Ambiguity and conflation of Wilfrid Sellars’ “myth of the given.” I say this because the myth of the given is actually an answer to three problems: 1. It is a confimation of Kant dictum: intuitions without concept are blind; concepts without intuitioms are empty. 2. As a corollarry of this, it is not possible to construct a world view with sense-data (Phenomenalism) This is tantamount to using only Humean inferences to get causal connections. 3. As I have argued in my dissertation, the myth of the given is a criticism of Pseudo-Foundationalism in epistemology. It is irrelevant against the use of a given in C.I. Lewis, Chisholm, and the Logical Politivists who used an appeal to the given for verification of empirical claims; not for foundations or premises for knowledge.
ChatGPT said:
Wilfrid Sellars’ critique of the “Myth of the Given” is a pivotal examination of foundationalist epistemology, challenging the notion that knowledge can be directly derived from immediate, non-conceptual experiences. Your observations highlight key aspects of this critique:
- Confirmation of Kant’s Dictum: Sellars’ critique aligns with Immanuel Kant’s assertion that “intuitions without concepts are blind; concepts without intuitions are empty.” Sellars contends that sensory experiences (intuitions) lack epistemic significance without the structuring role of concepts, emphasizing that raw sensory data cannot constitute knowledge independently.
- Rejection of Phenomenalism: By challenging the idea that sense-data alone can form the basis of knowledge, Sellars critiques phenomenalism, which relies solely on sensory data to construct a worldview. He argues that without conceptual frameworks, sense-data cannot yield meaningful knowledge, thereby questioning approaches that depend exclusively on Humean inferences for establishing causal connections.
- Critique of Pseudo-Foundationalism: Sellars’ argument extends to a broader critique of pseudo-foundationalism in epistemology, targeting the reliance on the Given as an unquestionable foundation for knowledge. He challenges the assumption that there are foundational, non-inferential beliefs that serve as the ultimate basis for all knowledge, emphasizing that all empirical knowledge is conceptually mediated.
In summary, Sellars’ critique of the Myth of the Given underscores the indispensability of conceptual frameworks in the formation of knowledge, challenging epistemological models that attempt to base knowledge on non-conceptual foundations.
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You said:
what about the irrelevance
ChatGPT said:
Wilfrid Sellars’ critique of the “Myth of the Given” challenges the notion that knowledge can be founded upon immediate, non-conceptual experiences. This critique is often seen as addressing foundationalist epistemologies that rely on such “givens” as indubitable bases for knowledge.
However, when considering the positions of philosophers like C.I. Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and the Logical Positivists, it’s important to recognize that their appeals to the “given” were not uniformly foundationalist in nature. For instance, C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism acknowledged the role of sensory experiences but emphasized the interpretative function of concepts in making these experiences meaningful. Similarly, while the Logical Positivists utilized empirical verification, they did not necessarily posit sense-data as foundational premises for all knowledge.
Therefore, Sellars’ critique may not directly apply to these positions, as their use of the “given” differs from the foundationalist perspective he targets. This suggests that his arguments against the “Myth of the Given” might be less relevant when addressing epistemological frameworks that do not rely on non-conceptual givens as the ultimate foundation for knowledge.
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is sellars myth of the given a conflation of several problems
Qwen2.5-Max5:26 am
Thinking completed
Okay, the user is asking whether Wilfrid Sellars’ “Myth of the Given” conflates several problems. I need to break this down. First, I should recall what the Myth of the Given actually is. Sellars argues against the idea that there’s a foundational level of knowledge derived directly from experience without any conceptual interpretation. He critiques the notion of “the Given” as a non-conceptual basis for knowledge, which he thinks is a mistake because all experience is conceptually structured. Now, the user is suggesting that Sellars might be conflating different issues here. So, I need to consider what distinct problems might be involved. Let me think. Sellars addresses epistemological issues, like foundationalism, but also touches on semantics and the nature of perception. Maybe he’s combining critiques of different philosophical positions, such as the myth of the Given in both empiricism and phenomenology. Wait, Sellars specifically targets the logical empiricists and their positivist ideas, but also earlier empiricists like Locke or Hume. He might be conflating different versions of the Given. For example, the Given as immediate sensory data versus the Given as a non-inferential justification. These could be separate issues that Sellars treats as one. Also, there’s the aspect of conceptual vs. non-conceptual content. Sellars denies non-conceptual content, but some argue that perception does have a non-conceptual component. So, is he conflating the critique of foundationalism with the rejection of non-conceptual content? That might be a point of contention. Another angle: Sellars’ argument against the Given is part of his broader attack on the “myth” in both philosophy and everyday thinking. He might be grouping together different errors that he sees as stemming from the same root problem—assuming a direct, unmediated access to reality. But some scholars argue that Sellars lumps together different concepts of the Given. For instance, the Given as a metaphysical entity versus an epistemic foundation. By not distinguishing these, he might be oversimplifying the problem. I should also consider responses from other philosophers. Like, John McDowell engages with Sellars and tries to clarify the role of conceptual capacities in experience, perhaps addressing where Sellars might have conflated issues. So, to answer the user: Yes, Sellars’ critique of the Myth of the Given might conflate different problems, such as different types of foundationalism, the role of non-conceptual content, and the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical aspects of the Given. However, others see his approach as a unified critique targeting the core assumption of unmediated cognitive access. The answer should outline these points, discuss possible conflations, and mention differing interpretations in secondary literature.
Wilfrid Sellars’ critique of the “Myth of the Given” is a cornerstone of his philosophical project, targeting the idea that knowledge or justification can arise from a non-conceptual, immediate “given” (e.g., raw sensory data or pure experience). While Sellars’ argument is powerful, some scholars argue that his critique conflates distinct philosophical problems. Here’s a breakdown of the potential conflations and the debate around them:
1. Conflation of Epistemological and Semantic Issues
- The Problem : Sellars often frames the “Myth of the Given” as both an epistemological error (assuming non-inferential justification from brute experience) and a semantic error (treating concepts as separable from the logical space of reasons). Critics argue these are distinct issues:
- Epistemological Given : The idea that foundational knowledge arises from non-conceptual experience (e.g., sense data).
- Semantic Given : The assumption that meaning or reference can be fixed by non-conceptual relations to the world (e.g., causal theories of reference).
- Conflation Charge : By bundling these, Sellars may overlook nuances. For example, rejecting non-conceptual justification (epistemological) doesn’t necessarily entail rejecting non-conceptual content (semantic), as later thinkers like John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus argue.
2. Conflation of Different Versions of the “Given”
- The Problem : Sellars critiques multiple historical versions of the “Given,” such as:
- Empiricist Given (Locke, Hume): Sensory impressions as foundational.
- Phenomenological Given (Husserl): Pure consciousness or intentionality.
- Positivist Given (Carnap, Ayer): Protocol sentences grounded in observation.
- Conflation Charge : These variants differ in scope and structure. For instance, logical positivists treated the “Given” as linguistically codified (protocol sentences), whereas classical empiricists saw it as pre-linguistic. Sellars’ broadsides might oversimplify these differences.
3. Conflation of Foundationalism and the Given
- The Problem : Sellars links the “Myth of the Given” to foundationalism (the view that knowledge requires a secure, non-inferential base). However:
- Not all foundationalists rely on a non-conceptual “Given.” Some (e.g., Aristotle, Descartes) posit conceptual or rational foundations.
- Rejecting the “Given” does not automatically refute all forms of foundationalism, as modern “modest foundationalists” (e.g., Susan Haack) argue.
- Conflation Charge : Sellars equates foundationalism with the “Myth of the Given,” potentially ignoring alternative foundationalist frameworks.
4. Conflation of Perception and Cognition
- The Problem : Sellars insists that “all awareness is a linguistic affair,” denying non-conceptual perceptual content. Critics (e.g., Dreyfus, Noë) argue this conflates:
- Perceptual Content : The raw, non-conceptual “what it’s like” of experience (e.g., seeing red).
- Judgment/Conceptualization : The application of concepts to that content (e.g., labeling it “red”).
- Conflation Charge : Sellars’ denial of non-conceptual content risks ignoring the phenomenological and cognitive science evidence for pre-conceptual perception.
5. Conflation of Normativity and Causality
- The Problem : Sellars emphasizes that meaning and justification operate within the “logical space of reasons,” distinct from causal processes. However, his critique of the “Given” sometimes blurs:
- Causal Efficacy : How sensory input causes beliefs.
- Normative Justification : How beliefs are rationally justified .
- Conflation Charge : By rejecting the Given, Sellars may overlook cases where causal processes (e.g., perception) contribute to justification without being sufficient on their own.
Defenders of Sellars’ Approach
- Proponents argue that Sellars’ conflation is intentional and strategic. By targeting the “Given” as a unified myth —a cluster of assumptions about immediacy, non-conceptuality, and foundationalism—he exposes a deeper error: the failure to recognize that all cognitive content is structured by concepts and inferential relations . For Sellars, the “Given” in any form undermines the holistic, social, and linguistic nature of understanding.
Conclusion
Yes, Sellars’ “Myth of the Given” can be seen as conflating multiple problems, particularly in its treatment of epistemology, semantics, perception, and normativity. However, this conflation is arguably a deliberate philosophical maneuver to challenge a pervasive, cross-cutting dogma in modern philosophy. Whether this approach is a strength (unifying critique) or weakness (oversimplification) remains debated. Subsequent philosophers like McDowell, Brandom, and Rorty have refined Sellars’ ideas, disentangling some strands while preserving his core insight: the inseparability of thought, language, and normativity .
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