john mearsheimer was wrong about Nato bring the cause of the russian invasion of ukraine, and he was wrong about the inevitability of russian victory. evaluate
ChatGPT said:
John Mearsheimer’s arguments about the causes of the Russia-Ukraine war and the likely outcomes have sparked intense debate. He’s a prominent realist scholar, and his views reflect a specific theoretical lens, but many analysts and historians argue that he was wrong—both about the causes of the war and its likely trajectory. Here’s an evaluation of both claims:
1. Mearsheimer’s Argument: NATO Expansion as the Primary Cause
What He Said:
- Mearsheimer argued that NATO’s eastward expansion (particularly the 2008 Bucharest Summit statement that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO”) was perceived by Russia as an existential threat.
- He claimed the West’s attempt to integrate Ukraine into Western institutions (NATO, the EU) provoked a defensive response from Russia.
- According to him, the invasion was a rational response by Russia to preserve its sphere of influence.
Why This View Is Challenged:
- Oversimplification: Critics argue that Mearsheimer overstates NATO’s role and ignores other significant causes, such as Russian imperial ambitions, domestic politics, and Putin’s ideology (e.g. denial of Ukrainian nationhood).
- Ukraine’s Agency: Mearsheimer tends to frame Ukraine as a pawn in a great-power game, ignoring the agency of Ukrainians who chose the EU path over Russian influence in events like the 2014 Euromaidan revolution.
- Lack of Immediacy: Ukraine was nowhere near NATO membership in 2022. The invasion wasn’t timed to prevent imminent accession but rather came after years of domestic evolution in Ukraine away from Russia.
- Pattern of Russian Behavior: Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014. These actions point to a broader imperial strategy rather than reactive self-defense.
Evaluation:
Mearsheimer’s argument about NATO being the cause of the war is not supported by the full range of evidence. While NATO expansion may have contributed to Russian perceptions of threat, it was likely a factor, not the root cause. The invasion seems more aligned with revanchist and imperial motivations, and Mearsheimer underestimates the ideological and authoritarian drivers in Putin’s regime.
2. Mearsheimer’s Predictions About the War
What He Predicted:
- Mearsheimer predicted that Ukraine would be devastated, and Russia would likely win due to overwhelming military superiority.
- He warned that Western military support would only prolong the suffering, without changing the ultimate outcome.
Why This View Hasn’t Held Up:
- Ukrainian Resistance: Ukrainian military and civilian resistance was far stronger than anticipated.
- Russian Military Failures: Russia suffered from poor logistics, morale, intelligence, and strategy. Initial objectives like taking Kyiv failed.
- Western Support: Western aid—both military and economic—has significantly strengthened Ukraine’s position and degraded Russian capabilities.
- Not a Clear Victory: As of mid-2025, there is no clear Russian victory. The front lines are relatively static. Russia has not conquered Ukraine or achieved its maximalist aims.
Evaluation:
Mearsheimer misjudged both Russia’s military effectiveness and Ukraine’s resilience, as well as the West’s willingness to commit long-term aid. His predictions reflected a realist assumption that material capabilities dictate outcomes—but the war has demonstrated that morale, leadership, innovation, and alliances matter just as much.
Final Assessment:
Mearsheimer brought a valuable but limited lens to analyzing the Russia-Ukraine conflict. His realism rightly emphasized great-power politics and spheres of influence, but his conclusions were undermined by:
- Underestimation of ideology (especially Putin’s nationalist-imperialist vision),
- Neglect of smaller-state agency (Ukraine’s domestic trajectory),
- Overconfidence in Russian strength, and
- Misjudgment of Western cohesion.
In both cause and consequence, Mearsheimer was wrong in key ways, though not necessarily due to bad faith—rather, due to the constraints and blind spots of his theoretical approach.
Would you like a comparison with other IR scholars’ takes, such as Anne Applebaum, Timothy Snyder, or Stephen Kotkin?
You said:
yes
ChatGPT said:
Great — here’s a comparative overview of how other leading thinkers, especially Anne Applebaum, Timothy Snyder, and Stephen Kotkin, diverge from Mearsheimer’s views on both the causes of the war and the trajectory/outcome. These scholars approach the issue from very different frameworks—historical, ideological, and geopolitical—and they provide a strong counterpoint to Mearsheimer’s realist analysis.
1. Anne Applebaum – Historian and journalist (Atlantic, Yale fellow), focus on authoritarianism and post-Soviet space
On the Causes of the War:
- Core Thesis: Russia invaded Ukraine not because of NATO but because Ukraine’s success as a democracy threatened the ideological legitimacy of Putin’s authoritarian regime.
- Applebaum stresses that Putin fears a democratic Ukraine on Russia’s border more than a NATO-aligned one. A free, Western-looking Ukraine could inspire Russians to demand the same.
- She sees the war as a classic authoritarian reaction to internal weakness, not external pressure.
On Mearsheimer:
- Applebaum has openly criticized Mearsheimer’s arguments as naïve, dismissing the idea that Putin was reacting to NATO encroachment in good faith.
- She sees his view as a form of “academic Kremlinology” that strips away the importance of values, democracy, and internal politics.
2. Timothy Snyder – Yale historian, specialist in Eastern Europe, author of “Bloodlands” and “The Road to Unfreedom”
On the Causes of the War:
- Snyder views the invasion as driven by Putin’s fascist-adjacent ideology, which includes the denial of Ukraine’s right to exist.
- He emphasizes that Russian propaganda and doctrine promote the idea of a “Russian World” and that Ukraine is an artificial state.
- He also points to Russia’s 2019 national security policy which explicitly names Ukrainian independence as a threat to Russian identity.
On NATO:
- Snyder argues that NATO is not the cause but the excuse—used to justify aggression after the fact.
- He notes that countries like Finland joined NATO only after the invasion, suggesting that NATO expansion is a response to Russian aggression, not a trigger for it.
On Mearsheimer:
- Snyder has strongly criticized Mearsheimer’s “realism” as morally and factually flawed, comparing it to appeasement logic from the 1930s.
- He accuses Mearsheimer of engaging in deterministic thinking that denies Ukrainians their agency and over-legitimizes Russian fear narratives.
3. Stephen Kotkin – Princeton and Hoover Institution, leading historian of Russia and Stalin
On the Causes:
- Kotkin blends realist and ideological interpretations.
- He agrees that Russia is a declining power trying to punch above its weight and fears the erosion of its influence—but he also emphasizes Putin’s imperial ideology and the dysfunction of a personalized autocracy.
- He’s nuanced: NATO didn’t “cause” the war, but Western passivity post-Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014) emboldened Putin.
On Mearsheimer:
- Kotkin is respectful but critical. He acknowledges that Mearsheimer’s realism helps us see why states say they act, but it fails to explain why they actually act, especially in authoritarian regimes where ideology can trump cost-benefit logic.
- He also notes that Russia had non-violent options to respond to NATO—like diplomacy or soft power—but chose invasion, which realism doesn’t predict well.
Summary Comparison Table
| Scholar | Cause of War | View on NATO | View on Ukrainian Agency | View on Mearsheimer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mearsheimer | NATO expansion threatened Russia | Central cause | Downplayed (Ukraine as pawn) | The war is West’s fault |
| Applebaum | Putin feared a democratic Ukraine | Not causal, scapegoat | Strong focus on Ukrainian democracy | Sees Mearsheimer as dangerously wrong |
| Snyder | Imperial ideology and denial of Ukrainian identity | Post-hoc justification | Central to resistance and legitimacy | Highly critical, sees moral blind spot |
| Kotkin | Mix of power decline, imperial ambition, and authoritarianism | Contributing factor, not core cause | Recognizes agency, especially post-2014 | Partially agrees, but sees key blind spots |
Final Thought:
Mearsheimer’s predictions haven’t held up well, and his theory-centric approach misses the ideological and internal political dynamics that thinkers like Applebaum, Snyder, and Kotkin emphasize. The invasion of Ukraine is as much about Putin’s vision of Russian destiny and the fear of democracy as it is about geopolitics. The war also highlights the failure of Western accommodation after previous Russian aggressions—something these critics say Mearsheimer fails to grapple with.
Would you like a deeper dive into Putin’s ideology or how Ukrainian political evolution factors into this conflict?