{"id":4829,"date":"2025-04-19T12:52:30","date_gmt":"2025-04-19T12:52:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/?p=4829"},"modified":"2025-04-19T12:53:12","modified_gmt":"2025-04-19T12:53:12","slug":"deepseek-on-chrucky-on-sellars","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/2025\/04\/19\/deepseek-on-chrucky-on-sellars\/","title":{"rendered":"DeepSeek on Chrucky on Sellars"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>[Go to Citations]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Edit<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This passage presents a detailed critique and extension of Wilfrid Sellars&#8217; philosophy, particularly concerning the problem of how we perceive and conceptualize physical objects. The author engages with Sellars&#8217; views on language acquisition, the nature of perceptual experience, and the relationship between sensory data (sensa) and the conceptual framework of physical objects. Here\u2019s a structured breakdown of the key themes and arguments:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>I. The Gap: Seeing Physical Objects<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Sellars&#8217; Assumption of Behaviorese<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sellars assumes a pre-existing &#8220;Behaviorese&#8221; language for the mythical Ryleans but does not explain how they acquire it. This hides the deeper problem of how physical objects are recognized in the first place.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The author argues that recognizing physical objects requires a\u00a0<em>concept<\/em>\u00a0of physical objects, but how is this concept acquired? Sellars&#8217; answer\u2014through natural and social evolution\u2014is seen as insufficiently specific.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>The Role of Sensa<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sellars introduces\u00a0<em>sensa<\/em>\u00a0(non-conceptual sensory states) as theoretical entities to explain perception. However, the author questions how sensa, as unstructured elements, can ground the learning of Behaviorese or the recognition of physical objects.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The gap between the &#8220;Heraclitean flux&#8221; of sensory processes and the structured language of physical objects needs bridging, possibly through a\u00a0<em>Representational System (RS)<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Animals and Pre-Linguistic Concepts<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Animals and pre-linguistic humans seem to &#8220;rs-see&#8221; physical objects without logical concepts. This suggests an innate, non-linguistic capacity for perceptual structuring (e.g., &#8220;ur-concepts&#8221; or &#8220;rs-concepts&#8221;).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The author aligns this with theories like Richard Gregory&#8217;s (and Helmholtz&#8217;s) that perception involves &#8220;unconscious inference&#8221; or hypothesis formation from sensory data.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Perception as Hypothesis Formation<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Perception is likened to forming hypotheses about sensory data, though not in the conscious, linguistic sense. This explains phenomena like ambiguous figures (e.g., the duck-rabbit) and perceptual constancies.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sellars critiques this view (e.g., in his debate with Feyerabend), arguing that the &#8220;Manifest Image&#8221; (common-sense framework) is not a\u00a0<em>theory<\/em>\u00a0about sense data but a distinct conceptual framework.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>II. The Computer Analogy<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sellars uses computer models to explain language and thought but fails to account for perception of physical objects.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The author distinguishes between:\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Hardware-level logic<\/strong>\u00a0(innate, unconscious processing of sensory data).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Software-level logic<\/strong>\u00a0(conscious, rule-governed language use).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>This suggests a middle ground: animals might use a &#8220;weaker&#8221; logic (e.g., associative or intuitionistic) to structure perceptions without full conceptual thought.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>III. Order of Being vs. Order of Knowing<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sellars distinguishes between:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><em>Ontological priority<\/em>: Thoughts exist before being known (e.g., as neural patterns).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>Epistemic priority<\/em>: Knowledge of thoughts requires language.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The author questions whether Sellars grants\u00a0<em>conceptual<\/em>\u00a0thought prior to language. Sellars seems to hold that conceptual thinking emerges only with language learning, while non-conceptual &#8220;rs-thoughts&#8221; may exist innately.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>IV. Logical Construction<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Traditional &#8220;logical construction&#8221; aims to reduce physical objects to sensory elements, but Sellars seems to propose something different: a\u00a0<em>theoretical unification<\/em>\u00a0of sensory data into objects.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>This is not strict analysis but a &#8220;cross-categorical correspondence&#8221; (e.g., a pink ice cube as a swarm of molecules).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>V. Unalterability of RS-Concepts<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The author argues that some perceptual ways of seeing (e.g., visual illusions like the M\u00fcller-Lyer lines) are\u00a0<em>unalterable<\/em>\u00a0and independent of belief.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>This suggests a hardwired, innate stratum of perception (the &#8220;Manifest Image&#8221;) that persists despite scientific or linguistic sophistication.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Key Disputes and Implications<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Innate Mechanisms<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The author argues Sellars is committed to innate perceptual structuring (rs-concepts), even if Sellars avoids explicit innatism.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Perception vs. Theory<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sellars rejects the idea that the Manifest Image is a\u00a0<em>theory<\/em>\u00a0about sense data, but the author sees it as analogous to scientific theorizing (just unconscious and non-linguistic).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Language and Thought<\/strong>:\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sellars ties conceptual thought tightly to language, but the author suggests pre-linguistic &#8220;rs-concepts&#8221; may play a foundational role.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The author extends Sellars&#8217; framework by:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Positing innate, non-linguistic representational systems (RS) to explain perception.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Drawing parallels between perceptual &#8220;hypotheses&#8221; and scientific theorizing.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Highlighting the independence of perceptual constancies\/illusions from belief, suggesting an unalterable core to the Manifest Image.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This critique enriches Sellars&#8217; philosophy by addressing gaps in his account of perception and concept acquisition, while also challenging his strict division between non-conceptual sensory experience and linguistically mediated thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>New<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>[Go to Citations] Edit This passage presents a detailed critique and extension of Wilfrid Sellars&#8217; philosophy, particularly concerning the problem of how we perceive and conceptualize physical objects. The author engages with Sellars&#8217; views on language acquisition, the nature of perceptual experience, and the relationship between sensory data (sensa) and the conceptual framework of physical &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/2025\/04\/19\/deepseek-on-chrucky-on-sellars\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;DeepSeek on Chrucky on Sellars&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60,61],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4829","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ai-assist","category-philosophy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4829","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4829"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4829\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4830,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4829\/revisions\/4830"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4829"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4829"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4829"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}