Should relations between nations be controlled by considerations of power or considerations of morality? The authors believe that neither is correct. They argue that states are obliged to adopt policies that are in the interests of their own citizens, and that they should pursue both power-seeking and order-seeking strategies in order to meet this obligation. Scott and Carr call this 'strategic consequentialism1.

Traditional views of the states have tended to draw analogies from individual action, have looked at the state as an actor in its own right, and in the process have obscured the client relationship between states and their citizens. But states exist for the benefit of their citizens --to provide security, and other benefits as well. As far as the international arena extends, Scott and Carr put it this way: the state's responsibility to its citizens is to manage international uncertainty in the citizens' best interest.

That thinkers who have emphasized the moral status of state have failed to recognize this advocacy role can be seen by examining their arguments. The authors divide the panoply of such 'moralist' arguments into two broad categories: the strong and the weak theses.

The strong thesis holds that as extensions of individuals, states are bound by the same moral rules that bind persons. But Scott and Carr note that the philosophers who hold such views do make allowances for extreme situations, particularly those involving serious threats to national security. But these concessions are not prudential in character; in fact, the authors maintain, they are an oblique recognition of the precedence of

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the state's moral obligation to its own citizens.

The -weak thesis refers to utility where the strong one referred to duty. It holds that each state should obey the dictates of international law because it is in the interest of all states that everyone do so. But this puts more burden on international law than it can support. States do not and need not look upon such laws as absolutely binding in order for the laws to be effective. A state would indeed be wrong to put international law above the welfare of its citizens, especially where their survival is at stake,

If we accept, then, that the true end of the state, in international affairs, is to be the advocate for its citizens, does it follow that aggression and immoral dealing are the proper political strategies? Scott and Carr say 'No1. They concede a good deal to Realpolitik: the first and most obvious way for the state to provide for the security of its citizens is to seek power. But more than security is desired. Individuals want some assurance that all their activites that cross national boundaries are free from undue uncertainty. This requires that states help assure order as well as security, and the fact is that power-seeking activities are often useless or even counterproductive in the maintenance of order.

But neither, of course, are order-seeking strategies alone sufficient, for they can seldom assure security. Given the complexity of international relations, therefore, states ought to adopt a combination of both power-seeking and order-seeking strategies -- which, in fact, is exactly what most nations do. And the implementation of these strategies should be geared toward the security and well- being of the citizenry. Does not this 'strategic consequentialism' permit any heinous action on the part of the state, though? In principle, yes, but in practice, no. Such actions are seldom if ever in the interests of the citizens of the perpetrator nation.

The answer to the question in the title, therefore, is that states are not moral agents in the usual understanding of the expression. But the authors do not feel that under 'strategic consequentialism' this need be a pessimistic conclusion. From a moral point of view, they think a good deal can be said for it.