Why is the world enamored by the Leader principle (except Switzerland)?

A single person in any capacity of making decisions is subject to advancing his own self-interest, subject to bribery, and subject to threats. Let us call this “corruption.”

I advance the following claim.

If it is possible for a leader to be corrupted, he will be corrupted.

This is just a rephrasing of the old adage that power tends to corrupt.

The ancient world of the Greeks and Romans knew this, and called a single leader a “dictator.” To offset this evil, Sparta had two kings, while the Roman Republic had two consuls — with veto powers over each other.

So why is it that everywhere in the world, we democratically give power to dictators?

Identifying default intellectuals

Richard Wolff keeps repeating that in trying to assess the merits of some claim, it is wise to listen to the proponents and the opponents of the claim. His interest is in the evaluation of capitalism. However, he does not tell us who he thinks is the best proponent of capitalism, but he does tell us that a formidable opponent of capitalism was Karl Marx.

Well, I am not ready to become a Marx scholar — there is too much to read. I want some trustworthy intellectual to tell me in a succinct formulation what I should learn from Marx. Who should I listen to?

And the above reasoning applies to all claims. The problem is this. It is living people who are writing and speaking on popular media and making an impact. And this is what creates something like “current popular opinions.” Couple this with a belief that the new is better than the old — a sort of belief in the inevitability of progress — and the “old” is placed in the dustbin of the antiquated.

It is true that the natural sciences and technologies advance, but this does not seem to be true of the moral and social studies where there is ongoing controversy.

To deal with this problem, I have sought to find intellectuals who have an aura of wisdom and authority. In the past — until the scientific revolution — Plato and Aristotle played such a role. They acted as a “benchmark” for evaluating claims. A few years ago I advocated treating the views of the British philosopher C. D. Broad for this role of a “benchmark,” giving the name “default philosopher” to such a role.

This is not to deprive other philosophers of a high status, but the fact remains that someone who lives later and can critically evaluate the scholarship of the past — has an advantage, provided he has done so well.

For topics not dealth with by C. D. Broad, I would extend the status of a default philosopher to Bertrand Russell.

As to present global affairs — involving war, economics, and politics — the current “default intellectual” — if I may use this phrase — is, for me: Noam Chomsky.

What is the practical implication of this view? One should read Chomsky, and when listening or reading where a claim is made about present global affairs, ask yourself: What is Noam Chomsky view on this?

I like to read axiomatized versions of books

First, what does it mean to “axiomatize” an argumentative book? It is to divide the propositions of the book into two parts, called “axioms” and “theorems.” The axioms will be statements which are asserted, but which cannot be derived deductively or inductively from other statements; the theorems will be those statements which can be derived from the axioms by deduction and induction. When philosophers treat a book in the above manner, they normally do not use the word “axiom”; instead they talk about “foundations,” “premises,” “assumptions,” “presuppositions,” and such.

The paradigm of this “axiomatic” approach as applied to argumentative books is Bertrand Russell’s book A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz (1900) in which Russell claims that Leibniz’s metaphysics is based on five premises. Here are Russell’s words:

The principal premisses of Leibniz’s philosophy appear to me to be five. Of these some were by him definitely laid down, while others were so fundamental that he was scarcely conscious of them. I shall now enumerate these premisses, and shall endeavour to show, in subsequent chapters, how the rest of Leibniz follows from them. The premisses in question are as follows:

  1. Every proposition has a subject and a predicate.
  2. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.)
  3. True propositions not asserting existence at particular times are necessary and analytic, but such as assert existence at particular times are contingent and synthetic. The latter depend upon final causes.
  4. The Ego is a substance.
  5. Perception yields knowledge of an external world, i.e. of existents other than myself and my states.

The fundamental objection to Leibniz’s philosophy will be found to be the inconsistency of the first premiss with the fourth and fifth; and in this inconsistency we shall find a general objection to Monadism.

What am I driving at with this? Let us take as an example John Rawl’s book A Theory of Justice (1971). It is a massive book of over 600 pages. It is very difficult to keep track of everything which is being asserted and argued for. But a reader has to have an understanding of the book before making an assessment. What is needed is some kind of skeletal structure of the book — a digest, divided into, what I am calling “axioms” and “theorems.” Such an analysis is provided by R. M. Hare in two articles, consisting of 22 pages: “Rawl’s Theory of Justice.”

Other such “axiomatizations” are provided by C. D. Broad in his Five Types of Ethical Theory (1930), especially of Sidgwick’s monumental Methods of Ethics.

What is the merit of such axiomatizations? It makes understanding and critical assessment easier.


The philosopher who was most conscious of this approach was James W. Cornman, who presented his arguments in the form of explicit premises and conclusions.

Bullshit about “Influence”

It is natural to seek explanations. And we are very successful in doing this with inanimate things, as in physics and chemistry. When it comes to living things — well, it gets fuzzy. And when it comes to explaining human activity, it gets to be perplexing. There is in humans something analogous to Aristotle’s saying that “nature abhors a vacuum.” It is to the effect that “the human psyche abhors a tabula rasa.” The result: myths. And in everyday life, there is the aversion to acknowledge ignorance; hence, the production of some claim or other — bullshit.

Why am I dwelling on this. It has to do with my very long uneasiness with claims to “influence.” In trying to understand the actions (including the linguistic acts of writing), all types of explanations are sought. And since causal explanations like those in physics or chemistry are out of place, some other explanations are sought. These are segregated into “influences” and “reasons.” “Reasons” I understand; “influences” leave me puzzled.

Reflecting on my own history. I would say that I was influences by the writings of Wilfrid Sellars and C. D. Broad — among others. How so? Simply in the fact that I read them and critically reflected on what they claimed or argued for. Did I agree with them? In some things, yes; in other things, no.

Alfred North Whitehead, in his book Science and the Western World, talked about presuppositions of the age. And Eric Dodds, in his Greeks and the Irrational, talked about an “inherited conglomerate.” Stephen Pepper talked about “World Hypotheses” as based on models and analogies. And when Descartes said “Cogito ergo sum,” he could have been a bit more reflective in recognizing that what he wrote was in a language. Call this linguistically presupposed set of implicit beliefs, a Weltanschauung. Given this understanding, I would acknowledge that I, and everyone else, is influenced by a Weltanschuung, which has a temporal and a geographical location.

Why am I dwelling on this? I am interested in politics and economics, and I have read a few books which I have tried to juxtapose with each other. Incidentally, I keep discovering old books which seem to be excellent, but which I have never heard of either in my experience with higher education, not in current articles or books . . . But then reflecting on the fact that most books in a library are picking up dust . . .

Anyway, I read Oppenheimer’s The State, and he makes constant reference to Ratzel’s “History of Mankind” and Gumplowicz’s “Der Rassenkamp.” I have also recently read some Max Weber and some Karl Marx. And most recently I have returned to Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies. Popper is concerned with what he calls “totalitarianism,” which is exemplified by Hitler and Nazi Germany. The Closed Society, he identifies with Tribalism, which in modern times expresses itself, for Popper, as Nationalism. Such a society has a Leader, who has a plan of Holistic or Utopian Engineering. Such totalitarian societies are closed to criticism through censorship.

Popper does a Herculean labor of examining the views of practically the whole history of philosophy, and his criticisms are to the point, insightful, and convincing for the most part. He is critically examing the political views of philosophers and some economists. If one were to justify or rationalize totalitarian practices — then yes, this is the sort of study to do. But such a study as Popper’s is relevant only to scholars who study and criticize the apologists of totalitarianism.

But understanding and explaining totalitarianism is a different matter. But really, how, for example, are the views of political and economic writers relevant to what Hitler did. If Hitler created a totalitarian State, the question should be how and why. Let us compare the mind of Hitler and that of Trump in some respects — like reading. Hitler, I assume was a sincere chauvinistic Nationalist, in the sense that he believed that Germans were superior to others and that Germans should be settled in the regions of Ukraine, by wiping out the indigenous populations. (Remind you of the American treatment of Native Americans? Or the colonial practices of England in Africa and India? Of the Belgian treatment of the Congo?) I suppose Rudyard Kipling’s phrase “white man’s burden” is a rationalization and an encouragement for Americans to take over the Philippines in 1898.

From one perspective, what Hitler did was a form of colonization which all of Europe had been practicing in remote regions of the world; in particular, Hitler followed the American plan of manifest destiny by expanding the German homeland. Other European countries justified themselves by the “white man’s burden” in respect to savages. Well, Hitler extended the coverage of “savages” to include Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs. And where others killed the indigenous people in makeshift ways, he did it efficiently. It is said that he modeled himself after the Armenian genocide of 1915 and the herding of American natives into reservations (concentration camps).

I don’t see how Popper’s book explains what Hitler did, as it would not explain anything which Trump does. Hitler took the practice of colonialism in a direction adjacent to Germany; while Trump will continue American imperialism, not because of any theory, but because he has the power, and he will use it for his own benefit, as he sees fit. As far as I know, neither Hitler nor Trump are intellectuals of any depth — so the literary tradition of the scholar has no relevance for them.

What is the relevant question? How does a person like Hitler or Trump get such power? And the answer is straightforward. There is the almost universal political practice in the world to give power to a single individual — a monarch, a president, a prime minister, a chancellor; and on a smaller scale to a governor or mayor. And once this power is given, there may or may not be ways to control this power. While it is hoped that these autocrats are benevolent; for the most part, they are not. Only Switzerland has wisely refused to give executive power to a single individual; giving it instead to a council of seven. The modern model of giving power to a council, comes from the French Revolution, but, as we know, it degenerated to the dictatorship of Napoleon. So power structures of any kind are precarious.

Venezuela: Another Overthrow!

Stephen Kinzer, wrote the book Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (2006), which documents the history of US interventions in foreign governments. What is going in the relation between the US and Venezuela is exactly an attempt to overthrow the President of Venezuela.

Below is a video of an interview of Stephen Kinzer by Amy Goodman of Democracy Now.

Here are some other interviews with Kinzer.

Is a Foreign Military Intervention in Venezuela Imminent?

I was looking for a reasonable analysis of what is going on in Venezuela, on the one hand, and what President Trump intends to do about it. Unlike most main media, the following piece at venezuelanalysis.com seems very reasonable: “Is a Foreign Military Intervention in Venezuela Imminent?

Let me say the following. The United States has never intervened in any country for “humanitarian” reasons. All the US interventions that I can think of, have had the character of destructive aggressions which have killed more people than “saved.” And let us not lose sight of the economic advantage to US corporations in any intervention.

Is there a fear of the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly?

See also the Wikipedia article United States – Venezuela Relations



How to assess the merits of some current popular person’s views? Compare what he says to what Noam Chomsky says!

In determining the worth of some claim, one can either rely on one’s own critical powers, and/or try to use as a “benchmark” the views of some highly respected intellectual. Do a comparison of views.

Well, there is someone out there on the internet who is using the views of Noam Chomsky as the benchmark to compare the views of currently fashionable people — what can I call them? — celebrities?. This critical assessor is someone who calls himself — using Quine’s famous term — Dr. Gavagai.

Here are some of his videos — juxtaposing the views of Jordan Peterson with those of Noam Chomsky.

Here is a juxtaposition of Chomsky and Slavoj Zizek. I must confess that I have a systematic hard time understanding Zizek. Anyway, his only objection to Chomsky seems to be the claim — correct or not — that in the case of the Khmer Rouge, he underestimated the extent of their genocide.

Is Capitalism an economic or a political system?

If you look up the definition of capitalism in Wikipedia, it reads: “Capitalism is an economic system based on the private ownership of the means of production and their operation for profit.” The Merriam-Webster definition on the internet is: “an economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market.”

The problem with these definitions is that they assume the concept of “ownership.” And ownership is a concept which has to be defined in a social context by a formula such as:

for two persons x and y, if x is the owner of item z, then y has to get permission from x to use z.

Well, who makes such a rule? If there are only two people involved, then the rule is founded on either an explicit or implicit (tacit) agreement. If there is an external government, such as the State, then it is the State which establishes such a rule by a law.

If the rule is established by a free agreement than we may call it an economic matter, if however it is established by the State, then it is a political matter.

The “private ownership” which is pertinent to capitalism, concerns the ownership of land. Since land is a given of nature — like air or water — it can be used either by mutual agreement or subject to the laws of the State.

Now, I cannot make the use of land without either the permission of a private owner or the State. For example, I cannot camp in State or Federal forests without getting “permission” — normally, by paying a fee. And, of course, if I want to hunt or fish, I have to pay some other fees.

Since capitalism is a function of ownership, and ownership is determined by the State, capitalism is also a political system. The following “Google definition?” is more accurate: “an economic and political system in which a country’s trade and industry are controlled by private owners for profit, rather than by the state.” But it is not accurate enough because there is such a thing as “state capitalism” which characterized the USSR.

Core Morality and other types

I offer below an incomplete sketch of my approach to morality. It agrees with much of what Gilbert Harman has written.

Writings on ethics tend to treat two different questions under the title of “ethics.” One is a question of prudent behavior; the other is a question of moral behavior. But, I must admit, that some contexts are such as to raise the perplexing question as to which has priority.

To distinguish the question of prudence from that of morality, let us consider the case of a solitary individual cast away on an island — call him Crusoe. His primary problem is one of survival. Given his desire for survival, he will have to follow, what Kant called, hypothetical imperatives. There are things he ought to do in order to survive. If he has tools, there will be right and wrong ways of using them. Again, if he is interested in efficiency, he must do things in certain ways. Will certain dispositions and habits — call them virtues — serve him well? Certainly. He can strive for happiness, which will be a function of leisure time. But I make no claims about what constitutes happiness. Whatever it is, it will be a matter of satisfying his interests. And since interests vary, so will the ways for reaching happiness. What I want to claim is that the question of moral behavior does not make sense for a solitary individual — unless he lives in a mythical world with another person — a god or spirit.

Let us now introduce another person to the island — call him Friday. I will call core morality the behavior which both of them agree to regarding each other. This will be expressed by rules. And these rules can be negative or positive, depending on what they forbid to be done to each other, or required to be done to each other. Justice will consist of abiding by the freely made agreements. (Agreements may be complicated because of tacit assumptions.)

However, there is also the most important question of trust. Can Crusoe trust Friday, and vice versa? Assuming that both are sincere, this does not settle the question of trust. Whether each is trustworthy is in part determined by their character, or, to put it another way, by their possession of virtues.

They can also agree on how to behave towards plants, animals, and the rest of their environment. Such rules I will call marginal morality.

If we introduce a third person on the island — call him Tarzan, with whom we do not interact, then Crusoe’s agreement with Friday in regard to Tarzan can be called peripheral morality. Peripheral morality may allow us to kill, rob, torture, sacrifice, or enslave Tarzan.

Theories of normative morality have been either teleological or deontological, i.e., based on consequences or based on rules. If I were Crusoe entering into an agreement with Friday, I would agree to the rule:

Neither of us will harm the other, except for self-preservation.

This is the element of egoism that is presupposed in normal core morality. But there is also, what I will call abnormal core morality, which takes place in sports in which the requirement of not harming each other, and the exception of self-preservation are suspended, and what is done is done strictly by the rules regardless of consequences.

This code of honor, as it way be called, requires a strict obedience to the rules with no exceptions for self-preservation. In extreme cases, it has the form: I will do X, even if it kills me; and if I do not do X, I will kill myself. Such was the code of the kamikazi and the samurai.

In making rules, one can also agree to punishments for breach of rules, and also for allowable excuses. Given that we have prudential considerations, sometimes one has to make a judgment call about how to act. Or, as C. D. Broad would say: What is the most fitting way to act under the circumstances?

[See my “Concepts of Persons and Morality“]

How I view Marxism

Marx and Engels wrote a lot, and on all sorts of topics. What they had to say about science, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc., may be interesting, but, to me, none of this is Marxism. Marxism, to me, is a definition and analysis of what Marx understands as “capitalism.” Moreover, it is not a characterization of capitalism under government control, but an analysis of “laissez faire capitalism” or what currently goes by the name of “anarcho-capitalism.” Capitalism is the market system composed of two classes — the bourgeoisie (his name for entrepreneurs and business owners) and the proletariat (workers or people who do not have access to subsistence other than selling their labor services). There are in some countries and regions of the world people who are neither bourgeois-es nor proletarians (i.e., people who do not live under capitalism). These are indigenous people and free peasants. By a “free peasant” I mean one who is not renting, who does not have a mortgage, and does not pay taxes. Are there such people? James Scott wrote a study of such people (look here)

What does Marxism say about these people? Nothing. Why? Because they are not part of the capitalist economy, and Marxism is an analysis of the capitalist economy. And what does Marx say about the capitalist economy? That it has the seeds of its own destruction. And that is all that Marxism means to me. Mind you, what Marx wrote about was a model of pure capitalism, i.e., anarcho-capitalism, as we may call it today. He was not writing about capitalism with government intervention (i.e., the welfare state or crony capitalism).

Marx anticipated a classless state which he called communism. But such anticipations or predictions are not essential to the claim that pure capitalism will self-destruct. This prognosis is the “scientific” socialism of Marxism, as contrasted with a moral ideal of a classless society espoused by so-called “utopian” or libertarian socialists.

After the Russian Revolution in 1917, people seized land from large estates — creating a country of relatively free peasants. What would Marx say about such peasants? I suppose he would congratulate them for their freedom; and if they organized themselves by regional councils — still more congratulations. [See the Marx-Zasulich Correspondence (1881)]

Now what did the Bolsheviks in Russia, who called themselves “Marxists” do? Under Stalin, they liquidated the peasants in Ukraine by the millions. I ask: by what diabolical train of reasoning can you get such a policy from Marx?