{1} Frank Jackson, Perception (Cambridge, 1977).
{2} J.F. Soltis, Seeing, Knowing and Believing (London, 1966). G.J. Warnock, "Seeing," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. R.J. Swartz (New York: Doubleday, 1965). Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
{3} Frank Jackson, Perception: A Representative Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 5.
{5} James Cornman, Materialism and Sensations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 65.
{6} Wilfrid Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1976), #34.
{7} Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), 150.
{8} Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 22.
{9} Chisholm, Perceiving, 150.
{10} Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 23, 52.
{11} Sellars,"Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #28.
{13} Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, ch. 3.
{14} Wilfrid Sellars, "Phenomenalism," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963), 60.
{15} Wilfrid Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception," Philosophical Studies 41 (1982), 87, #17.
{16} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #37; idem, "Sensa or Sensings," 84, #5.
{18} Perhaps an exception is Sellars' pink ice cube.
{19} See Roderick Firth, "The Men Themselves; or The Role of Causation in our Concept of Seeing," in Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967): 357-382; Chisholm, Perceiving, 153-156; Jackson, Perception, 19-20.
{20} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #30.
{21} Chisholm, Perceiving, ch. 4.
{22} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), 309, #53.
{23} This was also pointed out by John Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 36-37.
{24} C.W.K. Mundle, Perception: Facts and Theories (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 16.
{25} Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings," 89, #29.
{26} Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 32.
{31} Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), 77.
{32} Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, 65.
{33} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 151.
{34} H.P. Grice, "The Causal Theory of Perception," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. R.J. Swartz (New York: Anchor, 1965), 441.
{36} Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1967), 101.
{39} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 152.
{40} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 156.
{41} Wilfrid Sellars, "Phenomenalism," in Science, Perception, and Reality; idem, "Philosophy of Mind;" idem, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975): 295-347; idem, "Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception," Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 83-114; idem, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" idem, "Giveness and Explanatory Coherence," The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 612-24; idem, "More on Giveness and Explanatory Coherence," in Justification and Knowledge, edited by George Pappas, (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979): 169-182; idem, "Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures," The Monist 64 (1981): 3-90; idem, "Seeing, Seeming, and Sensing," in The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann, edited by M.S. Gram and E.D. Klemke, (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1974): 195-215; idem, "Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception," Philosophical Studies 41 (1982): 83-114; idem, "Seeing, Sense Impressions, and Sensa: A Reply to Cornman," The Review of Metaphysics 24 (1970-1971): 391-447.
{42} Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings," 89, #26.
{43} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" 19. See also his "Carus Lectures," 21-22.
{44} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #40.
{45} Lewis, Mind and the World Order, 63.
{46} Firth, "Percept Theory."
{47} Sellars, "Phenomenalism," 67.
{49} Wilfrid Sellars, "Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism: A Critique of Nagel and Feyerabend on Theoretical Explanation," in Philosophical Perspectives.
{51} Bruce Aune, "Comments on Sellars' 'Phenomenalism'," in Intentionality, Minds, and Perception, edited by H-N. Castañeda (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967).
{52} Sellars, "Phenomenalism," 67.
{55} Roderick Chisholm, "The Theory of Appearing," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. R.J. Swartz (New York: Anchor, 1965), 173.
{56} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem," in Philosophical Perspectives, 382.
{57} Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1967), 17.
{58} Chisholm, Perceiving, 115-116.
{59} Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 95.
{61} Chisholm, Perceiving, 151.
{62} Sellars, "Phenomenalism," 90-91.
{63} Romane Clark, "The Sensuous Content of Perception," in Action, Knowledge and Reality, edited by H.N. Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975), 112.
{64} Sellars, "Structure of Knowledge," 306, #42.
{66} Clark, "The Sensuous Content of Perception," 117.
{68} Romane Clark, "Sensuous Judgments," Nous 7 (1973), 53.
{69} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Intentional Realism of Evert Hall," in Philosophical Perspectives, 110.
{70} Clark, "Sensuous Content," 123.
{72} Clark, "Sensuous Judgments," 54.
{74} Richard E. Aquila, "Perceptions and Perceptual Judgments," Philosophical Studies 28 (1975), 27.
{75} Winston Barnes,"The Myth of Sense-Data," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. R.J. Swartz (New York: Anchor, 1965): 138-167.
{76} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #26.
{78}"Analysis of Visual Experience," Metaphilosophy 6 (1975): 127-135.
{83} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation," Metaphilosophy 6 (1975): 144-160.
{84} Thomas Vinci, "Sellars and the Adverbial Theory of Sensation," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1981): 199-217.
{86} Michael Tye, "The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience," The Philosophical Review 93, no. 2 (April 1984): 195-225.
{87} Albert Casullo, "A Defense of Sense-Data," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48, no. 1 (Sept. 1987).
{88} Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings," 89, #26.
{96} H.H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen & Co., 1932), 3.
{99} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #43.
{100} Ibid., #45. Perception (London: Methuen & Co., 1932), 3.
{99} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #43.
{101} Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings," 98, #53.
{106} Sellars, "Is Scientific Realism Tenable?" #42.
{108} Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings," 105, #78.
{110} See my criticism of the Manifest Image in chapter 2.
{111} Bertrand Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics," in Mysticism and Logic (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 143.