c.d. broad’s critical philosophy as an escape from bullshit. evaluate. improve on frankfurt’s bullshit
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Great — you’re after not just an evaluation of C.D. Broad’s critical philosophy as an escape from bullshit, but a sharpening or surpassing of Frankfurt’s conception of bullshit, using Broad as a lens. That’s a bold and rich project, and it can be approached on both philosophical and meta-philosophical levels.
Here’s a structured and conceptually tighter take, suitable for turning into a paper or essay:
C.D. Broad’s Critical Philosophy as an Escape from Bullshit: A Philosophical Revaluation Beyond Frankfurt
1. Introduction: Bullshit as a Philosophical Problem
Harry Frankfurt’s On Bullshit (2005) provides a cultural diagnosis: bullshit is more dangerous than lies because it represents indifference to truth. The bullshitter, unlike the liar, is unconcerned with whether what they say is true or false—they only care that it’s believable, impressive, or effective.
Frankfurt’s analysis, though influential, has limits:
- It’s psychological rather than epistemological.
- It doesn’t give us much traction for how to resist bullshit intellectually.
- It implicitly presumes bullshit is primarily a linguistic phenomenon, not a structural one in philosophy or culture.
This essay proposes that C.D. Broad’s critical philosophy offers not just an escape from bullshit, but also a more refined conception of what bullshit is and why it flourishes — particularly in philosophical contexts.
2. Frankfurt’s Bullshit: Foundations and Limits
Frankfurt’s account is valuable for highlighting:
- The erosion of concern for truth.
- The performative nature of much contemporary speech.
- The link between bullshit and a certain postmodern epistemic climate.
But Frankfurt falls short by:
- Not connecting bullshit with epistemic vice (like intellectual laziness or dishonesty).
- Underestimating institutional or academic bullshit (e.g., jargon, empty conceptual posturing).
- Failing to differentiate between degrees or types of bullshit.
Enter Broad—not as a philosopher of bullshit, but as a model of anti-bullshit thought.
3. C.D. Broad’s Method as Anti-Bullshit
C.D. Broad’s philosophy offers a structural counter to bullshit at multiple levels:
A. Analytical Honesty
Broad is consistently:
- Meticulous in distinguishing concepts.
- Reluctant to draw conclusions beyond what evidence or reasoning allows.
- Ready to revisit unfashionable problems (e.g. psychical research) without bias.
This stands in opposition to the bullshit philosopher, who:
- Obscures rather than clarifies.
- Argues for effect rather than truth.
- Follows ideological fashion or disciplinary prestige.
Broad’s insistence on clarity, even at the cost of elegance or innovation, is a philosophical ethic: truth-seeking over performance.
B. Virtues of Intellectual Humility
Where Frankfurt sees bullshit as a failure of truth-concern, Broad models the epistemic virtues that resist it:
- Humility: careful not to overstate what can be known.
- Courage: willing to pursue lines of thought others reject.
- Patience: explores problems without rushing to solutions.
These virtues are absent in Frankfurt’s analysis but essential to understanding why bullshit happens — often because of the pressure to appear knowledgeable rather than to be thoughtful.
C. Respect for Metaphysics and Its Limits
Broad defends metaphysical inquiry, but only if it’s done with rigor. He doesn’t dismiss metaphysics like many 20th-century positivists (whose dismissal itself often descended into bullshit), nor does he accept speculative systems uncritically.
This balance avoids two forms of philosophical bullshit:
- The overconfident metaphysician (bullshit via speculative overreach).
- The glib skeptic (bullshit via pseudo-deflation).
4. Improving on Frankfurt: A Structural View of Bullshit
With Broad in mind, we can push Frankfurt’s account further.
Bullshit is not just a speech act; it is a breakdown of epistemic responsibility in any domain. It emerges when:
- Argument is subordinated to identity, status, or performance.
- Precision is sacrificed for persuasion.
- Complexity is avoided for digestibility or authority.
Broad’s method suggests a richer taxonomy of bullshit:
| Type | Description | Broad’s Antidote |
|---|---|---|
| Performative Bullshit | Saying what sounds good | Conceptual exactness |
| Institutional Bullshit | Empty disciplinary rituals | Intellectual independence |
| Defensive Bullshit | Pretending to know | Humility + epistemic courage |
| Prestige Bullshit | Citing to impress, not clarify | Slow, honest engagement |
5. Conclusion: Broad as a Model of Epistemic Integrity
Broad does not offer a direct theory of bullshit. But his method provides a normative ideal: intellectual practice grounded in honesty, clarity, humility, and seriousness about inquiry. This is more than an escape from bullshit—it’s a quiet rebuke to it.
Frankfurt gave us a sketch. Broad gives us a blueprint.
Summary:
- Frankfurt diagnosed bullshit as indifference to truth, but didn’t explain how to resist it intellectually.
- C.D. Broad’s critical philosophy offers a way out: a disciplined, humble, clear-thinking approach that naturally filters bullshit out.
- Using Broad, we can upgrade Frankfurt’s theory: bullshit is not just a lack of concern for truth, but a structural failure of epistemic responsibility.
- Broad’s method models epistemic virtues that stand as a deep, practical resistance to bullshit in all its forms.
Would you like this expanded into a full academic paper, lecture notes, or a more informal essay?