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This passage presents a detailed critique and extension of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy, particularly concerning the problem of how we perceive and conceptualize physical objects. The author engages with Sellars’ views on language acquisition, the nature of perceptual experience, and the relationship between sensory data (sensa) and the conceptual framework of physical objects. Here’s a structured breakdown of the key themes and arguments:
I. The Gap: Seeing Physical Objects
- Sellars’ Assumption of Behaviorese:
- Sellars assumes a pre-existing “Behaviorese” language for the mythical Ryleans but does not explain how they acquire it. This hides the deeper problem of how physical objects are recognized in the first place.
- The author argues that recognizing physical objects requires a concept of physical objects, but how is this concept acquired? Sellars’ answer—through natural and social evolution—is seen as insufficiently specific.
- The Role of Sensa:
- Sellars introduces sensa (non-conceptual sensory states) as theoretical entities to explain perception. However, the author questions how sensa, as unstructured elements, can ground the learning of Behaviorese or the recognition of physical objects.
- The gap between the “Heraclitean flux” of sensory processes and the structured language of physical objects needs bridging, possibly through a Representational System (RS).
- Animals and Pre-Linguistic Concepts:
- Animals and pre-linguistic humans seem to “rs-see” physical objects without logical concepts. This suggests an innate, non-linguistic capacity for perceptual structuring (e.g., “ur-concepts” or “rs-concepts”).
- The author aligns this with theories like Richard Gregory’s (and Helmholtz’s) that perception involves “unconscious inference” or hypothesis formation from sensory data.
- Perception as Hypothesis Formation:
- Perception is likened to forming hypotheses about sensory data, though not in the conscious, linguistic sense. This explains phenomena like ambiguous figures (e.g., the duck-rabbit) and perceptual constancies.
- Sellars critiques this view (e.g., in his debate with Feyerabend), arguing that the “Manifest Image” (common-sense framework) is not a theory about sense data but a distinct conceptual framework.
II. The Computer Analogy
- Sellars uses computer models to explain language and thought but fails to account for perception of physical objects.
- The author distinguishes between:
- Hardware-level logic (innate, unconscious processing of sensory data).
- Software-level logic (conscious, rule-governed language use).
- This suggests a middle ground: animals might use a “weaker” logic (e.g., associative or intuitionistic) to structure perceptions without full conceptual thought.
III. Order of Being vs. Order of Knowing
- Sellars distinguishes between:
- Ontological priority: Thoughts exist before being known (e.g., as neural patterns).
- Epistemic priority: Knowledge of thoughts requires language.
- The author questions whether Sellars grants conceptual thought prior to language. Sellars seems to hold that conceptual thinking emerges only with language learning, while non-conceptual “rs-thoughts” may exist innately.
IV. Logical Construction
- Traditional “logical construction” aims to reduce physical objects to sensory elements, but Sellars seems to propose something different: a theoretical unification of sensory data into objects.
- This is not strict analysis but a “cross-categorical correspondence” (e.g., a pink ice cube as a swarm of molecules).
V. Unalterability of RS-Concepts
- The author argues that some perceptual ways of seeing (e.g., visual illusions like the Müller-Lyer lines) are unalterable and independent of belief.
- This suggests a hardwired, innate stratum of perception (the “Manifest Image”) that persists despite scientific or linguistic sophistication.
Key Disputes and Implications
- Innate Mechanisms:
- The author argues Sellars is committed to innate perceptual structuring (rs-concepts), even if Sellars avoids explicit innatism.
- Perception vs. Theory:
- Sellars rejects the idea that the Manifest Image is a theory about sense data, but the author sees it as analogous to scientific theorizing (just unconscious and non-linguistic).
- Language and Thought:
- Sellars ties conceptual thought tightly to language, but the author suggests pre-linguistic “rs-concepts” may play a foundational role.
Conclusion
The author extends Sellars’ framework by:
- Positing innate, non-linguistic representational systems (RS) to explain perception.
- Drawing parallels between perceptual “hypotheses” and scientific theorizing.
- Highlighting the independence of perceptual constancies/illusions from belief, suggesting an unalterable core to the Manifest Image.
This critique enriches Sellars’ philosophy by addressing gaps in his account of perception and concept acquisition, while also challenging his strict division between non-conceptual sensory experience and linguistically mediated thought.
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