Herbert Feigl, The "Mental" and the "Physical": The Essay and a Postscript (1967).

Concluding Remark.

An essential part of the justification of the philosophical monism proposed in this essay depends upon empirical, scientific assumptions. Only the future development of psychophysi-ology will decide whether these assumptions are tenable. Since I am not a laboratory scientist (though I did some laboratory work in physics and chemistry in my early years), I cannot responsibly construct psychophysiological hypotheses. Nor did I intend to close the doors to alternative philosophical views of the relations of the mental to the physical. What I did try to show, however, is that monism is

  1. still very plausible on scientific grounds,
  2. philosophically defensible in that it involves no insurmountable logical or epistemological difficulties and paradoxes.
I realize fully that I could deal only with some of the perplexities which have vexed philosophers or psychologists throughout the ages, and especially in recent decades. Just where the philosophical shoe pinches one, just which problems strike one as important -- that depends, of course, on a great many more or less accidental personal, educational, or cultural factors. Despite my valiant efforts to deal with what strike me as important and baffling questions, I may of course not even have touched on other facets which some of my readers might consider as the essential problems of mind and body. May others come and deal with them!