1. The Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1964).
3. Or, we should perhaps say, of experiencing redly.
4. Object, that is to say, in that sense of the term in which there is a real distinction between the experience (experiencing) and its object, as opposed to the intransitive sense in which a dance is an object danced.
5. Notice that according to this strategy, the concept looks red is ab initio a cognitive concept and, indeed, an epistemic concept in that broad sense in which a mental state is epistemic or cognitive, even if it is not as such a knowing or cognizing, provided that the concept of that state is to be analyzed in terms of propositional form and the concepts of truth and falsity. The term 'cognitive' has long been used in this broad sense in which a judgment or belief would be cognitive fact. I shall not hesitate to make a similar use of 'epistemic'.
6. It will be noted that the account I am giving of physical objects as individuated volumes of color stuff is essentially what I there called the child's proto-theory of the objects of visual perception. This proto-theory is part and parcel of what I have called the Manifest Image of Man in the World. That this essay moves largely within the categories of the Manifest Image must be borne in mind throughout what follows. It must also be borne in mind, however, that it also moves within the framework of a theory of categories which denies the authoritative status of the categories of the Manifes Image, i.e., it works within the framework of a theory of categories which rejects the Myth of the Given.
7. I am well aware that the phrase 'the true theory' win arouse suspicion and resistance. Let me attempt to disarm this reaction by saying that what I have in mind is the theory which, whether or not it is ever actually developed, would effectively explain all of the relevant facts with which it was confronted. The concept of such a theory is obviously a problematic one, the problematic features being indicated by the expressions in italics. Not the least problematic feature is that of uniqueness. That the concept of such a theory is a coherent one would have to be argued, in large part, I presume, by rebutting objections to the contrary. Since, although such arguments are available, there is no time to canvass them here, I must, I'm afraid, beg the reader to indulge me with a temporary suspension of disbelief.
8. In "The Structure of Knowledge," (the Machette Foundation Lectures [1971] at the University of Texas) in Hector-Neri Castaneda, ed., Action, Knowledge and Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975). See p. 310.
9. How, it might be asked, can conscious states of a perceiver satisfy an axiomatics of shape? The confusions which stand in the way of a straightforward 'why not?' are the very stuff of perception theory.
10. "Sense-data and the Percept Theory," Mind, 52 (1949).
11. For a development and defense of such a phenomenological account of sensmg see my essay, "The Role of the Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience," in Categories: A Colloquium, Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., ed. (University Park, PA: Penn State Univ. Press, 1978).
12. Remember that in this usage the sensing is not to be construed as a cognitive act of being aware of an item as being of a certain kind or character. The being given of the sensing (or, equivalently, what is sensed), on the other hand, would be its being the obiect of such an awareness.
13. A more subtle form of this view is one according to which although what is given is in point of fact the sensing of a cool smooth cubical volume of pink, we take this volume of pink (of which the esse is being sensed) to be a pink ice cube. Something like this view was held by H. A. Prichard. But to make this move (as we shall see) involves a subtle shift in the concept of what it is to be given. For according to it a sensing can be "given" and yet (mis)taken to be something quite other than a sensing, namely a physical object.
14. Which, it should be noted, need not mean that it is given as a belief content.
15. If I had written 'sensing' instead of 'experiencing', I would have aroused the anxieties which hover around the Myth of the Given. The ambiguities of 'experiencing' hold them momentarily at bay.
16. In addition to having first class epistemic status, the direct apprehension of facts has often been regarded as being a primary source of conceptual abilities. One acquires the idea of what it is to be red, the ability to think or believe that there is something red, by virtue of having directly apprehended something to be red.
17. On some accounts, while direct apprehension is the source of the epistemic value of beliefs, it is a "prime mover unmoved" (to borrow Chisholm's useful rnetaphor) of epistemic authority, in the sense that the direct apprehension of a fact is a source of warrant but itself neither warranted nor unwarranted.
18. "The Refutation of Idealism," Mind, 12 (1903); reprinted in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1922). See pp. 23 ff., particularly p. 26.
19. For an account of the adverbial theory of the relation of blue to the sensation of blue which is guilty of this conflation, see "Moore's Refutation of Idealism," by C. J. Ducasse in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, P. A. Schilpp, ed (Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers, 1942, now published by Open Court, La Salle, IL.) See particularly pp. 245 ff.
20. Perhaps Mary Baker Eddy merely scratched the surface of false ideas.