Andrew Chrucky’s paper, The Alleged Fallacy of the Sense-Datum Inference, critically examines Roderick Chisholm’s rejection of the sense-datum inference—a key argument in debates about foundationalism and perception. Here’s a structured summary and analysis of the paper:
1. Context and Key Positions
- Sense-data are often invoked by foundationalists (e.g., Russell, Ayer) as the basis of empirical knowledge, while anti-foundationalists (e.g., Rorty, Bonjour) reject them.
- Chisholm is an exception: a foundationalist who rejects sense-data, arguing that the sense-datum inference (from “appears” language to the existence of sense-data) is fallacious.
2. The Sense-Datum Inference
Chisholm formulates the inference in multiple ways, all of which move from statements about how things appear (e.g., “X appears F”) to claims about the existence of appearances (e.g., “There is something F”). For example:
- M appears P to S; therefore, something is P.
- M appears P to S; therefore, there is an appearance which is P.
Chisholm attacks this inference as:
- Deductively invalid (due to counterexamples).
- Inadvisable (it multiplies entities and creates metaphysical problems, like the speckled hen).
3. Chrucky’s Critique
A. Ambiguity in “Appears” Statements
Chrucky argues Chisholm conflates distinct uses of “appears”:
- Epistemic (“appeare”): Expresses belief (e.g., “It seems that X is F”).
- Comparative (“appearc”): Compares to typical cases (e.g., “X looks like F-things usually do”).
- Noncomparative:
- Ostensible (“appearo”): Reports perceptual content without commitment to truth (e.g., “X ostensibly looks F”).
- Phenomenal (“appearp”): Describes raw sensory qualities (e.g., color, shape).
Chisholm’s counterexamples (e.g., “The pail feels empty”) rely on non-phenomenal uses of “appears,” but the sense-datum inference hinges on the phenomenal use (e.g., “The curtain appears green”). Thus, his counterexamples miss the mark.
B. Defense of the Phenomenal Use
Chrucky (following Jackson) defends the irreducibility of phenomenal appearances against reductionist attacks (e.g., Bennett’s comparative analysis, Armstrong’s counterfactual epistemic analysis). He sides with Chisholm’s earlier view that phenomenal talk is distinct and tied to Aristotelian “proper sensibles” (color, shape, etc.).
C. Validity of the Inference
For phenomenal cases (e.g., “The curtain appears green”), the inference to “There is a green appearance” is valid. Chisholm’s objection—that “something” reifies appearances—can be addressed by interpreting “something” transcendentally (not as an external object).
Chrucky concludes that Chisholm fails to show the inference is deductively invalid; he only shows it doesn’t hold for non-phenomenal uses of “appears.”
4. Chisholm’s Shift to Adverbialism
Chisholm later proposes an adverbial theory (e.g., “I am appeared to greenly”) to avoid reifying appearances. Chrucky notes this is a separate debate but hints that Chisholm’s later work (e.g., his 1997 autobiography) abandons adverbialism, endorsing appearances as “individual things.”
5. Key Implications
- The sense-datum inference stands for phenomenal appearances, undermining Chisholm’s early critique.
- The debate hinges on distinguishing uses of “appears” and whether phenomenal properties are irreducible.
- Chisholm’s later reversal suggests the adverbial theory may not fully escape ontological commitments.
Conclusion
Chrucky’s paper clarifies the sense-datum debate by disentangling linguistic ambiguities and defending the inference’s validity in its strongest form. It also highlights shifts in Chisholm’s views, leaving open questions about the metaphysics of perception.
Strengths:
- Clear taxonomy of “appears” uses.
- Effective defense of the phenomenal/sense-datum link.
- Notes Chisholm’s evolving stance.
Limitations:
- Doesn’t fully engage with Chisholm’s later rejection of adverbialism.
- Could explore alternative non-sense-datum accounts of phenomenality.
This paper remains relevant for discussions on perception, foundationalism, and the ontology of appearances.
evaluate
Evaluation of Chrucky’s The Alleged Fallacy of the Sense-Datum Inference
1. Strengths
(a) Clear Distinction of “Appears” Uses
Chrucky’s taxonomy of epistemic, comparative, ostensible, and phenomenal uses of “appears” is a strong contribution. By showing that Chisholm’s counterexamples mostly rely on non-phenomenal cases (e.g., “The woods sound inhabited”), he successfully isolates the phenomenal case (“The curtain appears green”) as the relevant one for sense-data.
(b) Defense of Phenomenal Appearances
His argument that phenomenal appearances (e.g., color, shape) are irreducible counters reductionist attempts (e.g., Bennett, Armstrong). This aligns with foundationalist views that sense-data are necessary for explaining perception.
(c) Exposing Chisholm’s Shifting Position
Chrucky notes Chisholm’s later abandonment of the adverbial theory (in favor of treating appearances as “individual things”), which undermines Chisholm’s earlier objections to reification. This historical observation strengthens his critique.
2. Weaknesses
(a) Limited Engagement with Alternative Theories
Chrucky focuses on defending the sense-datum inference but does not thoroughly engage with competing theories (e.g., direct realism, intentionalism) that might explain phenomenal appearances without sense-data.
(b) Assumption of Irreducibility
While he rejects epistemic/comparative reductions, he does not fully address contemporary representationalist or enactivist accounts that might dissolve the need for sense-data.
(c) Overemphasis on Deductive Validity
Chrucky narrowly focuses on whether the inference is deductively valid, but Chisholm’s broader objection—that sense-data are metaphysically problematic—is not fully countered. Even if the inference is valid, it doesn’t prove sense-data are the best explanation.
3. Philosophical Significance
- For Foundationalism: If the sense-datum inference holds, foundationalists retain a basis for empirical knowledge.
- For Philosophy of Perception: The paper reinforces the need to distinguish phenomenal from other uses of “appears.”
- For Chisholm Scholarship: It highlights an inconsistency in Chisholm’s views, showing his later work may concede the very entities he earlier rejected.
4. Conclusion
Chrucky’s paper is a strong defense of the sense-datum inference against Chisholm’s objections, particularly by clarifying the phenomenal/non-phenomenal distinction. However, it could be strengthened by:
- Engaging with non-sense-datum theories of perception.
- Addressing whether adverbialism or representationalism might avoid sense-data.
- More thoroughly rebutting Chisholm’s metaphysical worries (e.g., the speckled hen).
Final Assessment: A valuable but partial defense—successful in refuting Chisholm’s deductive critique, but not a full vindication of sense-data.
Rating: ★★★★☆ (4/5) – Strong argumentation, but could engage more with competing views.
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