{"id":3779,"date":"2019-02-05T23:48:29","date_gmt":"2019-02-05T23:48:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/?p=3779"},"modified":"2024-11-17T21:35:09","modified_gmt":"2024-11-17T21:35:09","slug":"bullshit-bullshitters-and-bull-sessions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/ditext.com\/wordpress\/2019\/02\/05\/bullshit-bullshitters-and-bull-sessions\/","title":{"rendered":"Bullshit, Bullshitters, and Bull Sessions"},"content":{"rendered":"\nHarry Fankfurt must be given credit for initiating an interest in clarifying the concepts of “bullshit,” \n“bullshitter.” and “bull session.” His essay — which became a small best-selling book — gave rise to other \nefforts at clarification. and now my own. My overall assessment is that although all the efforts capture \naspects of bullshit and bullshitters, none have captured the genus and differentia. For one, starting with \nFrankfurt, most think that a bullshitter is, by definition, a conveyor of bullshit; or, conversely, wherever \nthere is bullshit, there is a bullshitter. My thesis is that this is wrong. The concepts of a bullshitter and \nthat of bullshit are independent concepts, i.e., one does not imply the other. To the Frankfurts, I make \nwhat to them is a paradoxical claim that a bullshitter does not have to resort to bullshit. In fact, the more \nsophisticated bullshitter will never use bullshit. And conversely, the more bullshit we detect, the less \nlikely is it coming from a sophisticated bullshiter.\n

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\n\nTo make these claims plausible, I have to clarify the concepts of “bullshit” and “bullshitter.” \n<\/p>

\n\nBullshit<\/b>\n<\/p>

\n\nThose who say “bullshit” do so in reaction to some utterance or group of utterances. Saying “bullshit” is \na dysphemistic way of expressing a rejection. Only in this sense, is “bullshit” a unitary concept. But the \nthings to which a rejection applies are varied. This requires a listing. The first thing that comes to mind is \na determination that a claim is false. If we used a neutral expression, i.e., neither a euphemism nor a \ndysphemism, we would say “That is false.” But resorting to a dysphemism — for whatever reason — we \nsay “That is bullshit.”\n<\/p>

\n\nWhat I have written above indicates the pattern for various other rejections. So, to save space, all I need \ndo is present a table with neutral rejections and equivalent dysphemistic rejections.\n<\/p>
\n Object of Rejection<\/b><\/td>Neutral Rejection<\/b><\/td>Dysphemistic Rejection<\/b>\n <\/td><\/tr>
Statement<\/td>False<\/td>Bullshit\n <\/td><\/tr>
Statement or Group of Statements<\/td> Nonsensical or Meaningless <\/td> Bullshit \n <\/td><\/tr>
Subject of Discourse<\/td> Trivial or Unimportant <\/td> Bullshit\n <\/td><\/tr>
Argument<\/td> Invalid or Weak <\/td> Bullshit\n <\/td><\/tr>
Proposal <\/td> Impractical, Unworkable, Unrealistic<\/td>Bullshit\n <\/td><\/tr>
[Demand to do something<\/td>“No”<\/td> “Bullshit”\n<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table>

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\n\nBullshitter<\/b>\n<\/p>

\n\nWhat all the writer on the nature of a bullshitter have missed is the identification of the bullshitter with \nPlato’s portrayal of a Sophist, and his contemporary embodiments in the lawyer, the politician, and the \nsalesman. The essential trait of a bullshitter is not, as Frankfurt thinks, with a sloviness towards truth. \nbut in the fact that he is more interested is winning or succeeding at whatever that he is trying to \naccomplish. And, the better he is at bullshitting, the more he is interested in knowing what the truth is. \nBut his interest in the truth is not to express it, but to manipulate it to his advantage.\n<\/p>

\n\nThe goal of a lawyer is to win. He may take a case in which he is indifferent to the guilt or innocence of \nhis client (an indifference to the truth), and his goal is for his client to prevail. Now, in his arsenal of \ntechniques for winning, he may resort to using bullshit \u2014 meaning making false statement, pursuing a trivial matter, or using the panopoly of fallacies, such as ad hominem, red herring, appeal to emotions, etc. But if he is a sophisticated lawyer facing a sophisticated prosecutor, jury. and judge, then he may \ndecide not to use bullshit of any kind. He will resort to various omissions of relevant material, and to \nselectively focus on issues to his advantage. Exactly the same strategy could be used by a politician and \nsalesman. They are all bullshitters because they use language for the sake of winning (and not for \ngaining knowledge or finding the truth) — and depending on the context, they will resort to or refrain \nfrom using bullshit.\n<\/p>

\n\nBull Session\n<\/b><\/p>

\n\nI think that Frankfurt is right in thinking of a bull session as a sort of explorations of hypotheses. This \nexploration can be done in a frivolous or a serious manner. Participant can pretend to hold particular \nviews, and see what the reaction is. This can be done for sheer entertainment or to learn mind-sets of \nothers. or whatnot. A bull session does not have to include any bullshitters or bullshit — though it may \ninclude both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ChatGPT said:<\/h6>
ChatGPT<\/text><\/path><\/svg><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>

The text you’re sharing provides a nuanced philosophical reflection on the concepts of “bullshit,” the “bullshitter,” and “bull sessions.” The author appears to be engaging with Harry Frankfurt’s famous essay On Bullshit<\/em> (2005), which examines the phenomenon of bullshit in contrast to lying, and offers a critique of Frankfurt’s work, adding their own insights into the nature of these concepts.<\/p>

Let’s break down some of the key arguments and themes in the text:<\/p>

Bullshit<\/strong><\/h3>

The text starts by clarifying that “bullshit” is a term typically used as a dysphemism to express rejection or disapproval of a statement or argument. This is different from the more neutral term “false.” The term “bullshit” can apply to a variety of situations:<\/p>