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Before addressing whether Broad’s taxonomy truly exhausts all possibilities and whether emergent materialism is the “best” metaphysical solution, here is a concise overview: Broad proposed 17 logically distinct ways in which mind and matter might relate, laying a comprehensive groundwork for the mind–body problem Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Subsequent philosophers have both built on and critiqued this schema, arguing that new perspectives (e.g., varieties of emergentism, panpsychism, neutral monism) may lie outside Broad’s original grid Information Philosopher. Emergent materialism—a form of nonreductive physicalism—appears especially attractive because it accommodates the apparent irreducibility of consciousness without positing an immaterial substance seansayers.com. However, it faces challenges regarding causal closure and the exclusion problem, leading some to question whether it can deliver on its promise Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Broad’s Seventeen Relations: Scope and Intent
C. D. Broad’s chapter in The Mind and Its Place in Nature systematically enumerates seventeen distinct ways mind and matter could be related, from strict dualism to various forms of materialism and neutral monism StafforiniInformation Philosopher. His aim was to lay out all logically possible positions given a set vocabulary and assumptions, rather than to advocate one positive view ditext.com. As a historical survey, it remains remarkably thorough and has guided generations of philosophers through the conceptual landscape of mental–physical relations Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On Exhaustiveness
Broad’s framework is exhaustive within his chosen logical parameters—namely, combinations of substance vs. property distinctions, causal directions, and reducibility assumptions Information Philosopher. Yet later thinkers have argued that adding dimensions—such as distinctions between weak and strong emergence, or finer-grained accounts of constitutive vs. causal dependence—can yield new “slots” not clearly mapped by Broad’s original grid Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Moreover, movements like panpsychism (everything has proto-mental aspects) or neutral monism (mind and matter are two aspects of one neutral stuff) have been developed beyond Broad’s initial formulations, even if he gestured toward them Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Thus, while his taxonomy remains a foundational reference, many contemporary philosophers view it as a starting point rather than a closed inventory.
Emergent Materialism: Definition and Appeal
Emergent materialism (also called nonreductive physicalism) holds that mental properties emerge from complex physical systems in ways that are not strictly reducible to lower-level physical laws, yet without positing a nonphysical substance seansayers.com. This view preserves the causal efficacy of mental states (e.g., beliefs causing actions) while rooting everything firmly in the natural world, thus aligning well with scientific methods Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It also reflects the intuition that novel properties can appear at higher levels of organization—just as liquidity emerges from water molecules without being present in individual H₂O units Philosophy Ball.
Challenges to Emergent Materialism
Despite its attractions, emergent materialism confronts two major objections. First, the causal exclusion problem: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, then positing emergent mental causes seems superfluous or epiphenomenal Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second, critics argue that ontological physicalism logically entails reductive materialism—so allowing irreducible mental laws appears inconsistent with the metaphysical definition of “physical” PhilPapers. Some have even accused emergent materialism of “having its cake and eating it too” by combining irreducibility with a commitment to physicalism PhilPapers.
Alternatives for Comparison
- Reductive Materialism (Identity Theory): Minds are literally brain states; avoids dualism but struggles with the qualitative “what-it’s-like” of experience Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Substance Dualism: Mind and body are distinct substances; preserves subjective experience but raises interaction puzzles and conflicts with neuroscience Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Panpsychism: Consciousness is a fundamental feature of all matter; offers a unifying picture but risks proliferating mental properties too liberally Wikipedia.
- Neutral Monism: Both mind and matter derive from a more basic neutral stuff; aims for a middle path but requires a coherent account of that neutral substrate Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conclusion
Broad’s seventeenfold taxonomy remains an invaluable tool for mapping the conceptual space of the mind–body problem, but contemporary philosophy generally treats it as open to refinement rather than exhaustive. Emergent materialism stands out as a powerful metaphysical approach because it reconciles scientific naturalism with the apparent irreducibility of consciousness. Nevertheless, it is not without serious challenges—especially regarding mental causation and metaphysical consistency—and so cannot unambiguously be declared the definitive “best” solution. The choice among these positions ultimately hinges on which balancing of explanatory virtues (e.g., ontological parsimony, causal efficacy, phenomenological adequacy) one finds most compelling.