{1} C.F. Delaney, "Theory of Knowledge" in The Synoptic Vision: Essays on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. C.F. Delaney, Michael J. Loux, Gary Gutting, W. David Solomon (University of Notre Dame Press, 1977): 1-42. James Cornman, "Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Justification," American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 287-297. William P. Alston, "What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?" Synthese 55 (1983): 73-96.
{2} Cornman, "Empirical Justification," 296.
{3} Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963).
{4} Alston, "Immediate Knowledge," 80.
{5} Laurence Bonjour, Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 9.
{6} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), 332.
{8} Bonjour, Structure, 22-23.
{9} Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. This paper presents counterexamples to the formula that knowledge is justified true belief.
{10} Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975). Keith Lehrer, "Why Not Skepticism?" in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978): 346-363.
{11} Sextus Empiricus, Outline of Pyrrhonism, trans. R.G. Bury, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), 8.
{15} Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 159.
{17} This use of 'the given' is appropriate if sense perceptions are presented to us involuntarily.
{18} C.I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929), 125.
{19} Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963), 170.
{20} Roderick Chisholm, "A Version of Foundationalism," in The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1982), 13.
{22} Ibid., 30. See also Laurence Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (Jan. 1978), 5.
{23} This same interpretation of foundationalism is given by Nicolas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford, 1973), 207.
{24} See Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science 15 (1948): 135-75.
{25} I mean this model to include a statistical syllogism as a species.
{26} Roderick Chisholm, "The Problem of Empiricism," reprinted in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. R. J. Swartz (New York: Anchor, 1965). C. I. Lewis, "Professor Chisholm and Empiricism," reprinted in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing.
{27} A. J. Ayer, for example, has given up phenomenalism and defends realism on something like this reasoning in The Central Questions of Philosophy (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973; New York: William Morrow and Company, 1975). See also his replies to critics in Perception and Identity, ed. C. F. Macdonald (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
{28} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 164.
{29} Since for Sellars an inference is a type of causal relation, it is necessary to distinguish an inferential cause from a non- inferential cause. See above the chapter on language and thought.
{31} David M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth and Knowledge (Cambridge, 1973). Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969). R. G. Meyers, "Sellars' Rejection of Foundations," Philosophical Studies 39 (1982): 61-78. Alston, William P., "Two Types of Foundationalism," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) 165-185.
{32} Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5, Studies in Epistemology. eds. P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, and H.K. Wetstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980): 53-73.
{33} Alston, "Immediate Knowledge," 85.
{34} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 144, #19.
{35} W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960), 44.
{36} Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 109.
{38} Ibid. He cites Sellars' "Philosophy of Mind," 146-7, #18.
{39} As to his argument, Lehrer seems to think that having a concept of an adverbial state, such as being appeared-to-redly, entails "independent information." And he uses the implicit principle that if any claim entails "independent information," then that claim is corrigible. I am unable to assess this reasoning, because I don't know what he means by his claim that being appeared-to-redly entails independent information. This is a problem because I cannot figure out how Lehrer would distinguish "dependent" from "independent" information -- especially since he classifies semantical information as "independent". For example, suppose I say 'This is red'. On my rendition of the semantics involved, this statement depends on understanding 'This is not not-red' and 'This is not blue', and such. On Lehrer's view, this kind of semantical knowledge apparently is to be understood as independent information. If Lehrer's point is that all linguistic information is independent information, then my position viz a viz this is that there is foundational pre-linguistic information of being appeared-to-redly which does not entail independent information.
{41} Ibid., 26. A systematic attempt at distinguishing and criticizing these concepts appears in D. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 100-113. And a comprehensively systematic approach is given by W. Alston in "Varieties of Privileged Access," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 223-241.
{42} Nelson Goodman, "Sense and Certainty," in Problems and Projects (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1972), 60-61.
{43} Bruce Aune, Knowledge, Mind, and Nature (New York: Random House, 1967), 34-35.
{44} O.K. Bouwsma, "Descartes' Evil Genius," Philosophical Review 58 (Jan. 1949): 141-151.
{45} Bruce Aune, Knowledge, Mind and Nature, 33.
{46} Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 307-308.
{47} Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 44.
{48} Wilfrid Sellars to Henri-Neri Castañeda, "Correspondence between Hector Casta¤eda and Wilfrid Sellars on Philosophy of Mind," unpublished (1961-1962), 35.
{50} Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York: Hoeber-Harper, 1961).
{51} Howard Gardner, The Shattered Mind (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), ch. 4.
{53} Sellars to Castañeda, 19.
{57} Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 44.
{58} Wilfrid Sellars, "Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience," in Essays in Philosophy and its History (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1974), 60.
{59} Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Macmillan Company, 1929); reprint (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 4-5. 26
{60} From the Kantian perspective, which Sellars adopts, the question of epistemology is: How is knowledge or epistemology possible? And once the necessity of language is acknowledged for cognition, ". . . epistemology, in this context, becomes the theory of this [linguistic] functioning -- in short transcendental linguistics." W. Sellars, "Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience," in Essays in Philosophy and Its History (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1974), 59.
{61} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 170.
{62} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), 345-346.
{63} R.G. Meyers, "Sellars' Rejection of Foundations," Philosophical Studies 39 (1982), 64.
{67} Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 169.
{69} Castañeda to Sellars, 25.
{70} Sellars to Castañeda, 36. See also Sellars, "Philosophy of Mind," 169, #37.
{71} Wilfrid Sellars, "Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism: A Critique of Nagel and Feyerabend on Theoretical Explanation," in Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield, Illinois: Charles Thomas, 1967), 353.
{72} Cornman, "Empirical Knowledge," 296.
{73} Wilfrid Sellars, "Theoretical Explanation," in Philosophical Perspectives, 335.
{74} Roderick Chisholm, "A Version of Foundationalism," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), 551-552.
{76} Sellars to Castañeda, 35.
{78} Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 32-33.
{79} Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), 62.
{81} Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 33.
{83} Laurence Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?" American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (Jan. 1978), 10.
{84} See below my chapter on perception for objections to Chisholm's purported refutation of the sense-datum inference.
{85} C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1946), ch. 6.
{86} Roderick Firth, "Reply to Sellars," Monist 64 (1981), 93.
{87} Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, ch. 6.
{88} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Intentional Realism of Everett Hall," in Philosophical Perspectives.
{89} Romane Clark, "The Sensuous Content of Perception," in Action, Knowledge and Reality, ed. H.N. Castañeda (Indianapolis: The 28 Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975).
{90} Clark, "Sensuous Content," 126.
{91} Lewis, Analysis, 131.
{92} Ibid., 138-139.
{93} Ibid., 134.
{94} Ibid., 134.
{95} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Role of Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience," in Categories: A Colloquium, ed. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (Pennsylvania State University, 1978), 237.
{97} I am putting the 'rs-' prefixes to make sure that we don't confuse these analogous (truncated) pre-conceptual descriptions with their conceptual counterparts.
{98} Sellars, "Role of Imagination," 237.
{99} The propria persona principle is the thesis that if something in fact (by theory) has categorical feature C, we must be aware of it as C.
{100} Wilfrid Sellars, "Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception," Philosophical Studies 41 (1982), 89, #26.
{101} Firth, "Reply to Sellars."
{102} See Roderick Firth, "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. R.J. Swartz (New York: Anchor, 1965), 248.