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Published in Philosophical Studies 2 (1951): 21-25.

Obligation and Motivation
by WILFRID SELLARS
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
The following paragraphs will be devoted to a somewhat schematic discussion of the significance of the word "ought" in such distinctively ethical sentences as "I ought to do X (in circumstances C)" and "One ought to do X (in circumstances C)." The frame is provided by the thesis, formulated here without spit and polish, that to be aware of a property is to have "in one's mind" a token of an expression which designates that property. If the expression is a simple one, in that it is not cornpounded out of other expressions, then the awareness is a simple or unstructured awareneness; otherwise a complex or structured awareness.
Thus, one can be aware of circularity by tokening the simple expression "circle" or by tokening the complex expression "closed plane curve with a constant degree of curvature." The former would constitute a simple awareness of what, after all, is a complex property. The latter would be a structured awareness of this same property, though the complexity of the awareness would be far from doing justice to the complexity of the property. Now, an unstructured awareness of a complex property may be mistaken, by philosophers, for the awareness of a simple property. This can occur even where the expression tokened by the simple awareness is paired in ordinary usage with a complex expression as neatly as "circularity" might be supposed to be paired with ''closed plane curve . . ." Here the philosopher speaks of supervening Gestalt properties, e.g., of an unanalyzable circularity which rides piggy-back on closed-plane-curve-with-consrant-degree-of-curvature-hood. The mistake, however, is much more likely to be made where common usage contains no such unambiguous correlation.
Before applying these tools to "I ought to do X," let us try them out on "I want to do X." (For the sake of brevity, the phrase "in circumstances C" will be omitted but understood.) Consider Jones who is tokening this sentence "in his mind" and who therefore has an unstructured awareness of whatever it is that is meant by "want (to do)." Now if Jones has been sufficiently corrupted by philosophy, it is not beyond the bounds of probability that he would reply to the question "What kind of situation is described by the above sentence?" by saying, "It asserts an ultimate and unanalyzable relation of want to obtain between myself and the doing of X by me." From here he might go on to wonder how there could be a relation between himself and an action which might remain a mere possibility. This might lead him to interesting metaphysical discoveries.
Let us refrain, however, from following Jones along this path. As a matter of fact we took French leave at the beginning of his remarks with an unexpressed comment to the effect that Jones was misled by a superficial grammatical resemblance between "(I) (want) (to do X)" and "(I) (eat) (apples)." If we were challenged to show that this resemblance is indeed superficial, and that Jones was indeed misled, we should surely reply by offering an analysis of sentences of the form "Y wants to do X." As a first attempt we might suggest "Y finds the thought of doing X attractive," following this with "Y's thought of doing X tends to evoke the doing of X." Though these are drastic oversimplifications, they do indicate the essential features of a successful analysis.
As our next step we might claim that the sentence "Y's thought of doing X tends to evoke the doing of X" is to be understood in terms of a tendency of tokens "in Y's mind" of the expression "Y doing X" to evoke the doing of X by Y, I suspect, however, that we should hesitate to speak of this step as an analysis. But would such a hesitation be, after all, warranted? The term "analysis," having as its core the notion of explicit definition (usually definition in usu) seems clearly to cover the following gamut of cases:

The definition reflects an antecedent mutual substitutability in ordinary usage of expressions having a clear-cut and unambiguous sense.
The definition would reflect such a mutual substitutability only if ordinary usage were focused and fixed.
The definition would reflect such a mutual substitutability only if ordinary usage were enriched by a new set of expressions.

To this last category belongs the analysis of material objects in terms of the micro-particles of modern physics. Analyses of both the latter two types are actually proposals for reform. The second urges a better use of materials already at hand; the third requests the introduction of new materials together with a demotion of words already in current use from the status, in effect, of primitive terms to that of defined terms. A basement is proposed for an already existing house. Where in this scale do the above analyses of "Y wants to do X" belong? It is reasonably certain that none of them belongs in the immediate neighborhood of (1). The two analyses in terms of "the thought of doing X" would seem to belong in the neighborhood of (2); as for the analysis in terms of tokens of the expression "Y doing X," its place in the scale could be determined only after a far more protracted discussion.
In an earlier paragraph we pointed out that insofar as he tokens "in his mind" the simple expression "want (to do)," Jones has an unstructured awareness of whatever it is that is meant by this term. Let us now agree to say that "want (to do)" means that which would be mentioned by a successful analysis of "Y wants to do X." Assuming, then, that the above analyses are in the right direction, the term in question means a dispositional complex, and we can say that Jones has an unstructured awareness of a dispositional complex involving the thought of his doing an action, and the doing of the action. On the whole, philosophers have been fairly successful in avoiding the mistake of treating wanting (to do) as a simple relation obtaining between agents and actions. The materials for a successful analysis have been sufficiently close at hand to keep all but a determined few from falling into this trap.
Let us now suppose that Jones has a token "in his mind" of the sentence "I ought to do X," and, therefore, has an unstructured awareness of whatever it is that is meant by "ought." This time we should by no means be surprised to find Jones claiming that this sentence asserts an ultimate and unanalyzable relation of ought to obtain between himself and his doing of X. Nor would we be surprised to find him modifying and refining the metaphysics of oughtness as new perplexities occurred to him. Now it is my intention to defend an analysis of "ought (to do)" which has a fundamental kinship with the account above of "want (to do)." The parallel is easily stated. "Ought" as used in "I ought to do X" refers to a type of motivation, to a "dispositional complex involving the thought of doing X and the doing of X. Yet it is the differences that must be stressed, for our moral consciousness finds all the difference in the world between merely wanting to do something and being morally obligated to do it.
Let me begin by putting my finger on the heart of the matter, though this involves an oversimplification which must later be made good. In wanting to do X (in circumstances C) it is the thought of oneself doing X (in circumstances C) which tends to evoke the doing of X in circumstances believed to be C. On the other hand, when I truly say "I ought to do X in circumstances C," it is the thought of myself doing X (in circumstances C) as an instance of everybody does X (in circumstances C) which tends to evoke the doing ot X in circumstances believed to be C. Let us call the content of the thought which tends to evoke action, the "formula" of the motive-tendency. (To simplify our account, we shall suppose that any restriction on the class of agents in the formula of an ought is included in the "circumstances.") Then, the formula in the case of want (to do) concerns only the agent, the action, and the circumstances, whereas in the case of I ought (to do) the formula has a major premise to the effect that all agents do X in circumstances C.
It will be noticed that I have gone out of my way to emphasize the autobiographical form "I ought to do X." I have done this deliberately as I wish to claim that this is the form through which alone "ought" can be understood. "You ought . . ." is not related to "I ought . . ." as "You eat . . ." is to "I eat . . ." (Or shall we say it is not merely related to it in this manner? The following remarks will explain this hesitation.) Note that in the analysans given above for "I ought to do X," the word "ought" does not occur in the statement of the formula of the motive-tendency. The major premise of the formula (and notice how Aristotelian¹ we have become in our account of ethical motivation) is All agents in circumstances C do X, not . . . ought to do X! Instead of being a mere application of "Everybody ought to do X," "I ought to do X" is the fons et origo of "Everybody ought to do X." It is because "Everybody does X (in circumstances C)" plays a motivational role in my conduct that there is such a significant sentence as "Everybody ought to do X." In other words, "I ought to do X" rests on "Everybody does do X," and "Everybody ought to do X" rests on "I ought to do X."
Yet we must hasten to add that in another sense, "I ought to do X" rests on "Everybody ought to do X." It is, indeed, an oversimplification to say that "I ought to do X" is an autobiographical sentence attributing to myself a tendency to be moved to action by a syllogism whose major premise has the form Everybody does do X in circumstances C. For the truth of the matter is that the word "ought," which as far as our analysis has gone stands for the motivational force of a syllogistic formula whose major premise is of this form, has stolen a syntactical disguise which can be said to embody the mistake of thinking of ought not only as a unique relation between myself and an action, but one which is objective and independent of me in that it holds between me and my doing X because it holds between everybody and their doing X. To assume this disguise, which is an essential condition of moral consciousness, the word "ought" worms its way into the expression of the formula of the motive, and the formula becomes the familiar moral syllogism Everybody ought to do X in C, I am in C, therefore I ought to do X. To put the matter in a paradox: the mistake of thinking of ought as a sui generis relation is essential to the correct use of the word "ought."

NOTES
1 "The one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of perception; when a single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case [Translator's note: i.e. in scientific reasoning] affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with production it must immediately act (e.g. if 'everything sweet ought to be tasted,' and 'this is sweet,' in the sense of being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same time actually act accordingly). When, then, the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that 'everything sweet is pleasant,' and that 'this is sweet' (now this is the opinion that is active [Translator's note: i.e. determines action]), and when appetite happens to be present in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the subject, but appetite leads us towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts); so that it turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the influence (in a sense) of a rule and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only incidentally -- for the appetite is contrary, not the opinion -- to the right rule." Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Bk. VII; Ch. 3, 1147a25-1147b2, translated by Sir David Ross and quoted from The Basic Works of Aritotle, edited by Richard McKeon, and published by Random House, New York, 1941. I have emphasized the kinship of my analysis with Kant's moral philosophy in "Language, Rules and Behavior," printed in John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, a volume of essays edited by Sidney Hook, and published by the Dial Press, New York, 1950.