{1} I mention C. D. Broad here for two reasons.The first is that Broad does defend, what he himself calls, Emergent Materialism. In the concluding chapter of The Mind and Its Place in Nature (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925; Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1960), he goes through what he takes to be an exhaustive catalogue of theories about the place of mind in nature, and concludes on page 653:
And, on all the evidence which is available to me, which I have tried to state as fairly as I can to the reader in the course of this book, I judge the most likely view to be some form of the Compound Theory which is compatible with Emergent Materialism.
The second reason for mentioning Broad is that the crux of Sellars' ontology seems to rely rather heavily on Broad's Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1933). This work is cited by Sellars in his "Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures," The Monist 64 (1981). He notes that in the Examination "Broad introduces the concept of what he calls 'absolute processes' (48)", and that Sellars' own account of the 'phenomenon of the specious present',
shares features with many other accounts and, in particular, with that offered by C.D. Broad in his reply to his critics [The Philosophy of C.D. Broad, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ., 1960)]. My account was developed independently of the latter, though not, of course, of his classic formulation in the Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (60, #128).
{2} John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (1929; New York: Capricorn Books, 1960).
{3} See Wilfrid Sellars, "Fatalism and Determinism," in Freedom and Determinism, ed. Keith Lehrer (New York: Random House, 1966); Robert J. Richards, "Sellars' Kantian Perspective on the Compatibility of Freedom and Determinism," Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1973): 228-236; Alan Donagan, "Determinism and Freedom: Sellars and the Reconciliation Thesis," in Action, Knowledge and Reality, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 975); Wilfrid Sellars, "Reply to Alan Donagan," Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 149-84. See also Gary Gutting, "Action and Freedom," in The Synoptic Vision: Essays on the Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. C. F. Delaney, Michael J. Loux, Gary Gutting, W. David Solomon (University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
{4} The locus classicus for W.V.O. Quine's position is his Word and Object (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1960), ch. 2. I accept John Searle's assessment of Quine's position on the indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of reference as a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's specific behavioristic assumptions. See John Searle, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person," The Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 3 (March 1987):123-146.
{5} "The traditional mind-body problem has two dimensions which have often been run together -- or, at least, not carefully distinguished: (1) What is the relation of sensations to physical states of the body? (2) What is the relation of conceptual states (thinking, inner speech) to physical states of the body? It should not be assumed that these two dimensions of the mind-body problem admit of the same type of solution." W. Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), 318, #6.
{6} Laurence Goldstein, "The Adverbial Theory of Conceptual Thought," The Monist 65 (1982), 384.
{7} "The Place of Color in the Scheme of Things: A Roadmap to Sellars's Carus Lectures," The Monist 65 (1982), 315.