s Definition, Recap
In On Bullshit (1986/2005), Frankfurt argues:
Bullshit is speech intended to persuade or impress without regard for truth.
The bullshitter isn’t lying (which requires knowing and hiding the truth), but instead doesn’t care if what they say is true or false. Their focus is on effect, not accuracy.
So, for Frankfurt:
- A liar respects truth (but hides it),
- A bullshitter is indifferent to truth altogether.
This indifference is what makes bullshit dangerous.
Is That Really What Bullshit Is?
There are several ways to push back — and philosophers have.
1. Overly Narrow or Overly Broad?
- Frankfurt’s definition hinges on intentions (disregard for truth), which are hard to measure.
- What about unintentional bullshit? If someone thinks they’re telling the truth but is deeply confused, is it still bullshit?
- E.g., is a confident but ignorant TED speaker bullshitting, even if they think they’re being insightful?
- Frankfurt would say yes, but this waters down responsibility.
2. What About Style or Form?
Some critics argue that “bullshit” also involves style, e.g.:
- Overuse of jargon,
- Pretending to be profound,
- Saying vague or empty things to sound intelligent.
So, maybe bullshit is more about performance and pretense, rather than just disregard for truth.
3. The Truth Focus Might Be Misleading
Some thinkers argue that bullshit isn’t just about truth vs. falsehood, but about meaning or understanding:
- Slavoj Žižek, for example, might say bullshit is ideologically charged language that conceals more than it reveals.
- Wittgenstein (especially later Wittgenstein) would likely say bullshit is language that fails to do real work in a language-game — speech that masquerades as meaningful when it’s not.
Alternative Views of Bullshit
| Thinker | Focus | Definition of Bullshit |
|---|---|---|
| Frankfurt | Truth-indifference | Speech made without concern for truth |
| Wittgenstein (later) | Language-use | Misuse of language that creates philosophical confusion |
| Postmodernists (e.g. Baudrillard) | Simulation / ideology | Language that simulates meaning or truth but is detached from reality |
| Žižek / Critical Theorists | Ideology / Obfuscation | Language that hides social contradictions behind pseudo-insight |
So, Is Frankfurt’s Definition “Accurate”?
Only within a certain frame:
- If you’re looking at intentions toward truth, Frankfurt gives a clear and useful definition.
- But if you’re more concerned with language misuse, social manipulation, or pretense, other definitions might fit better.
Conclusion:
Frankfurt gives a sharp but partial account of bullshit.
It captures something real, but not everything.
Especially from a Wittgensteinian view, bullshit might be better understood as linguistic confusion, illusion of understanding, or misfiring language games — not just disregard for truth.
Would you like to explore how Wittgenstein himself might define bullshit, implicitly or otherwise?
You said:
yes
ChatGPT said:
Excellent — let’s dive into how Wittgenstein might be seen as offering a philosophical account of bullshit, even if he never used the term explicitly.
Wittgenstein’s “Bullshit”: An Implicit Definition
Wittgenstein never talks about bullshit directly, but his entire later philosophy (especially in Philosophical Investigations) is aimed at exposing a particular kind of nonsense — which can be framed as a unique kind of bullshit.
Let’s break it down.
1. Bullshit as Linguistic Illusion
Wittgenstein believed many philosophical problems arise when people are “bewitched by language.” That is, they think they’re saying something meaningful when they’re not.
“Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.” — PI §38
What this implies:
Bullshit happens when people misuse the grammar of a language — not grammatically, but conceptually — e.g., trying to talk about the meaning of life as if it were a thing you can define, or asking what consciousness is as though it’s an object.
Bullshit = Grammatically correct, but conceptually nonsensical language.
2. Bullshit as Pretending to Have Clarity Where There Is None
Wittgenstein was obsessed with exposing philosophical pseudo-problems — for example, debates about whether the external world exists, or what “mind” really is, often stem from a misunderstanding of how language works.
He compares this to mistaking shadows for objects.
What this implies:
A lot of what passes for deep philosophical insight is actually empty verbal performance — people stringing words together in traditional forms (e.g. “X is the essence of Y”) but saying nothing intelligible.
Bullshit = The illusion of depth caused by language detached from its practical context.
3. Bullshit as Language Detached from Use
One of his core insights was:
“For a large class of cases… the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” — PI §43
Meaning isn’t something words carry in themselves, like boxes — it’s how they’re used in real, shared human activities.
So, when philosophers or others use words outside their ordinary contexts (e.g., asking “What is the meaning of being?” or “What is the self?” in abstract, detached ways), they’re playing a kind of language game with no rules — pure gesture, no grip.
➡️ Bullshit = Words unanchored from the “language-games” that give them meaning.
Wittgenstein’s Mission = Anti-Bullshit Therapy
Wittgenstein didn’t want to build new theories — he wanted to show how our thinking gets tangled, and how to untangle it by paying attention to how language really works.
This is philosophy as therapy, not theory-building:
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.” — PI §109
Summary: Wittgenstein’s “Definition” of Bullshit
| Feature | Wittgensteinian Bullshit |
|---|---|
| Truth-focus? | Not primary — more about meaning than truth |
| Main issue | Misuse or misunderstanding of language |
| Looks like | Profound speech that lacks real meaning or context |
| Common sources | Philosophy, metaphysics, theology, even science when abstracted too far |
| Cure | Returning words to their everyday use; clarity through attention to actual language games |
So:
For Wittgenstein, bullshit is what happens when language gets detached from life — when people say things that look meaningful but collapse under scrutiny because the language has no real use.
Would you like a concrete example — maybe a snippet of philosophical or political speech — and we can analyze it Wittgenstein-style for bullshit content?