Radical theorists and activists commonly appeal to the ideal of community, in opposition to the oppression and exploitation they see in our present society. Young criticizes this appeal on both philosophical and practical grounds.

Philosophically, the idea of community relies on the concept of unity, the making of many into one, what Derrida calls a 'metaphysics of presence' and Adorno terms a 'logic of identity'. But as these thinkers and others have observed, the identity that is achieved in developing such a unity receives its meaning and purity only by its relationship to what it excludes. 'Community' is a self-defeating concept, because it implies exclusion as much as inclusion. Furthermore, it represses or denies difference, about which Young says a good deal.

She begins this central part of her argument by observing that calls for community are generally made in opposition to liberal individualism, in opposition, therefore, to competition within society. Most radical theorists have consequently spoken of a community that itself consists in the respect for and fulfillment of individual aims and capacities. But this i-deal is impossible, in Young's estimation. The required balancing of opposite tendencies (as some radicals describe their solution) or reciprocity of recognition and understanding (according to others) still ends up constraining individuality on the one hand, or requiring an impossibly high standard of self-knowledge and knowledge of others on the other hand.

The desire for community. Young argues, is part of what underlies racism, ethnic chauvinism and class devaluation. Even progressive movements often founder on this same obstacle: by seeking and enforcing community, they end up excluding others, even excluding some of their own members who have divergent views.

Another problem with the ideal of community as it is sometimes presented is a requirement for face-to-face contact. Young objects to this specification for several reasons: it presumes an illusory ideal of social relations as unmediated while mistakenly equating mediation with a-lienation; it denies the legitimacy of relations across space and time; it implies that the ideal model of society is a small group; and it provides no means for communities to interact with one another. Young sees practical challenges in these points, along with one other: How do we get from where we are to such a communitarian ideal?

The alternative she recommends is a politics of difference. We should not only permit, we should promote and enjoy what makes us different from one another. The city (or large town) provides a model -- not, perhaps, the city just as we know it, but rather the 'unoppressive' city. In this model we need not be in community with everyone; most others will be strangers to us. But we would live peacefully with them and enjoy their differences from ourselves. Young thus defines the unoppressive city as 'openness to unassimilated otherness'.