Teaching Theory of Knowledge

6. Reliabilism

      The concept of reliability has played a central role in recent theories of justification and knowledge. The basic idea of one prominent version of the reliability theory of justification is that a belief is justified if and only if it is caused by a reliable belief-forming process. For the classical defense of this view, see Goldman, 1979. The other main version of the reliability theory of justification holds that a belief is justified just in case the fact that a belief is held is a reliable indication of its truth (see Swain). For a comparison of these two kinds of reliability theory, see Schmitt. Some reliability theorists avoid reference to justification, but hold that conditions similar to the ones just mentioned are necessary for knowledge. For an early formulation of this view see Armstrong and for a more recent information theoretic version see Dretske.

      There have been many critical discussions of reliabilism. Reliabilism seems to have the counter-intuitive consequence that the beliefs of a person deceived by an Evil Demon are all unjustified. This objection is developed by Cohen, Foley, Ginet, and Pollock. It has been argued by Feldman and Pollock that reliabilists are unable to develop satisfactory accounts of a belief-forming process and of reliability in order to make the theory plausible. For a recent attempt to deal with these problems, see Goldman (1986), chapters 3 and 5.

      Papers by Alston, Cohen, and Sosa contain good discussions of reliabilism within the context of more general discussions of theories of epistemic justification.

Readings

Alston, W. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification." The Monist 68 (1985), 57-85. Reprinted in Moser, (ed.), Empirical Knowledge. Rowman and Littlefield, 1986. Hereafter cited as 'Moser'.

Armstrong, D. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

BonJour, L. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Justification." In P. French, T. Uehling, Jr., and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 5. University of Minnesota, 1980, 53-73.

Cohen, S. "Justification and Truth." Philosophical Studies 48 (1984), 3 279-95.

Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge. Mass.: MIT Press, 1981.

Feldman, R. "Reliability and Justification." The Monist 68 (1985), 159-64.

Foley, R. "What's Wrong with Reliabilism?" The Monist 68 (1985), 188-202.

Ginet, C. "Contra Reliabilism." The Monist 68 (1985), 175-87.

Goldman, A. I. "What is Justified Belief?" In Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Dordreche Reidel, 1979, 1-23. Also reprinted in Moser.

Goldman, A. I. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1986, chapters 3 and 5.

Pollock, J. "Reliability and Justified Belief." The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), 103-14. Reprinted in Moser.

Schmitt, F. "Justification as Reliable Indication or Reliable Process." Philosophical Studies 40 (1983). 409-17.

Sosa, E. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge". In French et. al. (eds.), op. cit., 1980, 3-27. Also in Moser, and in Moser and vander Nat.

Swain, M. "Justification and Reliable Belief." Philosophical Studies 40 (1981). 389-407.