{"id":4843,"date":"2025-04-22T13:12:30","date_gmt":"2025-04-22T13:12:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/?p=4843"},"modified":"2025-04-22T14:26:48","modified_gmt":"2025-04-22T14:26:48","slug":"a-foundational-gap-in-wilfrid-sellars-account","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/2025\/04\/22\/a-foundational-gap-in-wilfrid-sellars-account\/","title":{"rendered":"A foundational gap in Wilfrid Sellars\u2019 account \u2014"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Analysis of ch. 10 of Chrucky&#8217;s dissertation by chatGPT:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This passage critically engages with a foundational tension in Wilfrid Sellars\u2019 theory of perception and conceptual learning \u2014 namely, how it&#8217;s possible to acquire the concept of a <strong>physical object<\/strong> if such a concept is needed in order to perceive one in the first place. The evaluation exposes a gap between:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Empirical experience<\/strong>, especially as Sellars models it using theoretical entities like <em>sensa<\/em>, and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>The acquisition of conceptual and linguistic capacities<\/strong>, particularly the language Sellars calls &#8220;Behaviorese.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Let&#8217;s break down and evaluate the core insights and implications:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">1. <strong>Sellars\u2019 Presupposition of Concept Possession<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The critique opens by noting that <strong>Sellars assumes the Ryleans already possess a language (&#8220;Behaviorese&#8221;)<\/strong>, and hence the concepts required to talk about behavior and physical objects. But this move <strong>presupposes<\/strong> the very thing needing explanation: <em>how these concepts could be acquired in the first place<\/em>. This raises the fundamental philosophical problem:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>How is it possible to acquire the concept of a physical object if that concept is necessary to perceive one?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is a version of the <strong>Myth of the Given<\/strong> problem (which Sellars famously criticizes): it points out that perception itself seems to be conceptually structured, but then questions how concepts get started.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2. <strong>The Role of \u2018Sensa\u2019 and Natural Evolution<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Sellars does try to explain the emergence of language\/concepts via <strong>natural and social evolution<\/strong>, and he posits that <strong>pattern-governed behavior<\/strong> leads to concept acquisition. However, the critique asks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>What are these <em>&#8220;perceptible elements&#8221;<\/em>?<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Are they raw sense data (<em>sensa<\/em>)?<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Is the learner <strong>passively conditioned<\/strong> or <strong>actively constructing<\/strong>?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This raises serious issues about <strong>agency<\/strong>, <strong>innateness<\/strong>, and the nature of perceptual input. Sellars introduces <em>sensa<\/em> as <strong>non-conceptual elements<\/strong> which underlie perception, but the critique rightly notes that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sensa are not <strong>objects of sense cognition<\/strong>, but theoretical postulates.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>There\u2019s no clear story of how these become <strong>organized into the conceptual framework of physical objects<\/strong> without already having some conceptual apparatus in place.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">3. <strong>The Gap Between Process Ontology and Conceptual Perception<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The paper then highlights a deeper ontological problem: Sellars&#8217; <strong>Scientific Image<\/strong> is built on a <strong>Heracleitean process ontology<\/strong> \u2014 a world of processes, not stable objects. So how does a perceiver carve out <strong>physical objects<\/strong> from this flux?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The introduction of Representational Systems (RS) is a useful move by the author: to bridge the gap, there must be some <strong>pre-linguistic representational ability<\/strong> (rs-concepts). Animals, for instance, can seemingly <strong>rs-see<\/strong> physical objects. That suggests:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>The human concept of a physical object <strong>supervenes<\/strong> on a more primitive representational structure.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>But this implies a <strong>hierarchy<\/strong> of concept formation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>rs-concepts<\/strong>: primitive, possibly non-linguistic representations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>ur-concepts<\/strong>: pre-linguistic but structured by logical constructions<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>linguistic concepts<\/strong>: full-blown concepts used in language like Behaviorese<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Thus, Sellars seems forced to <strong>postulate innate representational mechanisms<\/strong> that exist <em>prior<\/em> to language \u2014 a move that leans toward <strong>rationalist or nativist<\/strong> theories of mind (e.g., Chomsky, Fodor) and seems to contradict his <strong>empiricist behaviorist tendencies<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4. <strong>Evaluation of the Critique<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>This is a <strong>strong and sophisticated critique<\/strong> of Sellars on several fronts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It <strong>presses the regress problem<\/strong>: how do we explain the <em>first<\/em> concept acquisition?<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It <strong>identifies the hidden reliance on innateness<\/strong> in Sellars&#8217; account (ur-concepts or rs-concepts).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It <strong>demands a more complete epistemology of perception<\/strong> \u2014 one that explains not just linguistic usage, but how experience gets structured in a way that allows for linguistic conceptualization at all.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>The author\u2019s identification of the need for <strong>rs-concepts<\/strong> as a precursor to linguistic ones is particularly insightful and anticipates current debates in cognitive science and developmental psychology (e.g., core cognition, object permanence in infants, animal cognition).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Final Thought<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>If Sellars is committed to <em>rejecting the Myth of the Given<\/em>, but also needs <strong>non-conceptual sensa<\/strong> and <strong>pre-linguistic conceptual structure<\/strong> to explain perception and language acquisition, then he is either:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>In tension with his own commitments<\/strong>, or<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Obliged to flesh out a much more robust account<\/strong> of innate representational structures and how they become linguistic.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This passage rightly identifies a <em>foundational gap<\/em> in Sellars\u2019 account \u2014 and in doing so, raises important questions for anyone working at the interface of epistemology, philosophy of language, and cognitive science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Would you like to explore how this critique compares with more contemporary thinkers on concept acquisition (e.g., Brandom, McDowell, or even enactivist theorists)?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>yes<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h6 class=\"wp-block-heading\">ChatGPT said:<\/h6>\n\n\n\n<p>Great \u2014 let&#8217;s dive into how <strong>contemporary thinkers<\/strong> have tried to respond to or extend Sellars&#8217; project, particularly regarding <strong>concept acquisition<\/strong> and the nature of perception. We&#8217;ll focus on:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Robert Brandom<\/strong>: inferentialism and the social character of concepts<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>John McDowell<\/strong>: conceptual content of experience and the &#8220;space of reasons&#8221;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Enactivist theories<\/strong>: cognition as embodied interaction with the world<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">1. <strong>Robert Brandom: Inferentialism and the Social Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Brandom builds directly on Sellars and defends a view known as <strong>inferentialism<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>To have a concept is to be able to use it in <strong>inferentially articulated practices<\/strong> (e.g., making claims, giving reasons, drawing consequences).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Language is a <strong>normative social practice<\/strong>. It\u2019s not just about labeling experiences but playing a game where claims can be challenged, justified, or withdrawn.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>How Brandom addresses the gap<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Brandom would agree that there\u2019s no pre-conceptual \u201cgiven\u201d that can serve as a foundation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Concepts arise within <strong>socially governed inferential roles<\/strong> \u2014 essentially, <em>learning a language is learning a role in a norm-governed game<\/em>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>But: this doesn\u2019t explain <em>how you get into the game in the first place<\/em>. Brandom tends to presuppose the existence of participants already capable of minimal discursive participation \u2014 so the critique you raised about Sellars still bites here.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Tension<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Brandom\u2019s account seems to require already-in-place <strong>discursive capabilities<\/strong> \u2014 it&#8217;s not clear how the leap from animal rs-concepts to human conceptual normativity happens.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2. <strong>John McDowell: Mind and World \u2013 Experience is Already Conceptual<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>McDowell takes a different tack: he <strong>embraces<\/strong> the idea that <strong>perception is already conceptually structured<\/strong>. In <em>Mind and World<\/em>, he argues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>There&#8217;s no non-conceptual input (&#8220;Given&#8221;) that justifies knowledge.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Instead, perception is already <strong>infused with conceptual capacities<\/strong> \u2014 when you see a red apple, you see it <em>as<\/em> a red apple because you already have those concepts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>How McDowell addresses the gap<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>He accepts that animals may have perceptual sensitivities, but denies that <strong>our kind of perceptual experience<\/strong> (experience with justificatory power) is possible without conceptual capacities.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>McDowell suggests a <strong>&#8220;minimal empiricism&#8221;<\/strong>: experience is where the world exerts rational constraint on our thinking, but only because our capacities have been shaped by <strong>education into the space of reasons<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Tension<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Critics argue McDowell doesn\u2019t sufficiently explain how conceptual capacities develop in the first place \u2014 he idealizes the result (a rational agent) but doesn\u2019t give a <strong>genetic account<\/strong> of how one gets there from infancy or animal experience.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">3. <strong>Enactivist and Embodied Theories: Concept Acquisition Through Sensorimotor Engagement<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Thinkers like <strong>Francisco Varela<\/strong>, <strong>Evan Thompson<\/strong>, and <strong>Alva No\u00eb<\/strong> represent a break from the Sellarsian model:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Perception is not about representing a world of objects, but about <strong>skilled interaction<\/strong> with a dynamic environment.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Concepts are not imposed on perception, but <strong>emerge from embodied activity<\/strong> in the world.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>How enactivists address the gap<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>They argue the split between sensa and concepts is artificial. Organisms are always <strong>enacting a meaningful world<\/strong> through their actions.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Infants and animals <em>learn<\/em> through embodied engagement \u2014 not by passive conditioning, but through dynamic coupling with the environment.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>This model suggests rs-concepts aren\u2019t internal &#8220;pictures&#8221; or constructions but <strong>structured habits of interaction<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Implications<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Enactivism avoids the problem of how to bootstrap concepts from raw data because it <strong>rejects the idea of raw data altogether<\/strong>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>It offers a possible answer to your critique: the capacity to see physical objects arises from <strong>action-oriented processes<\/strong>, which are developmentally elaborated into conceptual practices in humans.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Comparative Summary:<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Thinker<\/th><th>Role of Concepts<\/th><th>How Are Concepts Acquired?<\/th><th>Relation to Sellars&#8217; Gap<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Sellars<\/strong><\/td><td>Conceptual perception; no &#8220;given&#8221;<\/td><td>Pattern recognition + evolution, but under-specified<\/td><td>Gap exists: unclear how sensa \u2192 concepts<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><strong>Brandom<\/strong><\/td><td>Concepts = inferential roles<\/td><td>Entering social practices<\/td><td>Gap remains: presupposes discursive agency<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><strong>McDowell<\/strong><\/td><td>Experience is conceptual<\/td><td>Education into rational practices<\/td><td>Gap shifted: not explained but normalized<\/td><\/tr><tr><td><strong>Enactivists<\/strong><\/td><td>Concepts as embodied interaction<\/td><td>Emergent from active sensorimotor life<\/td><td>Gap dissolved: no need for internal construction from &#8216;sensa&#8217;<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p>Would you like to develop this into a deeper comparative paper? Or zoom in on one of these views (like McDowell&#8217;s conceptualism vs. enactivism)?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>4o<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Search<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Reason<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Analysis of ch. 10 of Chrucky&#8217;s dissertation by chatGPT: This passage critically engages with a foundational tension in Wilfrid Sellars\u2019 theory of perception and conceptual learning \u2014 namely, how it&#8217;s possible to acquire the concept of a physical object if such a concept is needed in order to perceive one in the first place. The &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/2025\/04\/22\/a-foundational-gap-in-wilfrid-sellars-account\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;A foundational gap in Wilfrid Sellars\u2019 account \u2014&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,61],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4843","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ai-assist","category-philosophy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4843","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4843"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4843\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4846,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4843\/revisions\/4846"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4843"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4843"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4843"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}