{1} Wilfrid Sellars, "Presupposing," in Essays on Bertrand Russell, ed. E.D. Klemke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970): 173-89.

{2} This is an interpretation of Ockham I find in Michael J. Loux's "The Ontology of William Ockham," in Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part 1 of the Summa Logicae, trans. and intro. Michael J. Loux (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974).

{3} Jeremy Bentham, "The Theory of Fictions," in Bentham's Theory of Fictions, ed. and intro. C. K. Ogden (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959).

{4} Russell's theory of descriptions was considered by Frank Ramsey to be a paradigm of philosophical analysis.

{5} Wilfrid Sellars, "Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures," The Monist 64 (1981), 43.

{6} The equivalence is to be stronger than material equivalence. And the specification of this sense of equivalence must face Quine's objections to such construals as 'synonymous' or 'same in meaning' as expressed in his famous "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View, 2d ed., rev. (Harper Torchbooks, 1961). Quine's own proposal (shared by Wittgenstein and Sellars) is to accept a sense of equivalence construed as sameness of (linguistic) use: "The behavioral doctrine tells us that this relation of synonymy, or sameness of meaning, is sameness of use." W.V. Quine, "Use and Its Place in Meaning," in Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 47.

{7} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Language of Theories," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963), 116, #27.

{8} Wilfrid Sellars, "The Structure of Knowledge: (1): Perception, (2): Minds, (3): Epistemic Principles," in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Essays in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), 299-300.

{9} Peter Strawson, Individuals (New York: Doubleday, 1959).