This paper examines the common misinterpretation of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy as linguistic idealism, the view that all awareness is dependent on language. The author argues that Sellars does acknowledge pre-linguistic awareness through his concept of “Representational Systems” (RS), which are possessed by animals and pre-linguistic children. These RSs allow for a form of awareness that is not linguistically mediated, contrary to the common interpretation of Sellars’ famous statement “all awareness…is a linguistic affair.”
The author clarifies that Sellars distinguishes between RSs and languages (Ls), with the former being a more primitive system that doesn’t involve logical inferences. This distinction allows Sellars to maintain that while conceptual awareness is tied to language, a more basic form of awareness (rs-awareness) exists independently of language.
The paper further explores the nature of pre-linguistic awareness, drawing on the work of Romane Clark, who argues for the intentionality of sensations and their subject-predicate structure. This analysis supports the idea that a basic form of perception and awareness can exist without language.
In conclusion, the author contends that Sellars’ position is not that of linguistic idealism but rather a nuanced view that recognizes both linguistic and pre-linguistic forms of awareness.