Newton sketches an account of mental states which is openly reduc-tionistic and materialistic, and which claims to accomodate both inten-tionality and consciousness.

This account begins by enumerating parallels between mental and phyjsjgal acts: ^T5) both are 'acts'; mental, like physical, acts involve ob-jectsand may involve dispositions or 'stances';(2)) mental acts, like physical acts, have a goal or focus; (5^ there is mental as well as physical 'seeing', 'sensing', 'feeling', etc.; and (£T) mental and physical objects have values assinged to them, values -which motivate action.

The question is, are these parallels mere metaphors, simply superficial similarities? Newton believes not, and seeks to demonstrate that both intentionality and self-consciousness can be analyzed in terms of processes or states of our physical bodies.

Intentionality, in Brentano's sense of 'directedness upon an object', an object that need not necessarily exist, is accomodated by taking thoughts about things as mental re-enactments of physical experience. The appropriate neurological components are activated in -ways that recapitulate certain aspects of our past physical relationship to the objects we are thinking about. Complex cases that involve problem-solving, evaluation, etc., can be accomodated in the same way, according to Newton, except that they involve multiple layers of recapitulation of the neurological components of our earlier physical acts and responses.

Consciousness requires a more detailed analysis. Newton begins by contrasting the views of David Armstrong and Sydney Shoemaker. Armstrong notes that we can perceive our own conscious activity, as in the case of a truck driver who suddenly 'comes to' after a period of driving without realizing what he was doing. Shoemaker sees problems with this view. He points out that there are no sense impressions of mental states. Newton combines these ideas with contributions by Gareth Evans, who argues that self-awareness involves the re-use of perceptual mechanisms, and Gerald Edelman, whom Newton interprets to suggest that some abstract features of our response patterns can be the survivals of very early asso-ciations -which are -- in principle -- neurologically traceable. Newton's proposal emerges as: introspective consciousness consists of the activation of 'images' or response patterns from memory which give one information about oneself, such as the appearance of the -world from one's own position in space, the state of one's body, and the actions one is perfor-

CURRENT PHILOSOPHY 29

ming. Typically this will involve 'layers' of images, -which gives a feeling of depth to consciousness.

Advantages of this model include its ability to account for degrees of self-awareness as well as degrees of vagueness in the objects of thought. The model also offers a way to analyze pain and other direct perceptions (qualia) often thought to be unanalyzable. If consciousness consists in imagery activated in association with our experience, then in principle we can segregate these associations from the present physical experience, and also distinguish the learned from the biologically determined associations. Newton contrasts this explanation of 'qualia' to the views espoused by Patricia and Paul Churchland.