Notes

* I would like to thank the contributors to this special section for their thoughtful and instructive comments, criticisms, and investigations. And I am also grateful for the opportunity to add some thoughts of my own.

1 Strobe Talbott and Nayan Chanda (eds.), The Age of Terror (New York: Basic Books, 2002), jointly with Yale University Center for the Study of Globalization.

2 US Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction TRADOC, Pamphlet no. 525–37, 1984. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 98th Congress, Second Session, 1984, 19 October, vol. 2; par. 3077, 98 STAT. 2707.

3 For review, see my 'International Terrorism: Image and Reality', in Alexander George (ed.), Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity/Blackwell, 1991); reprinted in my Pirates and Emperors Old and New (London: Pluto, 2002, extended from 1986 edition).

4 On this matter, the US and Israel disagree with the rest of the world: they alone (Honduras abstaining) voted against the major UN condemnation of terror in all its forms, because it included a passage endorsing 'the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of people forcibly deprived of that right . . ., particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation', understood to refer to South Africa and the Israeli-occupied territories; Res. 42/159, 7 December 1987.

5 See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Continuity of International Politics', in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002). Also Colin Gray, 'World Politics as Usual after September 11: Realism Vindicated', same volume. While agreeing on the likely continuity, I think more attention should be given to the domestic structure of power, to what Waltz elsewhere calls the 'internal dispositions' of states (Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 71). See Herring and Robinson.

6 An early indication was provided by the first Bush administration's plans immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the revealing National Security Strategy report submitted to Congress in early 1990, and related materials, see my Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1991; extended, New York: Hill & Wang, 1992), ch. 1.

7 Gallup Poll International, December 2002, reporting overwhelming opposition to the Bush-Blair war plans, with scarcely 10 per cent support anywhere for their announced intentions, since implemented: a 'coalition of the willing' (US-UK). World Economic Forum press release, 'Declining Public Trust Foremost a Leadership Problem', 14 January 2003; Guy de Jonquières, 'US leaders score 27% in global trust poll', Financial Times, 15 January 2003, the lowest ranking among the categories tested. Pew Research Center, 'America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties', 18 March 2003. Glenn Kessler and Mike Allen, 'The Greater Threat? Around the globe, people see Bush -- not Hussein -- as the real enemy', Washington Post Weekly, 3–9 March 2003, cover story. Fareed Zakaria, 'The Arrogant Empire', Newsweek, 24 March 2003, cover story.

8 Colin Powell, facing an extremely hostile audience at the annual conference of the World Economic Forum. Foreign Desk, 'Powell on Iraq: "We Reserve Our Sovereign Right to Take Military Action"', New York Times, 27 January 2003.

9 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released by the White House on 17 September 2002. For a sample of critical discussion, see John Ikenberry, 'America's Imperial Ambition', Foreign Affairs, 81:5 (September–October 2002); Carl Kaysen, Steven Miller, Martin Malin, William Nordhaus, and John Steinbruner, War With Iraq (Cambridge MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2002), ch. 1.

10 For a sample of doctrine, see my Rogue States (Cambridge, MA and London: South End/Pluto, 2000). On implementation, literature abounds.

11 Envío, October 2001.

12 Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 219.

13 'The Murderous Mind of the Latin American Military', Los Angeles Times, 18 March 1982.

14 Colombia Update (Colombia Human Rights Committee), December 1989.

15 Schoultz, Human Rights and US policy, ch. 7.

16 Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania, 1977); Phyllis Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979); Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution (Kent, OH: Kent State, 1990).

17 Richard Stahler-Sholk, 'External Actors: Other States', in Thomas Walker and Ariel Armony (eds.), Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000).

18 Cited by Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter, 'National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy', International Security, 26:1 (Summer 2001). Richard Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer, America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998). See also Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, Co-Chairs, America -- Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). Barton Gellman, 'Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign', Washington Post, 20 December 2001.

19 On the first three cases, see my article and others in George, Western State Terrorism; on Cuba, much more evidence has been released since, some cited below. On Russia in Chechnya, see regular reports of the major human rights organisations, among them: Human Rights Watch, Memorandum to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya, 18 March 2002; Russia: Abuses in Chechnya Continue to Cause Human Suffering, 29 January 2003.

20 Waltz, 'Continuity of International Politics'.

21 Krugman, 'A No-Win Outcome', Op-ed, New York Times, 21 December 2001.

22 Draft memorandum to Truman. See Aaron David Miller, Search for Security (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1980), p. 144. The specific reference is to Saudi Arabia, but the point is more general. Note that the US interest was not access, then or now, but control, a very different matter. The oil factor is rarely discussed, and when it is, is disparaged on grounds that it would not be an 'instant bonanza' (Serge Schmemann, 'Controlling Iraq's Oil Wouldn't Be Simple,' New York Times, 3 November 2002). The observation is correct, but not very compelling. Thus, the same observation would hold -- in fact, more strongly -- for undeveloped oil reserves of the Middle East, Venezuela, and Texas 80 years ago, and every other case since. For some sharply conflicting views at the same time from the energy corporations, see Tobias Buck and Charles Clover, 'Big Oil Groups Wait to Pick Over Spoils of Iraqi Battlefield', Financial Times, 5 November; Evelyn Iritani and John Daniszewski, 'Iraqi Oil Lies Below Surface of UN Talks', Los Angeles Times, 5 November 2002.

23 'The Push for War', London Review of Books, 3 October 2002.

24 Referring to The National Security Strategy; see note 9.

25 On the assault, see Krugman's regular columns in the New York Times, and many other sources. On the strategy of suppressing socioeconomic issues in favour of security, with a massive propaganda campaign from September 2002 when the congressional campaign opened, see UPI Chief International Analyst Martin Sieff, 'Militarism and the Midterm Elections: White House strategists timed the Iraq war debate to dominate the fall Congressional campaign', American Conservative, 4 November 2002. On the (bare) success of the electoral strategy, see Donald Green and Eric Schickler, 'Winning a Battle, Not a War', New York Times Op-ed, 12 November 2002. The propaganda assault had a major impact on beliefs and attitudes. From September 2002, Iraq was transformed to an imminent threat to the US in the public mind, and the instigator of 9/11, planning further attacks; Christian Science Monitor, CSM-TIPP poll, 14 January 2003, and Linda Feldmann, 'the impact of Bush linking 9/11 and Iraq', Christian Science Monitor, 14 March 2003, also reporting the high correlation of the beliefs fabricated by propaganda and support for the planned war. Note that this closely follows the script of the Reagan-Bush years, when a highly unpopular domestic agenda was implemented while the population was regularly terrified by Libyan hit-men in Washington, an air base in Grenada, the Nicaraguan army two-days marching time from Harlingen Texas, crime and drugs, and other concocted threats, wielded with considerable success. Libya, see Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors, ch. 3; use of Grenada, Necessary Illusions, 176ff.; Nicaraguans on the march to Texas following the 'old Communist slogan that . . . the road to victory leads through Mexico' (Reagan), Stahler-Sholk, 'Extend Actors: Other States', and for detail and richer context, Eldon Kenworthy, 'Selling the Policy', in Thomas Walker (ed.), Reagan versus the Sandinistas (Boulder, CO and London: Westview, 1987); 'drug war', Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, ch. 4; crime-drugs exploitation, Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect -- Race, Crime, and Punishment in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 4ff.

26 See Scott Atran, 'Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,' Science, 299 (7 March 2003), on how the definitions have been reformulated, and why. He notes that the revised definitions still make 'no principled distinction between "terror" as defined by the US Congress and "counterinsurgency" as allowed in US armed forces manuals', one of the perennial problems in defining 'terror' in a doctrinally suitable way.

27 Including Nazi Germany. On the influence of this model for US counter-insurgency doctrine, see Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft (New York: Pantheon, 1992), ch. 3.

28 For review and sources on the first phase of the 'war on terror', in the 1980s, see George, Western State Terrorism. For more detail on US-backed or -implemented terrorist atrocities in the Mideast-Mediterranean regions, see Pirates and Emperors and my Fateful Triangle (Cambridge, MA and London: South End/Pluto, 1983; extended edition 1999); also Necessary Illusions (Cambridge, MA and London: South End/Pluto, 1989). On the reaction in the national media to the success of US international terrorist atrocities in Central America -- which were recognised, even detailed with some pride -- see Deterring Democracy, ch. 10.

29 On US (in some cases also UK) involvement in these crimes, see my New Military Humanism (Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 1999) and A New Generation Draws the Line (London: Verso, 2000); and Stokes's paper. On the origins of 'humanitarian intervention', including the classic essay of John Stuart Mill, see also my 'Peering into the Abyss of the Future', Lakdawala Memorial Lecture, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, Nov. 2001, published by the Institute, February 2002. Mill's essay is highly revealing and should receive careful attention, because of its status as a classic, its source and timing, and its very clear contemporary relevance.

30 A separate question is the mechanisms and sources of the avoidance. One classic study is Orwell's unpublished introduction to Animal Farm on voluntary self-censorship in England, which he attributes in part to a good education, instilling the understanding that there are certain things 'it wouldn't do' to say -- or to think. For the media, Orwell also mentions ownership constraints. Another classic discussion is John Dewey's thoughts on 'how far genuine intellectual freedom and social responsibility are possible under the existing economic regime'. For some discussion of their views, see my World Orders Old and New (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, extended edition 1996), ch. 2. On the long history of what Hans Morgenthau once called the 'conformist subservience to those in power' of intellectuals, see my 1977 Huizinga lecture 'Intellectuals and the State', reprinted in Towards a New Cold War (New York: Pantheon, 1982); Deterring Democracy (ch. 12); my 'Secular Priesthood', in Adriana Belletti, Luigi Rizzi, and N. Chomsky, On Nature and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

31 See my 'Terrorism and Just War', in James Sterba (ed.), Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford: Oxford Univesitry Press, forthcoming), for review of some of the reinterpretations of the record by scholarship on terror. On the earlier record, see several essays in George, Western State Terrorism, and Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston, MA: South End, 1982).

32 Raymond Bonner, New York Times, 28 October 2002.

33 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), International Court of Justice, 27 June 1986. Security Council S/18221, 11 July 1986. On the narrow legal strategy designed by Nicaragua's team, headed by Harvard University Law Professor Abe Chayes, see Paul S. Reichler, 'Holding America to its Best Standards: Abe Chayes and Nicaragua in the World Court', Harvard Law Review. The Court, however, reached far broader conclusions. Reichler presents the Court victory as an important step towards ending the war. That is hard to sustain. It was dismissed and had little effect. For more general context, see Howard Meyer, The World Court in Action (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). Reparations were estimated by an internationally-supervised commission at $17-18 bn. See Nicaraguan Society of Doctors for Peace and the Defense of Life and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), The War in Nicaragua: The Effects of Low-Intensity Conflict on an Underdeveloped Country (Managua and Cambridge MA: MEDIPAZ, 2003). For other estimates, see Deterring Democracy, ch. 10 and Meyers, The World Court in Action. After the US regained control the Nicaraguan government was compelled to drop the issue.

34 State Department Legal Adviser Abram Sofaer, 'The United States and the World Court', US Dept. of State, Current Policy, no. 769, December 1985.

35 General John Galvin, commander of the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), explaining strategy to Congress and the media; see Fred Kaplan, Boston Globe, 20 May, 1987. Also Julia Preston, Washington Post Weekly, 21 September 1987.

36 Americas Watch (now Human Rights Watch), Human Rights in Nicaragua, 1986, February 1987, pp. 144f. Kinsley, Wall St. Journal, 26 March, 1987.

37 For more detail on this affair, see my Culture of Terrorism (Boston, MA: South End, 1988), pp. 43f., 77f. For review of the impact of the US terrorist war on Nicaragua, see Thomas Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th edn. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003); also extensive reports of the main human rights organisations, and the dissident literature, including that cited above. The effects of Reaganite terrorist wars in El Salvador and Guatemala were, of course, much worse; see regular reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, among many other standard sources.

38 Talking points, 1999, cited by Adam Isaacson and Joy Olson, Just the Facts (Latin American Working Group and Center for International Policy, 1999).

39 For a review of editorials and opinion pieces in the national press, see Necessary Illusions, ch. 3.

40 For details, see Jules Benjamin, The United States and Cuba (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 1977); Michael Morley, Imperial State and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). The declassified record, though rich, remains 'heavily sanitized', particularly on covert operations (called 'terrorist' when carried out by others): Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 2002), p. 403.

41 Steven Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution (Athens, OH: Ohio University Centre for International Studies, 2000), p. 216.

42 Morley, Imperial State, p. 95.

43 On the UN record, see Daniele Ganser, Reckless Gamble (New Orleans, LA: University Press of the South, 2000).

44 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 15. The phrase 'terrors of the earth' is Arthur Schlesinger's, referring to the goals of Robert Kennedy, who regarded the terrorist operations as 'top priority', the declassified record reveals. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978).

45 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 26, citing State Department Planning Council, February 1964.

46 Ibid., p. 22.

47 Report to the President on Latin American mission, 2/12 -- 3/3/61, FRUS 1961–63, XII, 13ff, 33.

48 Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 16f.

49 Thomas Paterson, 'Cuba and the Missile Crisis', in Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson (eds.), Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, vol. II: Since 1914 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2000).

50 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, p. 25.

51 See Garthoff, Reflections, on terrorist attacks through the missile crisis, some quite serious; and beyond. See further Morley, Imperial State; Bradley Ayers, The War that Never Was: an Insider's Account of CIA Covert Operations against Cuba (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976); Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish is Red (New York: Harper & Row, 1981); William Blum, The CIA (London: Zed, 1986); Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: a National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992); Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997); David Corn, Blond Ghost (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Taylor Branch and George Crile, 'The Kennedy Vendetta: Our Secret War on Cuba', Harper's, August 1975. By the 1980s, the terrorist attacks were apparently no longer US-sponsored, though still taking place from US territory. Terrorist commanders received presidential pardons over the objections of the Justice Department, which regarded them as a threat to US security. See Juan Tamayo, 'Exiles directed blasts that rocked island's tourism, investigation reveals', Miami Herald, 16 November 1997; Tamayo, MH, 28 September 1997. Ann Louise Bardach and Larry Rohter, 'Key Cuba Foe Claims Exiles Backing'. New York Times, 12 July; 'Life in the Shadows, Trying to Bring Down Castro', New York Times, 13 July 1998. Anya Landau and Wayne Smith, 'Cuba on the terrorist list: In defense of the nation or domestic political calculation', International Policy Report, Center for International Policy, November 2002. For review in the broader context of international terrorism see George, Western State Terrorism.

52 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 332ff. The estimated toll in Angola and Mozambique is 1.5 m dead and over $60 bn in damage during the Reagan years alone, while the Reagan-Bush administration successfully evaded congressional sanctions so as to support its South African ally; at home as well, in its operations against Mandela's ANC, 'one of the more notorious terrorist groups' according to official Washington in 1988. See n. 4. For sources, see 'Terrorism and Just War'.

53 On the aftermath, see Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, Unfinished Business (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

54 Marion Lloyd, 'Soviets close to using A-bomb in 1962 crisis, forum is told' Boston Globe, 13 October; Kevin Sullivan, 'Nuclear War, One Word Away', Washington Post, 14 October 2002.

55 'Neither Consent nor Dissent', American Prospect, 4 November 2002.

56 They are not always ignored in mainstream literature. See the two opening essays (Achin Vanaik, Mahmood Mamdani) in Eric Hershberg and Kevin Moore, Critical Views of September 11 (New York: Social Science Research Council and New Press, 2002). Vanaik objects to the locution 'terrorist state', but on narrow grounds irrelevant here.

57 'A Just War?' (referring to Iraq), Ideas, Boston Globe, 6 October 2002; 'How to Fight a Just War', in Booth and Dunne, Worlds in Collision. Americans, she informs us, are 'nothing if not self-critical, often to the point of self-flagellation'. Much of the world, particularly in the backyard, will also be interested in the discovery that the US has never engaged in the practice of 'unleashing terrorists' or otherwise threatening or harming civilians. One can see why scrupulous avoidance of evidence is highly valued.

58 Abdul Haq, mid-October interview with Anatol Lieven, Guardian, 2 November 2002. Highly regarded in Washington, Abdul Haq received special praise during the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan, his memory bringing tears to the eyes of President Karzai. Elizabeth Rubin, New Republic, 8 July 2002. For this and other important examples of ignored Afghan opinion, see 'Terrorism and Just War'. On world opinion, see the international Gallup poll of late September 2001; <http://www.gallup.international. com/terrorismpoll-figures.html> (data from 14–17 September 2001). The poll was virtually ignored in the US, though not among the victims. See Envío, October 2001.

59 John Burns, New York Times, 16 September 2001; Samina Ahmed, 'The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia: September 11 and Beyond', International Security, 26:3 (Winter 2001–2).

60 Elisabeth Bumiller and Elizabeth Becker, NYT, 17 October 2001. On information publicly available at the time, see my 9–11 (New York: Seven Stories, 2001) and 'Peering into the Abyss of the Future'. Also Rahul Mahajan, The New Crusade (New York: Monthly Review, 2002).

61 J.B. Nielands, G.H. Orians, W.W. Pfeiffer, Alje Vennema, Arthur Westing, Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: Free Press, 1972); Arthur Westing (ed.), Herbicides in War (London: SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, 1984). For detailed analysis of consequences in one region, see Hatfield Consultants (Vancouver), Development of Impact Mitigation Strategies Related to the Use of Agent Orange Herbicide in the Aloui Valley, Vietnam, vol. 1, April 2000.

62 Admiral Sir Michael Boyce informed Afghans that 'the squeeze will carry on until the people of the country themselves recognize that this is going to go on until they get the leadership changed'; Michael Gordon, 'The Strategy; Allies Preparing for a Long Fight as Taliban Dig In', New York Times, 28 October 2001. Previously President Bush had informed the Taliban leadership that he would 'reconsider' the bombing if they handed over people the US accused of terrorism; Patrick Tyler and Elisabeth Bumiller, 'Bush Offers Taliban "2nd Chance" to Yield', New York Times, 12 October 2001.

63 Walter Pincus, 'Mueller Outlines Origin, Funding of Sept. 11 Plot', Washington Post, 6 June 2002. Italics mine.

64 See 9-11. Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 2nd expanded edn. (Monroe, ME: Common Courage, 2003); New Military Humanism, pp. 70f.

65 See Daniel Grann, 'Giving "The Devil" His Due', Atlantic Monthly, June 2001.

66 Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism after Kosovo (Basingstoke: Palgrave Press, 2001), pp. 171f.

67 For a classic case, see n. 29. It is not easy to find an example of military intervention that is not accompanied by lofty rhetoric. See, for example, Sean Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in the Evolving World Order (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996). He cites three examples of alleged 'humanitarian intervention' between the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the UN Charter: Japan's invasion of Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia, and Hitler's takeover of the Sudetenland, all carried out with professions of noble intent.