{1} Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1963), 1.
{3} W. Sellars, "Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures," The Monist 64 (1981), 59. Calling them "non-Whiteheadian" is intended, I take it, to disavow any suggestion of mind-like "prehensions" (intentions) to absolute processes (i.e., Whitehead's "actual entities").
{4} W. Sellars, "Scientific Image of Man," 10; also idem, "Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind," in Philosophy for the Future, eds. Roy Wood Sellars, V.J. McGill, and Marvin Farber (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949).
{5} Alan Donagan, "Determinism and Freedom: Sellars and the Reconciliation Thesis," in Action, Knowledge and Reality, ed. Hector-Neri Castañeda (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975), 79.
{6} Wilfrid Sellars, "Reply to Alan Donagan," Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), 181.
{7} John Dewey, Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960).
{7a} [I think I can be a bit more decisive about this. The absolute presuppositions can be identified with the Categories or a priori concepts. These, as C. D. Broad would put it, have the logical character of "postulates", or, as Walter Stace puts it in his The Theory of Knowledge and Existence (1932), they are "mental constructions." My position is, then, that from an epistemological perspective the Categories are discovered; from an ontological perspective, they are constructed. Added 1998.]
{8} John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, 4 books (1843): bk. 3. An abridged version is John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method, ed. and intro. Ernest Nagel (New York: Hafner, 1950). See the criticism of Mill's 'four methods' by Irving Copi, "Criticisms of Mill's Methods," in Introduction to Logic, 7th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 456-462.
{9} Wilfrid Sellars, "Aristotelian Philosophies of Mind," in Philosophy for the Future, ed. Roy Wood Sellars, V.J. McGill, and Marvin Farber (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949): 544-70.
{10} Wilfrid Sellars, "Mind, Meaning, and Behavior," Philosophical Studies 3 (1952), 84, #1.21.
{11} Sellars, "Scientific Image of Man," 34.
{12} Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), 120.
{13} Wilfrid Sellars, "Language as Thought and as Communication," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1968-1969), 512.
{14} Sellars, "Scientific Image of Man," 39.
{15} Peter Strawson, Individuals (New York: Doubleday, 1959).
{16} Sellars' mistake here seems to be similar to the one Bertrand Russell attributed to Leibniz in his A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937). The mistake attributed to Leibniz was of trying to construct a philosophical system on the basis of a subject-predicate form of sentences. Russell's corrective was to introduce relational sentences as irreducibly basic as well. I should add that I am not concerned here with the question of whether Russell was correct or not. Criticisms of Russell's interpretation of Leibniz are raised by Benson Mates, "Leibniz on Possible Worlds," in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science III, ed. B. van Rootselaar and J. F. Staal (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1968), and Hide Ishiguro, "Leibniz's Theory of the Ideality of Relations," in Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Harry G. Frankfurt (New York: Anchor Books, 1972): 191-213. Cf. W. Sellars, "Meditations Leibnitziennes," in Philosophical Perspectives.
{17} Reism, a term coined, it seems, by Tadeusz Kotarbinski (or possibly by Franz Brentano), who also used the name 'concretism', is the program of recognizing as basic only spatio-temporal entities as the referents of names. All such acceptable names are called by Kotarbinski 'genuine names'; all other unacceptable names are called 'onomatoids' or 'pseudo-names'. The reistic program is to paraphrase all statements containing pseudo-names to statements which contain only genuine names. This is indeed Sellars' program, and Sellars is, therefore, a reist. See Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology: The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966). See also Vito Sinisi, "Nominalism and Common Names," Philosophical Review 71, no. 2 (April 1962): 230-235; idem, "Kotarbinski's Theory of Genuine Names," Theoria 30, no. 2 (1964): 80-95; idem, "Kotarbinski's Theory of Pseudo-Names," Theoria 31, no. 3 (1965): 218-241.
{18} W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, 12, #29.
{19} The following passages are culled from the critics:
"The classical Sellarsian formulation of the problem we are discussing is that of the relationship of the Manifest and Scientific Images. An alternative formulation of the problem is in terms of the relationship between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge." William Rottschaefer, "Ordinary Knowledge and Scientific Realism," in The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions, ed. Joseph Pitt (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1978), 136."Many of us who are interested in Sellars' work were first attracted to his discussion of the relationship between the manifest or commonsense image of the world and the scientific image of the world." Thomas Russman, "The Problem of the Two Images," in Queries and Extensions, 73.
". . . the manifest or common-sense description." James Cornman, "Sellarsian Scientific Realism Without Sensa," in Queries and Extensions, 61.
"it would be wrong to follow Sellars in describing this image [manifest image] as corresponding to the world as we know it to be in ordinary experience." Donagan, "Determinism and Freedom," 79.
"Wilfrid Sellars thinks that the scientific image is the really real world (the noumenon) while the manifest or common-sense image is only appearance (the phenomenon)." Vincent G. Potter, S. J., Philosophy of Knowledge, 4th revised printing (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988), 19.
"An easy mistake is to take the manifest image to be the image of common sense." Robert Ackermann, "Sellars and the Scientific Image," Noûs 7 (1973), 141."Insofar as Sellars' Manifest Image is an attempt to capture the manner in which common sense conceptualizes and reasons about perceptual experience, this appears to be a serious shortcoming." Albert Casullo, "Adverbial Theories of Sensing and the Many-Property Problem," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983), 158.
"Sellars was misguided in his efforts to identify something as 'the manifest image'. For the manifest image is a function of common sense, and common sense is not a static body of beliefs and principles." Joseph Pitt, Pictures, Images and Conceptual Change (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1981), 140.
"For the manifest image is intended to represent a way of thinking common to all of us which has been one of the poles of philosophic reflection." Richard Bernstein, "Sellars' Vision of Man in the Universe," Review of Metaphysics 20 (1966), 117.
"The Manifest Image is an idealized construction ... I can see no warrant for accepting the particular characterization of the Manifest Image he offers." C. A. Hooker, "Sellars' Argument for the Inevitability of Secondary Qualities," Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), 346.
{21} Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1967), 150.