1. I.e., the Greeks of the orthodox tradition. The Cynics and, following them, the Stoics, laid the foundation of the larger view.
2. See The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 149, etc.
3. In the Introduction to his second edition (p. xxix) Dr Bosanquet seems to recognize some of the difficulties of his position, and speaks of a social co-operation which does not belong strictly either to the state or to the private person. If this admission is pressed, it will be found fatal to his first definition of the state as the entirety of the social fabric.
4. The hindrance of hindrances is indeed so vague an expression that almost anything can be extracted out of it, e. g., we are told (p. 172) that the state hinders illiteracy by compelling education. When formulae are so stretched it is a sign of something wrong in the theory underlying them. In public education two functions of the state are involved. (1) Compulsion, which is necessary to secure the right of the child against a neglectful parent, a right which, like all rights, is a condition of social welfare, and (2) the organization of public resources for a public object. We too often tend to think of such organization in terms of compulsion because it involves taxation. But taxation is not adequately conceived when thought of as the compulsory taking from individuals of property which is absolutely theirs. There are social factors in production, and therefore elements due to society rather than to the individual, which can only be secured for the community by the mechanism of the state. Taxation is a very rough, and in practice not always an equitable, method of securing these elements of collective wealth, but to secure them for common objects and organize their application is one of the functions of the state which is entirely missed by Dr Bosanquet's account.
6. Principle of Individuality, p. 112.
7. It is remarkable that in another connection Dr Bosanquet writes, "Nothing is properly due to finite mind, as such, which never was a plan before any finite mind." -- Principle of Individuality, p. 152.
8. For Hegel philosophy comes after reality, and has merely to interpret it. -- Phil. des Rechts. p. 20.
9. In the actual controversy with the conscientious objectors to military service the state has definitely put itself in the wrong. For a mechanism was devised for exempting the small number of men whose principles were perfectly well known and who could not be expected to change them on demand without incurring personal dishonour. This mechanism was such as to leave the general obligation to service untouched, and the refusal of the handful of objectors in no way obstructed the organization of the man-power of the country as a whole. But the machinery was not consistently applied, with the result that some conscientious objectors were left unmolested and others sentenced to long and repeated terms of rigorous imprisonment. This is state action at its worst, arbitrary, inconsistent and vindictive, and persistent in its wickedness. I rejoice to read in Dr Bosanquet's new volume that "the conscientious objector will follow his conscience to the end, and if we believe him to be sincere we all respect him for it," I rejoice, but with some bewilderment, for I cannot fuse the spirit of this remark (and of some others in Social and International Ideals) with the general spirit of The Philosophical Theory of the State.